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PLANNING FOR CRIME PREVENTION
Crime and the fear of crime are issues high in public concern and on political
agendas in most developed countries. This book takes these issues and relates
them to the contribution that urban planners and participative planning processes
can make in response to these problems. Its focus is thus on the extent to which
crime opportunities can be prevented or reduced through the design, planning and
management of the built environment. The perspective of the book is transatlantic
and comparative, not only because ideas and inspiration in this and many other
fields increasingly move between countries but also because there is a great deal
of relevant theoretical material and practice in both the USA and the UK which has
not previously been pulled together in this systematic manner.
The first part of the book looks at the context for understanding ideas and
practice in this field. It introduces the key concepts of place-based crime preven-
tion, and explores what we know both about the nature and scale of crime in the
two countries and about some of the issues surrounding crime statistics. The
second part looks at policy and practice in the USA and the UK, with a full
presentation both of how policy issues are perceived and handled nationally and of
how this translates into practice on the ground via a series of case studies. The
third part of the book makes a more formal comparison between the positions in
the USA and the UK as they have been presented, before drawing some ideas and
lessons out of this material to point the way forward.
This book is for anyone who wants to know about how planning processes
and crime prevention activities can be more effectively integrated. It is essential
reading not just for planning students but also for those in many built environment
and community disciplines, for practitioners in these fields including police and
property development professionals, for politicians interested in this area of public
concern and those who advise them.
Richard H. Schneider is Associate Professor of Urban and Regional Planning at
the College of Design, Construction and Planning, University of Florida, USA and
Graduate Studies Co-ordinator in the Department of Urban and Regional Planning.
Ted Kitchen is Professor of Planning and Urban Regeneration and Director of the
School of Environment and Development at Sheffield Hallam University, England.
THE RTPI Library Series
Editors: Cliff Hague, Heriot Watt University, Edinburgh, Scotland
Robin Boyle, Wayne State University, Michigan, USA
Robert Upton, RTPI, London, UK
Published in conjunction with The Royal Town Planning Institute, this series of
leading-edge texts looks at all aspects of spatial planning theory and practice from
a comparative and international perspective.
The series
• explores the dimensions of spatial planning and urbanism, in relation to
people, place, space and environment;
• develops the theoretical and methodological foundations of planning;
• investigates the relationship between theory and practice;
• examines the contribution of planners to resolving social, economic and
environmental concerns.
By linking planning to disciplines such as economics, anthropology, sociology,
geography, environmental and urban studies, the project’s inherent focus on sus-
tainable development places the theoretical and practical relationships between
social, economic and environmental issues in their spatial context.
Already published:
Planning in Postmodern Times
Philip Allmendinger, University of Aberdeen, Scotland
Planning for Crime Prevention
Richard Schneider, University of Florida, USA, and Ted Kitchen, Sheffield Hallam
University, UK
Forthcoming:
Sustainability, Development and Spatial Planning in Europe
Vincent Nadin, Caroline Brown and Stefanie Duhr, UWE, Bristol, UK
Public Values and Private Interests
Heather Campbell and Robert Marshall
Shadows of Power
Jean Hillier
Planning for Place Identity
Cliff Hague and Paul Jenkins
Urban Planning and Cultural Identity




RICHARD H. SCHNEIDER and
TED KITCHEN
I~ ~?io~;~~n~~~up 
LONDON AND NEW YORK 
First published 2002 by Routledge
The right of Richard H. Schneider and Ted Kitchen to be identified as the Authors of this Work has been
asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988
Typeset in 9.5/13.5 Akzidenz Grotesk by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Schneider, Richard H. (Richard Harold), 1947–
Planning for crime prevention : a transatlantic perspective / Richard H. Schneider and Ted Kitchen.
p. cm. – (The RTPI library series)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
 ISBN 0-415-24136-7 – ISBN 0-415-24137-5 (pbk.)
1. Crime prevention–United States. 2. Crime prevention–Great Britain. 3. City planning–United States.





2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
The Open Access version of this book, available at www.tandfebooks.com, has been made available
 under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.
ISBN 9780415241366 (hbk)
Copyright © 2002 Richard H. Schneider and Ted Kitchen
 Published 2017 by Routledge
To Samantha, Joanna, Amanda and Christopher

CONTENTS
List of figures ix





PART 1 CONTEXT AND KEY IDEAS 1
01 Crime, costs and the quality of life 3
02 Crime trends in the USA and in Britain 29
03 Echoes from the past: caves, castles, citadels, walls and trenches 65
04 Basic theories and principles of place-based crime prevention planning 91
PART 2 POLICY AND PRACTICE 119
05 American policy and practice 121
06 Case studies in North America 155
07 British policy and practice 183
08 British case studies 219
PART 3 COMPARISONS AND KEY ISSUES 259
09 Some Anglo-American comparisons 261





3.1 The Tower of Jericho
3.2 Triangular wood palisade fort at Jamestown, Virginia
3.3 Single curtain wall surrounding a settlement
3.4 Example of motte and bailey construction as a forerunner of
castle construction
3.5 Section of a masonry castle wall
3.6 Example of an arrowhead bastion
3.7 Double curtain walls with open space between the walls
3.8 Hadrian’s Wall stretching from Housesteads across the
English countryside
3.9 Plan view of Housesteads
4.1 Major milestones in the development of place-based crime
prevention theory
5.1 ‘Graffiti and Telephone’
5.2 Pruitt-Igoe
5.3 Pruitt-Igoe demolished
5.4 Washington, D.C. Metro system
6.1 Harbordale, Florida: Base map
6.2 Harbordale, Florida: General crime locations
6.3 Harbordale, Florida’s mangrove spine
6.4 Maintenance disasters
6.5 Counter-intuitive design examples
6.6 Long straight street in a distressed neighbourhood
6.7 Three street calming approaches
6.8 Undefined open spaces in a public housing project
6.9 Open access to the commons (note the tyre tracks)
6.10 Gardens along the fence
7.1 The impact of roller-shutter blinds and doors
7.2 CCTV cameras in Manchester city centre after the IRA bomb
7.3 Key influences on recent British debates about crime and the
design of the built environment
8.1 Location of the eleven Salford service delivery areas































8.3 Hulme photographic essay
9.1 How might crime and the fear of crime be linked?
9.2 Suburban residential units in Perth, Western Australia








2.1 Percentage of crimes reported to the police, 1981 and 
1995
2.2 Percentage of crimes in England and Wales estimated to
have been reported to the police in 1997 in rank order
2.3 Recording of reported crimes by the police in 1995 in the
USA and in England and Wales
2.4 Crime rates per 1,000 population according to police records
and to surveys, USA and England and Wales, 1995
2.5 Key statistics on crime trends, USA, 1981–1996
2.6 Public views about the most important problem facing the
USA in the twenty-first century
2.7 Crime risks by size of urban areas, USA, 1998
2.8 Crime rates by type of area, USA, 1998
2.9 Crime rates by selected family income ranges, USA, 1998
2.10 Crime victim rates by income and by race, USA, 1998
2.11 Recorded crimes per 100,000 population, Sheffield and
Manchester, 1975–1990
2.12 British Crime Survey – numbers of crime incidents (in
thousands), 1981–1999, selected categories and all crimes
2.13 Key statistics on crime trends, Britain, 1981–1999
2.14 Some key components in the geographical distribution of
risks of burglary, 1997
2.15 Proportions of adults who were victims of violence in 1997,
by age and sex
2.16 Proportions of victims of violence victimised more than once
in 1997
2.17 Comparative crime rates, USA and England and Wales
2.18 Comparative crime rates, crimes of violence, USA and
England and Wales
2.19 Crimes per 100,000 people, 1998, from police records for
selected ‘comparator’ countries
2.20 Incarceration rates by race, USA and England and Wales,
1991






















4.2 Connections between defensible space and CPTED
strategies
4.3 Sixteen opportunity-reducing techniques
5.1 Project classification
7.1 Public perceptions of factors affecting the quality of life in
major urban areas
7.2 Public perceptions of safety in major urban areas
7.3 The Architectural Liaison Officer role in the Nottinghamshire
Police
8.1 Key elements within the built environment that influence crime
and anti-social behaviour, according to the Secured by
Design scheme
8.2 SBD guidance – sheltered housing
8.3 SBD guidance – commercial developments
8.4 Hierarchy of vulnerability to crime of house types
8.5 Membership of the Salford Partnership
8.6 Membership of the Salford Crime Reduction Partnership
8.7 1998 Salford Quality-of-Life Survey – Top ten priorities of
Salford residents
8.8 Summary of crime level comparison, Salford service delivery
areas
8.9 Analysis of crime level comparison, Salford service delivery
areas
8.10 Environmental resistance objectives, Salford crime reduction
strategy
8.11 Hulme Development Guide – the kind of place it seeks to
create
8.12 Hulme Development Guide – urban design guidance – ‘The
street’























Richard M. Titus, Ph.D.
National Institute of Justice*
The role of place in crime causation and control has in recent years received
increasing attention from criminologists: routine activity theory and opportunity
theory being two examples. The same can be said for criminal justice practitioners;
examples being crime analysis, crime mapping, problem-oriented policing,
community policing, Weed and Seed, and COMPASS. The situation with planners
and architects is different: as the authors of this text point out, those who create
the environments in which we live, work, play, and travel too often seem to be mini-
mally conscious of how their work can affect the safety of those who use these
environments. And while avoidance of victimisation may not be uppermost in the
minds of those who locate and operate businesses, decide where to live, plan an
evening’s entertainment, etc., it is a factor in all these decisions.
The authors are not arguing an environmental determinism. While thoughtless
planning and architecture can create environments that criminals find to be more
congenial, it does not follow that security-conscious design can eliminate the risk
to people and their property: the authors point out the need for involvement of the
users and managers of these environments, along with public and private security.
The authors are careful to place their recommendations in the context of the
available research and evaluation. They point out that this literature is rather scanty.
Nonetheless, the burden of the evidence they review is that changes in the environ-
ment can lead to reductions in various types of crime. This evidence is difficult to
assess: much of it was accumulated during a period when crime rates – at least in
the USA – were trending downward. It is tempting to assume that the many
environmental crime prevention strategies put in place over the period** may have
contributed to this decline, but if not, it remains to be seen how they will perform if
crime rates rise again.
* For identification only. The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent
policy of the National Institute of Justice or the US Department of Justice
** e.g. the placement of security guards or concierges in the lobbies of almost all downtown
office buildings.
The authors properly urge the reader’s attention to fear as distinct from risk. If
the public’s mental maps of feared places and situations are not congruent with
the actual geographic distribution of risk, planners can analyse the fear as a separ-
ate problem to be addressed. But if they are congruent, it would be improper to
reduce fear without first reducing risk.
The authors indicate that recommendations must be put in the context of the
characteristics of particular settings and actors. If we apply lessons from examples
that are not generalisable to the current situation, the results are not likely to be
satisfactory. The authors also remind us that environmental strategies must be
examined as one of many available strategies. For example, if the crime of concern
is burglary, the strategies might include physical modifications, resident organisa-
tion, victim-centred policing, anti-fencing programmes, and anti-truancy pro-
grammes; all of which have been shown to impact burglary.
Whenever possible we should narrow our focus from ‘crime’ to the specific
crimes of concern at the location of interest. Police crime analysts and crime pre-
vention officers are a resource, but designers can also use available software and
crime data to conduct their own analysis. The stranger-nonstranger dimension will
be an important element in the analysis. For example, place-centred strategies may
have a role to play in the crimes of burglary and domestic violence, but the role is
likely to be quite different in the two cases.
The authors point out that fullest use of available technology for surveillance
and access control is more likely to be found in private space than in public space
– especially in the USA. This gap may well grow larger. For example, parents who
work are already using nannycams over the internet to guard their children from the
office; they can do the same with their residences, perhaps rotating the assign-
ment among adjacent neighbours, or, paying their retiree neighbours to do it. It will
be a continuing challenge to find ways to protect public space with the sophistica-
tion that we bring to bear in private space.
I believe that these authors have done an excellent job with a difficult topic. It




We have chosen to collaborate on this book because we have each seen from our
differing starting points the need for something like this in the available planning
literature. Richard Schneider comes at this with a long-standing academic interest
in crime and environmental design, reinforced by research and practice collabora-
tions with both police and planning professionals in Florida and by a sabbatical
period at UMIST in Manchester in 1995/96 looking at British practice in the field.
Ted Kitchen comes at it very much from the planning practitioner’s perspective,
having tried (if such a grand claim can be made) during his time as City Planning
Officer of Manchester from 1989 to 1995 to make that City’s planning service
more community-orientated and discovering as a result that this field was one of
considerable concern to local communities, if not typically to planners. Both of us
observed from these differing starting points the ways in which these concerns
generated considerable controversy and influenced decisions about the
approaches adopted to the redevelopment of Hulme in Manchester in the early and
mid-1990s, which is one of the case studies in Chapter 8 of this book. And both of
us subsequently, in collaborating on common teaching projects at our two universi-
ties, where we used email exchanges to swap results between our groups of stu-
dents, became aware not only of the absence of much useful textual material for
students and practitioners but also of the need for improved understanding on
both sides of the Atlantic of what was being done and written in the USA and in
Britain before its uncritical application. Hence this book.
Transatlantic writing collaborations are not especially common, and they
bring some fairly obvious difficulties in their wake. The old saw about ‘two nations
divided by a common language’ certainly applies to an endeavour of this nature,
and it was reinforced by an early recognition of the fact that we each had naturally
rather different writing styles. Rather than go for some sort of mid-Atlantic compro-
mise (whatever watery solution that might entail), we decided not to worry about
that but instead to concentrate on covering the agreed ground, adopting broadly
common structures for each chapter, so that at least the approach was common,
and then exchanging drafts for comment as critical friends. So, Richard Schneider
took the lead in respect of Chapters 1 and 3–6 and Ted Kitchen took the lead in
respect of the Introduction and Chapters 2 and 7–10. Ted Kitchen then took
responsibility for ensuring that all the text was in British rather than American
English, it being the view of all the parties to this endeavour that our readers would
benefit from a common approach in these terms. This working method seemed to
work well enough for us without (we hope) submerging the differences both of
styles and of perspectives that must inevitably be part of a transatlantic coopera-
tion. It is, of course, for our readers to judge whether this book achieves its object-
ives and provides a product that they find helpful; but we hope that it does.
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INTRODUCTION
We have two primary objectives in writing this book. The first is to encourage
planners and other professionals to take more seriously the relationship between
crime prevention and the design of the built environment in all its aspects. The
second is to contribute to moves which are trying to push work in this field
towards more evidence-driven approaches, since too often ideas have been
promoted loudly but with very little empirical basis, have waxed in the glow of
fashion for a short period of time, and have then been replaced by something
else with a similar pedigree including the lack of much empirical evidence to
support it. Before going on to describe how we set about these tasks through the
structure of this book, therefore, we would like to introduce these two primary
objectives in a little more detail, because we return to them both on several occa-
sions throughout.
One clearly observable phenomenon from some of the data we will be pre-
senting later is the belief that crime prevention and the fear of crime matter very
much to local citizens when they are considering the quality of life available to them
in the areas where they live, work, shop, send their children to school and spend
their leisure time. We will show how high up scoring systems about public con-
cerns matters of this nature consistently appear in surveys carried out on both
sides of the Atlantic. If planning and other related professional activities concerned
with the quality of the environment are to substantiate claims about being ‘for
people’, then it seems to us that one of the most basic requirements is that they
should address themselves to the concerns of those people in relation to their
environments and not just to the concerns and interests of the professionals them-
selves. And yet, with some clear exceptions, we would assert that the relationships
between planning activities, crime prevention, and the design of the built environ-
ment have not registered as major concerns of planners and indeed typically do
not feature very highly on planning education curricula.
Perhaps one of the reasons for this is that ideas in the field have often been
promoted with dogmatic zeal in some quarters and dismissed as ‘environmental
determinism’ with equal fervour in other quarters, leaving the majority of planners
both confused and with little reliable guidance about these relationships. Our view
is that there is no need to adopt either of these extreme positions to accept that in
some situations and in varying degrees the nature and organisation of the built
environment both have an effect on perceptions on the part of criminals about the
opportunity for crime and on the behaviour of people in the built environment
because of their fear of crime. The likelihood is that these relationships are often
subtle, complex, and variable both in relation to the huge range of forms taken by
the built environment and by the ways in which people perceive and use that
environment. That simple observation should of itself be a sufficient warning
against hard-sold standardised solutions, since if what it says about observable
complexity is true then it is inherently unlikely that externally predetermined
common solutions will fit other than a small fraction of situations on the ground. So
instead of starting from dogmatic and simplistic views about these relationships
(which may indeed be environmentally deterministic), planners and other environ-
mental professionals should study them on the ground, working with local people
to find and implement solutions which are carefully monitored and if need be modi-
fied in the light of that information. That way, planners and others can make an
effective contribution tailored to particular sets of local circumstances to the elimi-
nation or reduction of problems that matter a great deal to local people. In so
doing, they will almost certainly need to get involved in multi-professional partner-
ships, including with the police. Police officers have often in the past had to try to
work on issues to do with crime and the design of the built environment in the
absence of support from other professionals, who do have a considerable amount
of knowledge about environmental design issues (far more than the police usually
do) but have simply tended not to apply it in relation to crime prevention. Increas-
ingly, on both sides of the Atlantic, there is a growing acceptance, including from
many people in the police service, that multi-professional teams are needed in
order to tackle this job effectively rather than leaving it to the police, and that is
also what local citizens need if their wishes and concerns are to be effectively
recognised by professionals. So, we assert that there is both a need and an
opportunity for planners and others to take this issue more seriously and that the
time is overdue for this to happen.
Our second primary objective, to argue for more evidence and less assertion
as the basis for the growth of knowledge and understanding in this field, is in a
sense a corollary of the first. If the relationship between crime and the design of
the built environment is to rise successfully up the planning agenda, this will be not
just because more planners spend more time on the issue, but also because a
great deal of collective learning is taking place and is influencing what they are
actually doing. Our hope is that this will create a virtuous circle, which will also
assist with the problem of getting local people to trust inputs from professionals in
that they will see these as empirically based rather than as driven by professional
dogma. This is particularly important in cases where professional dogmas are seen
by local residents to have been significant contributors to their present problems,
for example in relation to the quality of some of the high-rise public housing that
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has been constructed in the inner city during the past thirty years or so. We say far
more about the need for an empirical approach as we go along throughout this
book, but the single most important thing that needs to happen in this context is for
initiatives to be monitored, appraised and reported on in openly accessible ways.
Modern information technology offers more opportunity to do this than has ever
been the case before, but the really important need is for this opportunity to be
grasped so that we can build up a pool of experiential knowledge of the kind that
to a considerable extent cannot yet be said to exist.
This assertion about the current ‘state of play’ in this field leads us to make
one cautionary statement about what this book is not, before we go on to describe
its contents. We do not wish to mislead readers into expecting that they will find
here a series of ‘recipes’ in a ‘cookbook’ that they can simply go out and apply in a
given set of circumstances. We do not believe that the state of knowledge in the
field at present would support such an approach, even if we felt that it was intellec-
tually justifiable. This may be possible at some time in the future, although we
would doubt that there will ever be a substitute for careful immersion in the local
circumstances working alongside local people. For the present, however, we con-
clude this book, on the basis of the material we present throughout, with a set of
broad propositions which we hope will help planners and other professionals to
begin to think their way into these kinds of situations, but which are not of the ‘this
is what to do’ variety. We believe that this is more helpful to readers in the present
state of knowledge than would be an attempt to construct a ‘how to do it’ manual;
and we hope also that it will encourage readers to see the opportunity through
their own efforts to attempt and to report upon what may be innovative initiatives
which may be both of local value and contribute to the broader growth of experien-
tial knowledge for which we are arguing.
To these ends, this book is divided into three parts, as follows.
PART 1. CONTEXT AND KEY IDEAS
Chapter 1 introduces the relationships between crime, the fear of crime and the
organisation and management of the built environment as major matters affecting
the quality of life.
Chapter 2 discusses recent crime trends in both the USA and in Britain, not just in
terms of overall statistics but also in terms of some of the major distributional
issues that these contain.
Chapter 3 looks at the history of how issues of defensible space have been
handled in relation to human settlements, making the point that much of our appar-
ently contemporary thinking can actually be found throughout this very long story of
human endeavour.
Introduction xxi
Chapter 4 sets out the major principles, ideas and theories that are to be found in
relation to this field.
PART 2. POLICY AND PRACTICE
Chapter 5 looks at policy and practice in the USA, showing the extent to which in
that society most of what has been done to date has been a function of local initi-
ative rather than of central direction.
Chapter 6 then looks in more detail at a small number of informative case studies
in the USA, to demonstrate something of what has actually been happening on the
ground.
Chapter 7 looks at policy and practice in Britain, and in particular at the growth in
recent years of a strong central policy direction to work in this field.
Chapter 8 then looks in more detail at a small number of case studies in Britain,
again chosen to try to illustrate in some detail something of the range of initiatives
taken in recent years.
PART 3. COMPARISONS AND KEY ISSUES
Chapter 9 makes some formal comparisons between the USA and Britain in terms
of the matters covered in the previous eight chapters, since a feature of this
particular book is that it is strongly transatlantic in its perspectives.
Chapter 10 then draws together some key principles which we believe help to
point the way forward in this field, and discusses some of the key research issues
that we would wish to see given a degree of priority in the coming years.
The transatlantic perspectives that we have adopted are, we believe, both a
distinguishing and an important feature of this book. They are distinguishing in the
quite literal sense that it is unusual for American and British academic authors to
cooperate on this type of book. And we believe that transatlantic perspectives are
important because the literature and the ideas that are used in the field tend to be
treated as being common between the two societies, without much acknowledge-
ment both of the similarities and of the differences that ought to be understood if
we are to make full and effective use of this heritage. Both societies have also in
recent years seen a considerable number of new initiatives, some of which have
borrowed from each other without formal attribution or apparent awareness of the
contextual differences affecting their application, and we believe that this will only
achieve its full potential as a rich learning opportunity if we understand both the
similarities and the differences between the two societies before seeking to borrow
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and apply ideas uncritically. We hope, therefore, that this book makes a worthwhile
contribution in these terms, as well as achieving the two objectives we have
described in this introduction.
We hope that this approach will mean that a wide range of potential readers
will find this book helpful and interesting. Clearly, a book which takes as its title
‘Planning for Crime Prevention’ is aiming particularly at planning students and plan-
ning practitioners, and thus we address much of what we have to say to the
planning community. But, to purloin a phrase, planning is far too important to
be left just to the planners, and so we hope that many of the professionals in
other fields who work with planners or whose activities are affected by the
planning process such as architects and civil engineers will also find something
here to challenge and stimulate them. In particular, we hope that people in or inter-
ested in the police service will find the perspectives presented here of value, not
least because we believe that the way forward in this field requires much stronger
partnerships between police and built environment professionals based upon
mutual respect for each other’s contributions. We hope also that participants in the
property development process will find useful material in these pages, because
their decisions will make a real difference (for good or ill) to outcomes on the
ground in many of the areas we discuss. Since much of this is about matters of
legitimate public policy concern, we hope that politicians with an interest in this
field and those that advise them will find the contents of this book a stimulus to
think through the policy frameworks they create or enable that provide the context
for action on the ground. And, last but not least, we hope that some community
groups and individuals who are interested in crime prevention and other civic
improvement initiatives in their localities, and recognise that this will require them to
work alongside a range of professionals, will find some help and encouragement in
these pages. This is a large and quite diverse potential audience; but then, this is a
field in which a lot of people have a part to play.
We wholly accept, of course, that readers from these various audiences will
have different reasons for looking at a book of this nature, and will wish to get dif-
ferent things out of this experience. While we hope some readers will stay with us
from start to finish, we acknowledge that many will want to read particular chapters
for particular purposes and skip material that is of lesser interest to them. We
therefore offer the following ‘route map’, in the hope that this will help readers to
find the material in which they are most interested.
Chapter 1 is a general introduction to the key themes of the book, and will be
familiar ground to readers already aware of the major relationships at work here.
Chapter 2 goes into a certain amount of detail about crime statistics and trends in
the USA and in Britain and can be passed over by those not interested in this
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issue, but it also contains some important messages about crime data which
should be understood by anyone who wishes to make use of this material.
Chapter 3 is an historical chapter, presented at this level of detail partly because it
is a fascinating story not usually told like this in the literature, and partly because it
demonstrates that many of our contemporary ideas actually have their roots in
earlier periods when defending cities from attacks from outside rather than crime
from within was the primary concern. Readers not interested in the history of this
could skip this chapter.
Chapter 4 in effect brings the story begun in Chapter 3 up to date, by presenting
the emergence of ideas in the twentieth century about the relationships between
crime prevention and the design and organisation of the built environment. We
think that this is a critical chapter to the development of an understanding of the
arguments we are presenting in this book.
Chapters 5 and 6 present material on policy and practice in the USA, with the
former having more of a broad policy focus and the latter having a case-study
focus. Clearly, readers who are particularly interested in US policy and practice
can go straight to these pages and those who are not interested in how these
issues are tackled in the USA can skip these chapters, but we feel that an under-
standing of what is happening on the ground is an essential complement to the
ideas presented in Chapters 1 and 4. This comment also applies to Chapters 7
and 8, since the USA and the UK are two of the world’s leading open societies
that are experimenting in this field.
Chapters 7 and 8 present the UK equivalents of the material on the USA in Chap-
ters 5 and 6, and so the same comments mutatis mutandis apply here also.
Chapter 9 is a comparison of policy and practice in the USA and the UK organised
around key themes, and it is in our judgement essential to developing an under-
standing of the transatlantic perspective that is a central feature of this book.
Chapter 10 presents what we feel we can say about the way forward with a
degree of confidence on the basis of what we currently know, and so we would
hope that all readers whatever their interests in previous chapters would look at
and reflect on our conclusions.
We hope that this ‘route map’ demonstrates that there is useful material here for
each of the groups we see as being amongst our audience, and that it helps
readers to find what they are looking for quickly.
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PART 1
CONTEXT AND KEY IDEAS

CHAPTER 1
CRIME, COSTS AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE
Introduction
For urban planners and designers, police, policy makers and a growing number of
citizens, the concept of ‘quality of life’ has become increasingly important as a
defining measure of the health of cities and the societies of which they are a part.
In this chapter we discuss crime and the fear of crime as key factors directing the
choices that citizens make and as these choices affect the quality of life in Britain
and in the United States. Towards that end:
• we explore the implications that basic questions of safety have for ourselves
and our families relative to urban places, the fundamental building blocks of
British and American cities. We review definitions of the component ele-
ments of crime prevention planning, focusing on measures of programme
success in reducing crime and the fear of crime.
• we consider the theoretical predicates of crime prevention, through origins in
the classical, positivist, sociological and modern schools of criminology. In so
doing, we focus particularly on offender and environment-based approaches
as related to traditional and emerging models of crime prevention.
• we review the impacts that crime has had on the quality of life of citizens in
Britain and the United States, noting citizens’ responses to crime and the fear
of crime in residential, shopping, recreational and employment choices. Since
crime is a major expense to both nations, we review some of the relative
costs of crime as estimated by recent national studies.
• beyond mere statistical measures, we explore the role crime has in driving
citizen choices, noting that these have important impacts on the viability and
liveability of large metropolitan areas in the United States and Britain. We
suggest that a primary role of urban planning is to increase the range of
choices available to citizens, while crime and the fear of crime have the
opposite effects. Despite that, we note that crime prevention planning has
been understated in the traditional planning and urban design literature and
in available coursework, even though, as we see in Chapter 2, it is consis-
tently at or near the top of concerns stated by citizens in repeated national
polls. We conclude with a summary that attempts to integrate the multiple
concepts expressed in this chapter and pave the way for future research and
practice.
‘Is it Safe?’
As every parent knows who has ever sent a child off to live away from home,
whether for a day or a semester, the fundamental questions asked are: ‘Is it safe
where you’ll be living? Is the neighbourhood a high crime area? Is there adequate
street lighting? Are the doors strong, the windows secure? Will there be parents
or guardians to watch over you?’ We put such questions to our loved ones (and to
ourselves) countless times in our lives. Often, the answers we get flow from gut
feelings, from casual observations, from impressions based on newspaper reports,
from speaking with friends and relatives, or infrequently, from police statistics or
from survey data. While those responses may be sufficient to guide the average
citizen’s choices in answering the question ‘Is it safe?’, they are rarely helpful in
understanding ‘How can we make places safer?’
We generally look to the police to make places safe. Until victimised, and
perhaps not even after then, most citizens never consider the role that others may
play – urban planners and designers, architects, environmental and behavioural sci-
entists – in making places safer by preventing future crime. Moreover, most people
never consider the linkage between the design and management of the physical
environment and crime prevention. But there is a growing body of evidence to
show that these are indeed connected. This book explores those connections by
reviewing the theory and application of crime prevention planning to places in
Britain and in the United States. Our intent is to understand where we are in the
struggle to make places safer for ourselves and our loved ones.
We are particularly concerned with how much of what we believe about
environmental crime prevention is based upon reasonable empirical research, and
the implications of proceeding with crime prevention interventions in the absence
of such validation. Our concern therefore is that the development of crime preven-
tion policy be evidence-driven (Van Dijk, 1997), and that planners and other pro-
fessionals concerned with the urban environment take more of a role in policy
making and application processes.
In developing those themes, our first task is to characterise the concepts that
we use throughout the book.
Definitions
The Oxford English Dictionary defines crime as ‘an act punishable by law, as being
forbidden by statute or injurious to the public welfare’ (1982, page 603). Recog-
nising that each nation defines crime differently within their criminal codes, we are
primarily concerned with those crimes that national surveys in Britain and the
United States tell us citizens fear the most: ‘stranger to stranger’ personal and
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property crimes, such as assault, robbery, burglary and car-related burglary and
theft. We understand nevertheless that there are other serious offences, such as
rape and murder, that citizens fear, as well as many minor crimes that affect
peoples’ quality of life, such as vandalism and public incivilities. We do not address
‘white collar’ crimes, such as fraud, or the rapidly emerging field of cyber-crime.
While burdensome to individuals and costly to society, these crimes have a struc-
ture that generally defies place-specific analysis as characterised here. Neverthe-
less, of the vast numbers of crimes in Britain and the United States – 14.7 million
crimes against adults living in private households in 1999 according to the 2000
British Crime survey (Home Office, 2000b) and 28.8 million in the United States
during 1999 according to the National Crime Victimisation Survey (Bureau of
Justice Statistics, 2000) – there is a growing body of evidence that many are
indeed amenable to interventions based on the environmental, place-based crime
prevention techniques discussed in this text. Case studies presented in Chapters
5–8 suggest that the commission of property crimes (which in both nations consti-
tute the vast majority of crime), as well as some types of violent crimes, are sensi-
tive to some design or planning-based crime prevention interventions. That being
said, there remain a wide variety of crimes (non-stranger-to-stranger homicides,
drug possession, child abuse, many types of sex offences) and annoyances (loud
music, on-street begging), not always rising to the level of crimes, that present
themselves within the urban context that are not, on the surface at least, suscepti-
ble to such interventions.1
Crime prevention has been defined many ways by many different public
agencies and scholars. One such definition is:
a pattern of attitudes and behaviour directed both at reducing the threat of
crime and enhancing the sense of safety and security, to positively influence the
quality of life in our society and to help develop environments where crime
cannot flourish (NCPC, 1997, page 2).
Another definition of crime prevention conceives it as ‘the anticipation, recog-
nition and appraisal of a crime risk and the initiation of some action to remove or
reduce it’ (NCPI, 1986), and yet another envisions it as efforts ‘to reduce the risks of
criminal events and related misbehaviour by intervening in their causes’ (Ekblom,
1997, page 251). While useful, none of the above definitions clearly grapples with
what has emerged in recent years as a powerful doctrine applied to almost all
private endeavours and to most tax-payer financed programmes on both sides of the
Atlantic: the focus on the results of activities, as distinct from processes and intents.
No matter how laudable programme goals or strivings are, politicians, admin-
istrators, and citizens have in the last decade increasingly demanded that agencies
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actually deliver on promises to make life better and, in the case of crime prevention,
to make places safer. As noted by practitioners and scholars for over almost two
decades (Poyner, 1983; Sherman et al., 1997), we have been awash in the widely
publicised good intentions of crime prevention programmes in institutional settings
ranging from communities to criminal justice agencies,2 yet we often lack the most
basic verifications to support the claims being made.
Perhaps because it has been difficult to separate the reality from the ‘hype’
there is widespread public cynicism about crime prevention measures. However,
contrary to popular sentiment, there is growing international evidence that many
types of crime prevention interventions actually work, and that they are more cost
effective than conventional, ‘punitive’ measures (UN Commission on Crime Preven-
tion and Criminal Justice, 1999). In spite of this, many crime prevention programme
results have often not been assessed against crime reduction goals, or are simply
not measurable. This is the case despite the emergence of relatively powerful ana-
lytical tools and techniques in recent years, and renewed interest by British and
American policy makers in the value of crime prevention planning, especially as
related to places.
For these reasons, we propose an amended version of Ekblom’s straight-
forward definition above, suggesting that crime prevention is ‘efforts to reduce the
risks of criminal events and related misbehaviour by intervening in their causes so
as to effect measurable changes in crime occurrence or the fear of crime.’
We consider ‘places’ as important since they are a fundamental component
of both the criminal event3 and the environment of cities. According to Paul J. and
Patricia L. Brantingham, the architects of environmental criminology:
A crime is a complex event. A crime occurs when four things are in
concurrence: a law, an offender, a target, and a place. Without a law there is no
crime. Without an offender, someone who breaks the law, there is no crime.
Without some object, target, or victim, there is no crime. Without a place in time
and space where the other three come together, there is no crime. These four
elements – law, the offender, the target, and the place – can be characterised
as the four dimensions of crime (1981, page 7).
The physical environment in which crime occurs, and places in particular, his-
torically has been overlooked as a focus of crime prevention by citizens and acade-
mics, with much more attention directed to offenders, to community economic and
social conditions, and to the criminal justice system. But the relation of place to
crime has become increasingly important: recent research demonstrates that in
many cities relatively small numbers of places account for disproportionate
numbers of crimes and that we can predict these ‘hot spots’ based on past calls
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for service by the police (Taylor, 1997; Sherman, 1995). In this context a leading
American researcher has suggested that since ‘future crime is six times more pre-
dictable by the address of the occurrence than by the identity of the offender, why
aren’t we doing more about it? Why aren’t we thinking more about ‘wheredunit’,
rather than just ‘whodunit’?’ (Sherman, 1995, pages 36–7).
To assist us in that regard, we adopt a modified version of Eck’s (1997) char-
acterisation, and define place as ‘. . . a small area containing a relatively restricted
range of functions, potentially controlled by a single owner and often identifiable as
a distinct physical entity within the community’. In this concept, places range from
small (micro) scale environments, such as a street corner or a bus stop, to medium
(meso) scale areas, such as a shopping centre or industrial park, to large (macro)
scale areas, such as a neighbourhood. They do not include cities. Rather, places
are the building blocks of cities and as such, are – or should be – of central
concern to urban planning and design. While modern planning in Britain and the
United States includes social, political and economic dimensions, it has a long-
established interest in the spatial and physical environment of cities that argues for
the importance of places as a legitimate focus of study.4 The responsibility to make
some sense of the vast numbers of discrete places that together comprise a city
falls to planners and urban designers, patching together the puzzle through plans
that aim at ‘rationality and comprehensiveness’ (a Sisyphean quest at best). In the
struggle to do this, planners learn the importance of moving between physical
scales – from the smallest place to the entire city – and balancing the political,
social and economic interests that attend to each.
Although many competing definitions of planning exist, we prefer Friedmann
and Hudson’s version as ‘centrally concerned with the linkage between knowledge
and organised action’ (Friedmann and Hudson, 1974; Friedmann, 1987) adding
our own coda, that it is aimed at influencing future activities and events that mea-
surably improve the quality of life.5 Urban planning is thus a forward-thinking
process compatible with our notion of crime prevention that is, or should be,
results-oriented to the maximum extent possible.
Moreover, planning and urban design professionals in Britain and the United
States have public benefit criteria at the core of their ethical commitments (Royal
Town Planning Institute, 2000; American Planning Association, 1992) and are
obligated to safeguard the public health, safety and general welfare, a charge
made explicit in the United States through legal precedent as well as common
consent. In this sense, we conceive of safety as encompassing citizens’ rights
to be free from crime and the fear of crime, as well as their being protected
against flood, fire, disease or injurious land use changes. That being said, we are
well aware of the problems of measuring the impacts of crime prevention and plan-
ning applications, as both have numerous intangible dimensions that are not
Crime, costs and the quality of life 7
subject to unquestioned or easy quantification. Evaluative schemes range from
those that employ the most rigorous and technical scientific methodologies to
those that are simple, after the fact, assessments of how people feel about a
particular planning or crime prevention intervention. Both genres have their place in
understanding these very complex subjects, although we would argue that the
strength and generality of conclusions must be supported by the rigour and appro-
priateness of the methods. Further, we are also mindful of the problem suggested
by some that:
performance indicators and benchmarking have become the latest industry.
Many in local government feel they are spending all their time producing
indicators and monitoring performance, and not performing (Royal Town
Planning Institute, 13 October 2000).
Nevertheless, our fundamental notion is that effective place-based crime pre-
vention planning should be knowledge rather than wish-based wherever feasible,
and that the solutions suggested inform and increase citizen choices so that they
enhance the quality of their own lives and those of their loved ones. We concen-
trate on Britain and the United States since, as two of the world’s leading open
societies, they have played major roles in the development of the place-based
crime prevention planning strategies – defensible space, crime prevention through
environmental design, situational crime prevention and environmental criminology
– that comprise the focus of this book.6 Moreover, while comparisons between
nations are fraught with difficulties, we believe that there is sufficient compatibility
of culture, language, history and core values that make this a worthwhile endeav-
our, and that we can and often do learn from each other’s experiences because of
(and some would say despite) these similarities.
The Consequences of Choices
The judgements we make based upon information about safe and unsafe places
guide many fundamental life choices in Britain and in the USA. Some places,
whether they are certain neighbourhoods, apartment buildings, corridors within
buildings, parks, street corners or schools ‘look’ or ‘feel’ safer than others. Our
friends tell us that they are ‘good’ places to live or work or shop or travel through
and the authorities report that crime there is rare. We shun those places that we
suspect to be unsafe and tend not to spend our resources or time there.
These decisions have enormous consequences for us personally and for
entire nations. They are particularly consequential to large, open societies such as
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Britain and the USA where the marketplace of individual choice-making has been
valued for centuries. While British and American cultures have long prized the
good sense of ordinary people to make their own judgements – many based on
perceptions as distinct from ‘reality’ – about everything from politics to their own
personal safety, such judgements have benefits and costs. The net result of this
calculation about the safety of places can mean that individuals may become
trapped at home, businesses may fail, neighbourhoods may deteriorate, and entire
communities may be consigned to poverty and despair. Just as the separate pieces
ultimately combine to complete a puzzle, places matter to the integrity of the city,
and perceptions of crime, whether based on real or imagined incidents, affect the
value of each place and subsequently, the viability of neighbourhoods, cities and
entire societies. Minneapolis–St Paul Metropolitan Council Chair, Curt Johnson
says:
fear of crime is a very real and powerful force. It can shape people’s
preferences about where they live and work and influence market demand for
housing and commercial development. The stakes are high. If we, as a region,
fail to address issues related to crime, real and perceived, we will be turning our
backs on some of our historically liveable neighbourhoods, and, eventually,
putting our region’s economy at risk (Minneapolis–St Paul Metropolitan Council,
1997).
The assumption inherent in all this is that people do indeed have a range of
options to choose from, as well as the ability actually to make a choice among
those options. But we know that options and choice-making abilities are limited for
many citizens, and especially for the poor wherever they live and for those in dis-
tressed neighbourhoods in urban centres. As the statistics show us in Chapter 2,
these are the citizens who tend to have the most to fear from crime. Without
wishing to appear elitist, we contend that it is precisely these individuals who are in
the greatest need of place-based crime prevention planning and urban design
assistance and advice, as the wealthy can and do fend for themselves and are able
to create options and decide among them. This makes the roles and responsibil-
ities of planners and urban designers all the more significant, inasmuch as they
have a central public-interest role in the creation of safe and liveable urban places
for and, most importantly, with those citizens who are least prosperous and who
may be unwilling or unable to speak for themselves. With this social imperative in
mind, the crime prevention planning approaches discussed in this book suggest a
range of physical design and management theories and strategies aimed at mitigat-
ing real and perceived crime in places – the primary structural elements of our
societies.
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Theoretical Predicates of Crime Prevention:
Offenders and Environments
Chapter 7 details British thinking, through the 1990s to now, about the interrelated
themes of crime prevention policy centring on offenders, victims, environment and
the community. The same themes can be said to characterise the range of Amer-
ican policy response to crime prevention across a wide variety of public agencies,
as discussed in more detail in Chapters 5 and 6. Historically, in both nations crime
prevention policy has flowed from choices among increased punishments and/or
treatment of the offender, treatment of the offender’s social-economic conditions
or hardening targets – more locks, stronger windows, doors and other environ-
mental interventions. These choices and the modern themes they have come to
represent, can be brought together into two general approaches, one emphasising
offenders and the other emphasising environments. Adopting these approaches is
in no way intended to minimise the plight of victims; we suggest rather that there is
reasonable empirical justification to suggest that physical environments have a
good deal to do with victimisation (Spelman and Eck, 1989; Spelman, 1995),
which may properly be considered to fall within the environmental approach, as
within sociological, economic or psychological approaches. Indeed, inasmuch as
victims can be considered as ‘targets’ of crime, they are central to the theory and
practice of place-based crime prevention.
While the police can be said to have a place in both offender and environ-
mental approaches to crime control, their roles as agents of environmental crime
prevention have only within the last four decades generally emerged as a central
concern in both theory and practice; traditionally far more emphasis has been
placed on duties in investigation and apprehension (NCPI, 1986). This trend is
demonstrated by recent national legislation in both Britain and the United States,
such as the 1994 Crime Act, which created the Community Oriented Policing Ser-
vices (COPS) programme in the USA, and the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act in
Britain, which requires community level partnerships focusing much more attention
on the link between policing and local (physical and social) environments than has
previously been the case. We therefore include the police within the context of our
discussion of contemporary environmental approaches.
While there is evidence to support the use of both offender and environ-
mental approaches in developing strategies to prevent crime, there is also an
increased understanding that apparently obvious remedies in both contexts can
also produce negative and unintended effects and that new empirically based
approaches are essential.
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Punishment of Offenders as Crime Prevention
Perhaps the most traditional societal approach to crime prevention is punishment.
While the biblical injunction prescribing ‘an eye for eye, tooth for tooth’ (Leviticus,
Chapter 24) has long been championed as an effective preventative approach, its
true crime deterrent value also has been argued for centuries. For instance, Waller
(2000) reports that in the four decades between 1680 and 1720 the number of
crimes that warranted the death penalty in England soared from approximately
eighty to more than 350. ‘Indeed, there are so many that no one can be absolutely
sure what you can or cannot be hanged for’ (page 309). However,
No one could have failed to notice that the severity of the law for offences
against property was having little effect in stemming the rising tide of crime. As
Cesar de Saussere observed: ‘Executions are frequent in London . . .
notwithstanding this, there are in this country a surprising number of robbers.
They may be classed in three divisions – highwaymen, foot pads, and
pickpockets, all very audacious and bold’ (page 315).
These observations were obviously lost on eighteenth century crime theorists of
the classical school, such as utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1962), who
argued that the deterrent effect of the fear of punishment was the best crime pre-
vention tool (Hart, 1968). Basic tenets of this conception were that offenders act
rationally and out of free will and that punishment was intended to punish the
offence, rather than the offender.7 Moral and legal principles guided this early
branch of criminology in its attempt to protect the rights of the accused and stan-
dardise punishments.
Laudable as these sentiments were, the effectiveness of punishment as crime
prevention remains questionable. Police Chief of Salt Lake City, Utah, Ruben
Ortega, recently noted that ‘I have locked up more people than I care to count . . .
we cannot jail our way out of this’ (Calhoun, 2000). This is a common refrain of law
enforcement and other public officials across both sides of the Atlantic; and it is
made all the more vexing by public attitudes that lay the vast majority of crime pre-
vention responsibility squarely on the abilities of the police to apprehend offenders
and on the criminal justice system’s role to punish them. A recent United Nations’
report notes growing disillusionment with the effectiveness of punitive measures,
inasmuch as:
Recidivist rates of ex-prisoners are almost universally very high (above fifty per
cent). In many parts of the world crime rates have continued to go up since the
sixties . . . in spite of considerable extra investments in law enforcement,
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prosecution, courts and prisons. This situation has led to a world-wide search for
innovative, alternative approaches (UN Commission on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice, 1999, pages 5–6).
Environmental design and related place-based crime prevention approaches
are among those innovative strategies that are being increasingly ‘discovered’ as
cost-effective and practical answers. They are receiving more attention since they
are generally politically neutral, divert potential offenders away from the formal crim-
inal justice apparatus, and tend to emphasise ‘self-help’ strategies that do not
necessarily rely on governmental intervention or resources. However, they are not
nearly as dramatic to the media and political opportunists as locking up criminals,
or as personally emphatic as bolting the doors or windows shut. Moreover, environ-
mental design does not pretend to treat what many conceive as the ‘root’ causes
of crime – offenders’ psychological temperament or socio-economic conditions.
Treatment as Crime Prevention
The concept of treatment as crime prevention flows out of the positivist school of
criminology which developed in the early 1800s and became rooted in British
empiricism, Darwinian determinism and Comte’s sociological determinism (Jeffrey,
1977). It focused not on the legal and moral aspects of crime and punishment –
which the positivists rejected out of hand – but on sociological, psychological and
biological aspects of crime. It was, in short, a ‘scientific’ approach to crime control.
Proponents of this approach concentrated on the offender, not on the offence,
hoping that treatment would rehabilitate him. Under this scheme, crime could best
be addressed by ‘healing’ the criminal, rather than punishing him; this ultimately
gave rise to the modern concept of the correctional system. Its guidance as to
crime prevention is thus primarily directed to causes within the individual and to his
treatment and ultimate redemption through rehabilitation.
This theory indirectly influenced the sociological school of criminology that
developed in the United States in the 1920s, which also suggested that crime pre-
vention was best achieved through treatment rather than punishment. However, in
this model, largely developed by theorists at the University of Chicago, it was the
offenders’ sociological and economic environments that required treatment, since
the ‘root causes’ of crime were seen to stem from inadequacies in these. Although
its adherents used such spatial and ecological terms as city ‘sectors, rings and
zones’ (Park et al., 1925; Shaw, 1969), it is clear that this school of thought was
concerned with the social and economic fabric of crime rather than its physical
environment (Michelson, 1976).
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In that light, emphasis was directed away from punishment or rehabilitation as
crime prevention and toward the repair of underlying social ills, such as the lack of
employment or the negative influences of juvenile gangs in the neighbourhood.
While these strategies are used in Britain and the United States today, they are
seen as part and parcel of a wider package of crime prevention measures, none of
which monopolise public funding or academic research to the exclusion of the
others. Indeed, the growing trend toward crime prevention partnerships at local
levels among a variety of agencies, from the police to health services, employing a
range of approaches demonstrates the attraction of this multi-faceted strategy in
present day Britain and the United States.
However, in its heyday during the 1930s–1950s, public remedies to crime
suggested by the sociological theorists tended to drive out other strategies, espe-
cially in the United States. At the core of this conception was an urban form
shaped by competition for space, with resulting ecological zones carved out by
various economic and social groups. Within each niche one could ostensibly
predict individual and group behaviours, and thus the propensity toward crime as a
function of the social organisation (and disorganisation) found therein. While
research on the uneven spatial distribution of crime in England had been charted
since the rookeries were documented by Mayhew in the 1860s, the social ecolo-
gists went well beyond descriptive statistics and maps, and their views became the
prevailing paradigm in academia and in government circles. For the most part,
however, these theories remain controversial, especially when applied to small
areas within American cities. The zonal hypotheses also proved particularly prob-
lematic in predicting patterns of criminal residence in England, where large-scale
public housing projects redistributed en masse the populations from which offend-
ers were more likely to come from city centres to city outskirts (Brantingham and
Brantingham, 1981).
Target Treatment as Crime Prevention
Target hardening treats the place where crime occurs as opposed to the offender
or their socio-economic surroundings. As such it is both a forerunner and compo-
nent of contemporary environmental crime prevention planning. Target hardening
increases the efforts that offenders must expend to reach their intended rewards
by making them more difficult to attain. As a long-established approach to crime
prevention, its development can be traced back to the beginnings of civilisation, as
we discuss in Chapter 3, and may be found across a wide range of applications,
from the construction of communal devices such as city walls and gates to the
strengthening of entryways by individual property owners. In both Britain and the
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United States, target hardening has been time-honoured advice given out by police
agencies, and a wealth of standards for locks, doors and window fittings have
been produced to guide builders and residents in implementing it.
While studies support its effectiveness as a crime prevention tool, target
hardening can create counterintuitive results, as when designers fortify structures
inspiring fear and repulsion which counterbalance security intents. A recent
example of this is the problem of hardening embassies against terrorist attacks. A
Los Angeles Times article notes that newly fortified and remotely located American
embassies ‘were forbidding to foreign residents and that the precautions pre-
vented US diplomats from coming into contact with the citizens of the countries
they were supposed to be observing’ (Kempster and Meisler, 1998). This is clearly
not the message that open societies want to convey to the rest of the world.
Another example, offered by Tim Pascoe (from the UK’s Building Research Estab-
lishment) in the course of commenting on an earlier draft of this book, is of the resi-
dent who, disturbed by the possibility of burglary, fits new but inappropriate locks
to his front door, thereby structurally weakening it. The end result is to enhance
rather than diminish the likelihood of a burglar’s success, certainly a counterintu-
itive effect.
In Britain, target hardening of individual properties has been one of the major
criteria that police use in presenting ‘Secure By Design Awards’ to residential and
commercial estates. However, British research on offenders’ decision making has
shown that the choice of which residences to burgle is largely based on environ-
mental cues gathered from the periphery of the target area (e.g. at the entrance to
the neighbourhood), as distinct from the target itself, no matter how well fortified it
was (Pascoe, 1993a). In the United States, other studies have provided only
limited confirmation that protective devices and target hardening are important in
protecting properties from burglaries (DeFrances and Titus, 1993). Moreover,
there is evidence that builders are concerned that target hardening may in fact
lessen the attractiveness and marketability of developments (Hoare, 1995). Target
hardening strategies, as part and parcel of environmental crime prevention gener-
ally, also have been criticised as encouraging crime displacement rather than
actual crime prevention, a subject we shall return to in Chapter 4.
All the above approaches are streams flowing out of traditional approaches
to crime prevention that, while variably effective, have demonstrable shortcomings
in modern application. They illustrate the point that no matter how obvious the solu-
tions may appear to be, there are no simple answers to problems as complex as
crime prevention. This has become increasingly clear as theory and practice have
moved from a priori reasoning to empirical testing over the last three hundred years
and have adapted modern technological and analysis techniques to crime and
crime prevention.8
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Environments: Contemporary Place-Based Crime
Prevention
Contemporary place-based crime prevention planning owes debts to both tradi-
tional punishment and target hardening conceptions described above, and –
despite the protestations of some criminologists (Jeffrey, 1977) – to the social
ecologists as well. Punishment, though debatable as to effect, makes the core
assumption that potential offenders make rational choices; target hardening
extends that logic by suggesting that increasing the efforts required to reach a
reward will deter offenders, who are presumed to be rational. Although they domin-
ated the crime prevention debate for years, social ecologists helped stir interest
during the 1960s and 1970s in geographical themes relative to socio-pathologies
and spin-off theories that stressed spatial variables, and ultimately the physical
environment in which crime occurs.
As one result, physical places started to become important in and of them-
selves, and not merely as receptacles of socio-economic variables. Moreover,
besides their physical design, attention also became focused on how places were
used and managed, so that modern crime prevention theory has come to incorpo-
rate holistic conceptions about opportunity, risk, efforts and reward as part of the
overall picture of the situational nature of the criminal event (Clarke, 1997).
Writings of social critics, and research conducted by behavioural scientists
(and especially early environment-behaviour scientists), architects and criminolo-
gists provided positive, though not unquestioned, support for the concept that the
physical environment influenced human behaviour generally and could be a ‘crim-
inogenic’ (crime-causing) factor in particular (Hall, 1959; Lynch, 1960; Jacobs,
1961; Newman, 1973; Jeffrey, 1977; Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981;
Sommer, 1983; Coleman, 1990; Clarke, 1997). We discuss some of their specific
contributions relative to the development of place-based crime prevention in
Chapter 4, but suffice to say for now that, because of their pioneering work, crime
prevention interventions into the design and management of the physical environ-
ment have been largely legitimised.
Indeed, one such place-based approach – Crime Prevention Through
Environmental Design (CPTED) – is now widely accepted by police agencies in
the United States and Britain as a crime prevention strategy, even though it is
much less well known among or applied by planners and urban designers. Its advo-
cates hold that ‘the physical environment can be manipulated to produce behav-
ioural effects that will reduce the incidence and fear of crime, thereby improving
the quality of life’ (Crowe, 2000, page 34). Although implicit in the long history of
target hardening, this connection is, as we have seen, relatively new to criminology
and to applied crime prevention. Recognition of explicit and systematic linkages
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among environment, behaviours, crime and the quality of life are also relatively
recent phenomena in academic and government circles.
Crime and the Quality of Life in Britain and the
United States
Systematic British assessments of the quality of life in cities are probably traceable
to Booth’s survey of East London in the 1880s, one of the earliest social surveys
(Booth, 1888). A range of societal health indicators has been in wide usage in the
United States since the 1930s when Baltimore journalist H. L. Mencken published
a series of articles ranking the quality of life in American cities and states based on,
among other variables, infant mortality, house price, crime rates, education and
income levels. Since these early efforts British and American social scientists and
pollsters have developed many such measures to produce ‘community bench-
marks’, ‘sustainability indicators’ or ‘quality of life indices’. In particular, the elabora-
tion of indicators owes a large debt to advocates of sustainable development (and
lifestyles) who have made this an art and science over the past decade (Brugmann,
1999). Indeed, the notion of sustainability – defined as ‘development that meets
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs’ (UN Commission on Environment and Development, 1987,
page 1) – is highly compatible with place-crime prevention planning. The latter is
presumed to enhance community stability, by helping discourage among other
things crime-generated urban out-migration and related economic and social dis-
order, while improving overall life quality for present and future residents.
Communities throughout the United States and Britain use quality-of-life
indicators, derived from a variety of government statistics and citizen surveys, as a
means of identifying social well being at any point of time and of gauging it against
past status. The range of indicators employed is extraordinary and often tailored to
the unique character of the community’s problems, needs and opportunities. For
example, counties in California’s Sierra Nevada range measure the rate of old
growth timber harvests as a quality of life indicator, while Seattle counts wild
salmon in the Cedar River. Communities in the Connecticut River Valley tally the
number of new developments in the floodplain as a measure of quality of life, whilst
cities in South Florida measure the number of tourists who visit each year. In
Britain, Devon County Council employs fourteen general headings, including
resources, pollution, bio-diversity and public safety, under which are grouped more
than sixty subheadings of quality-of-life indicators.
No matter how diverse the communities, almost all have one indicator, or
family of indicators, in common – ‘public safety’ – of which crime and the fear of
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crime are key components. The reason for this is simply that crime and perceptions
of crime are quality-of-life factors that affect citizens’ abilities to make seemingly
trivial choices such as ordering pizza delivery at home as well as basic life
decisions, such as where to live, work or send their children to school. Grayson
and Young (1994) report that in the United Kingdom, citizens have identified crime
and healthcare as issues that have the most significant impacts on their quality of
life. When questioned in more detail, respondents to the 2000 British Crime
Survey report that they are most worried about burglary, thefts of and from cars,
credit card fraud, mugging and physical attack (Home Office, 2000b).
There are convincing arguments that quality-of-life measures ought to reflect
changes in common everyday activities that people identify with, as a complement
to impersonal government statistics. Calhoun (2000) has identified several
examples of this approach collected in communities across the United States,
including: the restoration of pizza delivery to certain neighbourhoods in Columbia,
South Carolina, holding dances at formerly problematic neighbourhood schools in
Richmond, California, the construction of new homes on the sites of former ‘‘crack
houses’’ in San Antonio, Texas, and the ability of citizens to take a late bus to work
in the evening without danger in many cities. Answers to these queries amplify
responses to the more direct questions on surveys, such as ‘Do you think your area
has become safer over the last three years?’ as asked of residents in fifteen differ-
ent areas of Greater Manchester, Merseyside and Tyne and Wear, and reported in
Chapter 7 (Robson et al., 1994).
Devon County Council in south-west England uses sustainability as a guiding
philosophy,9 within which its notion of ‘public safety’ is couched. Specific defini-
tions of public safety focus on levels of crime and fear of crime, including fear of
burglary and fear of being physically assaulted, two of the crimes that the British
public in general fears the most (Devon County Council, 2000). In northern
England, Bradford Metropolitan District Council recently conducted its first crime
audit, a quality-of-life survey that all local authorities in Britain are now required to
carry out in accordance with the provisions of the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998.
The audit was undertaken in cooperation with the District’s twenty-four partnership
agencies. The results were used to develop multi-agency strategies to combat
crime and diminish fear of crime, two of the intents of the Act. In Bradford, as in
other British communities carrying out the new auditing process, community views
on crime were assessed by wide-ranging community consultation; this uncovered
responses that typify crime fears in both the United States and Britain, as the stat-
istics presented in Chapter 2 bear out. A further discussion of the general require-
ments of the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998 is presented in Chapter 7, and the
Salford case study in Chapter 8 provides a detailed example of local strategies
used to implement them.
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A fundamental question is: ‘What do people do as a response to crime or to
the fear of crime?’ One response is to move away from the problem area, which as
comparative statistics tell us in Chapter 2, is often the central city. At the national
level in the United States new studies have added to the existing knowledge about
urban flight. While there are certainly other reasons why people leave cities, there
is a body of research showing that crime is an important factor driving people
out of large American cities (Sampson and Wooldredge, 1986; Marshall and
O’Flaherty, 1987), although British cities are also affected by this phenomenon. In
so doing, crime and the fear of crime add to urban sprawl, which has affected the
costs and quality of life of almost every American wherever they live; the con-
sequences of sprawl for sustainability have been a major focus of urban planners,
designers and social critics for the last decade (see, for example, Kunstler, 1998).
A recent study by Cullen and Levitt (1996) demonstrates that rising crime rates (as
distinct from high crime levels) are indeed correlated with the depopulation of large
American cities, especially their central cores, and that Americans are so sensitive
to upward movements in crime rates that ‘each additional crime is associated with
a one-person decline in city residents’.
Those people most likely to move are the more affluent and those with chil-
dren. People also tend to change work venues because of particular types of
crime, a ‘hidden’ cost of crime and certainly a diminution of choice, which no doubt
affects the quality of life. For instance, a 1998 study of the ‘timing’ of work con-
cluded that since 1973 higher homicide rates have reduced the propensity of
people to work evenings and nights in large metropolitan areas. The study esti-
mates that this has cost the American economy between $4 and $10 billion (thou-
sand million) a year (Hamermesh, 1998). The practical impact of these residential
and work choices that people make in response to crime and the fear of crime is
that those most able to support city services leave behind those who need the ser-
vices the most, but are least able to support them. Demands for police, public hos-
pitalisation, education, social services and public transportation are intensified by
the remaining urban poor, who have little recourse to private institutions to protect,
heal, educate or house them.
At a different administrative level in Britain, a significant proportion of the
population – in this case over a third of those questioned in the Bradford District –
have changed small-scale place-related behaviours. The Bradford audit notes that:
The most common places that people avoid after dark are town/city centres
(36%), poorly lit areas (16%), secluded/quiet streets (15%) and parks/woods
(13%). The locations most commonly mentioned as places that are avoided
during the day are secluded/quiet streets (23%), subways (21%) and
parks/woods (20%) (Bradford Metropolitan District Council, 2000).
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The clear implication, although the question is not directly asked in the Bradford
case, is that people avoid these environments because of crime or the perception
of criminal activity.10 Recent national estimates reported by the 2000 British Crime
Survey suggest that about a quarter of the citizens surveyed report that they ‘never
walked alone in their local areas after dark’ or did so less than once a month and,
of those, 19 per cent said the reason was ‘fear of crime’ (Home Office, 2000b).
This closely corresponds to the results of a nation-wide survey that about 20 per
cent of Americans (38 million people) had ‘reduced their activities’ due to the fear
of crime over the previous year (NCPC, 1999).
In both nations, women and especially elderly women, were more likely than
men to restrict their activities because of crime or the fear of crime. Women’s
heightened fear of crime and their likelihood to change shopping, recreational, and
entertainment-related behaviours, especially after dark, are borne out by research
conducted across a range of different sized urban and suburban areas, and across
income groups (Valentine, 1991; Pettersson, 1997). This lends credence to
Whyte’s notion that women are more sensitive to environmental socio-pathologies
such as crime than men; and to his claim that the deserting of urban places by
women is an urgent distress signal (Whyte, 1980).
In Britain those individuals most likely to report that the fear of crime has
affected their quality of life are older women (over sixty years), minorities, those
with physical disabilities, the impoverished, those living in council or housing
association housing, and people living within areas of high levels of physical dis-
order (Home Office, 2000b). As in the United States, where the list is generally
comparable, we find that those who have traditionally been the most vulnerable to
pervasive social and economic discrimination are also those whose quality of life is
further undermined by the direct and indirect effects of crime and the fear of crime.
Quality-of-life impacts are therefore unequally distributed, despite the fact that all
citizens are affected in one manner or another.
The Costs of Crime as a Quality-of-Life Issue
The financial burden of crime is a key element in its effects on quality of life and, as
demonstrated by recent studies undertaken by private and public agencies across
the English speaking world, that burden is enormous. In one research effort, the
Association of British Insurers (1998) estimated that the total cost of crime to the
British economy exceeded £35 billion a year, with the average cost amounting to
£31 per household each week. This figure included the costs of police services,
prosecutions, prisons, insured and uninsured losses, fraud and prevention costs. A
more recent study by the Home Office almost doubled that estimate, putting the
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cost of crime in England and Wales at approximately £60 billion for 1999–2000
(Brand and Price, 2000). Moreover, the study emphasises that the figure is far from
comprehensive in that it does not count fear of crime or its effects on the quality of
life. Computer theft and damage alone was estimated in 1996 to cost British busi-
nesses more than £1.5 billion (Nando, 1996). An example at the local level in
Britain comes from the London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham, which esti-
mated that the cost of domestic burglaries to victims was almost £2 million for
1997–1998, not counting police costs and other indirect expenses. The Borough
uses these figures in developing its audit of local crime, pursuant to the Crime and
Disorder Act of 1998 (London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham website at
http://lbht.gov.uk/OurBorough/Reduction/thecostsofcrime.html).
In what was billed as the most comprehensive study of its type ever under-
taken, researchers for the United States Department of Justice estimated that
crime costs the American economy at least $450 billion a year. That study was
controversial in that it included for the first time the costs of child abuse, domestic
violence, mental healthcare costs and estimated reduced quality-of-life costs for
crime victims, along with more direct and traditional costs of crimes such as
murder, rape and robbery (National Institute of Justice, 1996). In comparison, the
United States Department of Defense spends about half that amount each year. A
1999 study by economist David Anderson put the US costs of crime at over one
trillion (thousand billion) dollars, calling it the ‘single most expensive – and wasteful
– aspect of life in America’. Anderson’s research added in ‘hidden’ costs of crime,
such as lost wages, personal anguish, and the costs of protective devices. He con-
cluded that strategic planning in local communities, among other cost effective
approaches, should be used in place of many current and ineffective crime deter-
rence practices (Anderson, 1999).
Recent Canadian estimates put the cost of crime there at about 46 billion
Canadian dollars a year, including physical and mental health costs and lost pro-
ductivity (Department of Justice, Canada, 1998), and in Australia researchers have
suggested that crime costs at least 18 billion Australian dollars a year, which
equates to $A2,800 per household, or more than 4 per cent of that country’s
gross domestic product (Walker, 1997).
Because different crimes and costs are assessed differently in each of these
nations it is generally impossible to compare them. However, recent efforts to
estimate the costs of crime in Britain, the USA, Canada and Australia are alike in
that they have become more inclusive, calculating a host of secondary and tertiary
impacts that have not been previously considered, such as the reduced quality of
life of victims. Consequently it has become apparent, even to the most inattentive
citizen, that crime is a monumental depletion of national economies, with wide
reaching impacts on communities, as well as on individual victims and their
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families. Many cities, especially in the USA, have been left with declining tax bases
in their central cores while their more affluent citizens migrate outwards into
sprawling suburban rings, thus creating a disturbing downward spiral. The general
decline in national crime rates over the past decade in the United States has not
reversed this trend: crime thus has a pernicious poisonous residual effect that is
hard to shake off – another hidden cost.
Governmental Crime Prevention Responses
What are the responses of governments to the assaults on quality of life and per-
sonal finances made by crime and the fear of crime? A recent United Nations
report suggests that although ‘prevention of crime is far more effective than paying
for the processing of offenders through the criminal justice system’, governments
are much more likely to make rhetorical statements on the need for and value of
crime prevention than to provide the resources to make it a priority (Newman,
1999). The same study estimates that for industrialised nations such as Britain and
the United States, investment in crime prevention amounts to less than one per
cent of all criminal justice system expenditures, while in developing and transitional
counties there is virtually no investment in it at all. In fact, while theories about
crime prevention have been discussed for centuries, actual resource expenditures
by governments in this area are quite new, dating in both Britain and the United
States from the 1960s, when a variety of government initiatives were launched in
both nations.
We present a more detailed discussion of crime prevention policy and appli-
cation in the United States and in Britain in Chapters 5–8, but we can say here
that approaches over the past four decades in both nations have generally been
characterised by attempts to move national crime prevention agendas down to
local levels; this has been accompanied by increased research and training
support and by either providing incentives for local agencies to cooperate (as in
the grants approach favoured in the United States, and exemplified by ‘Community
Oriented Policing’ programmes) or mandating that local agencies form partner-
ships (as in Britain and exemplified by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998). These
ambitious undertakings require the coordination of many bureaucracies struggling
with an intractable and volatile problem, which has not escaped the attention of
politicians at both ends of the liberal-conservative spectrum in both nations. The
problem is also one of balancing national agendas with regional and local con-
cerns, for in truth they often do not match up very well at all.
Despite that, the perseverance of both nations toward multi-party, multi-level
responses recognises an increasingly sophisticated view that crime prevention is a
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complex issue beyond the command of law enforcement alone and that it involves
interventions with offenders, victims, environments (as a physical entity) and the
community (as a social-economic entity) in some mix that we do not completely
understand. This has come to characterise much of the modern organisational
reaction to crime prevention in Britain and the United States although, as some
commentators note, there are inherent difficulties in multi-party crime prevention
efforts, however well intentioned they are.11
Nevertheless, there is clear evidence that national policies in both nations are
directing more and more attention to communities generally and to environmental
and place-based crime prevention responses in particular. Examples of these
efforts include ‘Safe Cities’ and ‘Safer By Design’ initiatives, experiments with
‘Problem and Community Oriented Policing’ and the adoption and support of crime
mapping using geographic information systems (GIS) technology. One of the key
questions that emerges from many of these efforts is how to set national directives
strong enough to guide local action effectively, while ensuring that they are flexible
enough to account for local variations.12 Chapters 5–8 provide some insights as to
how this is playing out in Britain and the United States relative to crime prevention
applications and policy. Much of the new responsibility for carrying forward
national initiatives at the local level within the context of place-based crime preven-
tion has been assigned to law enforcement agencies, an ironical situation since,
while they have historically had the most responsibility for ensuring that places are
safe, they have had the least control over the design and construction of the built
environment (Kitchen and Schneider, 2000).
Responses, Responsibilities and Opportunities of
Planning and Urban Design in Place-Based Crime
Prevention Planning
Given the fundamental significance of crime impacts and costs to urban liveability
in Britain and the United States, it is extraordinary how peripheral a role urban plan-
ners and designers have played in place-based crime prevention. Among the
variety of reasons for this are: the fact that ‘crime prevention as a form of public
policy is in many respects in its infancy’ (UN Commission on Crime Prevention and
Criminal Justice, 1999); the fact that the field of environment-behaviour research is
still emerging; the fact that the police have traditionally been given the role to make
society safe and have also been presumed to be the lead agencies to make it
safer; the fact that historically there has been little compulsion, especially in the
United States, whether through ordinance, public policy or client demand, for plan-
ners to become involved; and to the fact that planning and design literature and
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curricula have devoted so little attention to crime prevention planning. In the latter
context, even a casual review of most current planning and design texts reveals
few, if any, references to place-based crime prevention planning strategies such as
defensible space, CPTED, situational crime prevention, or environmental criminol-
ogy. Rather, most such works are full of descriptions of the design and comprehen-
sive planning processes, with land development codes and regulatory practices,
with portrayals of planning politics, with housing, regeneration, ecological issues or
with grieving the lack of ‘smart growth’ policies or ‘sustainable’ communities – all
topics certainly worthy of attention but which have tended vastly to overshadow
crime prevention planning. The neglect of crime as a fundamental planning and
design issue is also evidenced by the paucity of attention it is accorded within
American and British planning school curricula and research agendas, and what
we perceive to be its near absence as a design topic within architecture schools,
and within the mainstream of the professional community.
A review of resources, for example, listed in the (American) National Crime
Prevention Council’s handbook on ‘Designing Safer Communities’ (1997), identi-
fies fourteen university-based ‘Researchers and Other Experts,’ only two of whom
are located at an architectural or planning college (the same one). Most of those
listed represented schools of criminal justice or social science. While we in no way
wish to belittle the important contributions of the latter researchers, and while we
are aware that this cannot be a comprehensive list, we believe that it is neverthe-
less representative of the lack of attention that the planning and design disciplines
have traditionally afforded crime and the fear of crime. A similar review of the art-
icles included in Planning newspaper (a weekly professional journal for British
planners published in conjunction with the Royal Town Planning Institute) for 2000
reveals not a single article dealing with crime prevention planning, although there
are contributions on everything from ‘Planning for Protected Species’ to ‘Tourism
and Conservation Planning’ (RTPI Website at http://www.rtpi.org.uk/).
This is an odd response to one of the most significant forces driving up the
costs of life and driving down its quality. Perhaps the focus on sprawl as the bête
noire of modern urban planning and design, particularly in the United States and
less so in Britain, has so dominated the attention of planners and related profes-
sionals that they have been blinded to the reasons (crime among many) for why
people have ‘voted with their feet’ to escape to suburbia. An easy target in this
regard has been transport policy and practice. Based on the evidence, however, it
seems just as likely that the transportation systems that have funnelled millions out
to the suburbs have facilitated – not caused – the choices that people have made
to escape large urban cores.13 In this context, crime and the fear of crime have
limited the menu of choices that citizens in the United States and Britain have had
to choose from.
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If planning is about anything, it is about increasing the choices available to
citizens. The evidence suggests that as places actually become and are perceived
to be safer by citizens, citizens’ choices are given freer reign to play out among a
wide spectrum of living, work, and related options. And, while the police have an
undeniable role in making places safe, planners, designers and associated profes-
sionals have public interest missions that are as intimately connected to safety as
are those of law enforcement, and are conceivably more important in efforts to
make places safer. Recent research in the USA points toward how place-based
crime prevention can be incorporated in the day-to-day responsibilities of planners
and designers, in spite of Zahm’s point (1998) that American land use and devel-
opment codes were not originally framed with safety from crime as their basic
intents.
Thus, for example, planners have a great deal of influence in shaping compre-
hensive plans which lay out long-term community visions and in developing land
use regulations, including zoning,14 subdivision regulations, landscaping ordi-
nances and design guidelines that make the comprehensive plan vision come alive.
In the US planning system zoning, for instance, regulates a variety of spatial attrib-
utes including the type of land uses permitted, the density of development allowed,
building height, mass and bulk, lot sizes and dimensions, setbacks for yards, allow-
able open space, and parking requirements. In Britain, contemporary development
plans tend not to use the concept of zoning, but include policies and proposals
that address the same general elements. Each of these elements in turn has crime
prevention strategies or issues potentially associated with them. Thus, lot sizes,
dimension and yard setbacks relate directly to CPTED principles dealing with sur-
veillance, territorial perceptions and public–private space definitions (discussed in
Chapter 4).
Subdivision regulations also determine lot sizes and dimensions, as well as
specifying street right-of-way locations and dimensions, sidewalk construction and
the locations of utilities. Each of these relate to defensible space and CPTED crime
prevention strategies including activity generation, access control, and the delin-
eation of public and private space. Finally, planners and designers typically have a
great deal of input into the development and enforcement of landscape regulations
and design guidelines. These determine such spatial elements as wall locations and
dimensions, plant materials, site layouts, and the design and placement of buildings,
footpaths, roads, and car parks. Place-based crime prevention principles and issues
inherent in these spatial considerations include concern that offenders have
increased (or diminished) opportunities for concealment, for open sight lines across
property, for territorial definition, for maintenance to diminish perceptions of aban-
donment, for access control and for increased place legibility and wayfinding.
By influencing day-to-day strategic decisions in these very specific place
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making processes and by moulding long-term visions through comprehensive (or
master) planning, planners and designers have an enormous potential to make
places safer for citizens. Our view is that there is scant evidence to date that they
have indeed realised this potential, much to the detriment of public choice making
generally, and for those of us in particular who ask our children, ‘is it safe where
you’ll be living?’
Conclusions
Crime and the fear of crime are major issues in British and American societies that
help mould our cities and influence the qualities of life in both nations. Crime
affects a wide range of choices such as where we will live, where and when we will
work, whether or not to take a stroll in the park downtown, or whether we can
order pizza delivery to our home. We think about crime when our children leave our
care for even a short period of time. For many, these concerns constrain choices
and the liveability of our cities and societies. This is demonstrable not only in what
we do or refrain from doing but is registered on surveys and quality-of-life bench-
marks, from the local to national levels in both the United States and Britain. Both
crime prevention and planning seek to improve the quality of life and to broaden
choices.
Though employed for millennia through self-help target hardening and offender-
oriented punishment approaches, systematic crime prevention policy and practice is
only a relatively recent development across the globe generally, and in Britain and the
United States in particular, arising in response to rising crime rates in the 1960s in
both nations. While some crime prevention approaches have focused primarily on
healing offenders or the socio-economic conditions in which they reside, contempor-
ary crime prevention suggests a more holistic approach that includes the environ-
ment in which the targets of crime are found, and a focus on strategies that
manipulate the design and management of places – the relatively small-scale physical
locations from bus stops to neighbourhoods that comprise cities – where crime is
likely. In both the United States and Britain, such strategies increasingly involve part-
nerships between a range of local agencies guided by national objectives in efforts to
decrease opportunities and rewards for offenders while increasing the risks and
effort required to commit crimes. In both nations the credibility of crime prevention
has been subject to attack because programme results often have not matched or
been measured against advertised objectives, and because many strategies have not
been vindicated by objective empirical testing.
Even though their expertise and responsibilities provide them unique access
to regulatory arenas that influence the design and management of places, planners
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and urban designers have taken much less of a lead in the area of crime prevention
than their public interest missions would suggest, often leaving crime prevention to
traditional approaches and to other actors. This neglect ignores a growing body of
evidence that crime prevention approaches can be effectively employed at places,
although there is still considerable debate as to the measurable results of interven-
tions and the body of empirical evidence to support those results. We suggest,
therefore, that there is both room and cause to increase the role of planners and
urban designers in place-based crime prevention efforts in Britain and the United
States, and the following chapters of this book expand upon that view.
Notes
1 For example, a review of 266 ‘suspect actions’ from an American police crime analysis
unit reveals forty-six that are clearly or likely place or spatially-based. The latter category
includes such crimes as all types of burglary (business, conveyance, residential), drug
dealing, graffiti, home invasions, prowling, peeking in windows, business, residential and
strong arm robberies, purse snatching, vandalism and trespassing. The former – non-
spatial – category includes such offences as possession of child pornography, exposed
sexual organs, homosexual acts, harassing and obscene phone calls, stalking, making
threats, resisting arrest, making racial slurs, and being under the influence of drugs
(Crime Analysis Unit, City of Gainesville, Florida, 2001).
2 Sherman et al. describe seven major institutional settings in which much of the existing
crime prevention literature fits, including communities, families, schools, labour markets,
places, police agencies, and other criminal justice agencies (Sherman et al., 1998).
3 Modern ‘white collar’ crime can take place in cyberspace locations, and there is evid-
ence from the 2000 British Crime Survey that this type of crime concerns citizens a
great deal. However, citizens in both Britain and the United States still fear violent
stranger-to-stranger encounters and property crimes more.
4 An excellent discussion of the linkage of places to crime employing ecological psychol-
ogy and spatial epidemiology perspectives can be found in Taylor (1998).
5 This definition roughly follows John Friedmann’s broad conception of planning as the
‘attempt to link scientific and technical knowledge to actions in the public domain’
(Friedmann, 1987). The issue of definitions is a central concern of planning, both as an
academic discipline and a profession. An excellent discussion of planning definitions
can be found in Chapter 4 of Alexander (1992).
6 This is not intended to slight other nations, such as the Netherlands, Canada, Australia,
Japan and France which have provided support at national and regional levels to
environmental crime prevention research.
7 This is in contrast to retribution theory which holds that:
• The criminal act must be a voluntary and morally wrong act;
• Punishment must fit the offence;
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• Punishment must represent the return of suffering to the wrong-doer for his morally
wrong act (Jeffrey, 1977).
As a ‘backward-looking’ process that punishes past acts and ignores future ones, Jeffrey
and others do not consider retribution to be a legitimate part of crime prevention or
control.
8 See, for example Pascoe and Harrison’s paper (1997) on the combined use of statisti-
cal techniques, geographic information systems (GIS) technology, and situational crime
prevention theory in predicting the risk of domestic burglary among different neighbour-
hoods in Britain.
9 Devon County Council notes that ‘a sustainable community would be one in which
people live without fear of crime, or persecution on account of their race, gender, sexual-
ity or beliefs’ (Devon County Council, 2000).
10 That the Bradford statistics are relatively high when compared to the 2000 British Crime
Survey (BCS) statistics may be due to the winnowing effect of asking people ‘why’ they
avoid certain places. Thus, as the BCS suggests, there are many reasons why people
may avoid certain areas after dark, among them that they simply did not want to walk
there (Home Office, 2000b).
11 Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994) note in relation to interagency cooperation in Britain that
‘relations between particular agencies involved in crime prevention are highly compli-
cated, seldom static and influenced by a variety of institutional, individual and
local/historical factors’ (page 26). The same can be said to be no less true of relation-
ships among such agencies in the United States.
12 For instance, referring to the implementation of Britain’s social exclusion policies, RTPI
Planning Policy Officer David Barraclough says:
The SEU sees the key issues for neighbourhood regeneration as employment,
health, crime and education and, while the Institute would want to see these at the
heart of the Urban White Paper, it is extremely uncomfortable with the idea that
national templates can be devised and applied to all deprived neighbourhoods
(Planning newspaper, 13 October 2000, page 22).
13 This is particularly ironic since ‘murder rates in [American] cities are lower than traffic
fatality rates in exurban areas’ (Lucy, 2000).
14 Zoning is a particularly important planning tool in the United States and is sometimes
confused with planning itself, although it is only one means to implement planning.
Zoning has developed since the early part of the twentieth century as a legal device to
stabilise and preserve private property values (and hence is status quo oriented) and is
a means of ‘insuring that the land uses of a community are properly situated in relation to
one another, providing adequate space for each type of development’ (Goodman and
Freund, 1968, page 403). Although zoning ordinances vary from one community to
another in the United States, they generally control or direct such elements as special
districts (e.g. historic or business improvement districts), development density, and the
overall regulation of nuisances. Zoning is the primary planning tool used to publicly
manage private property in the United States.
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CHAPTER 2
CRIME TRENDS IN THE USA AND IN BRITAIN
Introduction
In this chapter we look at what has been happening to crime in the USA and in
Britain, both in an overall sense and in terms of trends in relation to different types
of crime. As part of this process, we comment in passing on what we know about
fear of crime in those societies, because fear of crime can be as serious a problem
as crime itself. We also consider the demography and the broad geography of
crime, because these factors have major effects on its place-specific elements
which are also the main focus of the relationship between crime and the design of
the built environment. It is necessary to undertake a breakdown of this nature in
any event, because overall crime figures mask very significant spatial differences.
This chapter therefore has four sections:
• a general cautionary introduction to the use of crime statistics;
• an examination of crime trends in the USA;
• an examination of crime trends in Britain;
• comparison and conclusions.
Crime Statistics
There are two common sources of crime statistics. The first is data on crimes
recorded by the police; these tend to be the easiest to use, since they are readily
available, and they have an apparent consistency to them, since they are published
annually and thus invite comparisons with what happened in previous years. They
are often used in the absence of available alternatives, as we will do for this reason
in this book; but there are some very important cautionary notes that need to be
entered about data of this kind which must never be forgotten when they are used.
We set these out below. The second major source is periodic surveys, either of
victims of crime or of the population at large, which are usually done on a sample
basis. This means, of course, that they are subject to all the problems usually asso-
ciated with sample surveys, plus some particular difficulties which arise from the
nature of their subject matter. Again, therefore, we set these difficulties out below,
and we also look at what can be learned about the reliability of these data sources
when they are compared with each other.
There are four main difficulties with police data on reported crimes.
REPORTING
The willingness on the part of victims to report crime to the police is very variable.
There is no doubt that it is affected by a variety of factors, including whether
people think the police will actually do anything to catch the offender or get stolen
belongings returned, whether insurance claims are likely to follow which will require
some sort of police corroboration, the general level of trust in the police in the
community or by individuals, or whether in relation to some crimes (for example,
rape) victims think they will get a sympathetic hearing from the police or will simply
be adding to the ordeal they have already experienced. Table 2.1 shows for the
USA and for England and Wales some estimated reporting rates based upon
survey information for 1981 and 1995.
Table 2.1 shows very clearly that there are differences in reporting rates for
the same crime over time within countries, for the same crime between countries,
and between different types of crime. The highest reporting rates are for motor
vehicle theft, which is regarded as being related to subsequent insurance claims.
The lowest reporting rates are for burglary (in the USA) and for assault (in England
and Wales), which may respectively be related to whether the scale of what has
been lost is seen to be worth the effort and whether people regard (at any rate
minor) assault as a matter for the police at all, as compared with something to be
sorted out between individuals. However, the four types of crime recorded in Table
2.1 do not represent the full range of crime; Table 2.2 by way of example shows for
England and Wales the broader pattern of willingness to report crime when this
range is widened. To put this in context, the overall average in England and Wales
is that about 40 per cent of all crimes get reported; this result was repeated in the
2000 British Crime Survey, which showed that in the year 1999, on the basis of
the most up-to-date view about the comparability of police records and British
Crime Survey results, 41 per cent of crimes were reported to the police (Home
Office, 2000b, Table 2.1, page 6).
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Table 2.1 Percentage of crimes reported to the police, 1981 and 1995
USA England and Wales
Crime 1981 1995 1981 1995
Robbery 56.0 55.0 46.5 56.6
Assault 46.7 54.0 40.2 40.0
Burglary 49.0 50.0 66.2 66.3
Motor vehicle theft 87.0 88.8 94.9 97.5
Source: Langan and Farrington (1998) pages 10 and 69
THE PROCESSES IN PRACTICE
Reporting processes are themselves problematic: they can be seen by people as
difficult and complex; they change over time, thus making trend statistics difficult to
establish; they may vary between police forces, thus making comparison difficult;
and there can be major difficulties with the classification of crimes, both because
classifications themselves change over time and because individual judgement
determines to which category a crime is assigned (often with rather imperfect
information) at the time it is reported. This is a particular difficulty when attempting
to make cross-national comparisons using data of this nature; for example, assault
is defined differently in the USA and in Britain. A further potential difficulty is that
whether or not something is formally reported depends upon the judgement of the
individual police officer at the first point of contact with the public, and then upon
the diligence of officers in contributing reports to statistical records. Without in any
way intending this last comment as a sweeping criticism of the police, it is probably
fair to say that we are dealing with a wide range of performance simply because of
the different characteristics of the individuals involved.
RECORDING
There is clear evidence of an important distinction between reported crime and
recorded crime. Some of this is undoubtedly entirely legitimate. For example, if it
becomes clear upon subsequent investigation that no crime was in fact committed,
it would be wholly appropriate not to record that report as if it constituted a crimi-
nal incident. There is also the likelihood that relatively minor crimes get weeded
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Table 2.2 Percentage of crimes in England and Wales estimated to have been reported to the police in
1997 in rank order
1. Theft of vehicle 96.5
2. Burglary with loss 85.0
3. Burglary with entry 79.0
4. Bicycle theft 63.6
5. Robbery 56.8
6. Mugging 55.3
7. Attempted burglary without loss 50.2
8. Snatch theft from a person 50.0
9. Wounding 45.3
10. Theft from a vehicle 43.1
11. Household theft 32.9
12. Domestic violence 26.4
13. Vandalism 26.3
Source: Home Office (1998) Table A4.1, page 51. The categories have been selected from this
table to illustrate the range it contains
out, although clearly this is a more contentious practice. However, this does not
explain either the scale of non-recording in Britain that has been reported in a
recent study (Povey, 2000) or the degree of variation found between individual
police forces. Inevitably, this may lead to more cynical interpretations, such as the
suggestion that the police have a vested interest in not recording crimes because
this makes their clear-up rate look better. Povey concluded that in Britain some 25
per cent of reported crimes are not recorded, and the evidence presented in Table
2.3 suggests that this may be an underestimate, at any rate for some types of
crimes. It was (perhaps inevitably) this more cynical explanation that was latched
onto by the press when reporting this study; The Independent’s front-page head-
line on 1 August 2000 of ‘Crime figures sham as police fail to report 1.4m
offences’ is a typical example. Langan and Farrington (1998, page 11) show that
this is more of a problem in England and Wales than it is in the USA (see Table
2.3). They also suggest that the trends towards higher recording rates over the
period 1981–1995 (but not for England and Wales in respect of burglary and of
motor vehicle theft) can be attributed to changes in policing practice.
Langan and Farrington (1998, page 11) offer five reasons for the trend
towards recording a growing fraction of reported violent crimes by the police:
• The police are becoming more professional.
• Police operations have become more computerised.
• Electronic recording of calls to the police creates an audit trail.
• The police are responding to public expectations that domestic violence will
be handled more formally and treated more seriously; for example, a growing
number of states in the USA now mandate arrests in all domestic assaults.
• Society is arguably becoming more litigious (perhaps particularly in the USA),
and this has resulted in more ‘defensive policing’ which defines rules about
when and how officers must act and as a consequence reduces police
discretion.
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Table 2.3 Recording of reported crimes by the police in 1995 in the USA and in England and Wales (%)




Motor vehicle theft 100.0 82.6
Source: Langan and Farrington (1998) pages 10 and 70
POLICE OPERATIONS
There is inevitably a self-fulfilling component in police statistics of recorded
crimes deriving from the nature of police operations. To take an obvious example,
it might be decided because of public complaint to target a particular type of
illegal activity (for example, car parking in an area where it is banned or restricted,
or an intensification of shoplifting in a shopping centre). The inevitable con-
sequence of a police operation aimed at clamping down on such activities –
assuming that in its own terms it is successful – will be an increase in the
numbers of recorded crimes under these headings. This is not necessarily a
measure of relative crime rates (although of course it could be, in the sense
that what triggered the operation in the first place may have been a belief that a
particular type of crime in a particular locality was on the increase and needed
to be tackled more intensively), as much as a reflection of a change in police
operational practices. This can have a particular effect on the crime figures for
a particular locality, sometimes in a direct sense, as in the examples quoted
above, and sometimes in an indirect sense. An example of an indirect effect,
which we discuss in more detail in Chapter 6, would be the introduction of closed-
circuit television (CCTV) cameras into a shopping centre deflecting certain types
of crime into other areas which did not have cameras (Dawson, 1994). It is import-
ant, therefore, when looking at crime figures for individual small areas based upon
police records, to try to understand whether any significant changes in police
operations affecting that area in recent times might have had an effect of this
nature.
These four difficulties, although clearly serious, do not mean that police crime
statistics should never be used, but they do suggest that they should be used with
considerable care and with an awareness that they can carry these sorts of dif-
ficulties with them. One of the most important reasons why we do not suggest that
police crime statistics should not be used is because they are the most common
currency in the field, and indeed are often the only data available in cases where
specific surveys have not been carried out. To take the view that they are so unreli-
able as to be able to contribute nothing to discussion and debate would often be
to condemn study of those activities to the absence of any sort of factual basis
whatsoever, and we think there is enough difficulty of this sort in the field as it is
without adding to it by taking up such an extreme position. In particular, we think
that such data can be useful both as a means of providing some sort of scale for
crime problems in an area and for relatively short-term comparison within the same
area,1 provided in this latter case that no obvious intervening variables, such as
significant changes in police operations, affect the area in the meantime. We do
think, however, that the health warnings deriving from this explanation of the dif-
ficulties associated with police crime statistics mean that they should always be
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used with care. Readers who want to follow up these matters and the issues
surrounding them in more detail can do so by referring to Walker (1995) and
Coleman and Moynihan (1996).
As far as survey data generated either from victim surveys or from surveys of
the general population are concerned, the main difficulties are as follows:
(1) The usual problems of any sample survey around its reliability, deriving from
the size of the sample and its structure and from the nature of the questions
asked, apply here also.
(2) In addition, some of the issues that are dealt with in surveys of this nature
are very sensitive and personal; this raises concerns about whether victims
of crime are prepared to talk about their experiences with interviewers or,
indeed, whether the questions asked are sufficiently sensitive to those
experiences (Pain, 2000, page 368). There must also be some doubt about
whether in all cases memories of such events are wholly reliable. There can
also be an exaggerated response, where people for whatever reason embroi-
der their experiences in various ways, including perhaps in instances where
an inflated insurance claim has already been made. We do not wish to imply
that for the most part people in responding to surveys of this nature do any-
thing other than tell the truth. But surveys are totally dependent upon what
people say in these terms, because it is rarely possible for there to be any
sort of independent check on answers given; and even leaving aside deliber-
ate distortion, it needs to be understood that people’s recall is fallible,
perhaps particularly when they have found a particular event psychologically
distressing.
(3) Surveys tend to provide fragmentary evidence, in that they occur only at
particular points in time. So, for example, Langan and Farrington (1998),
when comparing statistics on crime victimisation from surveys in the USA
and in England and Wales over the period 1981–1996, had annual
results from the US National Crime Victimisation Survey, but the British
Crime Survey was undertaken only six times during the period in question
in England and Wales (1981, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1993 and 1995). Under-
taking surveys is, of course, expensive and generally speaking the cost
(as well as the reliability) rises with the size of the sample; it may be this
factor which very often determines what an organisation is actually able to
do, irrespective of views about the inherent desirability of regular survey
work.
(4) Comparison between surveys can be particularly difficult, because of the
uncertainty surrounding whether or not like is being precisely compared with
like. For example, surveys which ask slightly different questions may result in
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slightly different answers, so it is important to be clear about whether appar-
ently similar data do emanate from processes that are likely to make the data
inherently comparable.
In the light of the preceding discussion, our preference, where both police crime
data and survey data are available, would be to regard the survey data as probably
more reliable, although we acknowledge that there is a debate about whether any
of the data in this field can be regarded as wholly reliable (Pain, 2000). As we have
already noted, however, we would not go so far as to discard the police data, and
would suggest that using the two in tandem can have certain advantages. A simple
illustration will make this last point. It can scarcely be regarded as being desirable
that, for certain types of crimes and in certain localities, reporting rates to the
police are very low; one of the objectives behind a local initiative might well be to
improve reporting rates as part of a process of tackling local crime more effectively.
Without comparing survey data with police figures, it is impossible to know what
the relationship is between someone regarding themselves as the victim of a crime
and that crime eventually emerging as part of police records. The police vested
interest will almost certainly be not merely in improving crime reporting but also in
improving their clear-up rate, because if the former rises and the latter remains
static police performance, according to the statistics that result, will actually be
deteriorating. Equally, local people are more likely to be willing to report certain
types of crime if they believe that something will be done about that crime as a
result, and if they have confidence in the police in the locality; and these things too
are likely to be parts of local initiatives. Thus, survey information and police records
taken together are likely to be able to paint the best available picture both of the
patterns of crime in the area and of public reactions to these activities, both as
victims and in terms of their perceptions of crime as a factor affecting their quality
of life.
There are some large-scale differences between what the two sources tell us
about levels of crime, however, and this point should help to reinforce the mes-
sages set out above about the available data and how they should be used. Table
2.4 illustrates these differences by using 1995 police and survey statistics for both
the USA and England and Wales for selected types of crimes.
Table 2.4 shows that, except for motor vehicle theft, the scale of crime as
recorded in police data is usually well below (and in the cases of robbery and
assault, less than half) that recorded by surveys. Survey data also show England
and Wales to have higher crime levels than the USA in all four of the categories
used for Table 2.4, whereas police records show the rates for robbery and for
assault in England and Wales to be lower than those in the USA; thus choice of
data in this case would lead to completely different conclusions being drawn from
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a comparative study. We comment later in this chapter on the different rates of
crime and the different trends in the two countries, but we close this section by
reiterating a point that we have already made. Generally, we believe survey informa-
tion to be more reliable than police records, and so for the remainder of this
chapter we will base our discussion of crime trends in the USA and in Britain on
survey data, unless we indicate otherwise in a particular instance.
Crime Trends in the USA
The headline figures in relation to crime in the USA can be summarised as follows
(Langan and Farrington, 1998):
• The broad pattern over the period 1981–1996 has been one of crime rates
falling in the early 1980s, then rising until about 1993, and then falling again,
a process which has continued subsequently.
• Robbery rates have fallen from just under 7.5 per 1,000 population in 1981
to just over 5 per 1,000 population in 1996.
• Assault rates have fallen from around 12 per 1,000 people in 1981 to just
under 9 per 1,000 people in 1996.
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Table 2.4 Crime rates per 1,000 population according to police records and to surveys, USA and
England and Wales, 1995
USA England and Wales
Crime Survey data Police records Survey data Police records
Robbery 5.3 2.2 7.6 1.3
Assault 8.8 4.2 20.0 3.9
Burglary1 18.3 9.9 33.8 23.9
Motor vehicle theft1,2 4.2 5.6 9.6 9.8
Source: Langan and Farrington (1998) pages 67 and 68
Notes:
1 To make survey data compatible with police records in these cases, it has been necessary to
convert the survey data from ‘per 1,000 households’ to ‘per 1,000 population’. This has been
done by dividing the survey data figures by the average household sizes for the USA and for
England and Wales, which in 1995 were respectively 2.59 and 2.45.
2 The more conventional method of recording rates for this type of crime would be per 1,000
vehicles rather than per 1,000 population, because comparisons over time are affected by
growing vehicle ownership rates. The method that has been used here, which is for a single
year, has been chosen to facilitate comparisons between types of crime.
• Burglary rates have fallen from about 105 per 1,000 households in 1981 to
under 50 per 1,000 households in 1996.
• Motor vehicle theft was at a fairly constant rate of just over 10 per 1,000
households at each end of the 1981–1996 period, although there were
some fluctuations between these two dates. It should be noted, however,
that vehicle ownership rates in the USA rose substantially over this period.
• The murder rate in the USA was 9.8 per 100,000 people in 1981 and had
fallen to 7.4 per 100,000 people in 1996, which equates to 0.10 per 1,000
people in 1981 and 0.07 per 1,000 people in 1996.
• The rape rate in the USA was around 0.7 per 1,000 females at each end of
the 1981–1996 period, although it rose between these two dates (but see
the qualifying note 2 to Table 2.5).
• According to 1996 police statistics, firearms were used in 68 per cent of
USA murders in that year and in 41 per cent of robberies.
Table 2.5 provides more detail in support of these headline figures. This overall
pattern, of a fall over the 1981–1996 period and in some cases (most notably
motor vehicle theft) of a steep fall in the 1990s, clearly represents an inherently
desirable trend. It is not our purpose in a book of this nature to attempt to say why
this has happened; in any event we suspect that there is no single answer to this
(despite what many protagonists of particular viewpoints may claim) but that it is a
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Table 2.5 Key statistics on crime trends, USA, 1981–1996
Type of crime 1981 1986 1991 1996
Robbery (rate per 1,000 population)1 7.4 5.1 5.9 5.2
Assault (rate per 1,000 population)1 12.0 9.8 9.9 8.8
Burglary (rate per 1,000 households)1 105.9 73.8 64.6 47.2
Motor vehicle theft (rate per 1,000 households)1 10.6 9.7 14.2 9.1
Murder (rate per 1,000 people)2 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.07
Rape (rate per 1,000 females)2 0.70 0.74 0.83 0.71
Source: Langan and Farrington (1998) pages 68 and 69
Notes:
1 These data come from the annual National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS).
2 These data come from police records. The data for rape may be unreliable because of the
particular problem of the unwillingness of women to report this crime to the police, given their
often low expectations of how they will be treated or whether they will even be believed. Survey
information, such as that contained within the NCVS, may be more reliable than police records,
therefore, but Langan and Farrington use this latter source because their focus is on achieving
comparability with the situation in England and Wales (see Table 2.18).
complex amalgam of a range of causes. For example, after examining a broad
range of explanations, ostensibly accounting for the twenty-five year decline in bur-
glary rates in the USA (including increased risk and severity of punishment,
national economic trends, greater stability of institutions, migration out of cities,
demographic changes and changes in the portability of consumer electronics),
Titus (1999) concludes that while there may be some truth to all the reasons
offered, none of them alone accounts for this extraordinary phenomenon, which
has not received the attention it merits in the literature.
It is important not to conclude from this, however, that crime is no longer a
problem in the USA, and that there is no need as a consequence to continue think-
ing about ways in which crime can be prevented. Crime clearly remains a problem
for those who are on its receiving end, and in an absolute sense many of the levels
of crime reported in Table 2.5 do not represent grounds for complacency in
society, even though in a relative sense they are improving. That the trajectory here
is a positive one may mean that the pressures on the political process, and hence
on the professionals who advise the politicians, to find new answers to the prob-
lems of crime in society are less than they would have been if the trajectory had
been negative. On the other hand, evidence from the USA suggests that people’s
fears of crime are not diminishing simply because the crime statistics are improv-
ing, and fear of crime in its own way can be just as serious a problem in society as
crime itself (and can lead to very similar pressures on the political process for
action), especially when it leads people to change their behaviour.
The importance that people attach to crime as an issue of concern to them in
the USA is emphasised by the data summarised in Table 2.6. This reports the
results of a CBS News public survey conducted by telephone in the USA in
October 1999, when just over 1,000 voters were asked what they felt would be
the most important problem facing the USA in the twenty-first century. The
answers, which put crime at the top of a pile of really major issues, demonstrate
clearly that the mere fact that crime rates have been falling in the USA for several
years has not of itself removed concern about crime from the public agenda;
although it is of course possible to argue (as some would) that the gap between
crime and the next highest item on the list in Table 2.6 would have been still
greater if crime figures in the USA had been worsening rather than improving.
This conclusion is in terms reinforced by the headlines from the findings of
the 1999 National Crime Prevention Survey in the USA, which were as follows:
• One in eight Americans said they were more fearful of walking in their
neighbourhoods this year than last.
• One in five people said that to varying degrees they had curbed their
activities out of fear of crime over the past year.
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• Three in ten survey participants said that to varying degrees violence was a
problem in the neighbourhoods where they live, work and shop.
(Source: National Crime Prevention, http://www.ncpc.org/rwesafe3.htm)
All of this reminds us that in many ways we are dealing with two distinct problems
– crime, and the fear of crime – where the relationship between the two is by no
means as straightforward as it may appear to be. Indeed, a recent review of the
literature (Pain, 2000) has concluded that ‘fear of crime’ is an elusive concept with
a range of meanings that is probably best understood in the context of place,
community, social relations and experience, within which environment might be a
relatively small component; whereas we believe that the relationship between
environment and some types of criminal activity is inherently more straightforward.
National crime statistics obscure a great deal of important information about
the demography and the geography of crime. At the local level too, it is not what
the national statistics say that matters to people; it is what is happening in their
locality. So the remainder of this section looks at some of the key indicators of the
demography and the geography of crime in the USA. The headline point is that
these crime statistics both reflect and act as contributors to the social polarisation
that is a characteristic of many American cities (see, for example, Kelso, 1994; also
Logan, in Marcuse and van Kempen, 2000). Table 2.7 pulls out some of the key
statistics from the USA National Crime Victimization Survey for 1998 (US Depart-
ment of Justice, 2000) by reference to different sizes of core cities in Metropolitan
Statistical Areas.
Table 2.7 shows that the residents of core cities in metropolitan statistical
areas are much more likely to be on the receiving end both of crimes against the
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4% economy, education, environment, drugs, jobs and employment,
overpopulation, war
3% racism/race relations, technology/computers
2% social issues, terrorism
Source: Public Agenda Online http:///www.publicagenda.org/issues/pcc
Note: the figures relate only to respondents to the survey who gave specific answers, and thus
cover 63 per cent of the total response. Since the question that was asked was about ‘the most
important problem’, respondents could only give one answer. The balance consists of other
answers, don’t know’s, and those who gave no answer. Where more than one subject is listed
against a particular score, each subject in the list achieved that score; so, for example, seven
subjects each scored 4 per cent.
person and of property crimes than are residents of rural areas. It also shows that
crimes against the person grow in frequency with city size until the core city’s
population size is 1 million or more, and although this broad relationship also holds
for property crimes in respect of the largest cities, the differences between prop-
erty crime rates for the various categories of smaller cities are not particularly
significant. This relationship can be taken further from the available tables by
making a more straightforward distinction between urban areas (the equivalent of
the core cities in Table 2.7), suburban areas, and rural areas. Table 2.8 looks at
some of the key variables in this context.
Table 2.8 shows that, in all the four cases it includes, there is a clear gradient
down from urban to suburban to rural, with crime rates lessening the further down
the gradient one goes. In all categories, the distinctions between urban, suburban
and rural areas are also quite marked; the differences between them are not mar-
ginal. Table 2.8 also shows that there is a clear relationship between crime pat-
terns and tenure, with rented property being much more likely to be targeted than
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Table 2.7 Crime risks by size of urban areas, USA, 1998
Type of Population of core city in metropolitan statistical area Rural
crime
50,000– 250,000– 500,000– 1,000,000
areas
249,999 499,999 999,999 or more
Crimes against 44.4 47.9 56.1 48.1 28.2
the person1
Property crimes2 280.2 289.2 285.1 254.6 173.5
Source: US Department of Justice (2000) Tables 52 and 53
Notes:
1 These figures relate to the number of victims per 1,000 people aged 12 and over.
2 These figures relate to the number of victims per 1,000 households.
Table 2.8 Crime rates by type of area, USA, 1998
Type of crime Urban Sub- Rural US 
urban average
Crimes against the person1 48.7 36.7 28.2 37.9
Property crimes2 274.2 204.5 173.5 217.4
Property crimes, property owned/being bought2 256.2 181.8 149.9 221.5
Property crimes, property being rented2 291.9 262.9 237.6 272.0
Source: US Department of Justice (2000) Tables 52, 53 and 56
Notes:
1 These figures relate to the number of victims per 1,000 people aged 12 and over.
2 These figures relate to the number of victims per 1,000 households.
property which is owned or being bought; and the differences between these two
categories in these terms are much more marked in suburban and rural areas than
they are in urban areas. So crime (at least when measured in terms of crimes
against the person and property crimes) is clearly a much more marked phenome-
non in urban areas in the USA than it is in suburban and rural areas. There are
important regional variations within this pattern of urban concentration, with urban
dwellers in the west of the USA being nearly twice as likely as urban dwellers in its
north-east to be on the receiving end of property crime (US Department of Justice
(2000) Table 58). This also has a considerable effect on the overall US average
figure, which in all the cases in Table 2.8 is somewhere between the urban and the
suburban figures.
Family income is also a key differentiator of risk of being on the receiving end
of crime in the USA, although this is much more marked for some types of crime
than it is for others. Table 2.9 draws together some of the key indicators in these
terms, taking the lowest and the highest annual income categories in the
Department of Justice tables and a representative middle income bracket
($35,000–$49,999 was chosen for these purposes, because it contains the
largest population aged 12 and over and the largest number of households). Table
2.9 shows that the poorest people in the USA are virtually twice as likely to be on
the receiving end of crimes against the person than are people who are in the
higher income brackets, although the differences between middle and higher
incomes in these terms are not particularly significant. For property crime, the likeli-
hood of being a victim rises with income; the rate of risk illustrated by the figures in
Table 2.9 is about 20 per cent greater in these terms for the highest income band
than it is for those in the lowest income band.
There is also a racial dimension to these statistics; Table 2.10 looks at this in
more detail by race (defined for these purposes in terms of ‘black’ or ‘white’ with
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Table 2.9 Crime rates by selected family income ranges, USA, 1998
Type of crime Less than $35,000– $75,000 or 
$7,500 $49,999 more
All personal crimes1 65.5 33.3 34.1
Property crimes2 209.0 221.7 248.6
Population aged 12 and 11,724,160 34,039,640 29,414,500
over in this income range
Source: US Department of Justice (2000) Tables 14 and 20
Notes:
1 These figures relate to the number of victims per 1,000 people aged 12 and over.
2 These figures relate to the number of victims per 1,000 households.
‘other’ excluded) and by income band. This shows that black people are usually
more likely to be the victims of the specified crimes than are white people (this is
true in 10 out of the 12 cases cited in Table 2.10), sometimes markedly more so,
and that these differences also vary with income levels. So, for example, the
poorest black people are actually slightly less likely to be on the receiving end of
crimes of violence than are the poorest white people; but by the time that the com-
parison is with the wealthiest people (although the overall risk has decreased) the
differential has changed markedly, such that the wealthiest black people are
approximately 50 per cent more likely to be the victims of crimes of violence than
are the wealthiest white people. A broadly similar pattern emerges for household
burglary and for theft, with in both cases a markedly higher risk for the wealthiest
black people than for the wealthiest white people, and it is only in relation to the
theft of a motor vehicle that this particular differential is not so marked. In this latter
case, however, there are very large differences in risk at the lower levels of income,
with the poorest black people being more than three times more likely to be the
victims of theft of a motor vehicle than the poorest white people, with this differen-
tial jumping to nearly four times for middle income people. There is also evidence
to suggest that as well as being differentially more likely to be the victims of many
crimes, black people are also much more likely to be convicted of crimes and
imprisoned as a result than are white people. In 1991, in the USA, the ‘incarcera-
tion rate’ was 396 per 100,000 white adults and 2,563 per 100,000 black adults,
a ratio of approximately 1:6.5 (Langan and Farrington, 1998, page 44).
Overall, within a pattern of falling crime rates in recent times, this information
suggests that crime in the USA is particularly an urban phenomenon, that for
crimes against the person there is a close relationship between poverty and the
risk of crime, and that race is also a significant factor in some instances with black
people usually more likely to be victims of crime than white people from the same
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Table 2.10 Crime victim rates by income and by race, USA, 1998
Less than $7,500 $35,000–$49,999 $75,000 or more
Type of crime White Black White Black White Black
Crimes of violence1 66.0 63.4 32.0 33.4 33.1 50.3
Household burglary2 53.6 61.6 32.3 42.1 27.2 50.5
Theft2 146.7 133.1 175.0 194.6 209.5 253.2
Theft of motor vehicle2 6.6 20.6 8.5 30.4 11.6 13.2
Source: US Department of Justice (2000) Tables 15, 21–23
Notes: 
1 These figures relate to the number of victims per 1,000 people aged 12 and over.
2 These figures relate to the number of victims per 1,000 households.
income bands. These elements are, of course, often closely interrelated in many
parts of American cities, which is why such areas have often been the subject of
place-specific crime-prevention initiatives (Feins et al., 1997).
Within this framework, particular attention has been paid in popular culture to
the component of crime in American cities that is to do with violence. US Bureau
of Justice statistics show that murder has been a crime more likely to be committed
in large cities than elsewhere in the USA, but they also show that homicide rates
were falling quite rapidly in the USA during the 1990s. The headline points are as
follows:
• Over the period 1976–1998, over half of all homicides occurred in cities with
a population of 100,000 or more and nearly one quarter were in cities with a
population of 1 million or more.
• But from 1991 the number of homicides in the largest cities was falling, and
by 1997 this figure had fallen to a rate below that recorded two decades pre-
viously.
• The comparable figures for suburban areas, small cities and rural areas
varied relatively little over this same period (source: Bureau of Justice,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/city.htm).
These trends are confirmed by National Crime Prevention Association data, which
show, among other things:
• Serious crime (murder, rape, robbery, serious assault and burglary) was at a
twenty-five-year low in 1998 in the USA. Within this, figures for murder
showed an 8 per cent drop from 1997 to 1998 and those for robbery
dropped by 11 per cent.
• Nonetheless, 8.1 million Americans were estimated to be victims of violent
crimes in 1998, and the annual cost of crime per annum was put at $4,500
per household.
• Public concern about these matters was confirmed in a 1998 Gallup Poll,
which showed that the American public ranked crime and violence as the
most important problems facing the country (source: National Crime Preven-
tion Association, hhtp://www.ncpa.org/studies/s229/s229.html).
Evidence is emerging that some politicians and criminologists in the USA
regard all of this as a process which was beginning to bottom out by the late
1990s, with the likelihood of a long-term continuation of the ‘good news’ represen-
ted by these 1990s trends being limited. An Associated Press news report of 22
June 2000 by Brett Martel, for example, in looking at some of these views, makes
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the point that expert views vary across the country, as indeed do the records of
individual cities. So, for example, murder rates in cities such as New Orleans, Los
Angeles and New York were reported as being up over the preceding 12 months,
although other cities such as Denver and Phoenix had experienced drops.
What does seem clear from this is that as well as broad national patterns,
many local factors must also be at work across the USA to account for some of
these differences; and many of these are likely to have environmental dimensions
to them.
Crime Trends in Britain2
Britain has probably seen itself historically as a country where crime rates are relat-
ively low, and where respect for the forces of law and order is quite widespread;
although it is now clear that the first part of that proposition in comparison with the
USA is open to challenge (Langan and Farrington, 1998), which will inevitably also
undermine the second part.3 Nevertheless, crime prevention has broadly been seen
as a consequence until recent times as being the territory of the police; it was
really not until Home Office Circular 8/84 (issued in 1984) placed an emphasis on
multi-agency approaches in the wake, amongst other things, of an investigation into
a wave of civil disturbances in many of Britain’s inner cities in 1981 that this per-
ception could clearly be seen to be changing (Walklate, in McLaughlin and
Muncie, 1996, pages 293–331).
This changing perception may well have been related to emerging evidence
that putting more resources into policing, the criminal justice system and the prison
system did not appear to be stemming what was seen as a growing tide of crime
(Fyfe, in Pacione, 1997, pages 255–8). Thus, for example, Smith (in Herbert and
Smith, 1989, page 271) reported that recorded crime in England and Wales rose
by 63 per cent between the mid 1970s and the mid 1980s, whereas clear-up rates
fell from 45 per cent in 1970 to 31 per cent in 1985. It was clear, however, that
this trend was not consistent either between or within urban areas of Britain, so
people’s experiences across the country were likely to be very variable. To illustrate
this Table 2.11, based upon work done by Taylor et al. (1996, page 26), compares
recorded crimes in Sheffield and Manchester between 1975 and 1990. Taken at
face value,4 Table 2.11 shows that both cities experienced large-scale crime
increases over the period in question, with the rate of increase being a little less in
Manchester than in Sheffield, but with the overall crime rate apparently being much
higher. Indeed, on this basis, nearly one in five of Manchester’s population was on
the receiving end of a crime in 1990, whereas the figure for Sheffield was a little
less than one in ten. More recent evidence seems to suggest that disparities
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between these cities have continued. The Independent of 18 July 2000, in reporting
recorded crime figures up to March 2000 for particular localities, comments on the
perception of Sheffield as a much safer city than Manchester,5 which it attributes
primarily to the nature of the community policing initiatives taken in Sheffield during
the 1990s. As an example, the Manchester figures show crimes of violence against
the person running at five times the Sheffield per capita rate for 1999/2000, and the
Manchester figures for burglary running at nearly twice the Sheffield per capita rate.
Without wishing to deny the possibility that particular sets of community policing
initiatives can make a difference, we find it difficult to believe that this is a probable
primary explanation for these differences, which appear to have existed long before
the community policing initiatives in question started. Rather, the figures presented
here (assuming that they can be relied upon) would tend to suggest that the phe-
nomena reflected in them are both long-term and deeply rooted in the socio-
economic characteristics of these communities, rather than being primarily a
function of different local styles of policing embarked upon in recent times.
The chances of being on the receiving end of a crime covered by the data in
Table 2.11, high though they may appear to be in many areas, need to be disag-
gregated, because even by the early 1980s there were major differences between
different parts of cities with their very different sets of prevailing economic and
social circumstances. Smith (in Herbert and Smith, 1989, page 276), for example,
shows that 1983 figures indicate that 12 per cent of households living in the
poorest municipal estates in Britain’s cities experienced at least one actual or
attempted burglary that year, whereas for households living in the more affluent
suburbs the equivalent figure was only 3 per cent. It is perhaps scarcely surprising
given these large-scale differences between component parts of cities that area-
based initiatives have been a significant component of the recent response to this
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Table 2.11 Recorded crimes per 100,000 population, Sheffield and Manchester, 1975–1990
Year Manchester Rate of increase Sheffield Rate of increase 
on 1975 base on 1975 base 
(1975 =100) (1975 =100)
1975 10,368 100 3,565 100
1980 13,180 127 4,893 137
1985 18,732 181 6,207 174
1990 19,724 190 8,602 241
Source: developed from Taylor et al. (1996) page 26
Note: Manchester and Sheffield are two northern English cities some 40 miles apart of broadly
similar population sizes within their administrative cities, although Manchester is the core city of a
much larger conurbation than is Sheffield and has much more wide-ranging regional functions.
issue in Britain. Indeed, the Urban Policy White Paper (Department of the Environ-
ment, Transport and the Regions, 2000b, page 106) summarises comparisons
between Britain’s cities and the national average carried out as part of the British
Crime Survey 2000 as showing that people living in conurbations ‘are 19 per cent
more likely to experience violent crime, 46 per cent more likely to experience bur-
glary and 35 per cent more likely to experience vehicle related theft’.
The 1998 and the 2000 British Crime Surveys allow us to bring this material
nearly up to date. Table 2.12 shows the pattern of crimes recorded in the regular
British Crime Surveys carried out for the Home Office between 1981 and 1999,
with the four selected categories being responsible for about 50 per cent of the
total number of crimes recorded in the British Crime Survey over the period in
question.
Overall, the 1981–1995 period saw crime numbers grow by over 70 per
cent, before the last two Survey years of the 1990s saw successive reductions
from the 1995 peak. Nonetheless, the long-term trend was still upwards, with the
overall number of crimes recorded by British Crime Surveys growing by one-third
between 1981 and 1999. In rank order terms, the biggest growth rates by types of
crimes recorded in Table 2.12 over the period 1981–1995 were for all vehicle
thefts, followed respectively by burglary, common assault and vandalism; it is
noticeable that both of the ‘top two’ categories have very specific environmental
dimensions to them. This precise rank order is repeated in terms of the scale of the
falls recorded between 1995 and 1999, with the figures respectively being 32
per cent for all vehicle thefts, 27 per cent for burglary, 22 per cent for common
assault and 17 per cent for vandalism. It is probably too soon on the basis of two
Survey years’ worth of data to conclude that Britain has permanently reversed its
long-term pattern of a significant growth in the crime rate, especially since the
absolute level remains well above that for 1981, but clearly the downturn recorded
by the 1997 and 1999 results is very welcome to all parties (except perhaps the
criminal fraternity) after well over a decade of seemingly inexorable growth.
Table 2.13, then, looks at crime rates, either per 1,000 adults or per 1,000
households, with a particular concentration on the changes recorded in the most
recent British Crime Surveys in the 1990s. Crime rates rose (in some cases by
large amounts) between 1981 and 1993, then fell back between 1993 and 1999;
although in the case of common assault 1995 saw a further rise from 1993 before
falling back. In all cases except that of vandalism, 1999 rates were still well above
those recorded for 1981; for vandalism, the figure for 1997 was below that for
1981, and 1999 showed a further fall. It should be noted in interpreting the major-
ity of these figures that average household sizes were falling in Britain over the
1981–1997 period and are predicted to continue to fall; this will have an effect on
future crime rates measured per household, not only because the number of



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































households will be growing but also because the number of houses (and hence
the opportunity for property crimes) will also be growing.
The 1998 British Crime Survey also contains some useful information on what
it describes as ‘unequal risks’ (Home Office (1998) pages 27–43); this is continued
in the 2000 Survey although it is not presented in the same way. The point has
already been made that the risk of being on the receiving end of burglary is much
less in British cities for people living in one of the more affluent suburban areas than
for those living in one of the poorest inner city municipal estates; this broad pattern
is confirmed by the 1998 Survey results. Table 2.14 picks out some key elements in
this pattern of unequal risk of being on the receiving end of burglary by looking at
pairs of results, which demonstrate vividly the differences in risks in these terms:
basically, being young, being unemployed, living in a flat or maisonette, living in the
inner city, living in a municipal housing area, and living on a main road are all risk
factors; there are others. These factors in turn make a major difference to insurance
costs and availability (Wong, 1997). Explaining these differences can be both diffi-
cult and controversial, and can get quickly into awkward political waters. For
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Table 2.14 Some key components in the geographical distribution of risks of burglary, 1997
Component Percentage1
Age of head of household 16–24 15.2
Age of head of household 65–74 3.5
Head of household in employment 5.4
Head of household unemployed 10.0
Detached house 4.1
Flats/maisonettes 7.2
Inner city location 8.5
Rural location 3.4
Municipal housing area 8.1
Non-municipal housing area 5.1
Main road location 6.6
Cul-de-sac2 4.3
Average for all households 5.6
Source: Home Office (1998) Tables 5.1 and 5.2
Notes:
1 Percentages relate to the numbers of households who were victims of burglary at least once
during 1997.
2 We refer subsequently (in Chapters 7 and 8) to the debate around the apparent support of a
majority of police Architectural Liaison Officers in Britain for the cul-de-sac form of housing
layout, on the grounds that it limits the escape opportunities available to criminals. This finding
(that in 1997 there was approximately a 50 per cent greater chance of being a victim of burglary
on at least one occasion if living on a main road location rather than in a cul-de-sac) may go
some considerable way towards explaining this preference.
example, if most burglary is opportunistic rather than carefully preplanned (as the
police typically say that it is), and if it is much more likely to take place in the poorest
rather than the wealthiest areas, the inference that most burglars are residents of
the poorest areas is difficult to resist. This is perhaps saying something fairly
obvious about the residential location of burglars, but it also carries the risk of stig-
matising large numbers of law-abiding citizens who live in those areas; and it can be
argued that this has in the past created some reticence in policy initiatives. There is
a suggestion, however, that concern about stigmatisation in this way is becoming a
little less significant in shaping British policy, as is perhaps illustrated by the
announcement of the Youth Inclusion Programme in July 2000 (see The Independ-
ent, 26 July 2000, article entitled ‘Ministers identify 47 crime hot spots’). This pro-
gramme not only identifies forty-seven crime ‘hot spots’ in England and Wales, but
also seeks to target within each the fifty worst offenders aged 13–16. Whatever the
merits of an initiative of this kind, it is clear that the obvious risk of stigmatisation that
it gives rise to is not seen to have outweighed the value of targeting in this instance.
In this brief overview of what we know about the geography of contemporary
crime in Britain, it should also be pointed out that the 1998 British Crime Survey
data, not for the first time, show that the risks of being on the receiving end of viol-
ence vary hugely by age and by sex. Table 2.15 picks out the key points, which are
that the group most at risk (by a huge margin) are young men and that risk falls
away very rapidly by age group. One of the favourite media images in Britain in
recent years in reporting on violence has been of the elderly woman who has been
attacked, because of course it is a shocking thing when it happens; but Table 2.15
shows that this group is in fact very unlikely to be on the receiving end of an attack
(see Pain, 2000, pages 374–6, for a review of what recent research has con-
cluded about some of these matters). The importance of this, of course, is that
such reporting has an impact on public perceptions of crime risk, and since the
fear of crime is one of the most significant elements in this field the relationship
between media coverage and fact is an important matter.6
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Source: Home Office (1998) Table 5.6
Table 2.15 could perhaps be interpreted as being dismissive of concerns
about gender differences, in that it records men as nearly twice as likely to be on
the receiving end of crimes of violence as women (and, it should be said, in the
case of young men aged 16–24, much more likely to perpetrate those crimes
against other young men). This does not, of course, deal with the question of the
fear of violence, nor does it deal with different types of violence and the social situ-
ations in which they occur, both of which are very important considerations in
seeking to understand issues related to gender as far as crimes of violence are
concerned. In particular, it does not distinguish between single acts of violence
and repeat victimisation, because it treats one or a number of attacks as simply
one person who has been on the receiving end of violence. The statistics on repeat
victimisation produce very different results from those of Table 2.15, however, as
Table 2.16 shows, with women aged 25–44 being the group at greatest risk.
About four in ten of the following groups who were victims of violence at
least once were actually repeat victims during 1997:
• women aged 25–44 (which is attributed to the high risk of repeat incidents
of domestic violence);
• single parents (who are largely women);
• social renters;
• those in council estate areas (Home Office (1998) page 41).
It is clear from the above that there are important gender differences here, although
as yet it is not so clear to what extent environment is a significant explanatory
factor in this (see Walklate in McLaughlin and Muncie, 1996, pages 300–2; also
Pain, 2000, pages 374–6). It is also clear from recent work that there are import-
ant gender differences in terms of ‘worry about crime’, with the British Crime
Survey 2000 (Home Office (2000b) page 48) showing that women described
themselves as ‘very worried’ about certain types of crime in comparison with men
at higher than a ratio of 2:1 in respect of rape (29:7), physical attack (27:9), being
insulted or pestered (13:5) and mugging (23:11).
Given the statistics reported above, it is scarcely surprising that crime in
Britain is big news, as is politicians’ reactions to crime. Indeed, there is probably a
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Table 2.16 Proportion of victims of violence victimised more than once in 1997
Women aged 25–44 40.0%
Men aged 16–24 34.7%
Women aged 16–24 30.0%
Source: Home Office (1998) Table 5.8
symbiotic relationship between crime, the ways that crime is reported, and political
reactions. One of the sound-bites most remembered in Britain from the Labour
Party’s successful 1997 general election campaign, for example, was ‘Tough on
crime, tough on the causes of crime’. As a generalisation, crime statistics are often
regarded as fair game politically, with politicians freely blaming each other when
they get worse, massaging them to suit their particular stances and quickly claim-
ing credit when they improve, all of which in turn generates further headlines. A
typical example of how this relationship between crime rates and the political
debate is sometimes reported even in the responsible press is the following extract
from a report in The Independent of 11 July 2000 under the headline ‘Blair raises
stakes with Commons showdown’:
Crime has risen to the top of the agenda, with Labour’s private polls showing
the Tories have re-established their reputation as the best party on law and
order after populist initiatives by Mr Hague.
Government sources admitted last night that official Home Office
figures to be published next week show crime in England and Wales has risen
by almost 3.5 per cent in the past year, largely due to a sharp increase in violent
offences.
Although burglary and car crime fell in the 12 months to April, the
increase in violent crime could reach double figures. The Home Office will reveal
that police successes in combating burglaries in cities has (sic) led drug addicts
to turn to robbery to fund their habit.
In a few short sentences, this illustrates both the perceived importance of crime to
the battle between the political parties and the extent to which attempts are being
made to dampen down the ‘bad news’ elements of an apparent rise in crime rates
by damage limitation tactics (trying to turn the figures into ‘old news’ and engaging
in deflection in explanations). Whatever else this achieves, however, it shows that
crime rates and the action to deal with them remain at the top of the political
agenda.
The intensity of reporting crime issues in Britain is well illustrated by looking
at the four major stories about crime reported in that same newspaper (The
Independent) in the three-week period that followed the story including the extract
quoted above, which appeared on 11 July 2000:
• 17 July 2000 – ‘Planners and police surrender city centres to Britain’s mass
volume vertical drinkers’ – near full-page spread reporting the rise of violent
(alcohol-related) behaviour in city centres that have fully embraced policies of
promoting ‘the night-time economy’.
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• 18 July 2000 – ‘Robberies rise by more than a quarter in a year’ – full-page
spread reporting new police crime statistics and some local initiatives to
tackle crime.
• 26 July 2000 – ‘Ministers identify 47 crime hot spots’ – near full-page spread
showing ministerial reactions to crime problems by ‘cracking down’ on ‘hot
spots’.
• 1 August 2000 – ‘Crime figures sham as police fail to report 1.4m offences’ –
front page main story, reporting a research study on the differences between
reported and recorded crime, which concentrates on the explanation that this
was about massaging the figures to make the police appear more successful.
Readers will readily understand that if this was the intensity of coverage in
the broadsheet press, the tabloids were even more prone to screaming headlines
and dramatic stories. We believe that there is likely to be a relationship between this
level of press coverage of crime issues on an ongoing basis and fear of crime in
society, and thus the material that introduces Chapter 7 of this book (on public per-
ceptions of crime as a quality of life issue in Britain) needs to be seen in this context.
Crime in the USA and Britain: A Comparison
As we have already noted, the problems associated with undertaking reliable inter-
national comparisons of crime data are very considerable. In terms of the compari-
son between the USA and Britain, however, we are much helped by a major 1998
study for the US Department of Justice which sought to look at this issue over the
period 1981–1996 (Langan and Farrington, 1998). Table 2.17 picks out key
figures based upon survey information.
The broad patterns of crime in each individual country have already been
noted, with falls in the USA particularly in the 1990s and with steady rises in
Britain, and these patterns are repeated in Table 2.17. What this table also shows
is that British crime rates were well behind those in the USA for robbery and for
burglary in 1981, but well ahead for both categories by 1995; and that for assault
and for motor vehicle theft British crime rates were already ahead of those for the
USA by 1981, with this gap substantially widened by 1995. Perhaps the most
remarkable reversal here is in the figures for burglary, for which in 1981 the British
rate was less than half of that for the USA whereas by 1995 the British rate was
approaching double that of the USA. The degree of change over the 1981–1995
period can easily be understood by looking at the ratios between the USA and the
England and Wales rates for the beginning and the end of the period, as follows
(USA figures first):
























































































































































































































• for robbery, the ratio was 1.75:1 in 1981 and 0.7:1 in 1995;
• for assault, the ratio was 0.9:1 in 1981 and 0.4:1 in 1995;
• for burglary, the ratio was 2.6:1 in 1981 and 0.6:1 in 1995;
• for motor vehicle theft, the ratio was 0.7:1 in 1981 and 0.5:1 in 1995.
In the first three of these cases, the changes in the ratios recorded are a function
of both the improving figures in the USA and the worsening figures in England and
Wales, whereas for motor vehicle theft the change in the ratio is wholly a function
of the deteriorating position in England and Wales.
Police records (used here because survey information does not cover all this
ground) show that for crimes of violence the USA apparently remains a compara-
tively more violent society than Britain, although the gap seems to be closing. This
may well be linked to the use of firearms in violent crimes, with police statistics
showing that they were used in 68 per cent of murders and 41 per cent of rob-
beries in the USA in 1996 whereas the respective figures for England and Wales
were 7 per cent and 5 per cent respectively (Langan and Farrington, 1998, page
iii). Table 2.18 picks out the key statistics from police records.
On the basis of the evidence contained in Table 2.18, whilst in the case of
each type of violent crime the USA has a higher rate than England and Wales, in
each case the gap is narrowing. This can be shown by giving the changing ratios
between the USA and the England and Wales rates for the beginning and the end
of the period as follows (USA figures first):
• for murder, the ratio was 10:1 in 1981 and 8:1 in 1995;
• for rape, the ratio was 17.5:1 in 1981 and 3.5:1 in 1995;
• for robbery, the ratio was 6.5:1 in 1981 and 1.7:1 in 1995;
• for assault, the ratio was 1.5:1 in 1981 and 1.1:1 in 1995 (and indeed by
1996 the rate in England and Wales was recorded as being about 13 per
cent above that for the USA).
In the cases of the figures for robbery and for assault contained in Table 2.18, the
explanation for this changing ratio appears to lie in a combination of a falling crime
rate in the USA and a rising rate in England and Wales. It should be noted, however,
that these figures, based as they are on police records, may well under-represent
the position in England and Wales more severely than they do the position in the
USA. This is because the survey data for both these categories for 1995 contained
in Table 2.17 show the rates per 1,000 people in both these cases to be higher in
England and Wales than in the USA. The explanation for this difference may well lie
in the police recording practices in the two countries, which Table 2.3 shows
produce very different outcomes, rather than in reporting rates to the police which







































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.1 shows are not very different. For murder, the explanation for the changing
ratio appears to lie wholly in the falling rate in the USA between 1991 and 1995,
since the figure for England and Wales did not change over the period. For rape,
the explanation for the changing ratio appears to lie wholly in the rising rate in
England and Wales, since the 1981 and 1995 figures for the USA were the same
and indeed the 1991 figure was slightly higher than this.
To provide a broader international comparative base, Table 2.19 sets out for
selected countries and in selected categories of criminal activity information on crime
rates per 100,000 people based upon police records. It is important that readers
should understand in looking at this table that it has been constructed to enable them
to make a judgment in broad ‘order of magnitude’ terms about how crime rates in the
USA and in England and Wales (the subject of this chapter to date) stand up against
some comparator countries in the developed world, and not to facilitate direct statisti-
cal comparisons of equivalent data. Readers who wish to pursue international com-
parisons based upon comparative sample surveys should look at the periodic results
from the International Crime Victim Survey carried out under the auspices of the
United Nations, which involves a programme of standardised sample surveys looking
at householders’ experiences with crime, policing, crime prevention and feelings
about safety. At the time of writing, the available data from this source were not as
recent as those quoted in Table 2.19, but clearly this will change over time.
Bearing in mind these caveats about how Table 2.19 should be used, it does
suggest that crime rates in the USA and in England and Wales are broadly in the
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Table 2.19 Crimes per 100,000 people, 1998, from police records for selected ‘comparator’ countries
Country Total Homicide Violent Domestic Theft of 
number crime burglary a motor 
of crimes vehicle
England and Wales 8545 1.4 633 902 745
Germany 7682 1.2 222 198 193
France 6085 1.6 330 354 710
USA 4617 6.3 567 862 459
Canada 8094 1.8 974 728 547
Australia 6979 1.8 926 1580 703
Japan 1612 1.1 33 188 559
Source: Developed from Barclay and Tavares (2000) Tables 1, 1.1, 1.3–1.5
Note: The statistical basis for the collection of crime data by the police varies between countries,
thus this table does not purport to claim that like is being compared exactly with like. Some of the
apparent differences will be explained by these differences in statistical practices. In addition, of
course, the general comments about the limitations of police recorded crime data introduced
earlier in this chapter apply to this material.
same range as are those in many of the chosen comparator countries. In an
absolute sense, England and Wales stands out for the high overall volume of crime
it displays (but not in every category), and the USA stands out in terms of its homi-
cide rate. Similarly, Japan stands out for the relatively low overall volume of crime it
displays and also for its low numbers in most categories. There are also significant
differences between the numbers for the various categories of crime for many coun-
tries, which in the broadest of senses are probably culturally specific; see, for
example, the figures for Australia.7 The overall conclusion to be drawn from Table
2.19 is that each country in its own particular way clearly has a significant crime
problem, and is likely as a consequence to be interested in methods that carry the
probability of success in reducing these figures. There is nowhere that can afford to
be complacent about these absolute levels of crime, and inevitably there is bound to
be a particular interest, given these sorts of absolute levels and the concerns they
cause in their respective societies, in what is happening to annual trends.
As far as the demography and the geography of crime are concerned, direct
comparisons are more difficult to make because the available survey information is in
each case tailored to the particular situation in its own country. We would suggest,
however, that the information presented about this earlier in this chapter suggests
that the situations in the USA and in Britain are broadly similar. That is to say, crime
tends to be more concentrated in urban areas, and within these within the poorest
areas; that for many crimes the poorest people in society also have the highest vic-
timisation rates; and that housing tenure patterns are also significant, with higher
property crime rates tending to be experienced by households in rented properties,
particularly in inner city-type locations, than by those who own or who are purchasing
properties. There are also significant racial differences, both in terms of those who
are the victims of crime and those who are incarcerated as a result of crime, and
these too appear to be broadly common between the two societies. Table 2.20 picks
out the key data in support of this statement in respect of incarceration rates.
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Table 2.20 Incarceration rates by race, USA and England and Wales, 1991
Racial USA England and Wales
grouping
Rate per Rate in Rate per Rate in 
100,000 adult comparison with 100,000 adult comparison with
population rate for white population rate for white
population population
White 396 1 102 1
Black 2,563 6.5 667 6.6
Other 643 1.6 233 2.3
Source: Langan and Farrington (1998) page 44
Table 2.20 shows that incarceration is more common overall in the USA than
in England and Wales (in the ratio of over 3.5:1), but that the racial distribution of
this ‘incarcerated population’ is actually very similar between the two societies,
with in particular the black population being in each case over six times more likely
to be incarcerated than the white population.
Conclusions
In an absolute sense, the figures provided in this chapter show why crime con-
tinues to be a matter of major public and political interest in the USA and in Britain.
While a great deal of political and media attention is devoted to the trajectories
inherent in the latest statistics, the overall levels of crime they portray show some-
thing that people as individuals are likely to experience in one form or another
during their lives, and are likely to be aware of at a still greater level of frequency in
terms of what is happening in their neighbourhood or their workplace. We would
suggest that it is this sense of crime as a personal or a proximate experience that is
also a major factor in the high ‘fear of crime’ scores we have discussed in this
chapter. Crime is not a remote activity affecting a few people, but a tangible threat
reinforced by the experiences of friends and colleagues. This perhaps suggests
that the overall levels of crime in society actually matter much more than the latest
trends, and will continue to do so while crime remains on the scale we have illus-
trated in this chapter.
This brief examination of the demography and the geography of crime in the
USA and in England and Wales also illustrates clearly why both countries have
exhibited considerable interest in area-based initiatives to tackle crime problems
and in the idea of ‘hot spots’ (areas of particular concentration of certain kinds of
crime). As we have indicated, these are likely to be inner city areas with a predomi-
nance of rented housing, concentrations of poverty, and quite probably also a con-
centration of people from ethnic minority communities. If these sorts of areas are
typical crime ‘hot spots’, they are also areas where the experience of planners has
tended to be that community-based initiatives can be particularly difficult to mount
successfully. We give several examples of initiatives of this kind in Chapters 5–8.
Overall, however, we believe that this review justifies our claim that in these terms
both societies face broadly common problems, although they are coming at them
with very different trajectories in terms of recent overall patterns of crime, with
significant reductions in crime rates having taken place in the USA in the 1990s
and significant increases having typified the British position until relatively recently.
We think that this difference of trajectory may be one element in explaining the
apparent searching in Britain for an ever-broader policy framework within which to
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tackle crime in the latter part of the 1990s, which is not visible in the USA; these
matters in particular are developed in more detail in Chapters 5 and 7.
Notes
1 Long-term comparisons of crime data are bedevilled by the fact that they can conceal
quite major shifts in what is regarded as socially acceptable or unacceptable. For
example, it has been argued that shifts in thinking about domestic violence as part of the
emancipation of women in the twentieth century make a real difference to what is kept
within the family as distinct from reported to the police, and thus trends drawn from the
crude statistics without considering the changing wider social context are potentially
misleading. Similarly, comparisons between areas are very difficult when it is all too
often unclear whether apparent differences reflect significant variations or merely differ-
ences arising from the differential application of some of the types of problems with
police records noted in this chapter. Short-term comparisons within the same area
simply have a better chance that these variables might be less significant; and in any
event, police records may be all that is available at the local level for the purpose of
undertaking this kind of comparison. Even so, as noted, care should be taken in using
these data to ensure as far as possible that like is being compared with like.
2 There is both a terminological and a data problem behind this use of the term ‘Britain’.
We use the term in this chapter to mean England and Wales, simply because that is the
territory consistently covered by the Home Office’s regular British Crime Surveys, which
in turn are used in the major USA/UK comparison (the work of Langan and Farrington)
upon which we draw heavily in this chapter. But we are conscious that many people
would expect a USA/UK comparison to be about the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, which of course includes both Scotland and Northern Ireland as
well as England and Wales. As far as Northern Ireland is concerned, the period over
which the statistics in this chapter extend is also the period of ‘the troubles’, which have
undoubtedly affected crime statistics in that part of the United Kingdom; we have there-
fore chosen not to include material on Northern Ireland. As far as Scotland is concerned,
the situation is somewhat complex because there has not been consistent coverage of
Scotland during the period of the regular British Crime Surveys. Scotland participated in
the 1982 and 1988 British Crime Surveys, but data collection was restricted to south-
ern and central Scotland. Factoring data up from this limited sample to provide esti-
mates for the whole of Scotland would be difficult, however, because it is known that
there are significant differences in terms of victimisation rates between the more urban
populations in the areas included in the 1982 and 1988 studies and the more rural
areas further north excluded from them. Since 1993, Scotland has had its own Scottish
Crime Survey, which broadly parallels the British Crime Survey, and to date three Scot-
tish Crime Surveys have been undertaken and published (1993, 1996 and 2000). This
means that directly comparable trend data for Scotland relate to a shorter period than
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do data from the British Crime Survey. The key points arising from the 2000 Survey
(MVA Ltd, 2000) in respect of crime in Scotland are as follows:
• The overall volume of crime fell by 13% between 1995 and 1999.
• Over 60 per cent of crimes in 1999 were against property, approximately half of
which were against vehicles.
• The fall in the overall volume of crime between 1995 and 1999 appears to be mainly
attributable to a significant drop in relatively minor crimes (such as ‘theft from a motor
vehicle’ or ‘other household theft’), but violent crimes appear to have increased over
the period. This latter conclusion is a conditional one, however, because it is affected
by a change in the questions used in the two surveys at either end of this period.
• Rates of victimisation appear to be lower in Scotland than they are in England and
Wales for all categories of crime. A comparison of victimisation rates for Scotland
from the 2000 Scottish Crime Survey and for England and Wales from the 2000
British Crime Survey shows the following summary:
Types of offences Scotland England Figure for 
and England 
Wales and Wales if
Scotland
= 100
Household offences per 1,000 households 237.4 428.7 181
Personal offences per 1,000 adults 
aged 16 or over 78.8 126.4 160
Source: MVA Ltd (2000) Table 3, page 8
Administrative responsibility at central government level for work in this area has shifted
as a result of the creation of the Scottish Parliament in the late 1990s. The 1993 Scot-
tish Crime Survey was commissioned by the Scottish Office, which was a UK Govern-
ment Department with territorial responsibility for most matters of ‘home’ policy in
Scotland, and thus was the equivalent in these terms of the Home Office covering
England and Wales. By the time the 2000 Scottish Crime Survey was published,
however, this responsibility had shifted to the Scottish Parliament and to the public
service structure in Scotland that it oversees.
3 This perception is well illustrated by a full-page article in the Sunday Times of 11
January 1998 by Jon Ungoed-Thomas, entitled ‘A Nation of Thieves’. The summary of
that article immediately beneath its banner headline puts the matter as follows:
More than one in three British men has a criminal record by the age of 40. While
America has cut its crime rate dramatically Britain remains the crime capital of the
west. Where, asks Jon Ungoed-Thomas, have we gone wrong?
4 Bearing in mind what we have said earlier in this chapter about the limitations of police
data and the difficulties of comparison over quite long periods of time and between
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places, it is pertinent to question the extent to which the differences recorded in Table
2.11 are solely attributable to differences in criminality in the two locations, or whether
they also include some other types of differences, such as differences in recording prac-
tices between police in Greater Manchester and in South Yorkshire.
5 There is some evidence to suggest that Sheffield can justify the claim made by its local
press that it is the ‘Safest City in England’, at any rate amongst the largest cities, and
marketing activities in relation to Sheffield have been quick to pick up on this. The
Sheffield Hallam University website (at http://www.shu.ac.uk/index.html), for example,
includes amongst its publicity designed to attract students to the University a compara-
tive table based upon Home Office collations of police recorded crime statistics; this
shows Sheffield as having lower offences rates per 1,000 population in 2000 than all of
Leeds, Nottingham, Birmingham, Liverpool, Manchester and Leicester for personal viol-
ence, sexual offences, robbery and theft from a vehicle; lower rates than all of these
except Liverpool in respect of burglary; and lower rates than all of these except Leices-
ter in respect of theft of a vehicle. By contrast, Manchester was the worst or second
worst performer amongst all of these categories in the table. In spite of this, and against
a background of a fall in recorded crime of 20 per cent in Sheffield between 1995/96
and 1999/00, the experiences of different parts of the city are very different, as is typ-
ically the case in British cities. So, for example, recorded violent crime per 1,000 popu-
lation is approximately four times greater in Central Sheffield than it is in other parts of
the city. This area also has the highest rate in three of these five years for recorded
domestic burglary and in all five years for recorded motor vehicle crime, although in this
latter case the trend has been sharply downwards (Sheffield First Partnership (n.d.)
pages 58–61). Overall, we would suggest that these figures provide some support for
the view that community policing initiatives have made a difference in Sheffield in recent
years, but that the patterns of lower recorded crime rates in comparison with Manches-
ter are consistent with the evidence we provide in Table 2.11 going back at least to
1975, and are thus primarily about longer-term phenomena.
6 The concept of ‘fear of crime’ can be two-edged. In other words, fear can affect
people’s behaviour, but the absence of fear may make groups of people insufficiently
aware of risks. Some of the results of the 2000 British Crime Survey reflect this point
clearly, in terms of the relative lack of awareness on the part of young men about the
extent to which they are at risk of being on the receiving end of crimes of violence. Table
A6.1 (Home Office, 2000b) shows that men aged 16–24 were victims of violence from
strangers in 1999 in comparison with the chosen sections of the population as follows:
men aged 16–24 8.3% of the population in this group
women aged 16–24 2.3% of the population in this group
men aged 65–74 0.4% of the population in this group
women aged 65–74 0.2% of the population in this group
However, when respondents were asked about their perception of whether they were
very or fairly likely to be a victim of attack by a stranger in the next year, Table A7.4 (ibid)
records the following results:
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men aged 16–29 11% of the population in this group
women aged 16–29 11% of the population in this group
men aged 60 or older 7% of the population in this group
women aged 60 or older 9% of the population in this group
In very broad terms, this comparison of the actual rate of attacks by strangers, as com-
pared with the perception of the likelihood of such an attack, shows that the very
significant differences in the actual rate of such attacks on young men are scarcely
reflected in any differential perception of risk.
7 A sociological review of crime in Australia (Edgar et al., 1993, pages 480–95) draws
attention to two particular features of the Australian situation that should be remem-
bered when looking at the information in Table 2.19. The first is that overall crime figures
in Australia are hugely influenced by figures for property crime, which outnumber
offences against the person in the ratio of roughly 25:1 (ibid., page 489). This is
reflected in Table 2.19, which shows that Australia has by quite some distance the
highest rate of domestic burglaries per 100,000 people of all the selected countries.
The second is the extent to which the treatment of Aboriginal people by the police in
Australia may distort the statistics, since they comprise just over 1 per cent of the
general population but nearly 29 per cent of all persons in police custody (ibid.,
page 493).
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CHAPTER 3
ECHOES FROM THE PAST: caves, castles, citadels, walls and trenches
Introduction
In this chapter we provide an overview of the evolution of defensive design and
construction from prehistoric times to the modern era. Although the primary focus
of this book is on modern applications of place-based crime prevention strategies,
there is much to be learned from the durability of ideas, especially in a field whose
applications stretch back into the distant past. Thus, while the use of present-day
crime prevention strategies such as urban and building designs and devices aimed
at impeding access or facilitating surveillance and territorial control may seem
obvious and intuitive, they are nevertheless rooted in experience that spans cen-
turies as well as cultures. Indeed, one could go so far as to say that the history of
defensive design parallels the history of humankind. That being said, we make no
pretence to exhaust the totality of defensive design experience, as it would be pre-
sumptuous to think we – or anyone – could do so in one modest chapter. Rather,
we touch upon pertinent examples of defensive designs as a starting place to
understand how we got to where we are today and where we may be going in the
evolution of place-based crime prevention. We are especially interested in the
adaptability of predators – whether invading armies of the past or criminals within
our midst today – to the range of successive defensive and protective design strat-
egies and devices that we employ to perplex and impede them.
Because they are so central to the history of defensive design, we focus pri-
marily on the planning, design and construction of walls at the boundaries of cities,
citadels, castles and empires. We consider their real and symbolic roles in provid-
ing protective edges, their impacts on city form, their vulnerabilities to changing
technology and to the adaptive strategies used by predators, their relationship to
isolationism, and their linkage to perceptions of security.
Within these contexts, we make connections to modern-day place-based
crime prevention issues and principles, such as territoriality, surveillance, access
control, activity support and maintenance. In so doing, we suggest that similar
defensive design needs and strategies are identifiable throughout history and that
they are much more important in determining the form and evolution of urban
places and human behaviours than they have been credited.
Prehistoric Defensive Design and Strategies
Although the archaeological evidence is fragmentary, it seems clear that our
species has been shaped by our environment while we shape it in return. Fossil
records in Africa now suggest, for instance, that early hominoid ancestors likely
became bipedal in response to venturing out from their forest habitat into unfamiliar
and dangerous open plains in search of food. They sought the highly concentrated
proteins contained in meats to fuel developing brains, which consume a dispropor-
tionate amount of the body’s energy (Leakey, 1995). Some scientists now believe
that early man was much less a hunter, than a scavenger of protein, stealing meat
from much stronger predators who had downed it first. Moreover, evolutionary psy-
chologists suggest that the ecological challenges presented by changing habitats
and the need to outsmart competitors required the organisation of group efforts,
which also contributed to the growth of the human brain (Gore, 1997, 2000). If
this is so – and the evidence points in that direction – it was the first step in a long
human tradition of organised theft and subsequent attempts to prevent it.
Recent archaeological discoveries point to the migration of homo erectus to
parts of Asia as far back as 1.8 million years ago and to Europe as early as
900,000 years ago (Gore, 1997). Once out of the tropical womb of Africa and
confronted by waves of dramatic climatic changes culminating in three ice ages,
our European ancestors were forced to find alternative ways to shelter themselves,
not only from the weather but from human and animal predators. Some discovered
the natural caves that are found throughout parts of southern Europe, particularly in
Spain and France. These provided temporary protection and residences – the first
‘true homes’ (Childe, 1964) – as long as the local food sources held out. We have
a growing history of cave life and early human culture in parts of Europe and Aus-
tralia based upon surviving wall art and other clues. But most humans were still
nomadic even as the last great ice age was approaching about 150,000 years
ago; they relied on family units or small social bands for protection along with
crude portable shelters or, even more likely, those that could be quickly fashioned
out of locally available materials. Because of their decomposition, we can only
guess at their structure and design.
Whether for cave dweller or nomad, the selection of sites that could be
defended in case of attack was undoubtedly a crucial decision. This is an important
principle that humans must have learned early and it has remained with us ever
since. A carefully chosen site helps one cope with a dangerous environment which,
compounded by an unfriendly climate, places an obvious burden on survival. This is
reflected in the density of human populations throughout Europe and parts of Asia
that are estimated to be extremely low – 0.1–0.2 persons per square mile in parts
of France and 0.03 per square mile in Australia – even as late as 15,000 BC
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(Morris, 1979). Indeed, without the intervention of extraordinary luck, humans prob-
ably would have remained rare animals.
Population increase occurred during the Neolithic era, beginning about
12,000–13,000 years ago when a fortuitous combination of chance in the mutation
of wild grasses into cultivable wheat (the raw material of bread) and the retreat of
the last ice age provided humans with the unprecedented opportunity to grow and
store sources of energy, rather than needing to harvest them on the move
(Bronowski, 1973). The dawning of the agricultural revolution brought the possibility
of accumulating the first food surpluses; this has had the most extraordinary implica-
tions for human development, profoundly influencing everything from technology to
the evolution of place-based crime control prevention policy and practice.
Being on the move makes it difficult for people to develop specialisations and
to innovate. Moreover, nomadic life consumes a great deal of energy and makes
the accumulation of goods and resources troublesome, inasmuch as they must be
transported from place to place. The agricultural revolution of the Neolithic era
obviated some of these problems but produced others. With more food on hand
than could be consumed over a short time, humans became rooted in specific
locations for relatively long periods, and organised themselves increasingly into vil-
lages. Here they needed ways to protect their priceless protein treasures against
the weather, insects and rodents and predatory humans. To do this required the
design and construction of granaries and other storage facilities. Further it required
their judicious placement – through planning – within specially shielded areas. As
such troves accumulated within villages, they presented inviting targets to those
who did not store food. A pertinent example of this is the city of Jericho, a city
whose founding predates the Bible.
The Walls of Jericho: Beginnings of Urban Scale
Defensive Design
The structure and symbolism of this ancient city is synonymous with its almost
mythical walls and towers (see Figure 3.1). Built around 7000 BC, almost contem-
poraneous with the final retreat of the last glacier sheets, Jericho was among the
first of many Neolithic settlements in the Middle Eastern and Southern
Mesopotamian region. It has survived to this day and is important, not only as one
of the earliest urban places in recorded history, but also because it was built to
defend the bonus of the great agricultural revolution. Bronowski writes of the city:
Here wheat and water came together and, in that sense, here man began
civilisation. Here too, the Bedouin came with their dark muffled faces out of the
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desert, looking jealously at the new way of life. . . . All at once Jericho is
transformed. People come and soon become the envy of their neighbours, so
that they have to fortify Jericho and turn it into a walled city, and build a
stupendous tower, nine thousand years ago (1973, page 69).
By 6000 BC Jericho had become a settlement of some 3,000 people contained
within ten walled acres (Kenyon, 1957). Whether or not Joshua actually brought
down those walls with a trumpet blast, one thing is clear: they and a hundred
others like it built in the same region were early examples of urban target hardening
in an effort to deter predators and war.1 In this context, Bronowski notes that war,
rather than being part of human instinct is:
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Figure 3.1 The Tower of Jericho
a highly planned and co-operative form of theft. And that form of theft began
ten thousand years ago when the harvesters of wheat accumulated a surplus,
and the nomads rose out of the desert to rob them of what they themselves
could not provide. The evidence for that we saw in the walled city of Jericho and
its prehistoric tower (1973, page 88).
Although not always simultaneous activities, wall building has been con-
nected with city building from the time of Jericho to the Middle Ages and through
the Renaissance, when it was elevated to a science and a high art. First developed
to protect the city’s goods and inhabitants from harm, the construction of city walls
is also strongly linked to the forms of community organisation, land economics, and
to technological changes that, as we shall see, can rapidly make defence systems
outdated.
Walls as Edges
The wall marked the boundary of the city, its edges, and these are not trivial things.
As Kostof has pointed out, and as every traveller knows, edges are important since
they distinguish relationships, duties and responsibilities between those within the
jurisdiction marked by the edge and those outside it. For example, the role of
boundaries in determining who pays taxes and customs and who is exempt is of
considerable historic and urban importance.
City edges have been held as sacred ground for thousands of years; in Rome
the pomerium, or the ploughed strip where the city walls were to be located, was
celebrated in a fertility rite in the late winter (Kostof, 1991). In some Indian cities
and other parts of Asia the form-giving city edge, whether walled or not, was also
venerated as holy. Walls added even greater import to the city edge. They became
the vessel, however temporary, in which the city was contained, giving it form and
substance, real and psychological. During medieval times walls were ‘valued as a
symbol as much as the spires of the churches: not a mere military utility. The
medieval mind took comfort in a universe of sharp definitions, solid walls and
limited views: even heaven and hell had their circular boundaries’ (Mumford,
quoted in Miller, 1986, page 117).
While many early cities throughout the world, both in the West and East,
have built walls, they are by no means a universal phenomenon. Wall construction
is an extraordinary investment in human effort and resources and many cities could
not afford to wall their edges.2 In other places, walls were not used because over-
lords could not justify the costs against the value of what they had to protect. Else-
where – such as in Japan and what was to become the United States – water
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provided natural buffers against attack and mitigated against the construction of
walled cities. Many English cities were also protected by large water impediments
and generally were not provided with defensive walls. In England this tendency
was reinforced by a long domestic peace lasting to medieval times that reduced
the need for such expensive constructions. There are, of course, important and
interesting exceptions to this such as those found at Berwick and Chester along
the English borders with Scotland and Wales. Kostof (1991) notes that for the
most part the walls surrounding many interior English towns were more a function
of allegiance than defence.
In other places, walls were deemed unnecessary when cities were sufficiently
protected by larger, overarching political or military entities. This was the case in
much of the Roman Empire up until the end of the third century AD and throughout
a vast expanse of the Ottoman Empire at the height of its power. Defensive walls
were also often torn down by victors, purposely allowed to fall into disrepair or, as
the Mongols did in the thirteenth century in conquered China, forbidden to be built
in the first place. (This policy changed radically when the Ming Dynasty came to
power in the fourteenth century). Plato approved of the Spartans’ practice of build-
ing towns without walls, as they feared they would make men ‘effeminate, slothful
and cowardly’ (Duffy, 1975, page 19).
Urban Wall Materials and Early Design
While there are exceptions as noted above, throughout much of the world, the con-
struction of walled cities was the order of the day, especially during the early
Middle Ages. It epitomised an act of political and economic will which, although on
a different scale, is not completely unlike the determination of neighbourhoods in
the present-day United States to close themselves off from outsiders with gates
and barricades. We shall consider examples of place-based crime prevention
applications which illustrate this point in later chapters.
Probably the first defensive walls around settlements were simply earthen
ramparts piled up using the soil removed from a ditch. When the ditch filled with
water, the resulting moat provided additional protection. There was, therefore, a
close connection between the size of the ditch and the size of the walls. Whether
used to protect towns, cities or nations, earthwork construction persists through-
out history as a basic human defensive strategy. Probably its most extensive use
was during World War I in the vast defensive trenches dug across France and
Germany. Local materials – wood, stone, boulders – were often used to bolster
defences by solidifying the soils, and in some cases, cut timber stockades or pal-
isades were constructed across the earthworks, as in the ostrogi towns of Siberia
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(Kostof, 1992) or in one of the first American colonial towns, Jamestown, Virginia,
constructed in 1606.
Efficiency in defensibility and construction effort were crucial elements in
early defensive wall design, especially when such structures had to be constructed
quickly. For that reason, settlement walls tended to follow the topography and were
often circular in the case of defensive hill towns, or even triangular as in the shape
of Jamestown (see Figure 3.2). Kostof suggests (1992, page 28) that a circular
shape was ideal in the period before cannon fire because it maximised manpower
around a defendable territory; a triangle ‘represents the least effort required to
enclose a protected space’ (Reps, 1965, page 90). Throughout the medieval
period, many city walls in Europe came to be further solidified by masonry added
on top of the rammed earth foundations. The same strengthening process turned
timber citadels and castles throughout Europe into hardened enclaves, as we
discuss below, and in China, where, as Kostof reports, the earthworks of such
cities as Beijing were studded with ‘brick, ceramic blocks and ashlar’ (1992,
page 28).
Most early defensive walls were built in one layer, as a sheet – a curtain –
enclosing the communities within (see Figure 3.3). Some of these shielded
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Figure 3.2 Triangular wood palisade fort at Jamestown, Virginia
unplanned – spontaneous and ‘organic’ – villages and towns such as Regensburg,
Germany and York, England that had sprung up as market centres (albeit over the
remains of Roman frontier military camps called castra) and subsequently accumu-
lated sufficient wealth to require the protection of a wall. In other cases, city walls
were built to protect carefully planned communities such as the bastide towns that
were hewn out of the countrysides of France, Spain, Wales, and northern England.
Built by royal decrees as Europe was moving from the Dark to the Middle Ages,
the bastides were generally rectangular in plan with an internal grid-iron street
network protected by a single curtain wall.
Such towns were intended to protect emerging national frontiers and trade
routes by dominating the surrounding countryside. Reps (1965) claims that bastide
towns represent a transitional stage between the feudal castle and the developing
cities of the Renaissance. Their design was probably influenced by Roman military
72 Planning for crime prevention
Figure 3.3 Single curtain wall surrounding a settlement
camp planning and they, in turn, probably influenced the Law of the Indies,
Spanish planning specifications that guided the design of towns throughout the
Americas beginning in the sixteenth century. There is no question that throughout
history cities influence and sometimes mimic each other’s design styles and asso-
ciated ideologies, whether for defensive or other purposes. In modern Britain and
the United States, the dissemination of ‘sustainability’ as a design imperative and
‘New Urbanist’ ideology – which has a crime prevention thread – are clear
examples of this tendency, although implementation, as we discuss in Chapter 5,
may be inconsistent across the urban landscape.
Citadels and Castles
It is not entirely clear whether walled cities developed before citadels and castles,
or in tandem with them, which is more likely. What is clear is that citadels and
castles represent the ultimate prerogatives of power. Beginning in earliest times in
the Middle East, citadels were built as the last retreat against attack for the ruler,
whether temporal or sacred, since they were the most difficult targets for attackers
to reach and the final ones to fall. From territoriality to maintenance issues their
design and use are prophetic of almost all modern defensible space and crime pre-
vention theories and strategies.
Many of the earliest citadels – specially fortified areas, usually built on high
ground – were centrally located and their walls completely encircled the entire
community. As these population nodes grew by attracting new settlers, additional
rings of walls were eventually constructed to encompass the new ‘suburban’ dis-
tricts, making the citadel a walled enclave within other walls. In yet another
scheme, among the multiple patterns of urban development in both the Middle
East and Europe, citadels were sited at the settlement edge in a commanding posi-
tion and later incorporated into the city walls from that location (Kostof, 1992).
Defensive nodes thus grew to become defensive districts, and in some cases,
defensive edges along the borders of civilisations.
However they evolved, these sites play an important role in the development
of urban forms throughout history. While remaining symbols of centralised political,
economic and military power, citadels came also to represent the distinction
between the communal interests embodied in the building of city walls and the
essentially private interests represented by the presence of a fortress contained
within the city (Kenyon, 1990; Duffy, 1975). As such, citadels – and later castles –
were often seen to be as much a threat to the local population as to external
enemies.3
Aside from their ambiguous political significance, the defensive essence of
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both citadels and castles – the latter defined as the ‘fortified residence of the lord’
and, as distinct from citadels, strongly associated with feudal times (Kenyon, 1990,
page xvi) – is that their design, siting and construction features were suited to their
tasks of extending control and dominion over territories that first included their
residents’ own living quarters and then beyond that, ever outward into adjacent
(and sometimes faraway) lands. Thus, while first conceived as an effective means
of holding off the attack of far larger forces, citadels and, especially, castles came
to have significant offensive functions. Whether offensive or defensive, the psychol-
ogy of extending ones’ domain, control and responsibility over space is inherent in
territorial notions of modern defensible space theory, and was facilitated in much
earlier times by the use of design interventions that were clearly fashioned to the
task.
Probably the first among these interventions was changing the surrounding
environment: moulding the land around the lord’s dwelling such that it symbolised
and actually functioned as a defensive site. In redefining the face of the land the
earliest castles in England were born out of simple ring earthworks carved into the
landscape. Kenyon (1990) suggests that these sites were relatively cheap and
easy to construct, especially in contested frontier areas, as compared to the more
complicated motte and bailey construction. In this latter design, the motte (mound)
creates an elevated site on which the early castle structures, made usually out of
timber, are constructed (see Figure 3.4).
Surrounding or directly adjacent to the motte was the inner bailey (or ward),
consisting of open ground often enclosed by a timber palisade. A ditch formed a
protective circle around the inner bailey. Beyond this ditch lay the outer bailey, a
larger open area which was also protected by an outer ditch and the earth
embankment. The baileys provided living space for castle servants, places of
assembly and refuge during attack and, importantly, several layers of defensive pro-
tection for the motte with its castle and lord (Hogg, 1975). Indeed, the fundamen-
tal concept of layered defences has not changed in millennia: precisely the same
strategy is suggested by one of the most widely used modern physical security
texts (Fennelly, 1997) and by the United States Department of Defense in a recent
anti-terrorism guide (Department of Defense, 1993).
These castle sites, found in significant numbers throughout England, pro-
vided defenders with clear lines of sight from the motte – surveillance – and
ensured that attackers had to struggle uphill to the stronghold, or the keep
(‘donjon’ to the French), which contained the residential apartments. Elevation also
gave defenders more time to prepare – delay being a timeless aid to defensibility –
and made it more likely that the opposing forces were fatigued by the time they
reached the keep.4 Altogether, the entire site was designed with hierarchical
spaces, providing clear definitions between areas so that ‘legitimate users’ of these
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areas could be clearly distinguished from illegitimate ones. These are spatial strat-
egies suggested by modern day defensible space and CPTED consultants and
theorists, and are evident in many of their design suggestions (Newman, 1973;
Crowe, 1991, 2000).
Castles were subsequently hardened as the timber structures and earthwork
ramparts were replaced or covered by masonry, a development made more likely
where the motte was a naturally occurring hilltop that would support the great
weight of stone (see Figure 3.5). In England and throughout much of the rest of
Europe, the development of stone castles, and their proliferation, was greatly has-
tened by the advent of feudalism, which lasted from the fifth century to the four-
teenth century. During this period power was increasingly vested by monarchs in
nobles who consolidated their realms into fiefdoms by exploiting the land and the
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Figure 3.4 Example of motte and bailey construction as a forerunner of castle construction
peasants. With their conscripted labour the nobles built hundreds of masonry
castles which, garrisoned by troops, dominated the countryside (Hogg, 1975). In
some cases, castles joined the defences of an existing walled town, as in Lincoln.
Here, as in the citadels discussed above, the castle was also protected from the
town by a ditch and drawbridge. In other cases, castles were built outside existing
city defences, such as at York, and the walls were subsequently enlarged to
include it within the perimeter. As Thompson (1975) suggests, variations on these
themes are extensive and generally site specific in nature.
The size and bulk of castles varied too as a function of the relative wealth and
status of their owners, and the embroidery of their designs across Europe boggles
the imagination, even though many of them share the same origin in the simple
motte and bailey concept, which seems to be intuitive. Subsequent technical and
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Figure 3.5 Section of a masonry castle wall
design sophistication through the Middle Ages largely aimed at increasing access
control and making attack so costly that enemies would be deterred by the effort,
which is also a fundamental principle of modern situational crime prevention theory
(Clarke, 1997).
Castle gates were strengthened and made more impenetrable by the addi-
tion of towers crammed with watchful troops, and an iron, spiked barrier – the
portcullis – was set like teeth across the main entrance. Further insulating internal
wards was the drawbridge that spanned the ditch (which could be dry or wet)
surrounding the castle. Machicolations, or spaced stone buttresses supporting the
parapet (the shielding running across the top of the ramparts), permitted defenders
to shoot arrows or drop lethal materials (including boiling oil) through holes on
attackers who had come too close to the walls. Arrow loops, crenellations and later
embrasures were cut into the stone walls, permitting protected bow and artillery
fire as well as surveillance. The tall curtain walls were thickened in an (ultimately
unsuccessful) attempt to deter breaches from cannon fire, and mural towers
(towers incorporated into the curtain walls) were gradually rounded in shape and
flared at their bases better to deflect cannon shot.
The sum of this was that by the dawn of the age of truly effective artillery in
the fifteenth century, many medieval castles had achieved their objectives: they
were impregnable and, assuming a continuing supply of food and water, could and
did hold out for years against attackers.
Technology and Urban Defensive Design and
Strategy
This era was not to last long, however. Technological change and the adaptations
of attackers to the new designs made the tall curtain walls of castles and cities
susceptible to attacks from below by mining and from above by bombardment. The
first transforming event was the fall (or liberation, for Muslims) of Constantinople in
1453 when the Ottoman Turks were able – assisted by gunpowder invented by
the Chinese and cannon devised for them by a Hungarian named Urban – to lob
800-pound cannon balls against the city’s walls, breaching them over the course of
fifty days. These were the same walls that had withstood the onslaught of Islam for
700 years.
This was closely followed by the second, and in some ways the more import-
ant transforming event relative to urban design generally and to the design of fortifi-
cations in particular. In 1494, Charles VIII invaded Italy, and successfully used
mobile artillery to conquer almost a dozen Italian citadels and cities, including Flo-
rence and Naples (Duffy, 1979). For military engineers as well as princes and
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popes, their fall heralded the advent of a new technology and a new era in city
design and military engineering.5 In so doing these events also helped close the
Middle Ages and usher in the Renaissance.
Following the lesson of Constantinople and the conquest of Italy, military
engineers such as Vauban, Filarete, Martini, Di Giorgio, and van Noyen, began to
design fortified cities for their princes with prickly edges which, while much less
graceful than the sweeping curtain walls of the medieval era, were far more effect-
ive against the increasingly accurate and destructive cannon that were being
deployed against them. City edges in the Renaissance came to feature bulky, low-
slung ramparts with massively fortified bastions – multi-faceted masonry projec-
tions – that were designed to provide protective fire across a wide circuit of the
field of view ahead, covering all flanks (see, for example, Figure 3.6).
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Figure 3.6 Example of an arrowhead bastion
As the complexity of built edges grew, they became increasingly expensive to
alter or expand. The irony is that, dominant as they were in physical presence, they
became outmoded as defensive strategies because of the largely negative spaces
– the outworks – designed to make it more difficult for attackers to reach the walls
with cannon shot. These often included vast open areas beyond the walls (Kostof
calls them ‘extramural wasteland’ as in the case of Turin, Italy; 1992, page 18), and
may have also included an assortment of oddly shaped structural elements such as
lunettes, hornworks and ravelins populating the area beyond the glacis, the killing
ground at the base of the bastions.6 Their effect, apart from creating a very defined
defensible space beyond the walls, was also to stretch out the distance between
the city and the surrounding countryside, further separating urban and rural popula-
tions and lifestyles.
Conceived not only for defensive purposes but also as engines of war –
‘machine’ model cities as described by Lynch (1981) – many of these Renaissance
era cities were intended not only to occupy the landscape but utterly to dominate
it. Only a few of the most elaborate designs were ever built, such as Palmanova,
Italy and Philippeville, Belgium, and these have faded into obscurity except for
architectural and urban planning scholars. But many other, less elaborate
makeovers were fashioned onto the edges of hundreds of large and small Euro-
pean cities and their surviving outlines are traceable today.
In addition to altering the edges of towns, the new technology of artillery
became the catalyst of design for the areas within the walls – its internal districts
and street patterns. Interior urban forms, which had been primarily defensive in
nature, in some cities took on offensive characteristics as they were modified to
facilitate the movement of cumbersome artillery and associated supplies. Thus, as
in Philippeville, broad straight avenues were created to supply the bastions with
cannon balls and troops more easily and to move the heavy cannon from one point
of the city to another. This was further aided by a radial design that focused inward
on a central plaza, where the prince or general could, through the use of a raised
tower or platform, command a view of the bastions and the entire perimeter.
The radial street pattern, no matter how aesthetically pleasing, was subse-
quently outmoded by the efficiency of the outworks in defending against attack as
compared with bastions, and simpler grid street came to replace or be built over
earlier star shaped patterns. The designs of Vitry-le-François, France, and Willem-
stad, Holland illustrate how the newer internal grid, bastions and outworks function
together (Reps, 1965, pages 7 and 11).
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The Importance of Defensive Walls in Urban Design
Both curtain walls and their successor bastion edges were important elements in
early urban life and in later city development across much of Europe. In some
cases, as in Constantinople (Iater Istanbul), single curtain walls were elaborated
into double and even triple curtain walls, often containing large open spaces
between the walls (see Figure 3.7). Townspeople came to live in these open
spaces, which often accounted for a significant proportion of a city’s total land
area. These inhabitants, in addition to the guards and military personnel who
manned the walls, suggest that walls were more than simple inert, mechanical bar-
riers, but were also organic in nature. Together, the walls and people associated
with them provided access control and surveillance functions facilitated by a
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Figure 3.7 Double curtain walls with open space between the walls
package of defensive design elements previously discussed, such as gates, draw-
bridges, portcullis, arrow loops, guard towers, and embrasures.
In many European cities one can trace the growth of the medieval city by the
rings of its successive curtain walls, much as one can gauge the age of a tree by
its rings. Despite the costs, walls were periodically adjusted to accommodate
surging city growth within and suburban ‘sprawl’ outside the gates. A striking
example of this is Paris, with five concentric wall rings built between AD 360 and
1845 (Morris, 1979). Millennia after urban walls have disappeared, their original
shapes can still be found in the plan views of cities such as Florence, Italy, Nordlin-
gen, Germany and Vienna, Austria and hundreds of other towns where the rem-
nants of early defensive walls are traceable in circumferential streets and
boulevards that traverse countless neighbourhoods (Mumford, in Miller, 1986;
Branch, 1985).
Morris emphasises that the ‘role of fortifications as an urban form determinant
has been largely neglected by urban historians’ (1979, page 129). For example, he
attributes the continental tradition of high density urban life and form to the early
restrictions imposed on towns by wall building, especially those created following
the development of elaborate bastion defences. He says: ‘Crammed within their
fortified girdles, for ever increasing in population and density, the typical contin-
ental European city of the fourteenth to mid-nineteenth centuries could expand only
upwards’ (page 129). This he contrasts with Britain, where the pacification of the
island permitted cities to grow outwards generally without the constraining effects
of walls, fostering more expansive attitudes and an anti-urban sentiment, reaching
its zenith in the ‘garden city’ movement at the turn of the last century. Duffy (1979)
reaches much the same conclusion, citing the startled and disappointed reaction
of English travellers to the dense cities of continental Europe during the eighteenth
century.
The same theory could be doubly applied to the United States, a country
where only eleven cities had walls of any sort. There are few developed nations
with such low density cities, especially in the American South and West, and that
harbour such anti-urban sentiment. These are also, interestingly enough, the
regions of the USA that lead in the construction of modern gated and walled
neighbourhoods and communities according to Blakely and Snyder’s landmark
study, Fortress America (1999).
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Defensive Edges Across Civilisations: The Great
Walls
While the walled edges of cities, citadels and castles are central elements in the
history of defensive and urban design, so too are edges that stretch across the hin-
terlands, designed to protect empires and cultures. Examples include the Great
Wall of China, Hadrian’s Wall, the Wall of Anthemius (or Theodosius) and, in the
modern era, the Maginot Line and, of course, the Berlin Wall, which was more a
containment vessel than a defensive structure. We focus on the first four examples
as they illustrate the changing nature of large-scale defensive strategies, which
tend to be cumulative over time by virtue of the massive investment required and
which, like city design, are vulnerable to changing technology and to the adaptive
strategies of attackers.
THE GREAT WALL OF CHINA
Now a vast historical monument and tourist attraction, the Great Wall of China
(also known as the 10,000 Li Wall, the li being a unit of measurement equivalent to
about one third of a mile) straddles northern China from the Shanhaiguan Pass on
the east to the Jiayuguan Pass on the west. The oldest sections of the wall were
begun in the Zhou Dynasty in the seventh century BC, when each of several vassal
states constructed their own walls for defensive purposes. These subsequently fell
into disrepair but were renovated and linked together by the first Chinese Emperor,
Qin Shi Huang, who unified the feudal states beginning in 221 BC.
The refurbished walls – a series of connected structures – were intended to
protect China’s northern frontiers against marauding nomads, particularly the
Xiongnu tribes. As in feudal Europe, the walls were built by conscripted peasants,
and made of locally collected stone and layers of compacted earth. After Qin’s
death in 208 BC, the empire dissolved in chaos and the Great Wall began to fall
apart from lack of maintenance – a central, but often overlooked, component of
defensive design and construction. The Han dynasty, which began to rule in
206 BC restored the Wall and extended it 300 miles westward across the Gobi
Desert. In the absence of rock in the desert, they utilised willow reeds and twigs to
reinforce a mortar made of water, fine gravel and sand that formed the wall structure.7
It was during the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) that the greatest period of wall
building commenced and the present form of the Great Wall took shape. Watch-
towers that had been installed at strategic intervals for surveillance were
redesigned and modern artillery were added, along with embrasures, peep-holes,
and ramparts. Although local inhabitants have through the ages helped themselves
to the generous stock of building supplies provided by the wall, one of its best pre-
served sections is located at Badaling, north-west of Beijing. Here it is 8.5 metres
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high and 5.7 metres wide, and stretches up and across miles of mountainsides. A
central characteristic of the Ming-era wall was its construction of rammed earth
faced with mass-produced kiln-fired brick, a technology that surpassed that of the
Europeans of the day, who were still using cut stones.
However, like medieval and the even more elaborate Renaissance city walls,
the walled edges of the Chinese tended to insulate their populations as much as
protect them: in the end, for example, the Ming dynasty turned inward, shunning
foreign contact as well as trade with the outside world. One cannot help but wonder
whether walls cause such behaviour or are themselves a result of insular behaviour
and thinking. The truth is probably a mixture of both. Whatever the answer, it seems
clear that wall building and isolationist attitudes stretch across time and cultures.
HADRIAN’S WALL
Another example of an edge across the boundaries of civilisations is Hadrian’s
Wall. It is a remnant of the Roman occupation of Britain, which began with the
invasion of the island by the Emperor Julius Caesar in 55 BC and its conquest and
occupation by the Emperor Claudius in AD 43. The wall winds its way across north-
ern England from the River Tyne just east of Newcastle past the city of Carlisle to
the Solway Firth on the west. It is approximately 80 miles long and up to 6 metres
high, 3 metres wide in places (see Figure 3.8). As such it came to be an unbroken
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Figure 3.8 Hadrian’s Wall stretching from Housesteads across the English countryside
defensive line protecting Roman Britain from the fierce Pict and Brigantes tribes
who lived in the area. Simpson (2000) suggests that its fundamental intent was to
‘separate the Romans from the Barbarians’ although other historians attribute other
intentions, as noted below.
Like the Great Wall of China, Hadrian’s Wall did not spring full blown into the
world but was rather the product of consolidating a line of existing fortifications
established earlier, culminating in the Stangate Line, established under the Roman
Governor Agricola in AD 78–85 (Morris, 1979). That defensive line was abandoned
and Hadrian’s Wall was begun in AD 122, during the Emperor Hadrian’s reign
(AD 117–138). The most salient existing feature of Hadrian’s Wall is Housesteads,
one of twelve forts that were built to connect the frontier line of the wall as it
marched across the hilly British countryside. A 5-acre site, the ruins of House-
steads sit at the peak of the Whin Sill escarpment about halfway between
Newcastle upon Tyne and Carlisle. It is an outstanding example of the Roman art
and science of military camp construction. Its rectangular (card-shaped) design
typifies one of the classic shapes of these castra, hundreds of which were estab-
lished throughout Europe during the Roman Empire (see Figure 3.9).
Housesteads’ grid-iron design with regularly ordered streets, including major
and minor roads, and the carefully thought out relationships among land uses,
illustrates the attentiveness to planning that characterised Roman camp settle-
ments in conquered territories. Many of the early imprints of the castra became the
84 Planning for crime prevention
Figure 3.9 Plan view of Housesteads
Source: adapted from Housesteads Roman Fort, 1989, London: Crown English Heritage
foundations from which villages and later cities grew, although this was not the
case in Housesteads. These sites – having both defensive and offensive character-
istics – are thus the wellspring of a significant proportion of urbanisation within the
vast reach of the Roman Empire which, at its height, radiated from England on the
west to North Africa on the south all the way to the Tigris River in Mesopotamia on
the east (Morris, 1979). Moreover, as Reps (1965) suggests, it is probable that
castra design, like later bastide examples, influenced the evolution of the ‘Law of
the Indies’ rules promulgated in 1573 by King Philip of Spain to guide develop-
ment in the New World, thus helping to shape hundreds of cities there as well.
Like China’s Great Wall and the later walls of medieval and Renaissance
Europe, Hadrian’s Wall was much more than a mere assemblage of stone. In
modern place-based defensive design terms, it was a combination of access
control features including physical design elements (stones bonded with clay) aug-
mented by human guardianship. The latter was organised into formal (military) and
informal (civilian settlers) surveillance and activity, all of which served the territorial
and cultural interests of the Romans. Simpson notes that ‘Hadrian’s Wall was an
active military zone, a customs barrier, a line of defence and above all ‘‘a way of
life’’ ’ (2000). It was, like so many other grand constructions, a zone of concen-
trated human activity which came, by design or simple use, to support its initial
defensive intent. A Renaissance poet wrote of the wall:
Townes stood upon my length, where Garrisons were laid,
Their limits to defend; and for my greater ayd,
With Turrets I was built, where Sentinels were plac’d.
To watch upon the Pict; so me my Makers grac’d,
With hollow Pipes of Brasse, along me still that went,
By which they in one Fort still to another sent,
By speaking in the same, to tell them what to doe,
And so from Sea to Sea could I be whispered through:
Upon my thicknesse, three marched eas’ly breast to breast,
Twelve foot was I in height, such glory I possest.
(Michael Drayton, ‘Poly-Olbion’, Song XXIX, 1613, in Hebel 1993,
pages 567–8).
While forming a protective barrier, the wall was a corridor in which Roman culture
was interposed in an effort to civilise the local ‘barbarian’ populations. While this
proved to be a dismal failure, it was a noble intent, and foreshadowed the hope of
modern builders of defensive design that interventions might produce ‘spillover’
beneficial effects in crime prevention – a ‘diffusion of benefits’ – that go well
beyond their seemingly obvious initial intents or purposes (Clarke, 1997).
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THE WALLS OF THEODOSIUS (ANTHEMIUS)
We have already discussed the fall of Constantinople in terms of its significance to
the redesign of cities throughout Europe in reaction to the new technology of
cannon fire. At the time of its collapse in 1453, the city was the central district con-
structed within a series of walled edges that extended across the peninsula pro-
tecting passage through the Bosphorus between the Black Sea on the north and
the Sea of Marmora on the south.
Its location illustrates why it is both one of the best defensive sites among all
cities in history, and also one of the most sought-after prizes as the pivot point
between eastern and western civilisations. Although scholars differ on the number
of walls surrounding the city (Morris outlines four walls, Dunlop depicts five) there
is no argument that the most important one was begun under the reign of Theodo-
sius II, in AD 413.
Also called the Wall of Anthemius, who was the regent and prefect of Con-
stantinople at the time, the walls stretched completely across the peninsula – a dis-
tance of more than four miles – and shielded the city within from land invasion.
Following an earthquake, the wall was reconstructed with an outer curtain and a
new moat added in AD 447, and eventually the system contained three walls. These
structures complemented a system of seawalls that had been built a decade
earlier. While only ruins remain, the original outer walls were 8 metres high,
2 metres thick and included 96 towers. The inner walls were even larger, standing
at 12 metres in height and 5 metres thick, also containing 96 towers spaced apart
at alternate distances with the outer towers. So formidable were these combined
defences, they were able to withstand a succession of attacks by Arab and Bulgar-
ian armies through the centuries.
The breaching of Constantinople’s defensive perimeter represented the
triumph of one ascending civilisation over another, dying one (the final remnant of
the Roman Empire), but also palpable proof of the fragility of stationary access
control in a world of changing technology. Successive walls, no matter how formid-
able and well located, are in the end no match for a determined attacker using
tools or strategies specially designed to counter static defences. While there is
undoubted truth in Clausewitz’s dictum that ‘if you entrench yourself behind strong
fortifications, you compel the enemy to seek a solution elsewhere,’ the question
remains whether actual security is not ultimately (if not immediately) outweighed by
the imagined sense of security. This difference between perception and reality is a
fundamental question of modern defensible space application and certainly applies
to our last example of a walled edge between empires, the Maginot Line.
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THE MAGINOT LINE: A MODERN DEFENSIVE EDGE
Inspired by French war hero, politician and civil servant André Maginot, the fortified
edge that bears his name was built between 1929 and 1940 as a defence against
invasion, and specifically German invasion, across France’s north-eastern border.
At the time it was constructed it contained state-of-the-art weaponry, communica-
tions, and armour, all linked together through a vast network of underground
tunnels, although concrete blockhouses and pillboxes peeked above ground at
intervals. The Maginot Line demonstrated that the fundamental lesson of Constan-
tinople was well learned: that defensive fortifications were safest when sunk low
into the earth, leaving a minimum profile for rifle and artillery fire. Trench and under-
ground warfare were natural by-products of this development.
Although the seventeenth-century military engineer, Sebastian Le Prestre de
Vauban first masterminded systems of progressively extended trenches to use in
attacking fortresses, the art and science of trench warfare reached its zenith in
World War I. In that conflict vast trenches were dug across the combat frontiers of
France and Germany to shield millions of soldiers on all sides. While they were
also used for offensive purposes, such as staging areas to mount attacks, their
main purpose was defensive in nature. Using these defensive lines the French and
their allies battled the Germans to a draw (albeit at a staggering cost in lives), and
this tactic became the inspiration for the Maginot Line. The reasoning was that if
underground defensive fortifications could stop the Germans once, they could do
so again. Moreover, it was believed that this line of extraordinary fortifications –
modelled in part after the fortresses of Verdun that had held out against repeated
German assaults – would discourage attack against France or, that if attacked, the
line would give the French army additional time to mobilise and deploy its forces
(Kaufmann and Kaufmann 1997).
The irony of the Maginot Line is that while it achieved one goal, it neverthe-
less became the symbol of a much larger failure. The Germans were indeed dis-
couraged from attacking it; rather, they simply flanked the Line by marching into
France through Belgium’s Ardennes Forest, a tactic that had been considered but
rejected as implausible by the French High Command. The result was that, as at
Constantinople, a formidable static defence was again defeated by a new
approach, but this time with a new twist in that the strategy of high mobility was
the essence of the new technologies, as distinct from increased firepower. The
lesson that the Germans learned from World War I was that tanks and aircraft
defeat trenches and underground bunkers, and that not confronting them was the
wisest strategy of all. The French, however, assumed what has been termed the
‘Maginot Mentality’, adopting an unrealistic sense of security based on their belief
that building sophisticated static defences was their best protection when, in
reality, they were virtually useless against a mobile enemy.
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This misdirected faith in a defensive solution that provides, at least initially, a
sense of security but later proves impotent, is emblematic of a wide range of
modern crime prevention strategies and assumptions. Among these are the notions
that we can, almost certainly, prevent crime by addressing defects in offenders’
sociological and psychological backgrounds; that increasing street activity and
‘eyes on the street’ surveillance are infallible crime prevention approaches; and that
gating off communities and neighbourhoods, in much the same way that towns,
cities and empires and civilisations have walled off their populations throughout
history, will protect us against predators who come to steal our grain or our televi-
sion sets. While each of these modern assumptions and strategies contain valu-
able kernels of truth, their messages have been overblown by zealots and true
believers, often with predictable results.
Conclusions
While we make no judgements about the inherent nature of man, it is clear from
even a cursory review that the history of our species is marked by recurrent preda-
tory behaviour and increasingly intricate efforts to deter or prevent it, which are
defeated in turn by ever adaptive predators. We likely began by stealing food from
other animals and progressed in Neolithic times to filching agricultural surpluses
from our neighbours as large, organised groups. Military fortresses, citadels and
walled edges were subsequently used by princes and potentates to dominate the
land that produced the food surpluses and the trade routes used to transport them.
That each elaborated defence has been defeated is evident in the demise of the
curtain walls, castles, bastions and trenches, as we have discussed. But what
seems to be elaboration of design is, in the end, only embroidery on simple ideas.
Thus, walls became successively taller, harder, thicker, rounded at the
corners, massively extended into the countryside and, ultimately, buried deeper into
the ground. They helped change the shape of cities throughout the world; but in
the end, they were still defeated. What this suggests is that complex problems –
as in war or ‘organised theft’, in Bronowski’s conception – rarely have simple long-
term solutions, such as that embodied in the redesign of wall systems, no matter
how daring the engineering. Rather, the answers to defensibility are likely to lie in
much more complex interplay among social, physical, political and economic forces
that we are only starting to recognise and understand in our modern cities and
towns.
This is especially so since our new enemies, at least in everyday life in the
United States and Britain, are far less likely to be invading armies than criminals
who invade our homes and neighbourhoods. They are among us, not outside our
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borders or hard edges. This means that the responses we offer against them
should not be the same, albeit with a few new twists thrown in, as those offered a
thousand years ago. To do so, is to take on the ‘Maginot Mentality’, an expensive
self delusion. A fundamental and sobering lesson of this thinking is that we can
convince ourselves of almost anything when it comes to our own safety, whether
as a society or as individuals, and it becomes easier to believe the truth of the
premise, no matter how flawed it may be, as we invest more and more resources in
it. We only have to look at the Pruitt Igoe housing projects in St Louis and the
Hulme Crescents in Manchester, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 8, to understand
the deadly attraction of this thinking.
This is an argument, therefore for critical thinking, for bringing empirical evid-
ence to bear, and for an appreciation of the extraordinary variability of environ-
mental contexts, such that there are few if any defensive solutions that fit all
circumstances despite the fact that fundamental principles of defensive design –
territoriality, surveillance, access control, and maintenance – have not changed all
that much across the centuries. Moreover, it is an argument in support of Ekblom’s
well reasoned conclusion that designers and planners must change perspectives
‘from envisaging use to envisaging misuse’ (1997) if they are to keep up with the
crafty adaptations of predators in modern society. This is an especially tall order for
planners, we suspect, as they are far more accustomed to thinking the other way
around.
Notes
1 The earliest evidence of organised warfare was found at a 14,000-year old site in Jebel
Sahaba, Sudan, in the 1960s and the first evidence we have of humans killing one
another comes from a 20,000-year old skeleton of a young man whose pelvic bones are
riddled by spearpoints found in Wadi Kubbaniya in the Nile valley area of Africa (Gore,
2000).
2 According to Pirenne (1969), more than half of a medieval European city’s budget was
commonly allocated to the maintenance of the wall and to offensive or defensive
weapons. In the sixteenth century the City of Bologna petitioned papal authorities not to
force them to refurbish their medieval walls because of the expense and the enormous
costs of maintaining them (Kostof, 1992).
3 Duffy (1975) recounts that the use of citadels was the subject of a longstanding debate
among political philosophers in the Renaissance since it was ‘the only kind of fortifica-
tion which could be turned equally against foreign enemies and fellow citizens’ (page
22). He quotes the French populist Carnot who said: ‘A citadel is a monstrosity in a free
country, a refuge of tyranny which should be the target of the indignation of every free
people and every good citizen.’
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4 But elevated locations also have their drawbacks. Duffy (1975) points out that by the
seventeenth century, military engineers had begun to resist designing fortresses and
citadels on mountains and hilltops. They presented a host of problems as they were diffi-
cult to build, supply with potable water and food, garrison, and, in the case of isolated
locations, could be blockaded by a small force while the main body of enemy troops
bypassed them.
5 Francesco di Giorgio, the Italian military architect and engineer (1439–1502) wrote of
the effect of cannon: ‘Modern men have recently discovered an instrument of such viol-
ence that against it avails neither valour nor arms, neither shield nor the strength of
walls, for with that instrument every broad tower must perforce quickly be brought down.
By reason of this most powerful machine, called the bombard, all the old devices must
certainly be termed obsolete and useless.’ (Quoted in Dechert, 1983, page 35.)
6 Excellent glossaries of fortification terminology can be found in Duffy (1975) and Hogg
(1975).
7 See (www.discovery.com/stories/history/greatwall/han.html) for an excellent graphic
tour of Great Wall sites.
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CHAPTER 4
BASIC THEORIES AND PRINCIPLES OF PLACE-BASED
CRIME PREVENTION PLANNING
Introduction
This chapter considers the basic principles of place-based crime prevention within
the contexts of the four theories with which it is generally associated: defensible
space, crime prevention through environmental design, situational crime prevention
and environmental criminology. Our aim is to discuss these theories and the prin-
ciples that are derived from them so that their applications to real world circum-
stances – US and British projects, interventions and case studies – will be clearly
demonstrable in the chapters that follow. Although ‘New Urbanism’ is not generally
considered to be a primary place-based crime prevention theory, we also explore
its design principles and strategies, since they have been widely claimed by some
architects and planners for their potential to reduce crime and the fear of crime in
communities. We conclude the chapter with a discussion of crime displacement,
one of the key issues that has bedevilled place-based crime prevention theory and
practice from its origins.
Weaving the Threads Together
Though often seen as whole cloth by police, planners, citizens and even some
practitioners, three of the four major place-based crime prevention theories were
spun out of separate fabrics that through time have become woven together. This
is so even though their chief advocates – Oscar Newman (defensible space), C.
Ray Jeffrey (crime prevention through environmental design), Ronald Clarke (situa-
tional crime prevention) – while acknowledging contributions from related
approaches, have earnestly argued the distinctiveness of their own. In fact, defens-
ible space, CPTED and situational crime prevention were developed largely inde-
pendently from each other.1 Environmental criminology was conceived by Jeffrey’s
protégés; it bears a strong resemblance to CPTED in many respects but also
draws inspiration from Kevin Lynch’s urban design imaging concepts (1960), from
University of Chicago School social and zonal ecology theory (Burgess, 1916;
Park et al., 1925), and from geographic research and theory. In some ways, there-
fore, it is in a class by itself while owing a large debt to the other three theories.
However developed, all four place-based crime prevention theories often overlap
as they contain mutually supporting concepts. There is no doubt that the pedigree
of each approach is far less important to the practising planner, architect and
police official making everyday on-the-job decisions than are the operational
lessons and practical advice they ultimately serve up, either separately or as one.
This being the case, it is nevertheless valuable for laying out future directions to
describe the evolution of each of these theoretical approaches and their associ-
ated critiques.
Defensible Space
It is clear that in the United States defensible space evolved primarily from an
architectural context, but was influenced by planning critics such as Jane Jacobs
(1961) and by social and behavioural scientists Elizabeth Wood (1961, 1967),
Schlomo Angel (1967, 1968), Edward Hall (1959) and Robert Sommer (1969)
among others. Despite these influences, however, important as they may have
been, the source of inspiration for defensible space largely flowed from Oscar
Newman’s (1973) critical observations of built structures and the behaviours he
associated with them. Thus, as we shall see from project examples contained in
Chapter 5 in St Louis and New York, defensible space is fundamentally a design
theory that is informed by human occupancy and use experience, a departure from
much of the architectural practice of the day.
First among the basic principles of Newman’s defensible space is
territoriality, defined as ‘the capacity of the physical environment to create per-
ceived zones of territorial influence’ (1973, page 51), which translates as the
design and subdivision of property so as to instil a proprietary sense in residents.
Second, natural surveillance is the ‘capacity of the physical environment to provide
surveillance opportunities for residents and their agents’ (1973, page 78), which
operationally means the design and placement of windows and building entrances
so as to maximise the abilities of residents and other ‘legitimate’ users to see inte-
rior and exterior spaces. Third, boundary definition, which is closely related to terri-
toriality and means clearly dividing and marking spaces to identify the shadings
between public and private use. It incorporates the use of symbolic and real
access control mechanisms as design elements to impede the movements of
offenders and to help alert residents to their presence, all of which are said to facil-
itate territorial impulses and behaviour. Newman focuses fourth and finally on the
image and milieu of sites and structures. This involves the use of sensitive design
to mitigate the stigma of public housing (a particularly American and much less a
British concern)2 and the juxtaposition of land uses, especially as these influence
activities, to affect safety in these or adjoining areas. Newman’s concern with
environmental signs of incivility (such as graffiti and vandalism) anticipated the
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‘broken windows’ theory of Wilson and Kelling (1982)3 and also laid down the
predicate for what was to become a later CPTED corollary: maintenance. A key
element in the practice of place-based crime prevention, maintenance in this
context may be defined as ‘the care directed to preserve, sustain, or repair prop-
erty so as to achieve crime prevention goals’. It has often been overlooked in
literature and by practitioners.
Interwoven throughout each of these principles are fundamental notions of
personal control and responsibility for space, both of which are encouraged,
according to Newman, by proper design. Thus, the outcomes of such designs are
places that legitimate users care to defend and indeed are defensible, in part at
least, by virtue of their physical characteristics. These principles have been subse-
quently elaborated by others to include subcategories and related concepts, as we
shall discuss below. We concentrate primarily upon territoriality, surveillance,
boundary definition and access control as the fundamental defensible space prin-
ciples. Image and milieu are discussed in Chapter 5 relative to site design, configu-
ration and placement of public housing projects within the urban fabric.
THE TERRITORIAL ENIGMA
Territoriality is in many ways the fundamental organising principle behind
Newman’s concept of defensible space and we devote special attention to it here
for that reason. It is ironic that the notion is at once extremely powerful and brings
to bear a wealth of sociological, socio-biological and anthropological speculation
and empirical research (Hall, 1966; Ardrey, 1966; Wilson 1980; de Waal et al.,
2000), while it is also the most vague and difficult to operationalise when applied
to human beings.4 To Newman, territoriality was vitally important to the public
housing tenants he studied, where he noted ‘that expressions of territorial feelings
correspond strongly with a concern for the maintenance of law and a belief in the
possibility of its enforcement’ (1973, page 51). Its expression – for example, in
tenants’ efforts to personalise entrances to apartments or to present symbolic
gateways – is seen as evidence of one’s attachment to the space and the willing-
ness to control and defend it against intruders.
Moreover, to Newman it heralds an investment of personal care and concern
that extends beyond interior living spaces out into (or at least toward) the street,
and hence into the wider community. Territoriality is thus seen – or at least implied
as – a combination of physical, psychological, socio-biological, cultural and civic
dimensions, which, although believed to be a real phenomenon by most place-
based crime prevention advocates, is difficult to measure.
While generally non-politicised, the concept of human territoriality is congru-
ent with free-market economics and notions of civic virtue, in that it reaches its
highest form of expression in home ownership. There is thus a supposed linkage
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between biological urges (‘natural desire’; Lundqvist, 1986), and achieving home
ownership, a central feature of the ‘American dream’, wherein families move up and
into the middle-class mainstream. Moreover, home ownership and occupancy are
intimately tied into the economic health of cities through real estate and banking
connections, and home ownership rates are important socio-economic and political
measures in both the USA and Britain.
It should be clear, however, that implications of the explicit or implicit connec-
tions between territoriality, home ownership and ‘community-mindedness’ do not
hold everywhere, and are hostage to cultural, social and economic influences that
differ significantly across national boundaries. It should also be clear that
Newman’s notion of territoriality does not require residents to be owners, but rather
that design should facilitate the development of the psychological trappings of
ownership in residents, even if the true owners are public agencies. Spaces organ-
ised and designed with this in mind extend private concern for property and
spaces into the public domain, so that residents are energised ‘to adopt propri-
etary attitudes and to exert potent territoriality prerogatives which serve as natural
and significant deterrents to crime’ (Newman 1973, page 53). Thus, given territori-
ally sensitive design, even public housing tenants will be galvanised to protect and
defend spaces outside their apartment doors which they do not own. In many
ways, territoriality roughly corresponds to the feelings of ‘stewardship’ that New
Urbanists suggest will be inculcated in residents of communities constructed
according to their design guidelines, as discussed below and in Chapter 8.
SURVEILLANCE
Surveillance and access control are controversial components of defensible space
theory. The debates are not whether they are useful tools of crime prevention plan-
ning – they are almost universally accepted to be – but rather about the real
strength of their reputed abilities to prevent or control crime, and the privacy and
civil liberties implications as they are deployed across open societies such as the
USA and Britain.
Mayhew (1981) suggests that while much has been imputed to surveillance
as a crime control mechanism, especially for crime that might be committed in
‘public view’, there is evidence that surveillance may be a much more limited pre-
vention mechanism than believed. She cites a series of studies (Gelfand et al.,
1973; Rosenthal, 1964; Latane and Darley, 1970) that suggest that the public
often does not notice crimes being committed (e.g. shoplifting, pick-pocketing),
may misperceive signals (e.g. the struggles of a murder victim were thought to be a
lovers’ quarrel), or may not wish to become involved out of personal fear or the
unwillingness to be caught in long legal-bureaucratic proceedings. Moreover,
Mayhew suggests further that the vibrant street activity embodied in Jacobs’ idea
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of ‘eyes on the street’ as a central mechanism to prevent crime, may really not be
as effective as supposed. Mayhew cites theory (e.g. Angel, 1968) and empirical
evidence suggesting that high levels of street activity may mask certain types of
crimes (especially crimes of stealth) and may even encourage other types of
crimes, since the offender can easily fade into the crowd. While it is therefore
probably inherently desirable for ‘somebody to see something’ on the street we
cannot conclude that this will necessarily result in action relative to the crime
because of many intervening variables that affect the process, as well as local
socio-cultural issues. The latter often includes fear of retaliation, a common reason
attributed by police for the failure of eye-witnesses to report crimes in distressed
neighbourhoods.
Mayhew’s criticism extends to Newman’s theory of surveillance in defensible
space design as well as citing problems of costs, safety and privacy issues in mod-
ifying existing structures. She further notes that empirical studies of defensible
space design implementation show relatively ‘small gains’ and ‘weak effects’ in
reducing crime rates among projects. Much of the evidence that Mayhew cites is
from British ‘council’ (public) housing studies or research relating to public tele-
phone kiosks (Mawby, 1977; Mayhew et al., 1979) conducted in the 1970s. More
recent evidence, however, especially related to the effects of ‘mechanical’ as dis-
tinct from ‘natural’ surveillance techniques, e.g. closed circuit television (CCTV),
suggest contrary yet not undisputed results.
Poyner’s (1991) research on parking lot thefts, for example, demonstrated
surveillance, operationalised through CCTV, to be an effective tool in helping
reduce university parking lot thefts in Britain. Sherman (1997) reports three evalua-
tions of CCTV usage in Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Birmingham, and King’s Lynn
(Brown, 1995). In the Birmingham case, burglaries, auto thefts, thefts from autos
and other types of thefts declined over the forty-one-month test period in which
CCTV coverage was employed in the town centre. Reductions in robberies, bur-
glaries, thefts, assaults and thefts from vehicles were also reported (though the
data were not made available) in Birmingham and King’s Lynn over relatively long
periods of time which encompassed periods before, during and after CCTV instal-
lation. Because some data were not reported and statistical tests of significance
were not performed, Sherman’s study does not endorse CCTV as an effective
place-based crime prevention tool in open (public) spaces. However, he strongly
recommends further, more rigorous, evaluation of its effectiveness, especially given
its now ubiquitous placement in Britain and the rapidly growing interest in and use
of this surveillance technique in the United States.
CCTV and associated technologically based surveillance approaches have
been criticised because of their costs and variable reliability. As structural add-ons
(device, cabling and connection), they may be more expensive than designing
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surveillance facilitation features into construction. There is no doubt that Newman’s
defensible space approach is far more oriented toward ‘natural’ design solutions –
judicious placement of windows, door, entryway paths – than mechanical or elec-
tronic add-ons, even though he did not reject their use. The latter require mainte-
nance and staffing to keep them functioning properly. Moreover, in the case of
CCTV there is no guarantee that guardians will be watching in time to actually
prevent or intercede in a criminal event. In most cases in urban contexts, helpers
are too distant or the criminal event is too rapid for effective intervention. Neverthe-
less, although the evidence is not conclusive, the increased likelihood of being
apprehended after the commission of a crime due to CCTV coverage has probable
deterrent value for some types of crime, with less value for other, impulse or drug-
driven crimes. As detailed in Chapter 7, there are also the suggestions from Britain
that the addition of CCTV improves community morale and is a less significant
intrusion on city centres than other, more invasive security measures. Further,
British studies have found CCTV to be remarkably effective in the prosecution of
crimes, a virtue which may be of little solace to victims but of great interest to pros-
ecutors and to ‘reality’ television show producers. It is unfortunate that these latter
public spectacles have almost obscured more fundamental issues of the utility and
ethics of public electronic surveillance for crime prevention.
Civil libertarians on both sides of the Atlantic have argued against the wide-
spread employment of these tactics, with far more success on the American side.
By and large, the British public has supported the growth of CCTV (recent polls
put the margin at a 70 per cent favourable level), a trend that does not seem to
have been impeded by the sale of embarrassing ‘out-takes’ of video footage to the
public by sleazy entrepreneurs, or by the costs of installing and operating such
facilities. The high value that Americans place on privacy, coupled with legal pro-
tections not available to the British, have helped slow the widespread implementa-
tion of CCTV in America’s public places. However, there is evidence that the
reluctance to value public order over privacy concerns in the United States is
eroding (Nieto, 1997).
An important surveillance ‘facilitator’ is lighting, since most surveillance tech-
niques are of little use without adequate illumination. Some have argued that light-
ing is a double-edged sword: it not only permits the offender to be seen, but also
allows the offender to see potential victims and other targets. In this view, lighting
is a crime facilitator as distinct from being a crime inhibitor. Moreover, most offend-
ers do not inhabit dark and gloomy places, even though that is our picture of their
actions in our mind’s eye. Rather, offenders, like the targets they pursue, are drawn
to reasonably lighted locations associated with known ‘criminogenic’ (crime gener-
ating and attracting) land uses such as bars, liquor stores, pawn shops and adult
entertainment districts (Taylor, 1997).
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There is a wealth of technical studies on lighting devices, illumination
levels, and standards but relatively few that deal with the impact of lighting on
crime rates and the fear of crime (Tien et al., 1979; Griswold, 1984; Ramsay and
Newton, 1991). An exception is an excellent recent study by Painter and Farrington
(1997) of a housing estate in Dudley, England which suggests that improved
lighting not only reduced the fear of crime and crime rates, but also did so
with little displacement of crime to adjacent neighbourhoods. Indeed, improved
lighting tends to have a much more profound effect on crime fears and perceptions
than it does on actual crime rates. Much more research is needed in this important
area.
BOUNDARY DEFINITION
Within the context of defensible space, the ‘proper’ functioning of territoriality is
facilitated by boundary markings and the clear, although often subtle, delineation of
spaces such that most people understand where public, semi-public and private
space begin and end, with the presumption that people behave differently in differ-
ent spaces. This notion is extended by Brown and Altman (1981) who suggest that
territory is a boundary regulating mechanism facilitating the protection of privacy,
whether for individuals or groups, through a variety of access control mechanisms.
They distinguish among primary territories (e.g. homes, bedrooms), public territo-
ries (e.g. restaurant tables, bus seats), and secondary territories (e.g. clubhouses,
neighbourhood bars) emphasising that the latter, where space ownership and
control is often ambiguous, are clearly the most problematic. The problem with
ambiguous space – whose is it and who will defend it? – makes the delineation of
spaces all the more important in defensible space theory and practice, and is
indeed one of Newman’s chief concerns, as he makes clear in discussing the prob-
lems associated with the vast, unassigned (and ‘un-owned’) common spaces found
in public housing projects built throughout the 1950–1970s. We say more about
this issue in Chapter 5.
In practice, territorial marking can be accomplished through a myriad of
design techniques, including changes in paving, paint, landscaping, signage, and
entry path design relative to individual dwelling units. Fencing, gating and barricad-
ing provide obvious territorial marking, impede the movement of offenders (as well
as non-offenders) and have fundamental planning and urban design significance,
especially when they set off entire neighbourhoods from each other. As we have
seen in Chapter 3, the influence of barriers, walls and other defensive structures
on historical city forms and evolution is significant. The implications of boundary
marking and access control for the form of modern communities are nonetheless
important.
Relative to crime prevention planning approaches, Brown and Altman (1981)
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present a theory of residential crime, specifically burglary, that is rooted in the
environmental cues that they presume burglars rationally process in making
decisions as to which houses to attack based upon perceived vulnerability. Among
these cues are the real and symbolic barriers, signals and markings that signify
human territoriality. More recently, CPTED consultant Timothy Crowe (1991, 2000)
identified three design and management principles to help gauge defensibility in
spaces and that bear on boundary marking, access control and territoriality. These
are the ‘Three-Ds’: definition, designation, and design. Table 4.1 summarises this
approach.
Crowe suggests that the Three-D approach may be used, following a ‘basic
assessment’, as a ‘simple means of guiding decisions about what to do with
human space’ (page 44). In truth, this is less a means of guiding decisions than a
starting point to obtaining data as a basis for decision making. Moreover, the ques-
tions asked have some profound implications (e.g. ‘What are the social or cultural
definitions that affect how the space is used?’ ‘How well does the physical design
support the intended function and how well does it support the definition of the
desired or accepted behaviours?’) that are not simple to address, given the ranges
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Table 4.1 The ‘Three-D’ approach
Space dimension or element Questions asked
Designation What is the space’s designated purpose? What
was its originally intended use? Given these
questions, how well does it support its current and
intended uses? What are the conflicts?
Definition How is the space defined? Is it clear who owns it?
Where are its borders? What are the social or
cultural definitions that affect how the space is
used? Are the legal and administrative rules clearly
set out and reinforced in policy? Are there signs?
Is there conflict between the designated purpose
and definition?
Design How well does the physical design support the
intended function and how well does it support the
definition of the desired or accepted behaviours?
Does the physical design conflict with or impede
the productive use of the space or the proper
functioning of the intended human activity? Is there
confusion or conflict in the manner in which the
physical design is intended to control behaviour?
Source: Adapted from Crowe (1991)
and mutability of urban spaces in the United States and in Britain. But despite
Crowe’s over-optimistic presentation, the Three-D’s do help provide structure to
Newman’s amorphous notion of territoriality.
ACCESS CONTROL
If Americans are less enthusiastic than the British in the use of electronic surveil-
lance, they are far more so in the employment of community and neighbourhood
access control as a form of public boundary marking. Thus, gating and barricading
communities and the local street closure process has been elevated to an art form
in the United States. As Blakely and Snyder make plain in their seminal work
Fortress America (1999), gating of communities and neighbourhoods has grown
significantly in the United Sates over the past two decades, particularly among
newer developments in the south and south-west. This trend is spurred by a variety
of factors, in addition to the presumed security effects that gates will supposedly
provide residents. One of the chief factors promoting the spread of such develop-
ments is the connection between marketing and buyer perceptions (whether in
terms of fears or aspirations) and the fact that developers know they can charge a
premium for homes built in gated subdivisions, irrespective of the real security
value of the barriers. This trend has not yet caught hold in Britain, probably
because of the different nature of urban forms, as well as differences in cultural,
legal and planning policy orientations, and because the ‘permeability’ of urban
areas has long been valued in Britain. Indeed, the British prized connectivity well
before the advent of New Urbanist theories emphasising the importance of linked,
open city streets, epitomised by the classical grid-iron pattern.
For these reasons, gating communities and neighbourhoods, closing streets
and even chaining off footpaths that are known to facilitate crime is much more dif-
ficult to accomplish in Britain as compared to the United States. Nevertheless, the
use of security as a marketing tool has been employed in Britain by housing
estates whose plans have undergone CPTED screening and have been awarded
‘Secured by Design’ status, as discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. In these cases, in
contrast to most neighbourhood gating decisions in the USA, plan and site reviews
are conducted by the police to check the claims that the developers make about
their crime prevention planning and design features.
The American propensity to close off neighbourhoods physically from each
other provides grist for important ethical concerns. For example, in considering the
growing number of gated communities in the United States, Blakely and Snyder
ask how we realise the social contract in the absence of social contact? Marcuse
(1997) makes a strong moral case against gated communities (he believes that
walls are always a ‘second best’ solution) inasmuch as they create classes of insid-
ers and outsiders, with the latter more likely to be the least affluent and most
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vulnerable members of society. These concerns are not easily addressed by the
mere presentation of physical or statistical evidence of crime reduction, even
where it exists.
Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
CPTED, as distinct from the residential and architectural genesis of defensible
space, grew out of C. Ray Jeffrey’s profound disgust with the ineffectiveness of the
criminal justice system in preventing crime and with his search for a new theory of
crime prevention based on the relationship between humans and their environ-
ments (1971, 1977). A criminologist, his was a fundamentally academic approach
that was grounded in a blend of psychological, behavioural and learning theory that
‘involves the interaction of organism and the environment or a combination of bio-
genic and environmental forces’ (1977, page 122). In this sense, Jeffrey’s general
approach is far more explicitly focused on the relationship between nature and
nurture than is defensible space theory, which tends merely to imply it, as a
significant force in determining human criminal behaviour. However, as Clarke
notes, ‘American criminology has been unreceptive to genetic explanations of
behaviour and Jeffrey’s general theory of criminal behaviour has enjoyed less
success than his concept of CPTED’ (1997, page 8).
Jeffrey was highly critical of the sociological approach to crime championed
by some members of the Chicago (University of Chicago) School of urban soci-
ology in the 1920s and 1930s, such as Park and Burgess who, in Jeffrey’s words,
‘transformed the physical environment into a social environment and crime into
criminals’ (1977, page 110). Jeffrey’s complaint was that these theorists and
others, such as Shaw, McKay and Sutherland, disregarded or negated the physical
environment as a factor affecting criminal behaviour and focused attention exclus-
ively on the social environment or on individuals. Thus, according to them, the
‘causal explanation for criminals was cultural areas of the city, conflicting normative
patterns, and the learning of normative patterns through differential associations’
(1977, page 111). To Jeffrey this dogmatic path crowded out alternative explana-
tions for crime, especially those which posited the value of man-environment inter-
action and learning theories. In his view, this unfounded focus on zonal sociological
explanations for crime led the federal government to adopt policies that proved to
be wholly unproductive in reducing or preventing it. He quotes James Q. Wilson
(1975, page 43), who noted that ‘by directing attention toward the subjective
states that preceded or accompanied criminal behaviour, the sociological theories
diverted attention toward conditions that cannot be easily and deliberately altered.’
Prodded finally by failed public policy in the inner cities – arguably the out-
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growth of the dogmatic and wrongheaded path set out above – rising crime rates,
and a crime control policy in inner city public housing that focused almost entirely
on target hardening, the American federal government in the early 1970s cau-
tiously began to test the largely theoretical relationships between environment and
criminal behaviour posited by Jeffrey and Newman. In a series of inquiries that were
undertaken in communities across the nation known as the Westinghouse Studies,
which we discuss in more detail in Chapter 5, the federal government sought to
answer fundamental questions raised by Jeffrey about the link between physical
changes and human behaviour, especially in urban settings. The results proved to
be far from conclusive, although it is clear that Jeffrey’s polemic was a benchmark
in the development and subsequent implementation of place-based crime preven-
tion theory and practice. His students, Patricia and Paul Brantingham, argue that
the development of CPTED was a pivotal point in modern criminology in that it
helped shift its emphasis away from the focus on the criminal onto the crime
environment (Brantingham, Rondeau and Brantingham, 1997).
While the focus of CPTED is much larger than the public housing venue that
gave birth to defensible space, in that it extends across all land use categories, the
fundamental principles embraced by CPTED theorists and practitioners are nearly
identical to those posited by Newman: surveillance, boundary definition, access
control, the importance of the relation between land use and activity locations and
territoriality, with less emphasis on territoriality than Newman predicated. This is
largely due to the fact, already emphasised, that territoriality is a difficult concept to
operationalise. As noted previously, maintenance has become a far more important
CPTED principle following the publication and subsequent elaboration of the
‘broken windows’ theory and a series of empirical studies bearing on the subject.
Its importance was further emphasised by Alice Coleman’s extensive work on
British council housing estates (1985, 1990), in which she stressed the import-
ance of signs of incivility (i.e. graffiti, trashed entranceways, vandalism) as factors
conducive to criminal acts. Inspired by Newman, Coleman identifies ‘design disad-
vantagement’ features in council housing and recommends corrective measures
that incorporate his defensible space principles.
Crowe (1997) identifies nine major CPTED strategies. They are listed in the
right-hand column of Table 4.2, which shows in the left-hand column their deriva-
tion from or connection to Newman’s defensible space principle. Note that two of
the CPTED strategies, scheduling and communication, are non-spatial elements
and have no defensible space analogues. These elements are accounted for by the
focus on management and use concerns suggested by situational crime preven-
tion, discussed in more detail below. They are also mirrored, to a certain extent, in
New Urbanist concerns for spatial connections among land uses and activity
patterns.
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CPTED practitioners and consultants have categorised original or derived
defensible space strategies, such as surveillance and access control, by their
methods of implementation. For example, Crowe (1991, 2000) defines surveillance
in terms of three elements: natural surveillance (facilitated by design, which was
Newman’s fundamental conception), organised surveillance (conducted by people,
such as guards or police), or mechanical surveillance (facilitated by electronic or
mechanical devices). In practice, these are not mutually exclusive categories and
spaces may be defended by any combination of techniques or by all of them
together. The same subcategories also apply to the principle of access control, so
that entrances to apartment complexes may, for example, be protected by the
placement of windows that look out onto entry paths and doorways (natural surveil-
lance), by security guards or doormen (organised surveillance), or by CCTV
(mechanical surveillance). Again, it is not uncommon to find all three elements
operating at once, especially in upscale developments.
It is generally assumed to be less costly to include these surveillance and
access control features in the initial design of structures than to retrofit them.
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Table 4.2 Connections between defensible space and CPTED strategies
Defensible space principles CPTED strategies
(Newman) (Crowe)
Territoriality Border definitions of controlled space
Boundary definition
Territoriality Clearly marked transitional zones
Boundary definition
Access control
Surveillance Attention directed to gathering areas
Access control
Image and milieu: activity generation Place safe activities in unsafe areas
Image and milieu: activity generation Place unsafe activities in safe locations
Boundary definition Reduce use conflicts with natural
Access control barriers
None Better scheduling of space
Surveillance Increase perception of natural
surveillance in spaces by design
None Overcome distance and isolation by
communication
Source: Adapted from Newman (1973) and Crowe (1997)
Moreover, ‘natural’ surveillance and access control applications are generally
believed to be more sustainable, i.e. energy and maintenance costs are also
assumed to be lower than for retrofitted buildings. The latter points seem to be
common sense, although we are not aware of any rigorous empirical evidence
directly supporting this belief.
CPTED applications and awareness – embodying defensible space con-
cepts at their core but applied to a broad range of urban land uses and not just
residences – appear to be widespread in Britain, implemented through police and
local planning authorities; we say more about this as we discuss the roles of British
Police Architectural Liaison Officers in Chapters 7 and 8. They are less wide-
spread in the United States, although some believe that CPTED concepts are now
‘mainstream’ among police agencies.5 While that may be the case there is little
convincing evidence that CPTED principles are embedded in the consciousness of
local planners or are on the agendas of local planning agencies, much less being
implemented by them. Nevertheless, CPTED is becoming better known in the
United States and has been used as a public relations vehicle for several high
profile crime prevention campaigns, such as those conducted by the US National
Crime Prevention Council. We believe, however, that overall it is much less well
known and understood by the public and planning professionals in the USA than is
the ‘Secured by Design’ programme in Britain.
Canadian researchers Gerda Wekerle and Carolyn Whitzman (1995) note
that early studies prompted development of ‘a veritable CPTED industry’ in North
America complete with diploma courses, mass training of police cadres and con-
sultants, and the dissemination of ‘one-size fits all’ checklists that reduced CPTED
to formulaic solutions. As a result, CPTED applications were criticised as largely
unsupported by empirical evidence, too focused on design solutions and distanced
from social and management explanations, difficult to apply to many urban situ-
ations, unresponsive to concerns about the fear of crime and too dependent on
‘outside’ experts and consultants who provided simplistic solutions. Moreover,
these initiatives overlooked the need for community residents to ‘own’ crime solu-
tions, which caused resentment and programme failures. To address these prob-
lems, Wekerle and Whitzman proposed the ‘Safer Cities’ approach, emphasising
‘management and community crime prevention, along with design amelioration’
(1995, page 13). This concept – less a theory than a series of interrelated
approaches to crime prevention – combines many of the principles of the four fun-
damental place-based crime prevention theories discussed here and overlays prac-
tical community implementation techniques that have been widely adopted in
Toronto and other Canadian jurisdictions.
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Situational Crime Prevention
Clarke’s concept of situational crime prevention was borne out of the British Home
Office’s crime prevention efforts of the 1960s and 1970s. It is significant in that it
extends the boundaries of both defensible space and CPTED beyond the physical
environment, to incorporate management and use issues such as space schedul-
ing and communications, elements once ignored by the other theories. Its growing
number of advocates have significantly broadened the theoretical bases on which
crime prevention planning theory rests and they have raised many important new
questions about the nature of crime and its relationship to both spatial and non-
spatial variables (Clarke and Mayhew, 1980; Clarke, 1992, 1997; Newman et al.,
1997).
Situational crime prevention is a fundamentally ‘tactical’ approach in that it is
place and crime specific – an attribute that makes large scale generalisations of
findings difficult. Thus, it operates largely at a micro scale, which is useful for analy-
ses of particular cases (e.g. the burglary of a specific residence in a specific neigh-
bourhood), but difficult when one wishes to make statements at meso (middle) or
macro levels. It does however provide generalisations in arguing that effective
crime prevention reduces opportunities for crime by reducing rewards and increas-
ing efforts and risks for perpetrators. A number of situational crime prevention
applications (a ‘multi-tactic’ approach) are epitomised in the design and manage-
ment of the Washington Metro subway stations, a project example in Chapter 5.
While influenced by both defensible space and CPTED, situational crime preven-
tion is also shaped by routine activity theory (Felson, 1986, 1992) and rational
choice theory (Clarke and Cornish, 1985; Newman et al., 1997), both of which
have become incorporated into the lexicon of modern crime prevention planning
theory and practice.
Recently, Clarke (1997) published a matrix of ‘sixteen opportunity-reducing
techniques’ (see Table 4.3), in which an additional category ‘removing excuses’ is
added to the original three categories of increasing perceived effort, risk and redu-
cing anticipated rewards. In each instance, Table 4.3 gives three examples of the
kinds of action that would fall under this heading. Clarke’s rationale for doing this
was that situational crime prevention should not be restricted to classical ‘street’
crime but is also applicable to crimes more typically associated with higher status
perpetrators and with others whose actions might normally escape the same level
of scrutiny and sanction as violent or ‘predatory’ offenders. This category is there-
fore intended to include many classical white collar crimes, as well as an assort-
ment of tax, traffic and minor theft incidents that have been previously overlooked.
Further, these crimes are generally not covered by ‘environmental’ designations in
that they may not be linked to specific places. As a mark of the growth in this crime
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prevention theory, the matrix is a considerable elaboration of Clarke and Mayhew’s
(1980) original formulation which included only seven components: target harden-
ing, target removal, removing the means to crime, reducing crime payoff, natural
surveillance, surveillance by employees and environmental management.
While not all elements of situational crime prevention applications are clearly
‘place-based’, it is a robust and developing theoretical field whose advocates are
adapting to new technical and cultural developments extending beyond the phys-
ical environment.
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Table 4.3 Sixteen opportunity-reducing techniques
Increasing Increasing Reducing Removing
perceived effort perceived risks anticipated rewards excuses
1. Target Hardening 5. Entry/exit screening 9. Target removal 13. Rule setting
Slug rejecter device Automatic ticket gates Removable car radios Customs declarations
Steering locks Baggage screening Woman’s refuges Harassment codes
Bandit screens Merchandise tags Phonecards Hotel registration
2. Access control 6. Formal surveillance 10. Identifying 14. Stimulating
property conscience
Parking lot barriers Red light cameras Property marking Roadside 
Fenced yards Burglar alarms Vehicle licencing speedometers
Entry phones Security guards Cattle branding ‘Shoplifting is stealing’
‘Idiots drink and drive’
3. Deflecting 7. Surveillance by 11. Reducing 15. Controlling
offenders employees temptation disinhibitors
Bus stop placement Pay phone locations Gender-neutral listings Drinking age laws
Tavern location Park attendants Off-street parking Ignition interlock
Street closures CCTV systems Rapid repair V-chip2
4. Controlling 8. Natural 12. Denying benefits 16. Facilitating
facilitators Surveillance compliance
Credit card photo Defensible space Ink merchandise tags Exit library checkout
Gun controls Street lighting PIN1 for car radios Public lavatories
Caller ID Cab driver ID Graffiti cleaning Trash bins
Source: Clarke, 1997
Notes:
1 Clarke (1997) notes that car radios are now being manufactured with built-in security codes
that require someone to know a specific Personal Identification Number (PIN) before they can
work in a vehicle other than the one in which they were originally installed. Studies in several
countries have shown that this has reduced car burglaries.
2 The V-chip is a computer chip in some newer TV sets that allows parents to block viewing of
certain television programmes.
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY
As a vital supporting element of situational crime prevention, rational choice theory
also incorporates fundamental defensible space and CPTED principles inasmuch
as it assumes that environmental factors influence offenders’ choices and that they
commit crimes within the context of a ‘bounded’ rationality (Cornish and Clarke,
1986). This rationality is less perfect than that of ‘economic man’ and takes into
account the notion that while individuals’ perceptions of situations vary they are
generally rational. Rational choice theory therefore views criminal acts as the result
of a calculation that acknowledges the costs (which include effort expended),
benefits (potential reward) and risks associated with those acts. Together situa-
tional crime prevention and rational choice therefore suggest that offenders make
considered decisions to commit crime in specific situations based upon the per-
ceived expenditure of effort, balanced by risk factors and expected reward.
Environmental (or situational) elements that increase risks and energy (for example,
a ‘hardened target’ such as a steel reinforced door), and diminished rewards (for
example, explicit announcements that cash kept on the premises is limited) reduce
crime rewards, hence the opportunity, in those circumstances. And it is the specific
circumstance – the situation – which is central to the theory. Now elaborated
beyond a mere set of techniques (Clarke, 1997), situational crime prevention
focuses on the immediate aspect of the criminal event, as distinct from the ‘distal’
or the psychological, cultural or sociological background or motivations of the
offender. Indeed, this also is a key factor that distinguishes place-based crime pre-
vention theory from earlier crime prevention approaches.
In concert with this thinking, offenders are seen to be driven by instrumental
as distinct from value rationality. That is, the crime is conceived to be a function of
the opportunity and rewards offered within the environment – the situation – in
which it occurs as distinct from defects in the offender’s values, beliefs or sociali-
sation. The theory broadens the responsibility for crime while not absolving the
criminal for his acts. A convenience store robbery may therefore be seen as a
coincidence of many environmental and situational factors that might include,
depending on the specific circumstances, the neglect of management to initiate
good cash handling practices, the inadequacy of designers to provide sufficient
surveillance and lighting opportunities, and the failure of code enforcement and
planning staff to require CPTED compliant design. Despite these design and man-
agement shortcomings, the offender is not excused from guilt. Rather, the external
elements contributing to the crime are painted in as well, providing a much more
complete canvas.
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ROUTINE ACTIVITY THEORY
Complementing situational crime prevention further is the work of Cohen and
Felson (1979) which focuses on understanding the ‘routine activities’ of offenders.
An approach which is compatible with all place-based theories, in that it concen-
trates primarily on the criminal event as distinct from the criminal’s state of mind or
background, routine activity theory also lends itself to the geographic and quantita-
tive analysis of crime patterns and trends. It is associated with theories of behav-
ioural geography and crime patterning (Eck and Weisburd, 1995) in suggesting
that offenders, like the rest of us, have day-to-day schedules – trips to and from
work, visiting friends, going shopping – and that in the course of such routine
travels they search out likely targets. Targets are often associated with offenders’
idiosyncrasies, so that paedophiles would likely select schools or playgrounds
encountered in the course of routine travel and drug addicted burglars would likely
prefer targets adjacent to drug markets. This approach is particularly practical for
law enforcement purposes – and especially to the growing field of crime analysis in
the USA and Britain – in devising tactical responses to crime grounded in the dis-
covery of order and patterns to raw crime data. Based on empirical studies
(Maguire, 1982; Poyner and Webb, 1991), routine activity theory helps one make
informed speculations about the search patterns of offenders in certain circum-
stances and likely venues for crimes based upon adjacent land uses and the socio-
economic characteristics of neighbourhoods. We know, for example, that offenders
are likely to prefer home-range areas (part of their ‘comfort zones’) in which to
commit crimes and that targets are often related in time as well as spatially. Clarke
emphasises the temporal element as being central to routine activity theory and its
stress on ‘three minimal elements for direct-contact predatory crime: a likely
offender, a suitable target, and the absence of a capable guardian against crime’
(1997, page 11). Taylor (1997) documents recent research by Felson (1995) that
further amplifies routine activity theory by suggesting that offenders have a variety
of ‘handlers’ including close associates, relatives and friends who may discourage
criminal acts and that settings often have ‘place managers’ – doormen, security
guards, bus drivers – whose scope of responsibility is limited to very small places
within the overall urban fabric.
Environmental Criminology: The ‘Fourth Dimension’
We turn now to environmental criminology, the final major thread in the develop-
ment of modern place-based crime prevention theory. Environmental criminology
incorporates defensible space and CPTED principles, although it focuses
much less on design elements of crime in places and much more on the
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‘geographic’ elements of crime, including paths and patterns. These are seen to
form ‘action’ and ‘awareness’ spaces of offenders which, in turn, contain the
‘search areas’ in which victims and targets are identified (Brantingham and Bran-
tingham, 1981). Like situational crime prevention, environmental criminology
incorporates routine activity theory and rational choice theory. Thus alloyed, the
Brantinghams suggest that environmental criminology provides a dynamic ‘back-
cloth’: a fluid context to the criminal event, that allows one to grasp both the
‘landscape and timescape of crime’ (Brantingham et al., 1997, page 7). Influenced
by both the small-area zone and sector-based ecological research associated with
the famous Chicago School of sociology (Burgess, 1916, 1925; Shaw and
McKay, 1931), the Brantinghams nevertheless reject its sociological determinism
by asking their most fundamental questions in terms of ‘where’ instead of ‘who’.
This is not to say that they discount the value of sociological explanations in
describing criminal behaviours, but rather shift these from being the primary (or
sole) perspective to one that is supportive of locational data. Patterns are built out
of the linkage of geographic and temporal events, and not the social and cultural
contexts in which offenders live. An example provided to differentiate the two
approaches is that
a robbery committed by a minority youth one block from his home in the ghetto
and a burglary committed by a middle-class white youth one block from home in
the suburbs might be treated as unrelated by the sociological imagination, but
as identical (one block from home, at noon) by the geographical imagination
(Brantingham and Brantingham, 1981, page 21).
The relatively recent development of Geographic Information System (GIS)-
based computerised crime mapping by law enforcement agencies in the United
States and Britain over the last decade is an outgrowth of historical interest in the
spatial identification of crime that harkens back to nineteenth century France
(Guerry, 1833) and England (Plint, 1851) and is allied to the development of
modern environmental criminology theory. GIS-based crime mapping adds enorm-
ous value to the voluminous crime data normally collected by police, by facilitating
its rapid transformation into spatial information depicting crime patterns and trends.
Crime mapping using GIS technology also has significant utility for comprehensive
planning and design issues by providing, among other things, easily understood
maps for community presentation. Further, by greatly enhancing crime analysis, it is
becoming an important tool in police management by permitting the rapid assess-
ment of problem areas and the deployment of personnel. It is being used to
support community oriented policing programmes in a growing number of North
American cities and by police forces throughout Britain.
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Using computerised crime mapping, police crime analysts can readily distin-
guish:
• crime series (recurrence of similar crimes committed by one offender);
• crime sprees (high frequency of criminal activity in a short period of time so
that crimes appear to be almost continuous);
• crime hotspots6 (borrowed from geology, this term signifies small areas or
specific locations in which an unusual amount of crime activity occurs that
may be committed by one or more offenders);
• crime hot dots ((Pease and Laycock, 1996) defined as ‘an individual associ-
ated with an unusual amount of criminal activity, either as an offender or a
victim’ (Velasco and Boba, 2000));
• hot products (types of property that are the repeated target of crime); or
• hot targets (defined as particular types of target that are victimised but that
are not confined to one geographic location). An example includes a recent
Florida case in which a roving band of transvestite burglars victimised dress
shops featuring ‘plus sizes’ across the state.
Routine activity theory and environmental criminology have foreshadowed the
advent of computerised crime mapping using Geographic Information Systems
(GIS) programs.
New Urbanism
While not explicitly recognised as a place-based crime prevention theory, New
Urbanism (also called Neo-Traditional Town Planning, and Traditional Neigh-
bourhood Development) adopts a fundamentally similar premise in suggesting
that its physical design prescriptions can profoundly influence behaviour and in
so doing, prevent crime and reduce the fear of crime. In many ways, however,
the sweep of New Urbanist advocacy is broader and more ideological than 
place-based crime prevention. First, it is a more comprehensive planning approach
with a larger urban design scope than place-based crime prevention. Second,
its adherents contend (in the absence of long-term evidence) that the implementa-
tion of its design principles can not only reduce crime but can also, among
other things, change social relations in cities, increase psychological satisfaction
among residents and strengthen their civic commitments – ‘stewardship’ – as sug-
gested by the recent redesigners of Hulme, Manchester (see Chapter 8). While
Newman may have implied those results as an outcome of the implementation of
defensible space, especially in connection with his concept of territoriality, the
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claims are not nearly as explicit or broad as those made by some New Urbanist
zealots.
Spurred by revulsion to the automobile dominated, decentralised suburban
society that emerged in the United States following World War II, New Urbanists
took their ideological cue from Jane Jacobs’ (1961) rejection of modern city plan-
ning and urban design in favour of a vision of the city composed of small villages
centred around vibrant streets, teeming with pedestrians and bustling with activity.
Expanding on those visions, the cardinal design principles of New Urbanism have
come to focus on the creation of bounded walkable neighbourhoods, the develop-
ment and use of public transit, and the encouragement of mixed land uses at the
neighbourhood level. By far the most significant theme involves the diminution of
the role of the automobile as the dominant design focus.
A series of principles (the ‘Ahwahnee Principles’) and recommendations,
summarised by the ‘first generation’ of New Urbanist theorists and practitioners,
Andres Duany, Elizabeth Plater-Zyberg, Peter Calthorpe and Henry Turley, fairly
spell out the range of New Urbanist design ideas. Apart from the three overarching
ones noted above, these include compacting wasteful community space taken up
by large lawns; providing local, pedestrian accessible shopping areas including
corner stores; creating bounded edges to communities and having clearly defined
and planned internal spaces including a town centre; reducing the influence of the
automobile by narrowing streets, using rear access alleys, widening sidewalks,
hiding garages, shrinking parking lots and locating them behind buildings; directing
night-time illumination to the sidewalk and not to the street; eliminating culs-de-sac
in favour of a grid-iron, ‘permeable’ street network; planting trees along curbs and
encouraging the growth of natural vegetation.
They also advocate diversifying housing types, businesses, and the use of
sustainable practices to conserve water and energy. To maximise sidewalk activity,
‘eyes on the street’ and the physical connection to the street, residences are
encouraged to have porches, present large front windows, and to have minimal
setbacks. Together, with the promulgation of a variety of development codes to
implement them, these design principles form the core of New Urbanist doctrine.
Although these ideas have had great press both in the United States and in
Britain, and have attracted a growing number of fervent adherents in both nations,
only a relatively small number of New Urbanist communities have actually been
built. While the promotional material touting a New Urbanist newsletter (New
Urban News, 2001) suggests that more than 300 such places are presently being
planned or under construction in the United States, that is but a small fraction of
the total number of new communities developed annually. Moreover, a recent
analysis of advertised New Urbanist communities suggests that developers are
often adopting their design principles piecemeal and primarily for marketing pur-
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poses, a practice termed ‘hybridisation’ or ‘neo-porchism’ by some (Ehrenhalt,
1998).7 Among the most well known and generally complete versions of New
Urbanist development in the United States are the communities of Kentlands (near
Washington, D.C.), Laguna West (near Sacramento, California), Seaside, Florida
(located in the north-west panhandle) and Celebration, Florida (just outside of
Orlando), although some would argue that the latter project is a hybrid. In Britain,
the redevelopment of Hulme in Manchester is the foremost example, and is dis-
cussed in detail in Chapter 8. Hulme is the rare case of a New Urbanist-like design
that has been built over the ruins of a distressed neighbourhood, catering to a
mixture of council housing and private sector residents. The case of the redevelop-
ment of East Perth in Western Australia along New Urbanist lines is also illustrated
in Chapter 10.
In the United States, where New Urbanists have been roundly criticised for
building new towns on greenfields for the upper classes (the average price of a
home in Celebration is $275,000) and the rich (Seaside), a ‘second generation’ of
New Urbanist designers have planned communities in some inner city neighbour-
hoods such as Orlando, Florida’s Parramore neighbourhood, and South Miami,
Florida’s Hometown plan area (Dunlop, 1997). Moreover, under the Clinton Admin-
istration, the US Department of Housing and Urban Development began to incor-
porate New Urbanist policies into several public housing redevelopment
programmes. Whether that trend will continue under the Bush Administration is
open to question. Moreover, we are a long way off from knowing how these efforts
will fare in preventing crime and reducing the fear of crime specifically, or relative
to the broad and widely heralded community building goals of the New Urbanists
generally. Although we appreciate how difficult they are to carry out, we would
hope that careful empirical studies help us assess that progress.
Some of the most zealous CPTED/defensible space and New Urbanist ideo-
logues suggest that place-based crime prevention and New Urbanist principles are
fundamentally at odds. We believe this to be an over-statement, attendant to right-
eous, dogmatic views. Rather, we suspect that in practice there are probably far
more points of convergence among these approaches than there are differences.
Thus, adherents in both camps subscribe to the belief that design can encourage
positive territorial-stewardship behaviours and impulses, and that these can be
accentuated by clear boundary definitions and attention to design detail; that
design interventions promoting street activity are generally desirable; and that
impediments to this (including speeding traffic) are problematic. Where they do
seem to differ, as in the preference for cars to be tucked away behind buildings
(New Urbanists) rather than in front of buildings (CPTED), the differences boil
down to functionality that can be addressed by design finesse as distinct from pre-
scriptive choices.
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Thus, while parking location is a question of aesthetics and sightlines for New
Urbanists, the key CPTED issue is that targets (cars and the people using them) be
protected by surveillance and, where possible, ‘natural’ surveillance. If this can be
accomplished through the design of rear fenestration or other means that encourage
‘eyes on the cars’ then there is no dispute. Where New Urbanists seek to maximise
street life and activity, whether through mixing land uses or other practices, CPTED
researchers agree that this is desirable for surveillance and related purposes, but
point to studies suggesting that there is a point at which increasing street activity can
shield or even promote certain types of crimes and, moreover, that there is no guar-
antee that observers will be spurred to help victims, whatever the circumstances. In
some cases we suspect that antipathy between the two approaches is more of a
‘raining on my parade’ reaction than real differences in substance.
Perhaps the most vexing disagreements between the two viewpoints are over
closing streets and the use of culs-de-sac versus grid-iron, or permeable, street
networks. There are some consultants who say there are never reasons to close
streets (Kulash, 1997) and a prime tenet of New Urbanist philosophy is that ‘the
design of streets and buildings should reinforce safe environments, but not at the
expense of accessibility and openness’ (Charter of New Urbanism, undated). In
response, some CPTED and defensible space practitioners and police advocate
street closures as a reasonable and sometimes necessary part of the crime preven-
tion toolkit. The key to this is the absolutist nature of the recommendation, from
whatever party. We would argue that it is inherently foolish to give formulaic advice
about cities since they are wholly idiosyncratic things, made up of a collection of
parts that fit together in a kind of ‘organised chaos’ (Catchpole, 1996). Moreover,
cities are extraordinarily mutable creations, changing form, function, appearance
and population base as places and neighbourhoods evolve (or de-evolve) over
time. Thus, despite evidence suggesting that permeable street patterns do facili-
tate certain types of crimes (Newman, 1981, 1996; Matthews, 1990, 1993; Atlas
and LeBlanc, 1994), and police inclinations to close off troublesome areas to limit
escape routes, we suggest that street closure must be a case-by-case decision,
made in consultation with the local community and in recognition of the unique cir-
cumstances that every urban place presents and mindful of the changing, adaptive
nature of both criminals and of cities.
Certainly, one great attraction of New Urbanism to planners and designers
(who are all taught to think about systematic connections among urban spaces and
functions) is that it presents a holistic theory that purports to tie all the disparate
threads together: in effect, to make sense of the chaos that is a city. These link-
ages, with explicit connection to the urban fabric, are largely absent in much place-
based crime prevention today, which is not nearly as neat a package as New
Urbanism. Perhaps that raggedness diminishes the appeal of such theory to plan-
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ners vis-à-vis New Urbanism. But the allure of its promise must be tested by the
experience of people living in these communities and by empirical study over time.
Will New Urbanist Communities stand up to these tests? Hopefully, yes. But even
if they do, it is highly unlikely that New Urbanism will become the solution to urban
design, or to the problems of urban crime. Rather, it is much more likely to be one
choice among many in the menu of options available to planners and designers
who seek to make cities both liveable and safe.
The Displacement Issue
No discussion of place-based crime prevention would be complete without men-
tioning crime displacement. It is an issue with practical and ethical components
that has dogged the development and application of these theories almost since
their inception. Saville (1997) and other CPTED practitioners suggest that the
crime displacement critique has been and remains the most serious obstacle to
CPTED implementation and acceptance. Essentially, displacement suggests that
place-based crime prevention is a zero-sum game. In this context, crimes pre-
vented at one place are automatically shifted to places that have had no crime
interventions – they are merely displaced or move. Thus, when a target is ‘treated’,
such as when convenience stores are forced to add additional clerks (thereby
increasing organised surveillance and guardianship), the concept of displacement
assumes that robbers will target other similar operations, such as gas stations, that
have not been similarly treated. Either that, or it is assumed they will turn from
robbery to other crimes, such as car theft or burglary. As Clarke (1997) has docu-
mented, there is indeed an early body of evidence, principally from the 1970s, to
support these views.
However, the problem is that the theory of displacement that developed from
these studies conceived crime to be a mechanical – hydraulic – phenomenon such
that if diverted from one target it must flow to another. This presumes not only a
single-mindedness among offenders, but also one that is largely non-rational (there
is little or no calculation of costs and benefits predicated on opportunities, risks,
and rewards) or even irrational (the offender may take a course of action that pro-
vides more liabilities than benefits), since he or she is presumed to be driven to act
again once the initial criminal opportunity is displaced. It is an ethical dilemma
whether it is in the public interest to expend resources to prevent crime that will
inevitably reappear elsewhere (although crime prevention can also be undertaken
by private persons). Moreover, is it ethical simply to ‘move crime around’, whether
by public or private mechanisms, especially when the displaced crime is more likely
than not to end up in already distressed, minority communities?
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These questions and long-held perceptions of place-based crime prevention
– voiced at local public meetings by citizens and at conferences by academics –
have begun to be challenged by a growing body of evidence showing that dis-
placement is not a foregone conclusion. One of the most influential counterweights
in this argument comes from Hesseling’s (1994) evaluation of displacement in fifty-
five studies of situational crime prevention applications. He found that there was no
evidence of displacement in almost half of the studies (22) and that when it did
exist in the remainder, it was never on a one-to-one basis. Indeed, closer inspection
of place-based crime prevention applications shows that the effects of displace-
ment are highly idiosyncratic, varying with the offence and the unique circum-
stances attendant to every situation. Moreover, in some circumstances,
researchers have been able to document the reverse of displacement – instances
where the benefits of crime prevention applications have extended beyond the
place or space initially treated. Termed variously the ‘drip-feed’ (Pease, 1991),
‘free-rider’ (Miethe, 1991), ‘halo effect’ (Scherdin, 1986), or the ‘bonus effect’
(Sherman, 1990), the phenomenon is more widely known by Clarke and Weis-
burd’s (1994) term ‘diffusion of benefits’ which aptly describes the process.
Conclusions
Figure 4.1 fairly summarises the development and perceived relationships among
the four major place-based crime prevention theories. It is clear that emerging the-
ories and applications incorporate modern technological innovations (e.g. GIS-
based crime mapping systems), an increasingly sophisticated view of the crime
event as a function of a combination of physical, management and community
involvement components, and the possibility of interweaving place-based crime
prevention theory (and practice) much more intimately into current and developing
urban planning and design theory, such as New Urbanism. This broadened con-
ceptualisation is more flexible than early defensible space and CPTED viewpoints,
which focused primarily on physical design, although like New Urbanism, there was
an undoubtedly utopian flavour to the rhetoric, especially in the case of defensible
space. While growing more expansive, the melding of the theories has paralleled
and in some cases has guided the increasingly sharpened focus of community
development policy on local level initiatives in both the United States and Britain.
Thus, the emergence of the Community Oriented Policing initiative in the USA and
the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act in Britain both owe no small debt to place-based
theories which underlie many of their policy premises.
Though they have evolved independently out of different knowledge bases,
over the past four decades the theoretical strands have become increasingly



















































Emerging Place-Based Crime Prevention Theory and
Strategies in the 2000s
*Continued refinement of place-based crime prevention
theories based on empirical evidence
*Increasing incorporation of place-based crime prevention
planning principles into development codes and planning law
*Increasing local emphasis – COPS (US), Community
Partnership (Britain), Safer Cities (Canada, US, Britain)
*Increasing use of technology such as GIS crime mapping,
GPS, 3-D modelling as crime prevention tools
*Melding of major place-based crime prevention
approaches into new theory and approaches,
including new urbanist-type theory
Figure 4.1 Major milestones in the development of place-based crime prevention theory
Source: adapted from Virginia Polytechnic University website, at
http://www.arch.vt.edu/crimepper/pages/home.html
woven together by practice, experience and empirical research. This is as it should
be as we move, haltingly to be sure, toward a general theory of place-based crime
prevention. Currently, we have a wider theoretical menu from which to choose to
test real world crime interventions, which we badly need to do. Woven together,
the theories have changed criminology and have had an impact on urban policy in
both nations. But they have had a scattered impact on local level planning and
urban design practice. One might expect that the principles derived from these
theoretical bases would be more influential on planning and design professionals,
project owners, builders, developers and local public officials than they have in fact
been. But old thinking dies hard, and while police in the United States and Britain
have increasingly adopted place-based crime prevention ideas and practice, their
influence on the planning and design community has been much less profound.
Part of the reason for this is undoubtedly due to gaps in professional educa-
tion, and to the fact that this field is in its infancy in many ways; part is also due to
the fact that, especially in the United States, there is nothing that has forced plan-
ners to learn these principles or adopt them into their practices, such as a well-
spring of demand from clients or their incorporation into widespread building or
development codes. Further, a good deal of the problem lies in the dearth of empir-
ical evidence and reasonably documented case studies that can be used to
support relatively general statements about relationships between crime and
environmental factors. Thus, a daytime burglary in a specific neighbourhood can be
explained within the context of the theories presented here, but daytime burglaries
in neighbourhoods cannot be generalised (other than to say that they are likely
because owners are away at work), no matter how much we would like to do so. It
remains difficult to recount empirically grounded general theory when called to do
so in public meetings and in court, forums in which planners and designers some-
times find themselves.
Thus, while past empirical research focused on small-scale urban places has
increasingly shed light on the connections between criminal behaviour, physical
design and the management of some of these places, we are still far from the
effective application of place-based crime prevention theories to the vast majority
of places. The expectation (the hope) is that increased emphasis on empirical
study along with carefully documented case studies will move us forward toward a
general theory of placed-based crime prevention planning and, in so doing, a better
understanding of the linkage between crime and place at all levels of analysis.
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Notes
1 Jeffrey writes: ‘At the time I was writing Crime Prevention Through Environmental
Design, I had no idea that Newman and his group were working on the same problem. I
was also unaware of the police work in Britain until I came into contact with the Institute
in Louisville.’ (1977, page 45.)
2 In the United States, living in public or government subsidised housing – as a form of
welfare – has long been subject to social stigmatisation, inasmuch as tenants are pre-
sumed incapable, for whatever reasons, of competing in the mainstream market
economy for better housing. Thus, public housing has popularly been seen as generally
inferior in quality, construction and location to that available in the private sector
(although this is not necessarily true), and associated with lifestyles and behaviours
eschewed by the middle-class. Aside from class differences, there is moreover no ques-
tion that there is a strong racial component associated with the stigmatisation of public
housing in the USA by the general population.
3 As advanced by Wilson and Kelling (1982) the ‘broken windows theory’ suggests,
among other things, that community order, disorder and crime are connected in a ‘kind
of developmental sequence’, such that relatively small acts of incivility progressively
lead to other, potentially larger ones, including criminal behaviour. An example used is
the experiment that compared the treatment of abandoned automobiles left on
the streets of the Bronx, New York and Palo Alto, California, where both were
plundered and destroyed following initial acts of theft and vandalism. Once the threshold
of community civility had been breached, the cars became ‘fair game’ to other passers-
by, even those who would not normally have fitted the ‘profile’ of vandals. In addressing
police patrol assignments, Wilson and Kelling draw from this and related evidence
the notion that even small levels of environmental (and behavioural) disorder matter and,
if left unattended, send out cues that ‘nobody cares’, hence encouraging further, pos-
sibly more serious disorder and crime. Thus, according to Wilson and Kelling, uncol-
lected trash, broken windows, graffiti, disorderly conduct, and other seemingly minor
transgressions not only injure the community generally, but can have a significant cumu-
lative effect. A recent study by Taylor (1999) suggests, however, that relative to long-
term neighbourhood stability, revitalisation efforts and the fear of crime, neighbourhood
status issues (which are historical) and low crime rates are more influential factors than
physical disorder. As a result, Taylor advises against ‘according grime reduction or
zero tolerance a privileged status relative to other community policing efforts’ (pages 10
and 11).
4 For example, Poyner (1983, page 11) notes that ‘Newman’s ideas about territoriality
have never been validated by research, even though a number of researchers have tried.’
He suggests that the concept has been replaced by accessibility and access control.
5 Although there are no national surveys that assess the spread of CPTED knowledge and
use among US police forces, experts such as US Justice Department official Dr Richard
Titus believe that it is now widespread, especially within larger agencies. This informa-
tion is based on personal conversations with him in April 2000.
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6 For an excellent discussion of the opportunities and problems associated with the desig-
nation of crime hot spots, see Taylor’s article, ‘Crime and small scale places: what we
know, what we can prevent, and what else we need to know’, published as part of the
Proceedings of the Professional Conference Series of the National Institute of Justice,
July 1998.
7 Based on field observations and conversations with planners such as David Maltby,
principal designer for Florida Planning and Design Inc., it is clear that owners seek
to widen the market appeal of large-scale projects by incorporating into them a range
of design approaches, from New Urbanist to traditional suburban cul-de-sac neighbour-
hoods.





AMERICAN POLICY AND PRACTICE
Introduction
In this chapter we move from the place-based crime prevention postulates offered
up by Newman, Jeffrey, Clarke, the Brantinghams and their disciples to con-
structed projects that either helped generate the theories, or have come to be sup-
portive of them after the fact, and to examples of legislation that are largely
grounded in these theories and projects. We look first at the structural context of
federalism, since this frames the adoption and implementation of new policies
generally in the United States, with implications reaching down to local level juris-
dictions, where place-based crime prevention interventions actually take place.
Next we concentrate on intervention examples from North America, and primarily
from the United States, as a basis for comparison with examples from Britain,
which are discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. Our interest is to focus on projects that
typify place-based crime prevention in the USA and Britain but that also help distin-
guish the approaches between the two nations. These projects and legislation
suggest a range of fundamental historical, structural and policy contrasts between
the USA and Britain that have led both countries to grapple with crime prevention
from different perspectives, sometimes with different results. This comparison
moves us toward an understanding of where we have come from in each nation rel-
ative to place-based crime prevention, as well as where we are likely to go.
Together, the four interrelated place-based crime prevention theories pre-
sented in Chapter 4 sought to revolutionise academic criminology, sociology,
architecture and urban planning and, by so doing, influence crime prevention inter-
ventions in the field. While there is no question that a growing number of acade-
mics have come to acknowledge the value of defensible space, CPTED, situational
crime prevention and environmental criminology principles as legitimate com-
ponents of crime prevention theory, the extent to which they are actually put into
practice in the everyday planning, design and construction of the built environment
is open to question. In the United States new policy and programmes often are far
easier to verbalise than operationalise, especially within the context of the highly
fragmented federal system in which decision-making plays out.
The Place of Environmental Design in Responses to
Crime
Place-based crime prevention programmes and planning in the United States
remain as the province of local and state governments, even though in recent years
the federal government has increased its influence in these fields through a number
of grant programmes aimed primarily at housing and local law enforcement. While
there are a variety of explanations for the jurisdictional ‘place’ of environmental
crime prevention design within local government in the modern United States,
much of the reasoning for its location can be traced to the operation of federalism
and to funding approaches, some of which we mention here by example. Moreover,
just because local governments have the power to implement many crime preven-
tion strategies, it does not necessarily follow that they will do so, for reasons to be
made clear.
It can be argued that the federal presence in place-based crime prevention
has antecedents in the series of housing, slum clearance and urban redevelopment
acts, beginning with the Housing Act of 1937 and continuing through the Housing
Acts of 1949 and 1954 and into the 1970s, when the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974 changed the way federal aid was dispersed to local gov-
ernments (Gerckens, 1979). It is also evident in HUD’s (US Department of
Housing and Urban Development) early interest in Oscar Newman’s defensible
space research in the 1970s. This interest continued, with some interruptions,
through the 1990s when place-based crime prevention ideas are seen in public
housing redevelopment policies and made explicit in the published viewpoints of
former HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros (1995), as we detail later in this chapter.
The federal role in place-based crime prevention can also be seen, albeit
sometimes indirectly, in the US Department of Justice (DOJ) administered 1988
Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which provided millions of dollars in both formula and discre-
tionary funding1 to localities and groups for crime prevention related activities, and
in the emphasis on Community Oriented Policing strategies embodied in the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. This latter Act included a
provision directing the US Attorney General to establish the Office of Community
Oriented Policing Service (COPS), which has distributed several billion dollars in
grant funding to communities across the United States. It has been suggested that
this emphasis on community policing marks a shift, at least at the federal policy
level, from advocating crime suppression to crime prevention as the chief goal of
the police (Greene, 2000). In so doing, Community Oriented Policing is seen as a
contextual activity (that is, based in the local environment) which has as a main
goal the enhancement of citizens’ quality of life.
Police are thus directed toward ‘partnership’ relationships with local citizens
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and with other local agencies, much like the thrust of the partnerships envisioned
by the British 1998 Crime and Disorder Act, as discussed in Chapters 7 and 8.
This is a radical departure from previous local law enforcement styles in the United
States, such as ‘traditional policing’ which has been characterised as reactive,
crime focused, inward looking and environmentally insensitive, among other attrib-
utes (Greene, 2000). Community Oriented Policing is thus a far more accommo-
dating vehicle for the application of the place-based crime prevention theories
discussed in Chapter 4, and this is evident in the linkages between, for example,
local CPTED programs and community policing made by the Department of Justice
(Fleissner and Heinzelmann, 1996) and the National Crime Prevention Council
(NCPC, 2000). Whether Community Oriented Policing is truly effective in reducing
crime remains an open question, although there is better evidence that it has a
positive impact on relations between community members and the police (Greene,
2000).
Despite these federal efforts in housing and law enforcement, and the fact
that ‘local crime prevention offices receive more Department of Justice funding
than anytime in American history’ (Sherman et al., 1997, page 1–12), the goal of a
‘comprehensive, and co-ordinated national crime prevention campaign’ (NCPI,
1986) remains elusive. Furthermore, the application of place-based crime preven-
tion strategies, such as CPTED, in local communities is extremely variable. There
are a number of reasons that this remains so. First, as we have noted in Chapter 1,
crime prevention generally, and place-based crime prevention specifically, are relat-
ively new developments; local level bureaucrats, especially in law enforcement,
tend to be reluctant to adopt new strategies, particularly when they may dilute their
own authority (Greene, 2000). Further reasons include the persistence of the
American belief that local government initiatives are preferable to those from the
central government, a value reaching back to Jefferson’s advocacy of small-town
democracy. Allied here is an enduring anti-urban bias that also stretches far back
into American history. This is salient in terms of crime since, as we have seen from
Chapters 1 and 2, the crimes that people tend to worry about the most and which
affect their quality of life are particularly urban phenomena. Additionally, as we have
noted previously, planners and urban designers have had little educational back-
ground in place-based crime prevention techniques and almost nothing to compel
them (or their local government) to consider place-based crime prevention plan-
ning in development ordinances or policy.
Moreover, an overarching factor affecting the local adoption of crime preven-
tion programmes and planning is the structure of the American federal system
itself, which splits power between the central government and the states, and in
which cities, regions and special authorities and districts further splinter power,
policy-making authority and available funding. The result is an unresolved, dynamic
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tension relative to policy development, programme application and the governing
process itself. In such a system, power is jealously shared among overlapping and
competitive governments, creating tension and ambiguity. And in such a system it
is possible to have the circumstance where, as in crime prevention funding, it is
entirely up to local decision-makers whether or not to apply for, and subsequently
adopt, specific crime prevention programmes.
Given the thousands of state and local jurisdictions in the USA – the National
League of Cities represents 18,000 municipalities (National League of Cities,
2000) – the potential for variability in the types of programme(s) adopted, as well
as the rate of adoption, is extraordinary. This is particularly true relative to building
control functions. As the Douglas Commission (1968) pointed out:
Building code jurisdictions are thousands of little kingdoms, each having its own
way: What goes in one town won’t go in another and for no good reason (ibid.,
page XI).
This same variability provides a natural laboratory for innovation: cities and states
become ‘petri dishes’ for experimentation. In this context, jurisdictions have differ-
ent predilections for innovation: some learn from each other and copy programmes
almost verbatim – a ‘contagion’ effect – whereas others also learn but tailor their
programmes depending on local circumstances, politics and environmental issues,
and may take years to adopt a programme or policy – a ‘stepwise’ adoption
process (Campbell, 1996). The adoption and diffusion of convenience store crime
prevention legislation, presented at the conclusion of this chapter, is a case illus-
trating both these points.
Finally, while federalism underscores the fracturing of power and policy-
making between state and federal governments, it is private economic interests
that often shift the balance of power decisively one way or the other, especially
where issues devolve to the local level. This is extremely important for crime pre-
vention planning, particularly where it deals with physical interventions to private
property in the United States. Why? Because private development is by far the
largest financial supporter of local government through local property taxes. We
suspect that this tends to heighten conservatism towards policy and development
regulatory changes at the local level, such as those suggested by some place-
based crime prevention planning strategies. The tendency may be further exacer-
bated by the sensitivity of builders and developers to the marketability of their
products and to their reluctance to experiment with ‘risky’ innovations. Moreover,
local building and development regulatory officials are notoriously conservative rel-
ative to changes in codes, and in planning and building regulations (Schneider,
1981), much like local law enforcement administrators, a fact that mediates the
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spread of innovative ideas. Thus, while local governments are often the ultimate
repositories of the power to adopt and implement design and regulatory strategies
such as those contemplated by place-based crime prevention theory, they may be
unwilling to do so. In the face of these forces, even profound ideas for making
communities safer have an uphill battle.
Influences of the Era
No matter how ostensibly revolutionary, profound ideas nevertheless tend to be
products of their times. This is especially true of defensible space and CPTED. The
decade in which they emerged in the United States, 1964–1974, encompassed
arguably the greatest political and social turmoil ever experienced by the nation,
including the civil rights revolution, urban riots and the perceived (and actual) finan-
cial failure of large city governments, the Vietnam War, the ascendancy of women’s
rights, the sexual revolution, the growth of participatory politics, the assassination
and resignations of leaders and a fundamental shift in the funding of state and local
government though the Nixonian revenue-sharing doctrine. It was an era when par-
adigms shifted (Kuhn, 1962) as fundamental values were challenged and gave
way.
Old elitist ‘establishment’ ideas in planning, architecture and the social sci-
ences came under attack as it was clear that new answers were needed to
address burgeoning social problems, especially those within the nation’s largest
metropolitan areas, symbolised by the subject matter of the urban graffiti depicted
in Figure 5.1.
Crime and social disorder – ‘law and order’ issues – fuelled political debate
across the nation, even as great cities – Los Angeles, Detroit, Washington –
ignited in the flames of urban riots. Other cities, such as Chicago, St Louis,
Newark and New York, struggled to deal with the problems of social disorganisa-
tion in their massive public housing projects, seen by many as emblematic of the
breakdown of American civilisation itself.
Public Housing: The Project Seedbeds of Defensible
Space
While the concepts of defensible space and CPTED sprang from this turbulent
era, the predicates of defensible space had been laid down three decades earlier
as the nation came to grips with the need to house lower income citizens and to
revitalise its largest cities through ‘urban renewal’. Tied from the outset to slum
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clearance objectives, New York City was the first jurisdiction in the nation to create
public housing in 1934. The federal government joined in modestly with the
Housing Act of 1937, and then again in 1949 with a much more ambitious attempt
that produced a multi-year plan to construct more than 800,000 units across the
country. Though a fraction of the British response to the problem, and late in
coming when compared to other western industrialised nations, it was a start nev-
ertheless. For a variety of legal and political reasons, most of these units were built
in America’s inner cities. This is in sharp contrast to the selection of public
(council) housing sites in Britain in the same period which, because of the sheer
scale of the slum clearance programme embarked upon in the major cities from
around the mid 1950s to the mid 1970s, not only re-used the land freed by demoli-
tion but also over-spilled to more peripheral locations, including expanded or new
settlements away from the conurbations.
Conceived in response to the airless, congested and inherently unhealthy
‘dumbbell’ urban tenements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
depicted so graphically by photographer Jacob Riis (1890), that housed genera-
tions of immigrants, American public housing development has been classified by
Franck and Mostollor (1995) into three general design stages: the courtyard plan
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Figure 5.1 ‘Graffiti and Telephone’
Source: Courtesy of Urban75/Mike Slocumbe
stage (1930s–1940s), the high-rise stage (1950s–1970s) and what might be
termed the ‘neighbourhood connection’ stage (1980s–present). A recent develop-
ment – perhaps too early to be described as a discrete stage – is the incorporation
by the US Department of Housing and Urban Development of New Urbanist tenets
into several programmes. This trend suggests, as one would expect, that each
stage has been markedly influenced by the design doctrines of their times.
In the first stage – the courtyard plan – public housing projects were
designed as low-rise, semi-enclosed courtyards, such as those in Newark’s 1940
Pennington Court. This design approach was influenced by Garden City advocates
in Britain and the United States such as Ebenezer Howard, Raymond Unwin and
Clarence Stein, and produced village-like developments on large parcels of urban
land which, while different from their surrounding neighbourhoods, were generally
compatible with the urban fabric, including connections with the existing street
grid. There were, however, few, if any internal streets within these projects. It was
theorised that the stark design differences between the new projects and the exist-
ing neighbourhoods would ‘protect the projects from blight’ (Franck and Mostollor,
1995, page 211).
Although the structural outcomes were vastly different, the same fervour of
design determinism permeated the second public housing design stage, which
saw construction of high-rise behemoths such as Pruitt-Igoe in St Louis, Van Dyke
Homes in New York, Rosen Homes in Philadelphia and the thirteen-storey Christo-
pher Columbus Homes built in Newark in 1955. Generally tilted off the street grid
of surrounding neighbourhoods, these designs freed up as much land as possible,
reducing lot ‘coverage’, and creating super-blocks of vast self-contained communit-
ies, complete with their own identity and project names. Like their predecessors in
stage one, it was held as an article of faith by architects, planners and the popular
press that the architectural and site distinctiveness of these new high-rises would
help them ‘break with adjacent “slums”’, thereby insulating their occupants from
the social and physical disorder of the surrounding blight (Franck and Mostollor,
1995).
Corbusian towers thus poked skyward throughout the middle part of the
twentieth century, stacking the poor (after World War II, mostly African-American
poor from the South) in ever greater numbers to the sky. Guided by theories of ide-
alised urbanism and implemented through an unholy alliance of design arrogance,
political expediency and on-the-cheap construction, these projects established the
context for the third stage of public housing planning and design – the neighbour-
hood connection stage – which sought, among other goals, to reduce the size and
impersonality of public housing structures and diminish their isolation from the
urban context from which they had been torn.
This third stage, which reaches into the current era, grew largely out of
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revulsion to the crime and social disorder that came to be inextricably associated
with American high-rise public housing. There is no American project which is
more directly associated with the demise of high-rise housing for the poor, or the
ascendancy of defensible space and CPTED theory, than St Louis’ Pruitt Igoe. In
Britain it is rivalled by the disaster of Manchester’s Hulme ‘Crescents’ project,
which is described in Chapter 8, and met a similar fate in the 1990s.
Pruitt-Igoe
‘One cannot discuss crime and environmental design without mention of Pruitt-Igoe’
(Jeffrey, 1977, page 193), the quintessential symbol of the failure of both 1950s-style
urban renewal and the ‘City of Towers’ approach to housing the urban poor (Hall,
1988). Pruitt-Igoe was also the structural genesis for the concepts of defensible
space. It was from this living laboratory in the early 1960s that Oscar Newman, then
a professor at Washington University, enunciated the fundamental principles of
defensible space. The term itself was ‘born . . . in the spring of 1964 when a group
involved in the study of ghetto life . . . in Pruitt-Igoe, began an inquiry into the possible
effects of the architectural setting on the social malaise of the community and on the
crime and vandalism rampant there’ (Newman, 1971, page 5). Composed of thirty-
three identical super-blocks each eleven stories high, the site contained 2,764 apart-
ments at a density of fifty dwelling units per acre, as shown in Figure 5.2. It began as
an award winning, albeit ‘experimental’ (for the City of St Louis) design by Minoru
Yamasaki. It ended with a project that was so badly constructed that ‘locks and door-
knobs broke on first use, sometimes before occupancy. Window panes blew out.
One lift failed on opening day’ (Hall, 1988, page 237).
Beyond construction defects was the overwhelming failure of its design, a
testament to what Newman termed its ‘compositional commitment and orientation’
wherein ‘the architect was concerned with each building as a complete separate,
and formal entity exclusive of any consideration of the functional use of the
grounds or the relationship of a building to the ground area it might share with
other buildings’ (Newman, 1973, page 58). This sculptural and formalist approach
segregated the structures from each other; and the entire project, built off the
existing street grid, was also symbolically separated from surrounding neighbour-
hoods, although at the same time left vulnerable to them, by a ‘permeable’ site
combined with vast open, unfenced spaces between structures. While this design
might have worked for middle or upper income tenants, the fact that the residents
were increasingly welfare dependent, single-mother families with children created
by the early 1960s an island of utter devastation and despair within St Louis. As
Newman recounts:
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The common grounds, which were dissociated from all units were unsafe. They
were soon covered with glass and garbage. The mailboxes on the ground floors
were vandalised. The corridors, lobbies, elevators, and stairs were dangerous
places to walk through and were covered with garbage and human waste. The
elevators, laundry, and community rooms were vandalised, and garbage was
stacked high around the non-working garbage chutes. Women had to go
together in groups to take their children shopping. The project never achieved
more than 60 percent occupancy and was torn down some ten years after its
construction. It was a precursor of what was to happen everywhere in the
country (Newman, 1995, page 150).
In sessions involving police and sociologists Lee Rainwater and Roger
Walker, Newman and fellow architect Roger Montgomery began to hammer out
American policy and practice 129
Figure 5.2 Pruitt-Igoe
Source: US Department of Housing and Urban Development website: http://www.hud.gov/library
the notions of defensible space, or ‘those physical features which produced secure
residential settings – even in the midst of social disintegration and terror’
(Newman, 1971, page 3). To do so, he contrasted Pruitt-Igoe with Carr Square
Village, an adjacent neighbourhood that housed tenants with similar socio-
economic characteristics but which was designed very differently. He also relied
upon the largely untested social and planning theories of Wood (1961, 1967) and
Jacobs (1961), repudiating wholeheartedly the ‘style metaphysicians’ and the fol-
lowers of the International Congress of Modern Architects (Hall, 1988). In plain
language, Newman rejected the design stylists while embracing the ‘social’ design-
ers. He chose to characterise housing projects as ‘ ‘‘defensible’ only when resid-
ents choose to adopt this intended role – a choice that is facilitated by the
development’s design. Defensible space therefore is a ‘sociophysical phenome-
non’ (Newman, 1976). Uncharacteristic of the architects of his day (and many
would argue to the present day), Newman sought empirical and evaluative post-
occupancy research to bolster design decision-making.
Thus, defensible space was rooted in its outset as a reaction to the urban
utopian ideas embodied in Le Corbusier’s Ville Radieuse, which, while well-
intentioned enough, had no empirical bases, and which were especially problem-
atic when applied to low-income families. It is ironic, however, and perhaps speaks
to the dualistic nature of defensible space both as an ideology and a theory still in
search of a solid empirical foundation, that with some small exceptions Pruitt-Igoe
provided little opportunity for rigorous theory testing before it was destroyed in
1972, as shown in Figure 5.3. However, the project’s spectacular failure –
although demolished with a bang it actually died a long, lingering death – provided
the jumping off point for a flurry of empirical and post-occupancy research into the
relationship of design to crime prevention.
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Figure 5.3 Pruitt-Igoe demolished
Source: US Department of Housing and Urban Development website: http://www.hud.gov/library
The New York Housing Authority and Defensible
Space
The most prominent of these early investigations was Newman’s own work, Defens-
ible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design, which was published in 1973.
An outgrowth of the Safe Street Act of 1968, and funded by the United States
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ), the research
centred on New York City’s public housing projects, which at that time housed more
than a half-million residents in 150,000 apartments scattered throughout the city’s
five boroughs. Housing Authority police reports were thorough and the variety of
project types ‘provided an incomparable laboratory for measuring the effects of differ-
ent housing environments on crime and vandalism’ (Newman, 1973, page xiv).
Newman’s research reviewed crime records for 100 of the projects, sorting
them by building height and the number of apartments contained within each.
Based on his statistical analyses, which have been criticised on a number of
methodological grounds (Mawby, 1977; Mayhew, 1979), he concluded that build-
ing height and project size were factors in the occurrence of crime in that high-rise
housing (which he defined as anything over 7 storeys) and larger projects (defined
as larger than 1,000 units) were more likely venues of crime and vandalism than
low-rise, smaller projects. For comparative purposes, he also focused on a number
of specific projects, including some that were not within the Housing Authority
sample. He compared, for example, Brownsville and Van Dyke (height differences),
Breukelen and Pruitt-Igoe (site design, interior corridors, surveillance features and
entry areas), Sarah Lawrence College’s new and old dormitories (corridor and
entrance design), Bronxdale Houses and Highbridge Gardens (lobby design and
surveillance), Stapleton Homes and Columbus Towers (interior, single loaded corri-
dors and surveillance), among others. This site-specific research bolstered his
general conclusions as to now familiar defensible space principles based on terri-
toriality, surveillance, image, and the juxtaposition of ‘safe’ and ‘unsafe’ activity
areas. He concluded that low-rise, smaller buildings were less likely crime venues
than large, impersonal towers, and that those buildings and sites that provided
design features that increased possibilities for resident territoriality and surveillance
were generally safer than buildings and sites that did not.
These design features included clearly demarcated and ‘owned’ public,
private and semi-private spaces, L-shaped lobby entries facing the street, single
loaded corridors, especially those that served a limited number of families and that
contained windows adjacent to entryways and corridors. The breadth of this
research into the relationship among crime, public housing design and planning
was unprecedented in the United States and only later rivalled by Coleman’s study
of more than 4,000 public housing blocks in London (1990).
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Impacts of Defensible Space
While hailed in the popular press (Time magazine gushed that Defensible Space
was ‘Astonishing. It explodes just about every long-accepted rule on the way we
build’, which was also the blurb pasted across the paperback cover), it was
received with much less enthusiasm by academics and by architects. The New
York Housing Authority research was criticised as lacking statistical and research
design rigour, particularly because control groups were not used when projects
were compared. Architects bristled at the possibilities of further restrictions to their
freedom to design, while social scientists characterised the findings as too simplis-
tic – disturbed by the architectural and environmental determinism they perceived
– even though Newman went to pains to note that ‘crime is caused by a multiplicity
of factors – economic, social and governmental as well as physical – and it is
extraordinarily difficult to isolate one sort of characteristic and discern its particular
influence’ (Newman, 1973, page 210).2
But Newman’s work with New York Housing Authority data, flawed as it might
have been, nevertheless provided the first empirical – project-based – support to the
previously untested sociological, anthropological, psychological and design theorists
who preceded him. With the release of Defensible Space and its companion report
Architectural Design for Crime Prevention (1973), Newman helped to energise plan-
ning and architectural academic and professional interest in human-environment link-
ages that had previously been the almost exclusive domain of other, non-design
fields. Moreover, Defensible Space helped precipitate federal funding and interest in
studies to refine further and validate its seemingly common-sense arguments.
In a nation whose cities still smouldered from the riots of the late 1960s and
which laboured under the burden of a spectacularly failed urban renewal pro-
gramme, the relatively clear-cut, non-politicised, design notions of defensible space
seemed worth a closer look. Following the publication of Defensible Space, the
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice launched a major multi-
year effort to assess defensible-space concept applications in schools and com-
mercial areas, as well as in neighbourhood residential settings.
Early Project Evaluations: The Westinghouse
Studies
Formerly dubbed the ‘CPTED Program’, this aggregation of research application
and evaluation projects became better known as the Westinghouse Studies since
the Westinghouse National Issues Center performed much of the research under
contract from the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice.
(Another phase conducted in Hartford, Connecticut was supported directly by the
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agency, and was subsequently known simply as the Hartford Project.) Although
rooted in Newman’s work from the outset, the Westinghouse research team
rejected using the defensible space concept since they considered it too narrow to
encompass the varying environments – neighbourhood residential, commercial,
school – that were to be evaluated.3 Instead, they chose Jeffrey’s CPTED formula-
tion since it was seen to ‘treat both the proper design and the effective use of the
environment’ and ‘involves an integration of strategies selected from existing and
new physical and urban design, community organisation and citizen (social), man-
agement, and law enforcement prevention concepts’ (NILECJ, 1976, page 9). In
short, while CPTED was thought to embrace the fundamental concepts of defens-
ible space, defensible space itself was perceived to be too restricted to residential
(public housing) applications, too focused on physical design, and most import-
antly, its emphasis on territoriality was not seen as particularly useful in many ‘tran-
sient’ places – subway stops, commercial zones, and road corridors – where
people were not expected to develop territorial attachments.
The Westinghouse Studies/CPTED Program concentrated its research and
evaluative efforts on Portland’s Union Avenue Corridor (commercial application),
on Minneapolis’s Williard-Homewood, Lowry Hills, and Hawthorne neighbourhoods
and, through the Hartford Institute of Criminal and Social Justice, on Hartford’s
North Asylum Hills area (residential application), and on four Broward County,
Florida high schools (schools application). Despite characteristically enthusiastic
public relations from Program advocates, such as the promise held out by the
interim report that ‘the results to date – coupled with the optimistic yet realisable,
objectives for the remainder of the Program – portend a wealth of information and
assistance’ (NILECJ, 1976, page 10), the projects’ results were in fact disappoint-
ing. While the City of Portland commercial application has been characterised as
the most successful, inasmuch as the combination of social, police and design
applications was shown to have had a clear impact on crime (Wallis and Ford,
1980), the other studies produced what Clarke has termed ‘meagre’ results
(1997). Reiss and Roth (1993) explained that the short-term and erratic benefits
derived from the CPTED applications in Hartford were due to the failure of CPTED
to address the interactions between physical and social factors in the production
of crime and violence.4
What was more problematic is that neither defensible space nor CPTED
lived up to their advance billing or high public expectations. In retrospect they
could not have done so, given the rudimentary state of knowledge about the extra-
ordinarily complex nature of human-environment interactions and a corresponding
lack of sophistication in the evaluative research instruments of the day. Even today,
as we shall discuss further, rigorous empirical research and project evaluation in
this field are elusive.
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Despite the value of this hindsight, it is clear that the well-funded and mas-
sively publicised Westinghouse Studies did not accelerate the federal govern-
ment’s momentum to fund defensible space, CPTED or related situational crime
prevention project applications or research throughout the 1980s. It had quite the
opposite effect. This blow was further magnified by a United States Justice Depart-
ment review (Motoyama et al., 1980) of fifty-two studies that focused on the con-
nection between crime and the environment. The study found that associations
between crime and the environmental variables were not nearly as strong as
Newman and others had suggested, and that the effects of environmental changes
dictated by CPTED and defensible space applications might simply displace crime
to other locations, and thereby have no impact on overall crime rates. These con-
clusions completely overshadowed the generally sympathetic tone of the report
toward CPTED theory.
Impacts on Public Housing Design
Following the disappointing project evaluations of the Westinghouse Studies and
the damaging Justice Department report, both federal funding and academic inter-
est (the two being inextricably related) in defensible space and CPTED applica-
tions declined in the United States throughout the 1980s. This was further
exacerbated by the election of Ronald Reagan, whose administration, resonating to
an angry public mood after the Iran hostage fiasco, heralded a much more punitive
approach to criminal justice in the United States, turning away from treatment and
prevention programmes at almost all levels. Despite these considerable draw-
backs, defensible space concepts (along with CPTED and situational crime pre-
vention) became slowly integrated into the fundamental worldview of public
housing designers in the United States and, as we shall see in Chapter 7, in Britain
as well. The lessons of Pruitt-Igoe and the New York Housing Authority studies
were assimilated, however unconsciously, into these architects’ designs and into
planners’ plans. The results were seen in such projects as the redevelopment of
Boston’s West Broadway public housing and by the new, small-scale, ‘neighbour-
hood friendly’ emphasis of the Newark Housing Authority (Newark Redevelopment
and Housing Authority, 1984) which also epitomised the reaction of designers to
the high-rise public housing debacle of the 1950s–1970s. As Vale notes:
Though few designers seem to acknowledge their conceptual reliance on
Newman’s theories, the basic principles of Defensible Space have been, in
recent years, enshrined in city and state guidelines such as the Redevelopment
handbook produced by the Massachusetts Executive Office of Communities
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and Development (ECOD, 1990), touted in the final report of the national
Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing (NCSDPH, 1992a),
highlighted in this Commission’s compilation of case studies of ‘successful
turnarounds’ (NCSDPH, 1992b), and heavily funded through the Urban
Revitalization Demonstration grants implemented beginning in 1993 by the US
Department of Housing and Urban Development (Vale, 1995, page 289).
The federal government subsequently came to acknowledge the importance of
Newman’s pioneering work in public housing with the publication of an essay by
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Henry Cisneros in 1995. Cisneros
enumerated the basic principles of defensible space and pointed to Newman’s
work at Clason Point Gardens, a public housing complex in New York’s South
Bronx, and to Dayton’s distressed Five Oaks neighbourhood as examples of
success stories, admitting however that ‘it is too early to be sure that Five Oaks
has turned around for good’ (Cisneros, 1995, page 20).
Impacts Elsewhere: Project Applications in the
1980s and 1990s
The application of defensible space in federally funded public housing, however, is
not the same as in local-level, neighbourhood-based private residential housing, the
predominant land use in American communities, or in local commercial or industrial
settings. The damage of the Westinghouse and Justice Department studies, along
with the change in political climate, ensured that by the end of the 1980s only a
scattering of jurisdictions around the United States had experimented with a
defensible space or CPTED project application, whether as ordinance, policy or as
an intervention. To be sure, CPTED ‘checklists’ had found their way into local
development review processes, but these were often counterproductive, since
their ‘cookie-cutter’ approaches were unsuited to the endless variety of places in
most urban environments. These ‘one-size fits all’ solutions still haunt serious
place-based crime prevention advocates.
Without federal funding or sustained academic interest some communities
had, by the dawn of the 1990s, done little more than to establish crime prevention
units within their police agencies, perhaps incorporating CPTED or ‘security
design’ as a public relations ‘gesture’. This is so despite the best effort of the
National Crime Prevention Institute (NCPI) CPTED training programmes. Thus,
while Cisneros’ ringing endorsement of defensible space in the mid-1990s could
be seen as federal reaffirmation of Newman’s work, it was also a reminder that
there were relatively few local-level project applications in communities that could
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serve as examples for the nation or as grist for serious research and evaluation.5
Some of those communities existed to be sure, such as Sarasota, Florida, Ann
Arbor, Michigan, Tempe and Tucson, Arizona; they were among the few cities that
had initiated innovative CPTED-based planning and development ordinances.
They and others were identified by a 1994 survey of 1,060 cities conducted
by the United States Conference of Mayors with support from the US Department
of Justice. The survey found that of the 323 responses, 151 cities in the United
States reported that they had incorporated CPTED strategies in their development
and zoning codes (United States Conference of Mayors, 1998). Unfortunately, the
survey instrument was flawed (its first question was badly worded and failed to
capture the desired responses) and the sample – a tiny proportion of the total
number of US cities – cannot be considered representative of the universe of
American cities.6
However, the survey results clearly pointed out that while there was a diver-
sity of jurisdictional approaches – a familiar picture in the fragmented American
federal system – many responding cities had similar problems with CPTED appli-
cations. These included difficulties coordinating internal review teams, problems
balancing aesthetics and safety, and, significantly, resistance from neighbourhood
groups, property owners, the development community and the general public to
CPTED-related design provisions.
For instance, a respondent to the Mayor’s survey from the City of Tustin, Cali-
fornia noted: ‘The builders don’t understand the reasons why we don’t allow
certain types of lighting, locking devices, why we want open carports instead of
enclosed, why we frown on screening everything from the roadways.’ And Univer-
sity Heights, Ohio’s respondent pointed out the ‘failure of owners/developers to ini-
tiate these concepts into design and/or even to understand the need for them’
(1998, page 163). A central problem that the responding cities identified was the
difficulty of justifying the increased costs (in time as well as money) of CPTED
reviews relative to the benefits (e.g. less crime). This finding is supported by a
1998 survey of a sample of police officers charged with implementing CPTED ordi-
nances in Florida. That survey found that most of these crime prevention specialists
had great difficulty explaining the value of CPTED to sceptical builders and few
could provide any ‘scientific’ bases for its principles when challenged (Schneider,
1998). Ultimately the question comes down to being able to ‘prove’ that CPTED
and defensible space interventions are effective in reducing crime.
136 Planning for crime prevention
Project Examples
Many of the more rigorous empirical studies of defensible space, CPTED or situa-
tional crime prevention interventions have been done outside the United States,
principally in Britain.7 However, some documented project interventions in the
United States and Canada have, to varying degrees, risen to that level, providing
evidence to support CPTED or defensible space applications – whether in legisla-
tion, policy or planning or development practice – across national and in some
cases, international boundaries. The following are synopses of some project
examples which influence crime prevention applications in urban planning and
design in the United States and Canada. As we have noted, strategies suggested
by the four basic place-based crime prevention theories are interwoven in real
world applications. They may be initiated in response to a perceived problem and
thus be primarily ‘reactive’ in nature, or they may have been promulgated as part of
a planned or ‘proactive’ strategy which is likely broader in nature than a purely
reactive response.
Moreover, interventions also may be characterised by the relative number of
strategies or tactics involved (single or multiple). The matrix in Table 5.1 depicts
the possible combinations. This is not to say, of course, that these are always neat
and clean classifications since interventions have a life of their own and evolve over
time. Thus, a strategy that begins as a single, reactive place-based intervention
may generate new approaches that are broader in scope and planned: proactive.
The Miami Shores street closure case illustrates a single tactic, reactive
example based primarily upon access control (defensible space and CPTED),
whereas the ‘rapid-response’ graffiti clean-up programmes and ordinances that
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Table 5.1 Project classification
Initiation Tactic
Single Multiple
Reactive Single reactive Multiple reactive
Miami Shores, Florida Street Gainesville, Florida Convenience 
Closure Store Ordinance; Sarasota,
Florida North Trail Zoning
Ordinance
Proactive Single proactive Multiple proactive
Graffiti clean-up programmes and Washington DC Metro; Tumbler 
ordinances following New York Ridge Pub Planning; Tempe, 
City’s Subway Clean Car Arizona Environmental Design 
Program Ordinance
developed in cities across the United States following the apparent success of
New York City’s 1984 ‘Clean Car Program’ can be classified as generally proac-
tive efforts that also rely primarily on a single tactic. In this case the tactic reduces
rewards for perpetrators, and flows from situational crime prevention theory.
The Gainesville, Florida convenience store project example demonstrates a
multi-tactic, reactive application with several theoretical roots while the Sarasota,
Florida case is a much broader brush approach than Gainesville’s, but is also
largely reactive in nature and draws upon a range of defensible space and CPTED-
based tactics and strategies.
The final examples – the Washington D.C. Metro Subway system design case,
the Tumbler Ridge, British Columbia pub case and the Tempe, Arizona Environ-
mental Design Ordinance – are examples of proactive applications or interventions
which utilise multi-tactic approaches that combine several of the place-based theo-
ries. The Tempe example is similar to the New York Subway clean-up programme,
and the Gainesville and Sarasota cases, in that their place-based crime prevention
approaches are largely the results of the efforts of ‘champions’ who nurtured them
from conception through implementation. Sarasota and Tempe also illustrate some
of the problems inherent in evaluating the results of multi-tactic efforts.
MIAMI SHORES, FLORIDA STREET CLOSURE
The barricading of 78 streets in Miami Shores, Florida between 1988 and 1992
represents a single-tactic, reactive intervention that was intended to stem the
growth in the crime rate of this affluent community of mostly single-family detached
residences north of the City of Miami. With a grid-iron street network bordered by
two major highways and close to low-income neighbourhoods, Miami Shores had
experienced a significant increase in stranger-stranger crimes in the period immedi-
ately preceding the closures. Disgusted by the cut-through traffic that also plagued
the community, the inhabitants themselves initiated this intervention, a factor that
has been attributed to its apparent success.
Documented by Atlas and LeBlanc (1994), the project study provides
‘promising’ evidence (Eck, 1997) that is consistent with place-based crime preven-
tion theory, as well as with other studies (Matthews 1992, 1993; Newman, 1996),
that closing streets (access control) does control certain types of crimes in certain
circumstances, at least over a relatively short period of time. Newman’s (1981)
documentation of privately owned and largely closed streets in several St Louis
neighbourhoods anticipated the Atlas and LeBlanc study by more than a decade,
broadly suggesting that closed streets lowered crime rates while increasing per-
ceptions of security and property values. To evaluate the results of the street clo-
sures in Miami Shores, the authors compared crime rates for robbery, burglary,
larceny, aggravated assault and auto theft before and after implementation, and
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also compared changes in crime rates for these crimes with surrounding municipal-
ities. They found that, while over time, crime rates for all the offences above (with
the exception of burglary) had increased in the City of Miami, there were either no
changes or, in the case of larceny, an actual decrease in Miami Shores’ crime rate.
Compared to Coral Gables, another relatively near community, Miami Shores’ bur-
glary and larceny rates decreased, while rates for the other crimes remained the
same. Attributing these effects to the closures, the study concluded that ‘although
some crimes appear to be unrelated to environmental road devices, overall crime in
the barricaded areas is growing at a slower rate than it is in the surrounding
municipalities’ (Atlas and LeBlanc, 1994). Other effects, such as the rise in the
city’s property values and an increase in community cohesion, have also been
credited to this single tactic intervention.
The Miami Shores study has been widely cited in the popular press, within
real estate and development circles, as well as by some crime prevention consul-
tants to help defend barricading streets and gating neighbourhoods. Its statistics
have been embodied in policy and ordinances within untold numbers of communit-
ies across the United States as they have sought empirical justification for these
actions. As Blakely and Snyder (1999) and Kunstler (1998) among others make
clear, this is an enormously controversial area in American planning and develop-
ment, as it implements not only access control for crime prevention but also facili-
tates the ‘privatisation’ of formerly public domains, potentially slicing communities
into disconnected pieces. From a historical point of view it is ironic that, while there
are differences, street barricading mimics the design and intent of the early public
housing site designers who sought to isolate their projects from the contamination
– including crime – of surrounding neighbourhoods.
GRAFFITI CLEAN-UP PROGRAMMES AND ORDINANCES BASED ON
NEW YORK CITY’S ‘CLEAN CAR PROGRAM’
As documented by the US Conference of Mayors (2001), a growing number of
cities across the United States including Houston, St Louis, Denver, Little Rock
and Cincinnati have followed the lead of New York City’s ‘Clean Car Program’ by
adopting policies, implementing programmes or by enacting ordinances aimed at
the rapid removal of graffiti from public (and in some cases, private) structures and
conveyances. While initially reactive, as in the case of New York City’s response to
the defacement of its subway system, such programmes and ordinances now have
become part and parcel of the daily maintenance agendas of a growing number of
local public works agencies. In the process, this has helped move the concept of
graffiti-cleaning from one that was once almost entirely thought of as a reactive
‘police problem’ to one that is now more and more conceived of as a ‘maintenance’
issue, although the act itself may still be a crime (Kelling, 1996).
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The Clean Car Program was born out of the frustration of the former presid-
ent of the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA), David Gunn, with the horrific
state of the vast subway system when he assumed control of it in 1984. As anyone
who used the system at that time can attest, the state of repair of the rail infrastruc-
ture was unreliable, the stations were dirty and considered especially dangerous,
and the subway cars were almost completely covered, inside and out, with graffiti.
Much of this disarray was the result of New York’s financial difficulties of the
1970s. Despite these woes, many concerted and unsuccessful efforts were made
throughout that decade and early into the 1980s to eradicate graffiti from the
subways, an effort given more weight following the publication of a controversial
article by Nathan Glazer (1979). Glazer argued that the inability (or unwillingness)
of public agencies to stop the graffitists – seemingly ‘minor’ lawbreakers – sent the
message to the general public (and to more serious criminals) that the New York
subways were wide open to any sort of criminal misbehaviour. Kelling notes that
the Glazer article ‘galvanized thought about graffiti’s potential for disruption in
urban settings’ (1996, page 116). Embedded in this notion are the seeds of the
‘broken windows’ theory which Wilson and Kelling (1982) later elaborated in their
now famous Atlantic Monthly article (see note 3 to Chapter 4).
The ultimate solution to the New York Subway system’s graffiti problem lay in
understanding the rationale of the act itself, called ‘tagging’, which basically means
to post one’s mark, whether it be a name, message or design, in a public place.
Gunn removed the incentive to tag trains by instituting a policy of thoroughly clean-
ing subway cars and never allowing them to re-enter service again with any form of
graffiti on them at all. Cars were quickly cleaned (within two hours) or, if that was
not feasible, they were taken out of service entirely. This approach illustrates a
classic situational crime prevention technique in that it destroyed the reward inher-
ent in the graffitists’ acts: their work would no longer be put on public view.
The Program was successful enough so that five years after being first imple-
mented, the last tagged car in the system was removed from service and cleaned.
‘Now’, report Sloan-Howitt and Kelling, ‘subway trains in New York City are not
only graffiti-free, they are among the cleanest subway cars in the world’ (1990,
page 132). In a subsequent analysis of the Clean Car Program, Smith and Clarke
(2000) suggest that it is an exaggeration to say that graffiti has been completely
removed from the subway trains (something that any present subway rider in New
York can attest to), rather it has been ‘controlled’. Moreover, they question the
linkage between the clean-up programme and purported (or hoped for) reductions
in more serious crimes (the essence of the broken windows argument), since they
note that New York City Transit Police data for the period following the clean-up
show no decreases in crime.
Despite that, few have questioned the efficacy of this strategy in significantly
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reducing New York’s Subway graffiti problem, and this has contributed to its dif-
fusion across the nation to other cities. While basically a single tactic strategy, it
was supported by a number of related programmes and policies, including
improved lighting at maintenance yards, more aggressive policing directed against
order maintenance disturbances in the subways (as part of Community Oriented
Policing) and better subway cleaning techniques and materials. Moreover, there is
no dispute that its success was greatly assisted by new resources pumped into
the NYCTA, by a growing political will to act (spurred by the Glazer article and
subsequent public debate) and, perhaps most importantly, by the efforts of a
champion who was willing to ferret out the causes of the problem and make its
resolution a high priority. Some of these elements were certainly learned by
other American cities, who were influenced by reports of New York’s success in
the popular press and in the academic and professional literature. A recent US
Mayor article on Houston’s new ‘Operation Renaissance Cleanup Program’ notes
that:
Graffiti also contributes to the blight of the neighborhood, so Operation
Renaissance includes a component focusing on graffiti abatement. Mayor
Brown presented the keys to a new van dubbed the ‘Graffiti Mobile,’ . . . the van
[will be used] by the community to identify and cover up graffiti in their
neighborhoods . . . Studies have shown that quick and continual abatement of
graffiti is effective in preventing future graffiti (DeLong, 2000).
We are not aware of any present empirical studies comparing the results of rapid,
concerted graffiti clean-up programmes across the United States or elsewhere.
While anecdotal reports suggest that it is indeed effective, it would be interesting
to know (among other things) if ‘tagging’ activity is displaced to other targets and if
so, how.
GAINESVILLE, FLORIDA CONVENIENCE STORE ORDINANCE
This case represents a combination of CPTED and management (situational crime
prevention) strategies – a multi-tactic approach applied as a reaction to a wave of
violent crimes affecting convenience stores in a small college town in north-central
Florida. While it stands alone by virtue of its impact on subsequent state-level leg-
islation, the case is also part of a long stream of evaluations, beginning in 1975
(Crow and Bull) of the effects of crime prevention interventions on robberies in
convenience stores.
Convenience stores have been important enough venues of robberies that
they have merited their own subclassification within the FBI’s Uniform Crime
Report’s Part I Crime Index.8 They are generally small grocery and sundry stores
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strategically placed within a community, typically in highway strip malls (in the
USA) or within easy neighbourhood walking distance (in the UK). They have a
much more limited selection of goods and staff than larger grocery stores (such as
‘Sainsbury’s’ in the UK or ‘Safeway’ in the USA and the UK), but their operating
hours are generally longer (often extending into the early hours of the morning) and
they cater to clients who typically need only a few items at a time and are inter-
ested in transaction speed as distinct from comparison shopping. Shoppers gener-
ally pay a premium for these conveniences. Examples of such stores are ‘SPAR’ in
Britain and ‘7–11’ in the United States. The incidence of crimes affecting these
establishments has ebbed and flowed through the years, with peaks reported
during the early 1980s, shortly before the City of Gainesville, Florida enacted what
came to be known as the ‘two-clerk’ law. The city’s police chief championed the
ordinance after a particularly brutal 1985 murder that occurred during the course
of a convenience store robbery. Police-sponsored research subsequently found
that while convenience stores constituted only 5 per cent of all retail businesses,
they accounted for 50 per cent of all retail store robberies in Gainesville, and that
96 per cent of all convenience stores in the city had been robbed, compared to 36
per cent of fast food stores, 22 per cent of hotels, 21 per cent of service stations
and 16 per cent of liquor stores and lounges (Clifton, 1993). Most robberies had
been committed in stores that had only one clerk on duty at the time of the
robbery.
The law was modelled on versions that had been adopted in Kent, Ohio and
Coral Springs, Florida and provided for CPTED-related elements relating to surveil-
lance (e.g. prohibiting signs from covering windows, placing the clerk so as to be
visible from the street, providing parking lot illumination standards, security camera
requirements), cash management elements (limiting the amount of cash available
to clerks, requiring a drop safe, signage) and managerial elements (required
robbery prevention courses for clerks). Far and away, the most controversial
element was the requirement that stores operating between the hours of 8 p.m.
and 4 a.m. (when most robberies were found to have taken place) have two clerks
on duty at that time. While the CPTED provisions were generally accepted by the
large corporations that owned many of the city’s convenience stores, they strongly
challenged the two-clerk provision, a situational crime prevention element. The cor-
porations contested the police research with their own studies (Scott et al., 1984),
and ultimately fought the city in federal district court, where they lost decisively in
1987. In the first seven years following its enactment in Gainesville, convenience
store robberies declined an average of almost 80 per cent over the previous six-
year time period (Clifton, 1993). While there are rival explanations for this decline
(the police had locked up some of the most serious offenders) and some research
that shows contrary findings, the local crime statistics are still compelling.
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The irony is that the city’s apparent success was its undoing. Gainesville was
not the only city in Florida to be plagued by convenience store robberies and the
ordinance soon became a model for state law. But what the convenience store
corporate lawyers could not do in federal court, their political lobbyists could
accomplish in the state legislature. The state law, ultimately passed in 1990, so
diluted the original city provisions that many became meaningless. It narrowed con-
siderably the definition of convenience stores, excluding ‘mom and pop’ stores –
often the most vulnerable to robberies – and required stores to implement the two-
clerk rule (or provide a bullet-proof glass enclosure for after-hours shifts) only after
a serious crime such as a murder, robbery, sexual battery, or aggravated assault
had been committed there. Since state law pre-empts local ordinances in the
United States, the Gainesville legislation was voided and was ultimately repealed in
1998. Recent research has shown that convenience store robberies in Gainesville
have once again crept upward, so that 113 were recorded for 71 stores between
1995 and 1998, a figure that approaches the 124 robberies mark for the three-
year period preceding the original ordinance’s enactment (Leistner, 1999).
Despite these local-level drawbacks – unintentional consequences of
success – the Gainesville convenience store ordinance has become a model for
other states (Virginia, Oklahoma, California, and Texas), for the federal government
(the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s voluntary guidelines to
protect convenience store employees) and for other nations. We will know whether
the specific crime prevention design and management strategies embodied in the
ordinance are effective across cultural boundaries depending upon the results of
future evaluative, empirical research.
SARASOTA, FLORIDA’S NORTH TRAIL ZONING DISTRICT
The creation of Sarasota, Florida’s North Trail Zoning District was a reactive, multi-
tactic intervention that is far broader in scope than Gainesville’s Convenience
Store Ordinance but narrower than Tempe’s broad brush Environmental Design
Ordinance (below). Like most crime prevention approaches, this legislation was a
reaction to a local circumstance, although in the case of Sarasota the problem was
more diffuse than that which caused Gainesville’s or Miami Shores’ reactions.
A tourist-oriented community of about 55,000 people, Sarasota was in the
late 1980s facing a problem that troubles many cities in the United States, the
deterioration of a once prospering neighbourhood. In Sarasota, this was the North
Trail District, an area surrounding the city’s main entrance corridor, US 41, also
called the Tamiami Trail. The Tamiami Trail links Sarasota and Miami, and during
the 1940s and 1950s, was a booming commercial and tourist strip. By the advent
of the 1990s it was a deteriorated relic of a past era. Many of the small businesses
that flourished there, especially older tourist hotels that could not compete with
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more modern ones, closed down and were not replaced.9 Compounding the
problem were the widening of the Tamiami trail, which sliced off front yards, and
the adoption of new, more restrictive land development regulations that altered
density requirements and changed setbacks, parking, landscaping and storm water
retention rules (Carter, 1997). An unintentional consequence of the new regula-
tions was a further degradation of the area through the creation of a district where
many of the pre-existing structures, sites and land uses did not conform to the new
regulations, hence generating ‘non-conforming’ uses, buildings and lots. As the
area decayed further over time, it attracted prostitution, drug dealing and related
crimes. Carter notes that ‘by 1990 many considered it the worst area in town’
(1997, page 1).
Public reaction from area residents finally prompted the city to act and a
‘CPTED Task’ team was created, initially consisting of police, planners and building
officials under the direction of the city manager. While the team’s broader goal was
to use CPTED tactics throughout the entire city, it chose the North Trail corridor as
a prototype. The team subsequently coordinated input from the local university
(student architectural projects), city planners (a new zoning district to deal with
constraints to viable redevelopment), the public (consensus building), city police
(new law enforcement strategies) and local designers (plan visualisations and
public education) in the development of the North Trail District’s new land develop-
ment regulations.
These regulations incorporate CPTED principles within substantive areas and
review processes. For example, the new regulations sanction natural surveillance –
‘eyes on the street’ – by encouraging open air facilities, by promoting safe pedes-
trian access to streets and stores from parking lots, by requiring windows on all
street frontages, by providing shade trees and enhanced landscaping and by pro-
viding illumination standards for businesses. Setback requirements are adjusted to
facilitate increased use of front yards and the structural height requirements are
changed to encourage increased residential redevelopment within the entire dis-
trict, but especially along the Tamiami Trail corridor. Sherry Carter, an original
member of the CPTED task team, notes that other CPTED principles, such as
natural access control, territorial reinforcement and maintenance, were also
embodied in the new development regulations for the North Trail District (1997).
Like Tempe, Arizona (below) Sarasota’s review of construction plans is per-
formed by a multi-agency team consisting of law enforcement, planning and build-
ing officials. And like Tempe, this is a mandatory review process (albeit only for the
North Trail District zone). However, while the review is required, plan changes
made by the city officials are recommendations – suggestions – which may or may
not be implemented by the designers or owners. Unlike Tempe, the CPTED review
team does not have the power to stop construction, although in both cities the
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parties tend to negotiate design and construction outcomes rather than rely on
hard and fast rules.
Carter (1997) reports evaluative results of the Sarasota North Trail District
CPTED intervention through a comparison of North Trail Sector,10 North Trail Corri-
dor and city-wide police calls for service data and FBI Part I crime data for 1990
and 1996. The data show that while calls for service to the police grew for both
the North Trail Sector and the Corridor in 1996 compared to 1990, they increased
at a much lower rate (5.93 per cent and 0.11 per cent) than did calls for service
city-wide, which grew at a 13.26 per cent rate for the same years. Further, Part I
crime rates for the North Trail Sector and the Corridor are reported to have
declined at a much higher rate (dropping 40.72 per cent and 29.56 per cent
respectively) than did city-wide rates for these types of crime, which fell by 8.69
per cent. She also reports a growing regeneration of the area through increased
building permits, new development, and growth in property values (Carter, pages
10–11), and the diffusion of CPTED applications into other city programmes and
areas, particularly Sarasota’s downtown.
Like the Tumbler Ridge and the Tempe examples presented below, the Sara-
sota project evaluation is weak on a number of methodological grounds. For
example, the comparison of changes in calls for service and crime rates for the
North Trail Sector and the Corridor with the city’s rates overall is statistically ques-
tionable, inasmuch as the ‘comparison groups are . . . too unlike the target group
given the program’ (Sherman et al., 1997, pages 2–16). Moreover, we are not
entirely sure whether the programme simply attracted people who were less prone
to commit crimes and, if that were the case, can we say that the programme’s
design and code strategies actually were the cause of the reduced crime? Prob-
ably not. In that context, there are no real alternative explanations for the declining
rates offered and, in the end, we are not entirely sure of the cause and effect rela-
tionship between the programme and reduced crime, no matter how much we
want to believe it to be the cause. Nevertheless, like the other examples, it presents
a well-documented community-level project in which to assess further the credibil-
ity of the place-based crime prevention theories presented here.
THE WASHINGTON, D.C. METRO SUBWAY DESIGN
Although criticised for not having a strong research design, this case by Nancy La
Vigne (1997) nevertheless provides the ‘best available evidence’ (Eck, 1997,
pages 7–24) that the design of subway systems has an influence on crime. While
the system designers were not driven by CPTED or other crime prevention theo-
ries, La Vigne notes that the concepts were nevertheless incorporated into the
system’s architecture, policing and management from the outset in the 1970s. Her
study carefully documented the design of the systems’ platforms (open and
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uncrowded by structural elements facilitating good sight lines) (see Figure 5.4),
entrances, exits and pathways (shortened passageways to reduce loitering,
winding and curved pathways avoided), lighting and maintenance (uniform
minimum lighting standards, reflective durable and easily maintainable wall sur-
faces, rapid graffiti and damage repair policies generally similar to those used in
the New York Subway System, as described above), security devices (widespread
use of CCTV and station guardians), signage (criticised as being weak), money
handling policies (limited commercial activities and use of farecards and auto-
mated systems that reduce fare evasion) and transit police and personnel (quality
of life violations enforced, vigilant attendants).
LaVigne notes that the Metro system’s construction and design opera-
tionalised many CPTED and situational crime prevention prescriptions and she com-
pared its crime rates with those of generally similar systems in Boston (MBTA),
Atlanta (MARTA), and Chicago (CTA) that did not incorporate similar defensible
space or CPTED applications. Her findings were that the Metro’s mean crime rate
was significantly lower than the other three systems. She also compared the Metro’s
robbery, aggravated assault, and total Part I crime rates to crime rates at above-
ground locations throughout the Washington, D.C. area, reasoning that ‘if Metro’s
environment is structured in such a way to reduce criminal opportunities, one would
expect to find little variation from station to station, compared to that occurring
above ground’ (La Vigne, 1997, page 293). Though her findings were mixed
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Figure 5.4 Washington, D.C. Metro system
(robbery and Part 1 crimes were significantly lower in Metro stations but assault
rates were not significantly different), they were also generally supportive of the
hypothesis that Metro’s environment thwarted crime opportunities and incentives.
LaVigne’s carefully crafted study provides scientific support for the inclusion
of CPTED and situational crime prevention measures in subway design across the
United States. Clarke (1997) notes that the lesson learned by Metro’s experiences
also have been instructive to designers of other new systems throughout the world.
THE TUMBLER RIDGE, BRITISH COLUMBIA PUB
An example of proactive, multi-tactic crime prevention design is the case of the
Tumbler Ridge pub reported by Brantingham, et al. (1997). A new town, Tumbler
Ridge, was laid out by planners with a special concern for crime prevention. Of
particular interest to planners was the location, site layout, parking and access
design of the pub since ‘heavy drinking and associated assaults and accidents are
major problems in resource towns in northern British Columbia’ (ibid., page 6). As
a result, the pub was situated in the town plan so that walking to and from it was
facilitated, while the connecting street pattern and overall road network were
designed to reduce drunk driving incidents as well as increase the ability of police
to keep an eye on drivers who were entering or leaving. The pub’s entryway and
parking lot were separated from the entry area of an adjacent hotel in order to min-
imise potentials for assault and vandalism. These proactive design considerations
were part of a much larger town plan in which ‘housing types, parks, pathways
were specially considered’ (ibid., 1997, page 6). Such large-scale conceptual
design, which builds in crime prevention applications from smaller pieces to a
grand scale, is similar to that undertaken in some new towns, such as Celebration,
Florida, the multi-million dollar Disney-sponsored development in central Florida.
While follow-up research in Tumbler Ridge is necessary in order more
directly to connect crime rates to design intervention and to eliminate (or at least
explain) rival hypotheses, the Brantinghams report:
since its inception the town has maintained one of the lowest crime rates
amongst all British Columbia policing jurisdictions. In 1995, its criminal code
offence rate of 76 crimes per 1000 population was about half the provincial
average across all 192 policing jurisdictions and only about a third of similar
nearby resource towns such as Dawson Creek, Fort St. John or Mackenzie (ibid.,
1997, page 6).
TEMPE, ARIZONA’S ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN ORDINANCE
The City of Tempe, Arizona’s environmental design code, incorporating defensible
space, CPTED, and situational crime prevention principles, is among the most
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sweeping laws of its type in the United States. It is an example of a multi-tactic,
proactive strategy that, like the case of Sarasota, Florida above, requires the sus-
tained cooperation of planners and police in the review of the development of the
city’s built environment. Because of their breadth and the presence of numerous
intervening variables, the impacts of Tempe’s environmental design provisions,
also like Sarasota’s, are difficult to assess empirically. However, they serve as a
model by virtue of that comprehensiveness and because of their implementation
strategies.
First broached publicly in 1989 by a police officer who had become a
CPTED ‘convert’ and champion,11 the Tempe CPTED code provisions were negoti-
ated among city agencies and with the local development community over a 6-year
period, and ultimately implemented in 1996. Their genesis was therefore not a
reaction to a specific crime wave or a horrific act. Following complaints from the
city council that elements of the first draft of the ordinance were too restrictive and
that they sacrificed some public amenities and aesthetics, such as landscaping, for
security (a problem also voiced by other cities responding to the 1994 US Confer-
ence of Mayors CPTED survey cited previously), the sections were redrawn to be
more flexible, and subsequently enacted at the end of 1997 within the city’s larger
design review process.
The CPTED provisions amended Tempe’s Chapter 11, Design Review Ordi-
nance, adding four general ‘Environmental Design articles’ (Tempe Police Depart-
ment, 1997). These are intended to synchronise with part of the city’s zoning
ordinance that regulates land uses identified as particularly crime-prone, such as
bars, adult-oriented businesses, pool halls, hotels, motels and convenience stores,
among others. For these, the police department is empowered to review and
approve special security plans. But the ordinance extends far beyond these areas
of focused concern to include all new construction in the city, additions, alterations
and use enlargements (exceeding 50 per cent of value), and existing multi-family
dwelling units converted to private unit ownership. Most single and two family
dwelling units are excluded from the ordinance (Tempe Police Department, 1997).
Within this broad spectrum, ordinance sections regulate interior spaces,
lighting, landscaping, wall and access control gates, identification signs and
addresses, directories, vision panels and parking structures. The rationales driving
these regulations are defensible space, CPTED and situational crime prevention
principles, all of which are recited in the ordinance under the familiar rubrics of ter-
ritoriality, surveillance, access control, activity support, and maintenance, basically
unchanged from Newman, Jeffrey and Clarke’s original formulations.12
In its enforcement, the Tempe ordinance incorporates a strong multi-
disciplinary, multi-agency approach, although it is a fundamentally police-based
function. Thus, the city has established a CPTED section comprised of police
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officers within its development services department who work directly with city
planners, fire officials, park department, transportation and other agency represen-
tatives to review site and development plans. In many ways, this approach is similar
to the Architectural Liaison Officers (ALOs) model used in Britain (see Chapter 7),
although the British officers generally remain housed with their own police agen-
cies. To the best of our knowledge, the Tempe example is unique in the United
States in one crucial aspect: CPTED section officers can stop, or ‘red tag’, con-
struction that does not conform to the ordinance. This is a formidable power,
usually reserved for building inspectors and fire marshals in US jurisdictions.
As previously noted, empirical evaluations of the ordinance’s impacts are diffi-
cult, if not impossible.13 Lacking clear evidence of effectiveness, some prominent
members of the development community have strongly opposed the new ordi-
nance, with one former mayor–developer going so far to say that ‘it’s a cumber-
some process. It’s almost impossible to get final (building) approval here’
(Kuykendall, 1999, page 40). Other problems relate to internal administration since
development review staff turnover means that new personnel, most of whom have
no prior knowledge of CPTED, have continually to be trained. The police, who
admittedly have a large stake in its outcome, rate the ordinance as a success.
However, as Henry Cisneros noted relative to Newman’s Five Oaks Neighborhood
in Dayton, it may be much too early to tell.
Certainly, one of the strongest arguments to the private development
community that CPTED or other place-based crime prevention applications actually
‘work’ is that it is in their financial interests to implement them. Unfortunately, to the
best of our knowledge, there are no empirical studies that detail cost savings or
advantages of either specific or general interventions to owners. What we do have,
however, is indirect evidence based on the costs of not utilising place-based crime
prevention approaches. This comes from the rapidly growing field of premises lia-
bility law, where property owners – from individuals to large corporations – are
being successfully sued in American civil courts for failing to have exercised rea-
sonable care in property design, maintenance and use. In noting that CPTED now
equips property owners and managers with proactive crime prevention tools,
Gordon and Brill (1996) point to the trend in American courts, beginning in the
1970s, to expand concepts of ‘special relationships’ between business inviters
(typically business owners/managers) and invitees (typically customers), and widen
the scope of ‘foresee ability’ to include the ‘totality of circumstances’ in determin-
ing whether or not a crime was indeed foreseeable. This now broadened view
includes a variety of elements, such as ‘the nature of the business, its surrounding
locale, the lack of customary security precautions as an invitation to crime’ (ibid.,
page 4), as well as whether previous similar incidents have occurred on the prop-
erty. The authors note that courts in the United States are increasingly amenable to
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allowing juries to ‘hear theories about the relationship between how properties are
managed and designed and criminal behaviour’ (ibid., page 10). A study of trends
in 186 security-related lawsuits conducted by Sherman and Klein (1984) between
1958 and 1982 clearly demonstrated that the number and the size of the awards
in such cases rose dramatically during that time. Kennedy (1993) has documented
the growing legal and financial importance of security design to architects, engi-
neers, and property owners, although he notes that ‘criminogenic aspects of the
physical environment have not been routinely selected for analysis by design
teams’ (page 110). There is, therefore, a body of indirect evidence that place-
based crime prevention is cost effective to the far-seeing owner and property
manager insofar as the implementation of appropriate strategies will help them
defend against costly lawsuits. In the absence of federal or state mandates, this
may, in the long term, be the most effective way to insinuate place-based crime
prevention strategies into the design and development of many types of private
land uses.
Conclusions
It is clear that the implementation of place-based crime prevention theories –
defensible space, CPTED, situational crime prevention, and environmental criminol-
ogy – in the United States has been uneven over the past four decades. This is
due to many interrelated factors that include the relative newness of the ideas, the
discovery (and for some the rediscovery) of the importance of city street life in
America, the social, political and economic upheaval of the 1960s and the search
for responses to crime set loose by ‘law and order’ demands, the disenchantment
of some academics and professionals with old ideas and solutions based on
offender-based models in criminology and the rejection of purely ‘sculptural’
approaches to architecture. Further, the evolving sophistication of housing and
human-environment research and the erratic interest in place-based crime preven-
tion planning at the federal government level, have also played major roles in the
evolution of place-based crime prevention theory and applications in the USA.
Perhaps the latter point has been the most important, yet most understated, of
these factors inasmuch as public policy in America’s fragmented federal system
plays out much differently than it does in Britain’s more centralised system.
The structure of the American federal system splinters jurisdictions and
policymaking among many, sometimes competing levels of governance. In this
polyglot system, place-based crime prevention theory and applications have
become largely the province of public housing and law enforcement organisations
to the relative exclusion of most other local agencies. Indeed, while CPTED may be
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widely used by police in the USA (although we suspect this applies primarily to
larger agencies), we do not believe the same to be true of local planning, develop-
ment and building code enforcement agencies, or their city and county commis-
sions, who have the power to make design and construction details binding. The
alliances that we have illustrated in this chapter between the police, planners and
designers in the Tempe and Sarasota cases are, we believe, rare phenomena in
the United States.
This is so even though in recent years some engineers, planners, architects,
real estate developers, office managers and professors have ‘discovered’ place-
based crime prevention planning, and despite the fact that the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Justice and some state agen-
cies (such as Florida’s Office of Attorney General) have provided training assis-
tance and funding to public housing agencies and police in these areas. By and
large, in the absence of federal or state law, executive orders, federal or state court
decrees, or significant demand from client groups, local government agencies, pro-
fessional groups and societies (as well as individuals) tend to be attentive to
central government policy (whether at the state or federal level) and innovation pro-
grammes primarily through grants and related discretionary funding inducements.
Moreover, as a whole, it is arguable that American planning and zoning (which sub-
stitutes for planning in many communities) is far more sensitive to market demands
than is the case in Britain, insofar as local government in the USA is supported pri-
marily from property taxes, which are generated by private development decisions.
And, although significant increases in the numbers of premises liability cases have
made place-based crime prevention planning more of an issue to property owners,
developers and insurance companies (Gordon and Brill, 1996), we believe it to be
still relatively low on their ‘radar screens’.
Thus, there is little compelling incentive to focus the attention of local agen-
cies (other than the police or public housing officers) on many aspects of place-
based crime prevention theory and applications or to galvanise professional or
academic interest. The United States Department of Justice does not by dint of
policy announcement have the same authority or influence over the thousands of
police agencies or the local, regional or state planning and development agencies
in the United States that the equivalent British Government Departments have (as
exemplified by DoE Circular 5/94; see Chapter 7). Thus, when federal interest and
funding in defensible space and CPTED dried up during the 1980s, local adoption,
implementation and experimentation with these approaches also flagged. And aca-
demic interest, which had also been piqued, foundered as well, although it revived
during the 1990s. Despite that, it is nevertheless clear that federal leadership in
introducing defensible space and CPTED concepts into public housing has been
important to the gradual diffusion of these concepts to this arena, and this has
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influenced design and construction policies and professional practice even through
periods of relative inattention. Such leadership in the United States has been
generally lacking, however, in other land use categories, as we shall discuss further
in the next chapter, such as in private (non-distressed) residential, industrial and
commercial land use development, where direct federal intervention has been his-
torically weaker. Thus, we would hypothesise that the role of central government is
pivotal in the introduction and dissemination of new design and building concepts,
especially when these include funding over time, as a way to overcome the natural
diluting tendencies of the federal system.
The way forward in the United States is thus through a much more fractured
and truncated structural system than in Britain, and the result of this shows in the
history of the differential implementation of these approaches between the two
nations. We look more formally at this comparison in Chapter 9. There are, of
course, other factors at play here, including different cultural and value systems
(which, for example, show up in discussions about privacy concerns and CCTV),
different levels of urbanisation (Britain is a more dense and more urbanised society
than the United States), different types of development review and planning
processes (British planning tends to provide more discretionary power to local
planning authorities than is granted to American planners), and differences in the
resort to legal action to redress civil wrongs (Britain is far less litigious than the
United States).
However, the essence of these differences – which on the whole argue for
more rather than less adoption of crime prevention planning applications in Britain
than the USA – may be obviated ultimately by the potential for innovation that the
federal structure leaves open. Thus, if this structure is a hindrance to the adoption
of central policy, it may also be a boon to experimentation at the local level, assum-
ing there are some inducements to do so. Whether those inducements are forth-
coming is arguable, and will likely depend on the establishment of strong empirical
bases for these place-based crime prevention theories and applications. But this
leaves us with a ‘chicken and egg’ dilemma portending an evolutionary answer far
different from the seemingly revolutionary spirit that heralded the beginnings of this
field.
Notes
1 Federal funding to localities is provided in a variety of ways depending upon how the
resources are allocated by Congress. Formula funds (sometimes called block grants) are
generally provided to certain classes of grantees (say cities over 100,000 population) on
the condition that they satisfy specific application requirements. Discretionary funds may
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be open to any qualified applicant but may be limited by Congress by specific eligibility
criteria, such as the provision of matching funding or the passage of state or local legisla-
tion that addresses a nationally designated purpose. Earmarked discretionary grants are
directions from Congress – whether written into the legislation itself (a ‘hard’ earmark) or
as directed by congressional hearings and conference reports (‘soft’ earmarks) – as to
how to spend portions of the funds allocated within the overall funding, usually for a des-
ignated specific purpose or group. An example of an earmark within the Office of Justice
Program (OJP) Byrne Discretionary Grant Program is the funding ($3 million in FY1996)
allocated to the National Crime Prevention Council. Finally, competitive grants, which are
generally the smallest amount of funding available, are awarded based upon meritorious
application (Sherman et al., 1997, pages 1.13–1.20).
2 While giving credit to Newman’s contributions, C. Ray Jeffrey, originator of the term
CPTED, suggests that his later work was much too simplistic in that it moved away from
design and deeper into hardware and target-hardening solutions, a ‘not very imaginative
approach to environment-behaviour interaction’ (Jeffrey, 1977, page 224).
3 Gardiner, an advocate of comprehensive environmental security, criticises defensible
space’s focus on public housing projects as being limited and ‘as applied to date, (it)
isolates the resident of the public housing project from his surrounding neighborhood
and forfeits the neighborhood streets to possible offenders’ (1978, page 15).
4 This perceived inadequacy gave increased credence to the notion of place-based, situa-
tional crime prevention strategies, insofar as those are intended to extend beyond both
defensible space and CPTED’s foci on physical space to include design, use and man-
agement. In fairness to Newman and Jeffrey, it should be pointed out that, while both
placed a high value on the role of physical environment in preventing crime, they also
advocated multi-faceted strategic approaches that included social (community) and
managerial (institutional) interventions as well.
5 This is in contrast with the diffusion of defensible space, CPTED and situational crime
prevention applications to communities across Britain, where the more centralised struc-
ture of government and greater sustained research, police and political interest in these
theories helped disseminate place-based intervention strategies.
6 Moreover, it does not account for CPTED or defensible space policy or ordinances
included in county, state or special authority codes, nor does it include the independent
CPTED interventions by private designers or developers.
7 See Eck, ‘Preventing Crime at Places’ in Preventing Crime: What Works, What
Doesn’t, What’s Promising, US Department of Justice, 1997.
8 These are available at http://ww.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm. Part I crimes refer to the first eight
offences listed in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR).
These are the so called ‘index crimes’ that identify the most serious violent and property
crimes in order of their presumed seriousness. They consist of murder and non-
negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault, burglary,
larceny-theft, motor-vehicle theft, and arson. The UCR consists of crimes reported to the
police, and then reported to the Program Support Section of the FBI. Index crimes are
used to compare crime rates nationally and across jurisdictions. Part II crimes consist of
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arrest reports for such crimes as curfew and loitering violations, disorderly conduct, drug
abuse, and a host of other, non-traffic violations. Chapter 2 discusses some of the prob-
lems of dealing with reported crime rates of several sorts. An excellent recent article
dealing with the subject of crime data in the United States is ‘Bridging gaps in police
crime data’ by Michael D. Maltz (1999).
9 In the words of a university assessment of the area in 1990, ‘Today, it is a random string
of small commercial and retail facilities, a decreasing number of ‘‘host’’ facilities such as
hotels and motels, restaurants, a small number of residential options and an increasing
number of vacant properties’ (University of South Florida Urban Design Group 1990,
page 2).
10 ‘Sector’ is used as the geographic bounds of the data here since, presumably, police
reporting areas for calls for service and crime rates rarely correspond with zoning dis-
tricts.
11 Officer Dick Steely played the major role in developing and implementing the ordinance.
12 The ordinance also recites and defines the ‘three-D’s’ – designation, definition, and
design (Crowe, 1991 and 2000).
13 This is true, as Clarke has noted (1997), even in relatively small scale applications, since
urban environments are extraordinarily dynamic places unlike the laboratories of physical
scientists who can control intervening forces.
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CHAPTER 6
CASE STUDIES IN NORTH AMERICA
Introduction
In this chapter we focus on several examples of existing applications and case
studies that relate to general land use classifications found in most American plan-
ning and zoning codes and that illustrate specific CPTED, defensible space, situa-
tional crime prevention or environmental crime prevention principles. We employ
cases whose focus is very narrow in scope (micro) as well as those which are
broad (macro). These cases are documented in the literature or based upon our
own field observations.
Diversity of the American Experience
As noted previously, the US federal system encourages the splintering of public
policy as it moves through various layers and levels of government throughout the
nation. This is an important reason why there is little consistency in approach or
application of place-based crime prevention measures from one community to the
next. Some applications involve the adoption of ordinances that implement CPTED
techniques, whereas others are grounded not in law but in practice as carried out
by owners or designers on their own initiative. Tempe, Arizona and Sarasota,
Florida have chosen broad brush applications, incorporating defensible space prin-
ciples and CPTED into fundamental planning and zoning ordinances and site
review procedures, whereas other communities selectively embed CPTED in nar-
rowly focused law, such as Gainesville, Florida’s convenience store ordinance. In
still other places, CPTED, defensible space and situational crime prevention tech-
niques have often been ‘unconsciously’ inserted – much as Newman’s defensible
space principles have found their way into public housing design – in a range of
planning, zoning and land development ordinances and professional practice. For
instance, surveillance and access control concepts derived from defensible space
are woven into countless Automatic Teller Machines (‘ATMs’ in the US and ‘cash
points’ in Britain) siting ordinances in jurisdictions across the nation, whereas many
of these communities have no other CPTED provisions in their codes. As the 1998
US Conference of Mayors’ survey attests, place-based crime prevention
approaches tend to be recent additions sprinkled throughout land development
and life safety codes. These codes, as Zahm (1998) argues, have not historically
been developed to consider safety from crime as a fundamental objective.
The upshot is that, while CPTED applications are numerous across North
American communities, they are likely to be idiosyncratic and are often unrelated to
broad-scale comprehensive planning initiatives. Moreover, to reiterate a point made
in Chapter 5, relatively few of them have been documented and fewer still have
been carefully evaluated for their effectiveness in preventing crime.1 Rarer still are
rigorous longitudinal case studies: a comprehensive, illustrated catalogue of case
examples (which is sorely needed) is at present non-existent.
Towards a Catalogue of Case Studies
Place-based crime prevention case examples may be organised and illustrated:
• based on classical defensible space and CPTED principles (e.g. ‘territorial
reinforcement, surveillance, access control, activity placement and genera-
tion, maintenance’),
• by using Wekerle and Whitzman’s (1995) three-fold urban safety typology
(‘awareness of the environment, visibility by others, finding help’),
• by employing Clarke and Homel’s matrix (1997; Clarke 1997) depicting
sixteen situational crime prevention techniques from ‘target hardening’ to
‘facilitating compliance’ (see Chapter 4),
• by using Fisher and Nasars’ (1992) trilogy of physical features that relate to
victim-offender dynamics (‘prospect, refuge, escape’), or
• through the Brantinghams’ (1993) environmental criminology scheme
(‘nodes, paths, edges’) that owes a debt to Kevin Lynch’s approach to
understanding urban environments and images (1960).
To be sure, this is not an exhaustive list of conceptual classifications. But whatever
crime prevention typologies are used, they must all somehow connect with the
physical environment they describe and with the crimes they seek to prevent.
For planners and probably for most citizens, that environment is most readily
conceived in terms of general land use categories: residential, commercial, indus-
trial, recreational and parks, educational, healthcare, and transportation uses, each
with its own series of subcategories. While a comprehensive catalogue of cases
based upon all land use categories and subcategories arrayed against all place-
based crime prevention principles is beyond the scope of the present work, we
provide four representative samples that fall within the residential, commercial,
industrial and transportation land use categories. As noted in previous chapters,
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some of these examples demonstrate proactive strategies while some are reactive;
some are single-tactic strategies while others employ many, sometimes very differ-
ent, strategies and are therefore multi-tactic. Within these contexts, we also
present examples of situations where no place-based crime prevention interven-
tions are employed, as a means to discuss and demonstrate their potential applica-
tion(s), especially at micro-scale levels.
Residential Land Uses
In the United States residential land uses constitute the largest proportion of all
urban land uses. They are also the most likely venues for crime. As we have noted
previously, ‘distressed’ neighbourhoods and public housing projects stand out
among all residential areas as places where crimes are clustered, specifically homi-
cide, sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary and drug law violations.
These are the crimes that citizens tend to fear the most, and to which they adjust
their behaviours accordingly.
In comparison to Britain, American residential areas tend to be much less
densely populated in terms of both people and structures. This is especially true in
suburban areas, where land allotments are more generous in the United States and
single-family, detached housing tends to be the norm. Although there are similar
suburbs in Britain, by and large housing there tends to be attached, with common
walls and adjoining entryways bordered by small, carefully tended garden areas
allocated to each home. British residential CPTED approaches are often focused
on micro-level access controls, such as fencing back and side yards which may
lead to common back lots or shared spaces, and target hardening by securing
doors, windows and other building entrances. While these approaches are
common in the United States as well, the wider separation between structures and
land uses fosters more macro-level approaches, epitomised by the gating of entire
suburban communities accompanied by changes in community traffic circulation
patterns. The result is the tendency to create broader swathes of ‘privatised’ space
in the United States than in Britain. We shall discuss the implications of these dif-
ferences in more detail in Chapter 9.
RECENT INTERVENTIONS IN NEIGHBOURHOODS AND IN
PUBLIC HOUSING
CPTED and related interventions and experiments in residential neighbourhoods
can be found throughout the United States and Canada. Examples include Bridge-
port, Connecticut (‘Phoenix Project’), Fort Lauderdale, Florida (‘Riverside Park’),
Los Angeles, California (‘Design Out Crime’), Toronto, Canada (‘Safe Cities’),
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Vancouver, Canada (‘Safer City Task Force’), Phoenix (‘Safe Communities Pro-
grams’), Knoxville (integrated into its Community Policing programme), Houston
(‘Neighborhoods to Standard’) and in Dayton, Ohio (‘Five Oaks’). Of these, one of
the best documented cases comes from the Five Oaks neighbourhood where
Oscar Newman-designed interventions (traffic pattern changes, addition of gates
and fences, target hardening, capital improvements) combined with community
policing were reportedly responsible for a 15 per cent decrease in crime between
1989 and 1993 and a 26 per cent decline between 1992 and 1993 (Feins et al.,
1997). Other widely reported CPTED applications are found in a variety of public
housing projects across the nation, such as in Cincinnati (Cincinnati Metropolitan
Housing Authority), Chester, Pennsylvania (Ruth Bennett Homes), Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania (Richard Allen Homes), Louisville, Kentucky (Cotter Homes), Lexing-
ton, Kentucky (Bluegrass-Aspendale Housing Project), Macon, Georgia (Macon
Housing Authority), Portland, Oregon (Iris Court), Los Angeles (Mar Vista
Gardens), New York (Clinton Hill Block Association), and San Francisco (Robert
B. Pitts Plaza) among others.
Among the best documented residential cases, including public housing and
neighbourhood studies, are found in the National Institute of Justice publication,
Solving Crime in Residential Neighborhoods: Comprehensive Changes in
Design, Management and Use (Feins et al., 1997) which provides extensive
research and evaluations of four residential areas where place-based crime preven-
tion measures have been instituted. These include Castle Square Apartments
(Boston, Massachusetts), Lockwood Gardens (East Oakland, California), Genesis
Park (Charlotte, North Carolina), and Oak Park, Illinois. This NIJ study is careful to
note that these cases are ‘suggestive’ that place-based crime prevention tactics –
tailored to specific locales and that coalesce multiple stakeholders – do indeed
reduce crime, although they are not ‘proof’ that this is the result. In practice, it
would be as difficult as untangling a spider web to evaluate the effectiveness of
specific place-based crime prevention measures applied to these residential areas.
Despite the fact that the crime data support the contention that place-based appli-
cations work, the physical, management and community organisational interven-
tions in these cases are woven together in complex ways that defy individual
analysis.
One study that does provide strong empirical evidence for a place-based, sit-
uational crime prevention application in residences is Eck and Wartell’s research
into the use of nuisance abatement programmes in San Diego (1996). In a ran-
domised and controlled experiment, the researchers found that letters threatening
landlords with property seizures for illegal drug dealing were effective in signific-
antly reducing such activity over a six-month period. Although other nuisance
abatement programmes tended to corroborate their results, this evaluation was the
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only place-based residential research to rate a ‘5’ – the highest score for the most
rigorous research methods – in the US Office of Justice Program’s landmark
report, Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn’t, What’s Promising
(Sherman et al., 1997).
A NEIGHBOURHOOD EXAMPLE: HARBORDALE, FLORIDA
A previously largely unreported case that resembles the NIJ cases noted above is
that of Harbordale, a neighbourhood within St Petersburg, Florida. Like Sarasota’s
North Trail District example presented in Chapter 5, Harbordale is an example of a
distressed neighbourhood within an otherwise prospering resort and retirement
community. It provides the opportunity to discuss place-based crime prevention
strategies at macro and micro-scale levels.2
Consisting of approximately 2,300 residents occupying 1,437 single and
multiple-family dwelling units as depicted in the base map in Figure 6.1, this pre-
dominantly African-American community was in serious decline by the mid-1990s.
Its structures and infrastructures were far below city-wide standards. It contained a
high proportion of vacant, abandoned and dilapidated buildings, poor property and
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Figure 6.1 Harbordale, Florida: Base map
Source: Ajoc, 1996
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landscape maintenance, missing or inadequate sidewalks, bike paths and lighting,
and low property values compared to the city generally.
Approximately 38 per cent of the residents had incomes below the federal
poverty rate and most lived in rental housing. Between 1992 and 1995 the neigh-
bourhood’s crime rate was significantly higher than the city’s crime rate, with drug
activity, assaults, robbery, burglaries and prostitution accounting for the most serious
and pervasive criminal activity. In late 1996, following the fatal shooting of a black
citizen by the police, rioting broke out throughout St Petersburg’s minority neighbour-
hoods, including Harbordale. A number of buildings were burned and vehicles
destroyed in Harbordale and adjacent neighbourhoods. Implementation of the neigh-
bourhood plan – containing the CPTED-related interventions noted below – was
delayed by these ‘disturbances’, as they euphemistically came to be known locally.
The neighbourhood is emblematic of many similar venues in the United
States, not only as a crime vector but also as an example of a distressed commun-
ity containing badly needed affordable housing located within the urban core.
Figure 6.2 is a map of crimes, including prostitution, strong arm robberies, drug
trafficking and assaults, showing their relative distribution in 1993–1994.
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Figure 6.2 Harbordale, Florida: General crime locations
Source: Ajoc, 1996
Response to Harbordale’s deteriorating situation was framed within the City
of St Petersburg’s ‘Neighborhood Planning Program’ established in 1989 as an
effort to shore up the city’s neighbourhoods by defining their goals and addressing
expressed needs. Executed in tandem with a state programme (the ‘Urban Partner-
ship Initiative’), the programme employed city planning staff to work directly with
neighbourhood groups in solving their problems. It also involved other city agen-
cies, such as the police, that have a role in the process. Development of neigh-
bourhood plans based on issues raised at ‘brainstorming’ sessions was a key aim
of this effort. At sessions in 1995 Harbordale neighbours and planning staff identi-
fied seven issue areas to be included in the neighbourhood plan submitted to the
City Council. These were: crime and public safety, housing and building codes,
mangroves, infrastructure, parks and recreation, landscaping and neighbourhood
identity, and transportation. Within these areas, specific place-based crime preven-
tion elements included concerns over insufficient street and alley lighting, the inci-
dence of burglaries, drug-dealing, prostitution and vandalism, the extent and
condition of ill-maintained properties, the overgrown mangrove swamp area (‘Salt
Creek’), and vehicle speeding and cut-through traffic on neighbourhood streets
(City of St Petersburg, 1999).
Of particular interest is the ‘mangroves’ issue. It had been identified by the
neighbours as their primary concern in that it was symptomatic of their inability to
resolve crime and neighbourhood appearance issues. Figure 6.3 shows the central
location of the mangrove swamp area in Harbordale. Mangroves consist of dense
woody plants that are found in tropical climates throughout the world. They provide
habitat for many types of animals and their distinctive root system acts as a natural
filter, which can improve water quality and reduce pollution. In Florida, State law
protects them. Untended, their foliage can grow to heights of 20–30 feet, which is
what happened in Harbordale. The wild mangroves bisected the neighbourhood,
forming a complete visual barrier from one side to the other and, due to inadequate
street lighting, they provided a convenient place to dump trash and stolen goods,
consummate drug and prostitution deals. Many residents were fearful of this area
and avoided it, especially at night. Initial attempts to secure approval to trim the
mangroves had been unsuccessful; the uncontrolled growth along the spine of
their community became a symbol to the neighbours of their ineffectual voice and
the lack of the government’s concern about the neighbour and the neighbourhood.
Accordingly, the mangrove issue became the first implementation priority
under the new neighbourhood plan. Following significant effort, state agencies ulti-
mately granted permission to trim the mangroves in 1996, and they are currently
maintained to a low level on a regular basis. The residents credit the trimming with
reductions in illegal dumping and criminal activity and improvements made to
private properties along the creek. Moreover, the effort galvanised local planning
Case studies in North America 161
efforts and provided neighbours with the sense that they could, if organised, effect
positive changes. Though delayed by the riots in late 1996, other plan implementa-
tions in the neighbourhood included the addition of infrastructure improvements
(speed plateaus (speed ramps), road striping and sidewalks), housing demolitions
and acquisitions, street beautification and signage (including neighbourhood
entrance signs), and the planning and development of a linear walking park – a
viable common space – along the Salt Creek mangrove spine of Harbordale.
Coupled with community policing and a new sense of neighbourhood effi-
cacy, St Petersburg planners credit these improvements with increasing property
values (4.55 per cent rise in 1996–1997 and a 5.5 per cent increase in
1997–1998) for the neighbourhood, and a significant decline in its crime rate. This
has been reflected in a steady drop in the area’s UCR (Uniform Crime Rate) index.3
It slid from 390 in 1995 to 298 in 1996, and from 292 in 1997 to 222 in 1998.
Police calls for service in Harbordale have also declined, dropping nearly 12 per
cent from 1997 to 1998 alone (City of St Petersburg, 1999). Residents and the
community police officer assigned to the neighbourhood point specifically to
reductions in prostitution, robberies, and drug-related crimes in the triangle formed
162 Planning for crime prevention
Figure 6.3 Harbordale, Florida’s Mangrove Spine
Source: Ajoc, 1996
Drawn by· Stephanie Ajoc 
hiltia1 Maagrova 
by NW 22nd Avenue, West Harbor Drive, and 7th Street south, once Harbordale’s
chief crime generator. Place-based crime prevention changes are given much of
the credit for this decline. As with the NIJ neighbourhood studies noted above, it is
impossible to say what changes actually deserve what credit since physical, man-
agement and community organisation changes were implemented together in Har-
bordale. Moreover, other intervening variables, including the expansion of the
American economy and age cohort factors related to the reduction in crime gener-
ally, probably also account for the positive changes seen here. However, there is
no doubt that residents perceive crime to be lower and the quality of life to be
improved by virtue of the City’s place-based crime prevention interventions in
Harbordale.
RELATED PROBLEMS AND APPLICATIONS
Harbordale’s concerns with surveillance and lighting (the mangroves and alleys),
cut-through and drug related traffic on local streets, and neighbourhood appear-
ance and upkeep as problems related to crime generation and facilitation, are not
unique. They are problems that are often unexpressed and consequently not
addressed in many American – especially minority – residential areas. A recent
examination of several such neighbourhoods revealed the following examples.
As the experience with Harbordale’s mangroves demonstrates, landscape
maintenance is a relatively inexpensive yet effective means to improve sight-lines,
facilitate ‘eyes on the street’ surveillance and improve neighbourhood morale.
However, it is often overlooked, as the photographs in Figure 6.4 illustrate. Both
were taken at the same public housing complex in north central Florida. They show
residences located in distressed neighbourhoods in high crime areas. Untended
growth inhibits surveillance from the structures to the street and vice versa and
contributes to the general impression to residents and visitors that nobody is con-
cerned with upkeep. Unlike Harbordale’s mangroves, no state permits are needed
to cut this foliage.
Surveillance also can be impeded by man-made structures, built with the
best of intentions. The results of such constructions are often counter-intuitive, as
was the case with the screening walls shown in Figure 6.5, also in a high crime
neighbourhood. Here, and throughout this complex, both garbage and side
entrances are completely obscured from view. The intent was to provide residents
some additional privacy and to shield sight-lines to trash receptacles from the
street and apartments. In fact, residents claim that these barriers have created
‘entrapment’ zones, where drug deals take place and violent crimes occur. The
landlord has not responded to the neighbours’ complaints.
Street design and traffic circulation patterns are particularly important for
neighbourhoods with crime problems related to cut through traffic and vehicular
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Figure 6.4 Maintenance disasters
Figure 6.5 Counter-intuitive design examples
drug sales. Neighbourhood layouts that are extremely ‘permeable’, with many
entrances and exits and with long straight roadways (‘straightshot streets’, as
shown in Figure 6.6, a photograph of part of a street in a public housing complex)
tend to promote escape and excessive speed, according to police. Many of Har-
bordale’s streets follow this pattern and, until the addition of ‘street plateaus’, could
be considered crime facilitators (Clarke 1997).
Some communities adopt the most extreme options by gating or barricading
entire neighbourhoods, as in Five Oaks, Ohio or Miami Shores, Florida, whereas
others utilise street calming techniques that slow traffic and make quick getaways
problematic, yet do not seal off neighbourhoods from the outside world. The photo-
graphs in Figure 6.7 illustrate street calming techniques used in Orlando, Florida
neighbourhoods. In one, a planted median is used to slow traffic; and another
depicts a closed traffic lane, creating a one-way street with the other lane now
used for pedestrian and bike travel on that block.
There are dozens of street calming interventions that are considerate of
all forms of transportation and that can also accommodate emergency vehicles,
often the biggest sticking point in their implementation in residential neighbour-
hoods. American cities have been glacial in their adoption of such devices, unlike
the British and other Europeans whose use of roundabouts, woonerfs (a Dutch
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Figure 6.6 Long straight street in a distressed neighbourhood
Figure 6.7 Three street calming approaches – continued on page 168
innovation designed to incorporate compatibly between cars, houses, pedestrians
and playing areas in neighbourhoods), pinch points and speed humps is common-
place. Rather, an American response has been to shut down whole streets in
certain neighbourhoods, a solution that Kunstler notes:
is a drastic remedy for an uncivil society and must not be thought of as normal.
It is one thing to tame traffic, it is another to create paranoidal fortifications. The
best way to bring security to streets is to make them delightful places that
honorable and decent citizens will want to walk in. They become, in effect,
self-policing. The disadvantages of an interrupted street network in all other
respects far outweigh any supposed gain in security (1998, page 130).
Finally, we consider the use of common space in residential areas, an issue
that was addressed in Harbordale through the trimming of the mangroves and the
creation of a linear walking park. This amounted to the reclaiming of enemy territory
and has proved to be a rallying point in bolstering neighbourhood morale. Newman
was among the first to point out the problem with the creation of large tracts of
undefined lands within distressed neighbourhoods, noting in connection with the
Bruekelen project in New York City that ‘residents view these interior areas as the
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Figure 6.7 Continued
most dangerous in the project’ (1973, page 53). This is especially true for spaces
that are permeable to surrounding neighbourhoods such that it is difficult to know
who ‘belongs’ in areas and who does not. Gilbert Rosenthal, an architect in charge
of remodelling Philadelphia’s Richard Allen Homes, reported a conversation with
residents where they were presented with various configuration options for
common space and courtyards. They rejected them all saying, ‘You don’t get it, do
you? We don’t want any common space: it’s all too dangerous’ (Rosenthal, 1995,
page 6).
A tenet of defensible space and CPTED theory subsequently developed
around the conception of spatial hierarchy, advocating clear distinctions among
public and private space (with gradients between them), and the assessment of
spaces using Crowe’s ‘Three-D’ approach of designation, definition and design
(1991, 2000), as noted in Chapter 4. While one result has been more careful
attention to the delineation of open common space through the use of real (i.e.
fences and gates) and symbolic (i.e. pavestones) barriers, especially within Amer-
ican public housing projects and high-crime neighbourhoods, there are many
exceptions, as illustrated by the photographs in Figure 6.8 of open spaces in a
Florida public housing project.
Poor maintenance and undefined common space are characteristics of the
central section of the public housing project depicted above, surrounded by a low-
income neighbourhood. As a consequence, few residents actually use this area
and it is vulnerable to pedestrian and vehicular drug activity, especially at night.
Easy access for outsiders is available through the large parking lots, which provide
unimpeded entry to apartment rear entrances and to the common open spaces, 
as shown by the tyre tracks between the trees in the following photograph 
(Figure 6.9).
In contrast, a number of residents living on the site’s perimeter have person-
alised adjacent open spaces using territorial markers such as gardens, lawn furni-
ture and low hedges. The fence line shown on the far right of the photograph at
Figure 6.10 provides a boundary to the common space, insulating this part of the
property from outsiders and allowing residents to develop a sense of territorial
control over otherwise common lands. The only gardens that exist in this project
follow the fence line. We leave open for now the question of whether Kunstler’s
rejection of street closings is as applicable in the context of the commons and if
not, why not.
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Figure 6.8 Undefined open spaces in a public housing project
Figure 6.10 Gardens along the fence
Figure 6.9 Open access to the commons (note the tyre tracks)
Commercial Land Uses
Case studies of place-based crime prevention applications in commercial land
uses are rare, with most being confined to the convenience store studies cited pre-
viously, ATM design (NCPC, 1997), pay phone toll fraud (Bichler and Clarke,
1996), shopping bag theft in central markets (Poyner, 1983; Poyner and Webb,
1992), banks (Clarke et al., 1991), and shoplifting (DiLonardo and Clarke, 1996).
This is unfortunate since, although commercial land uses in the United States
generally comprise no more than 5 per cent of developed urban areas (Goodman
and Freund, 1968), they account for a disproportionate amount of criminal activity.
They are obvious targets for crime.
Depending upon the individual community, these areas may contain central
business districts, neighbourhood-shopping areas, regional shopping centres, as
well as wholesale and retail establishments of varying size and complexity. In the
past, communities in the United States tended to overzone lands for commercial
purposes to provide for business expansion along transportation routes. At the
urging of business leaders, city and county commissions zoned an overabundance
of commercial lands, reasoning that such lands would ultimately be more valuable
than residential properties to owners and to the jurisdictions. Insufficient demand
for this excess property caused owners to be reluctant to improve it, especially
where residential uses fell into commercial zones.
A consequence was the creation of large amounts of urban ‘waste’ lands that
deteriorated into slums, often adjacent to existing business districts within down-
town areas. These districts contain multiple crime targets and are often within the
routine paths of would-be perpetrators within urban settings.
A 1985 study of the security needs of three commercial centres undertaken
by New York City’s Crime Commission and the Regional Plan Association sug-
gested that fear of crime was hindering economic development in these centres,
but that behaviour was more important in that respect than physical signs of dis-
order (see the ‘broken windows’ theory; endnote 3, Chapter 4). Following surveys
and interviews in a total of twenty-three cities across the nation, the authors con-
cluded that a combination of physical and situational crime prevention strategies
should be employed to decrease crime and the fear of crime in commercial areas.
These included more dense development with increased housing and mixed-use
projects, the hosting of downtown special events to draw people and activity and
the increased use of police foot patrols (Citizens Crime Commission of New York
City, 1985). There is no evaluation as to the impact of these recommendations –
some adapted directly from Jacobs and Newman – on any commercial areas.
Indeed, as we have stated, such evaluations are rare in the United States. There is,
however, a growing body of research from Britain on mixed-use neighbourhoods
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and crime (Poyner and Webb, 1991; Pettersson, 1997); most show that a
complex series of micro-factors such as neighbourhood design, the specific mix of
land uses, and local policing style can have an impact on the fear of crime and
actual crime rates in such districts. Some of the findings are inconsistent with the
ideology of the ‘New Urbanists’ and ‘eyes on the street’ adherents, noting that
mixed uses may in fact promote more crime insofar as ‘the greater level of activity;
more people (especially tourists unfamiliar with the area) increases the potential for
street crime’, even though those living in some mixed-use neighbourhoods tend to
feel safer than those living in other urban districts (Pettersson, 1997, page 195).
One of the few American evaluations of place-based crime prevention inter-
ventions in a commercial area was a re-evaluation of the impact of a CPTED pro-
gramme in a declining commercial neighbourhood in Portland, Oregon. This 1981
study, sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, assessed the use of
increased access control, surveillance, and security advisors for local businesses;
it found that commercial burglaries were reduced following CPTED interventions
and that there was a ‘stabilisation’ in the neighbourhoods’ quality of life, physical
appearance and social cohesion among the business community. Of all the
CPTED strategies – increased street lighting, security surveys and the use of
security advisors – the report credits the use of security advisors and the sub-
sequent mobilisation of the business owners and managers as the most effective
interventions. It concluded that:
(1) a realistic timetable should be established for CPTED projects;
(2) changes in the social environment are more difficult to accomplish than
physical changes;
(3) changes involving a smaller number of agencies and special interests are
more likely to be implemented than large-scale changes, and
(4) a successful CPTED program generally depends on augmenting existing
resources (Kushmuk and Whittemore, 1981).
Perceived and real crime problems associated with downtown commercial
areas combined with burgeoning road development to the hinterlands, insufficient
parking, and the high costs of urban land and construction, have helped push com-
mercial activities from the urban core to the urban fringe, and ultimately to the strip
commercial development and to large scale suburban shopping centres which are
spread over the American landscape.4 The not unexpected irony is that crime has
followed these commercial developments to the suburbs.
From modest beginnings in the Southdale Shopping Mall outside of Min-
neapolis in 1955, enclosed shopping centres (which account for about 65 per
cent of all malls) have grown to become multi-million square foot behemoths
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featuring almost every form of modern service and entertainment imaginable. It was
not until 1993, when the National Shopping Center Security Survey was con-
ducted, that anyone had an inkling of the dimensions of the crime problem in shop-
ping centres and malls in the United States (Hollinger and Dabney, 1998). Until
that time, there was no extant database that compiled information about shopping
centre crimes or their associated security services. The Survey, sponsored by an
industry magazine, sought to provide crime information to centre managers,
owners and store tenants. The 350 shopping centre respondents revealed that
shoplifting was by far the most prevalent crime they had to deal with, followed by
disorderly conduct and then by a combined category of trespassing, vagrancy, and
begging. Part I crimes such as rape and homicides were far down the list. Unfortu-
nately, the Survey did not provide much information about crime prevention
approaches.
Despite their growing dominance of the American commercial scene, there
are no independent, reasonably comprehensive case studies in the literature of
before and after place-based crime prevention applications in shopping malls.
There are, rather, studies of theft of cars from shopping centre parking lots
(Hollinger and Dabney, 1999), theoretical examinations of environmental criminol-
ogy and shopping centres (Brantingham et al., 1990), and shopping malls as pre-
dictors in the ecological distribution of crime (LaGrange, 1999). This paucity of
evidence is due, no doubt, to the complexity of the subject matter, to the intimidat-
ing array of intervening variables presented by the environment and most of all, we
suspect, to the proprietary and hence generally secretive nature of the shopping
centre industry relative to the release of crime data and security responses.
We do have one small-scale case study of a CPTED intervention in a strip
shopping mall, the Council Ring Plaza, a neighbourhood commercial centre
located in Ontario, Canada. Documented by Peel Regional Police Officer Tom
McKay (1997), this study considers the effects of physical changes made to a
problematic waste-space adjacent to the shopping mall and the resultant impact
on crime. Strip malls are inherently problematical: longitudinal design makes them
more vulnerable to crime than other types of shopping areas since their orientation
to the street makes casual surveillance relatively difficult. It is even more problem-
atic when they are located along higher speed roadways, as many are. Moreover,
they are designed for easy vehicular access and egress, factors which facilitate
escape.
According to McKay, during 1991–1992, the Council Ring mall had experi-
enced ten burglaries and one sexual assault, with many more unreported incidents.
The police performed a CPTED survey of the area that identified the southern
portion of the property – leftover space – as a significant problem. While adjacent
to the mall, it was isolated and visually disconnected from it and from the street,
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and had become a favourite place for vagrants. The police response was to recom-
mend that the area be opened up visually (a wall and slats were removed from a
privacy fence) to the street and to passers-by. In addition, the waste space was
made physically uncomfortable for vagrants through the removal of landscaping
and the substitution of a concrete deck that further threw open the area to passing
surveillance.
The results, according to police, were a reduction in loitering and vandalism
and, during the 5 years since the changes, a 92 per cent reduction in break-ins
and declines in assaults, sexual assaults, robberies, thefts and other crimes as well.
As with so many other crime prevention case studies, this is not a scientific evalu-
ation but rather an impressionistic one, and the total number of crimes is so small
(eleven) that the percentage reduction, while dramatic, is statistically questionable.
Further, there is no discussion of alternative explanations for the crime decrease,
there are no adjacent area crime rates compared and there are no control groups.
Nevertheless, the results are in line with other empirically based reports in the liter-
ature that support increased surveillance and the removal of ‘facilitators’ as means
of preventing crime (Clarke, 1997). It is clear that further research needs to be
devoted to commercial land uses, insofar as they are significant targets of criminals
and often present opportunities that, while difficult for them to pass up, may be
thwarted by rather rudimentary assessment and design changes.
Industrial Land Uses
In the United States, industrial land use districts are generally divided into two
types: light manufacturing and heavy manufacturing, which are distinguished by the
relative amount of noxious emissions, noise, vibration, odours and dust emitted
from each. Other sub-classifications may also be established for special purpose
districts, based on community needs and ordinances. According to Leary (1968),
industrial zones were once considered ‘catch-all’ districts, such that other land
uses that could not otherwise be zoned were dumped into that category. Over
time, communities have come to recognise the value of industrial zones and they
have become increasingly popular as venues for industrial parks, which aggregate
generally similar types of manufacturing firms under centralised management.
In describing the use of CPTED and situational crime prevention measures in
two California industrial parks, Peiser and Chang (1998) note that research on
crimes in industrial parks is scarce. Despite that, they are significant crime targets
since, like many downtown urban commercial centres in the United States,
they contain valuable assets but are likely to be deserted at night and on week-
ends. Moreover, industrial parks are commonly located adjacent to low-income
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residential areas with high crime rates and are inviting foci for criminal activity,
especially perpetrated by juveniles.
Such was the case with a 20-acre site, the Cerritos Business Park, located
between Los Angeles and Long Beach, California. According to Peiser and Chang,
the Park was plagued by automobile thefts and break-ins, break-ins of warehouses
and buildings, and thefts from buildings, vandalism and graffiti. Crime prevention
responses centred around access control and reducing escape routes (perimeter
fencing and fencing between building), improved signage (‘for lease’ signs that
advertised that buildings were vacant were removed), target hardening (installation
of retractable window bars), improved lighting, CCTV surveillance, and night-time
security patrols. To reduce the problem of teenage loitering, the managers turned
on lawn sprinkling systems periodically throughout the day.5
After the changes were implemented, Peiser and Chang report that break-ins
were drastically reduced (from every weekend to one every 2 months), as were
reports of vandalism and graffiti. Moreover, the Park’s occupancy rate jumped from
a low in 1995 of 75 per cent to 98 per cent in 1996. According to Park manage-
ment, costs of the improved security measures were far outweighed by income
from increased rents, higher occupancy rates, and shorter vacancy periods for indi-
vidual buildings, all credited to the security improvements (Peiser and Chang,
1998).
Peiser and Chang also discuss the Paramount Industrial Complex, an indus-
trial park located in the City of Paramount, California. Located adjacent to a high-
crime community, the park experienced a high incidence of auto theft and a series
of burglaries accompanied by vehicles’ ‘ram-raiding’ roll-shutter doors in loading
areas. This latter ‘smash and grab’ technique appears to be more common in
Britain than in the United States, although there is no comparative data to support
that impression.
Situational and CPTED crime prevention measures for the Park included
increasing guardianship (random night and day patrols instituted), target hardening
(removable bollards installed in front of loading docks), surveillance facilitation
(improved and better maintained exterior lighting) and improved access control
(fencing between buildings). Peiser and Chang report that these interventions
‘have been effective’ but unfortunately give no further details as to crime statistics
or related impacts.
The Cerritos and Paramount cases share design similarities. Prior to interven-
tions, they were both highly permeable, car-oriented suburban sites containing a
myriad of isolated interior spaces, such as loading docks, that were prime crime
attractions. Both are located in generally suburban areas, adjacent to relatively low-
income residential neighbourhoods, a problem inasmuch as these contributed
motivated offenders as distinct from ‘eyes on the street’ surveillance.
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While we do not have enough information from the case reports to know, we
can speculate that these parks are likely similar to many others in the United States
and Canada in that they have limited public transportation options and that previ-
ous to the application of the place-based crime prevention measures, little thought
was given to the security of shift workers, who come and go at odd hours of the
day and night. These issues have been addressed by a number of prescriptive
studies (as distinct from cases), including Wekerle and Whitzman’s Safe Cities
(1995), one of the most comprehensive public-service texts published to date.
While they speak to many of the same remedies for industrial zones suggested by
the case analyses above – lighting, surveillance, and access controls – they focus
much more on protecting the workers and clients (as distinct from the property)
and look to the nature of changing land uses within industrial zones, especially in
urban industrial areas. Wekerle and Whitzman address the problem of ‘gentrifying’
industrial areas where residential and commercial conversions have turned shop
and storage spaces into ‘boutiques or restaurants, or into loft living spaces’ (1995,
page 107). The book’s grasp of the fluid nature of urban zones and neighbour-
hoods, and its focus on the needs of residents (especially women), are important
contributions to the discussion of planning for crime prevention.
Like commercial land uses, it is clear that there are insufficient empirical
studies of place-based applications to make sweeping statements about industrial
land uses or about specialised subcategories within them, such as industrial parks.
Rather, what is more productive and logical, at this stage in the development of the
science and art of place-based crime prevention, is the tailoring of interventions
to each case which, while unique, nevertheless tends to present problems found
elsewhere in terms of surveillance, access control, maintenance and activity
support/generation.
Transportation Land Uses: Bus Stops
Our final illustration is less an example of a crime prevention intervention than a
carefully drawn empirical study of a transportation land use subcategory that has
largely been overlooked in the literature: urban bus stops. The ‘transportation’ cat-
egory, with a focus on terminals (e.g. the BART system in San Francisco) was con-
sidered for inclusion in the original Westinghouse Studies of the 1970s but was
dropped because the study designers believed that defensible space principles
such as ‘territoriality’ would not be much applicable to such ‘transient places’.
However, a recent study of Los Angeles bus stops using updated models of place-
based crime prevention strategies puts that notion to rest – although it focuses
less on territoriality and more on ‘aggregate’ environmental features – and seeks to
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demonstrate the potential applicability of place-based crime prevention principles
in urban ‘micro-environments’ (Loukaitou-Sideris, 1999). As such, the study sets
out a host of ‘environmental responses’ – suggestions rooted in empirically based
research – to guide transportation and land use planners in their decisions on
where to locate urban bus stops.
After a careful review of the extant literature on place-based crime prevention
planning, Loukaitou-Sideris concludes that there are sufficient theoretical and
empirical bases to analyse bus stop crime patterns using environmental planning
variables as independent variables, and employs a ‘qualitative and ethnographic’
approach as distinct from one that is ‘quantitative and cross sectional’ (ibid., page
398). To carry that forward, she analysed the environmental attributes of ten high-
crime bus stops in Los Angeles and compared these to four low-crime bus stops
that are located reasonably nearby. Bus stops were chosen for study since in Los
Angeles they account for a disproportionate amount of bus system crime (67 per
cent compared to 33 per cent of crimes reported while riding buses), are important
places for many low-income citizens who have limited transportation options, and
are the focus of a significant level of perceived crime and fear for bus riders,
particularly in the Los Angeles inner city.
Moreover, as nodes within the urban transportation system that forms the
skeleton against which all urban elements, including buildings and landscape, are
framed, bus stops are important gathering and dispersal places – pulse points –
for large numbers of urban citizens. They are numerous in large cities (Los Angeles
has almost 20,000), and their locations are highly correlated with the growth and
shifting of populations. In that context, they obviously are far easier and less expen-
sive to move and to alter than to move or redesign train stops or train and aero-
plane terminals. Indeed, in some jurisdictions, notably smaller urban areas, bus
stops are left to the discretion of the driver, ensuring that the system will be
tailored to rider needs.
In Los Angeles, bus stop locations generally are fixed and the author concen-
trated her research on those stops in the inner city area that accounted for a high
proportion of the total number of bus stop crimes (18 per cent) over a two-year
period, 1994–1995. She analysed the immediate surroundings (the micro-
environment) of each bus stop using structured observations, systematic mapping
techniques, interviews and systematic random surveys of passengers. The environ-
ments of four adjacent low-crime rate bus stops were also carefully examined and
compared as paired sets with four of the high-crime sample.
Although this research could be criticised for the small sample size, the find-
ings are nevertheless pointed: Loukaitou-Sideris notes significant environmental
differences, characterised in five categories of features, between the high and low-
crime rate bus stops that account for the differences in crime. The feature cat-
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egories are ‘bad neighbours’ (which includes ‘negative land uses that can be con-
sidered crime generators’, such as bars, liquor stores, single room occupancy
hotels, vacant buildings and surface parking lots), ‘desolation and lack of surveil-
lance’, ‘crowding’, ‘broken windows’, and ‘easy escapes’ (ibid., pages 401–4).
These factors are by and large familiar to students of place-based crime prevention
theory. One, crowding, usually receives more attention now in this literature as it is
related to pick-pocketing and to spaces between shoppers and thefts from bags
(Poyner and Webb, 1992) than it has relative to crime generation. Early in the
history of CPTED and defensible space theory, Angel’s research (1968) predicted
that certain levels of street activity and population density were linked to the likeli-
hood of crime occurrence. In this concept, a critical crime zone was one that could
support a relatively low number of people but of sufficient density to contain both
targets and perpetrators. Loukaitou-Sideris adds to Angel’s theory by postulating a
second level of population density, one large enough to mask less serious crimes
such as pick-pocketing within crowds.6
Her research concludes that environmental variables play a significant role in
crime at bus stops in Los Angeles, in that deteriorated surrounding structures and
uses or ones that attract or facilitate crime (‘bad neighbours’) characterise the
most dangerous bus stops. Further, those stops which are isolated or do not lend
themselves easily to nearby surveillance, and especially those that have easily
accessible escape routes, are more prone to crime than nearby stops that do not
have those environmental features. Stops that have high density usage – and
hence become crowded to the point where relatively minor crime such as purse
snatching can be concealed in the confusion – are more likely to be venues for this
type of crime than stops with less usage. And, finally, the high-crime stops were far
more likely to have ‘broken windows’ attributes than low-crime bus stops.
Loukaitou-Sideris’ research leads her to a series of suggestions that could be
the basis of a ‘best bus stop practices’ siting manual. In line with what is preached
by most crime prevention advocates, she emphasises that crime control cannot be
left entirely to the police but that it requires a coordinated approach among agen-
cies and citizenry. According to her research, safer bus stop siting must take into
account surrounding land uses, avoiding where possible areas containing crime
generators and crime attractions such as bars, liquor stores, pawn shops and adult
theatres. Further, siting should be attentive to the signs of public incivility that dis-
tinguish areas that are cared for as distinct from those that are not. And in line with
other evidence about the importance of convenience store locations (Leistner,
1999), she suggests that bus stop sites should not isolate riders by placing them
amongst ‘dead spaces’ where surveillance opportunities from nearby businesses
or activities are minimal, since serious crimes were found to take place at bus
stops in desolate areas. In the opposite situation, crowded bus stops can facilitate
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less serious offences, and Loukaitou-Sideris endorses sidewalk design alterations
(‘nubs’ that broaden sidewalks) to lessen crowding at high-use stops and the use
of barriers to shield bus patrons from pedestrians in these circumstances. Ade-
quate lighting, reducing visual obstructions from man-made and natural features
and the removal of sidewalk space impediments (‘newspapers stands, signs,
poles’) are also proposed as design and maintenance considerations of good bus
stop siting. However, one would have to question whether it is truly in the interest
of bus patrons to do away with newspaper stands and signs in all but the most
congested situations.
Finally, Loukaitou-Sideris reports tangential evidence that increased levels of
criminal activity are associated with grid street design (as distinct from culs-de-sac)
insofar as these provide a myriad of escape routes to fleeing offenders. Noting that
the higher-crime bus stops in her study tended to be located near intersections
and areas with alleys, she suggested that where feasible, escape routes near bus
stops be fenced or barricaded so as to diminish opportunities of offenders to
vanish into the urban fabric.
This study of bus stop design and siting is valuable inasmuch as it focuses
on micro environments spread throughout the urban landscape, in contrast with
the relatively large-scale sites (neighbourhoods, shopping centres and strip malls,
industrial parks) that we have presented heretofore. As such, it clearly demon-
strates that place-based crime prevention interventions and research can be
applied across a spectrum of urban sites and scales and within a range of land
uses.
Conclusions
This latter point is crucial, for if place-based crime prevention theory is to be mean-
ingful to the urban planner, police official, building and zoning officer, architect,
developer and property owner and, not least, to the person on the street, it must
translate into clearly effective applications within the land uses and experiences
each come into contact with in the course of daily living and work. But, as we have
seen, while there is a growing body of knowledge based on residential – primarily
public housing – applications, there is relatively little case or project evidence to
support the diffusion of applications based on these approaches within other land
use categories. For example, much of what we know about the application of
place-based crime prevention in commercial areas as noted in the Ring Plaza
study, in office parks as demonstrated by the Cerritos and Paramount cases or at
Los Angeles bus stops is imported from empirical studies in other areas. While this
may be adequate for many purposes, there is no doubt that each land use type
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presents unique problems and possibilities, as does each individual site within land
uses. There is the need for a systematically constructed casebook of place-based
crime prevention studies within and for specific urban land use categories, some-
thing which may be far in the future. This is all the more relevant, we believe, in a
society like the United States whose fragmented governmental structure makes it
difficult to discern the emergence of clear-cut policy and trends.
This being the case, there are nevertheless some fundamental themes that
are becoming evident within particular land use categories. One, demonstrated by
the Harbordale study and supported by reports from throughout the literature, such
as Wekerle and Whitzman’s ‘Safer Cities’ work in Canada, is that outsiders cannot
assume what is important to residents in making place-based crime prevention
design changes. For instance, to Harbordale residents, the untamed mangrove
swamp common space running through the heart of the neighbourhood presented
a physical, psychological and political barrier that was underestimated or unrecog-
nised for years by local and state government agencies. On the other hand, too
much value has been ascribed by outsiders to the provision of common open
spaces in many public housing complexes, much to the chagrin of residents who
often fear and avoid such spaces. The lesson is that truly safer communities and
improved qualities of life must be designed for specific places with the vision of
residents clearly in focus, otherwise even the best laid plans will, as they say, go
astray. Our expectation is that such conclusions can be applied to other land uses
and activity generators within the urban fabric.
However, it is wise and prudent to resist the temptation to dictate to others
what we think is preferable and to stretch the implications of the available studies
beyond the boundaries of the available evidence – which is often difficult for con-
sultants, professors and local officials to resist. But to do so is to raise expecta-
tions among citizens that may be dashed and that ultimately discredit place-based
crime prevention theory as well as those who would preach and apply it to urban
settings.
Notes
1 Sherman et al. (1997, page 3) note that ‘many evaluations funded by the Federal
Government – perhaps the majority – are ‘‘process’’ evaluations describing what was
done rather than ‘‘impact’’ evaluations assessing what effect the program had on crime
. . . Evaluations containing both process and impact measures provide the most informa-
tion but they are rarely funded or reported.’
2 We are indebted to Susan and Stephanie Ajoc, planners for the City of St Petersburg,
who provided information on Harbordale and access to neighbours and local police for
interviews.
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3 As described in endnote 8, Chapter 5, the UCR (Uniform Crime Reports) consists of so-
called ‘index crimes’ that identify the most serious violent and property crimes in order of
their presumed seriousness. They consist of murder and non-negligent manslaughter,
forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor-vehicle
theft, and arson. The UCR is derived from crimes reported to the police, and then
reported to the Program Support Section of the FBI. Index crimes are used to compare
crime rates nationally and across jurisdictions.
4 Citing Jacobs (1961), both new urbanist ideologues and CPTED advocates argue that
the development of commercial districts separated from residential zones has con-
tributed to the decline of the American city as a vibrant and exciting place and to the
growth of crime as such districts are deserted for many hours of the day. Although they
are compelling arguments, the empirical evidence to support both theses is mixed at
best.
5 Some convenience store managers have addressed this problem by playing ‘MUSAK’ in
their parking lots.
6 It should be clear that ‘crowding’ is a psychological and cultural notion distinct from
population density, which is strictly a physical phenomenon. Crowding has also been
the subject of numerous comparisons between aggressive and pathological behaviour in
animal and human populations, many of which are discredited (de Waal et al., 2000).
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CHAPTER 7
BRITISH POLICY AND PRACTICE
Introduction
This chapter looks at how policy and practice in relation to crime and the design of
the built environment have evolved in recent years. Britain is distinguished from the
USA in these terms (the subject of Chapter 5) by several factors, but one of the
most significant is the existence in Britain, particularly during the 1990s, of a
strong central government policy thrust in this area, framing and hopefully comple-
menting initiatives at the local level. This chapter therefore has this component
running through it as a consistent thread, while Chapter 8 has a more local focus
as it looks in much more detail at three case studies of particular types of initi-
atives.
One potential consequence of the stance adopted for the purposes of this
chapter is that it can create the impression that the British experience is charac-
terised primarily by uniformity.1 In comparison with the American experience which
has been described in Chapters 5 and 6, it is undoubtedly true that a primary dis-
tinguishing feature of the British approach in recent years has been both a strong
central government policy thrust and the creation through legislation of a common
framework within which most of the local work in this field is expected to take
place; thus in a book of this nature it is both appropriate and necessary for a
chapter with the title ‘British Policy and Practice’ to concentrate largely on this
superstructure. However, this should not be taken as implying that the British
system is lacking in diversity or in the willingness to experiment at the local level.
The differences that exist in British society, not only between its urban and rural
areas and its economically well favoured and less favoured regions but also in
terms of the very segmented nature of many of its urban areas, in which neighbour-
hoods characterised by relative poverty frequently sit alongside those marked by
relative affluence, inevitably mean that there is both a need and an opportunity to
respond in different ways to crime prevention issues. It would grossly misrepresent
the efforts of large numbers of people in these localities to imply that all they do is
sit and wait for Government directives before taking action in this field. There is,
therefore, a very considerable variety of initiatives to be found both throughout
Britain as we have defined it for these purposes (and indeed throughout the length
and breadth of the United Kingdom), to which it would be impossible to do full
justice without the kind of detailed survey information that is not at present to hand.
Nevertheless, the existence of a strong Central Government policy thrust in recent
years is the primary distinguishing characteristic of the British system, which is why
it is the focus of this chapter. This in turn also affects the three case studies
chosen as the focus of Chapter 8, since they all derive from component elements
of this Central drive: the police Secured By Design initiative, the arrangements set
in train as a result of the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998, and an example of how
crime prevention initiatives relate to urban regeneration issues.
The chapter commences with an overview of the public perceptions of crime
and the fear of crime as a pair of closely related quality-of-life issues. It then exam-
ines the place of environmental design alongside other policy responses to crime,
and looks in more detail at how the police service organises itself to contribute in
this area. The specific emergence of national policy via DoE Circular 5/94 leads
into a wide-ranging discussion of the sustainability, urban regeneration/revitalisa-
tion and social inclusion contexts within which this issue is increasingly viewed in
Britain, including the partnership approach underlined in the Crime and Disorder
Act, 1998. The chapter concludes with some reflections on the current state of
British policy and practice.
Public Perceptions of Crime as a ‘Quality-of-Life’
Issue
The recognition that crime rates in Britain are a major political issue that we noted
in Chapter 2, with the success or otherwise of a Government being at least par-
tially reflected in whether crime rates have gone up or down, is not merely a func-
tion of sensationalist media reporting. Such concerns about crime rates and the
fear of crime are often also reflected in the results of the studies that have been
undertaken which ask people about their perceptions of the factors that affect the
quality of life in the areas where they live. Indeed, these two phenomena (the sense
that this matters to the national political tussle, and the recognition that it does
matter locally) may well be mutually reinforcing.
A major study of this issue was undertaken in the early 1990s by Robson et
al. (1994), as part of an appraisal of the effectiveness of initiatives undertaken to
date under the broad heading of ‘urban policy’. This study asked 1,299 residents in
fifteen different areas of Greater Manchester, Merseyside and Tyne and Wear to
rank twenty variables they were given in terms of their importance to the quality of
life in the area. The results are summarised in Table 7.1. This shows that, by quite
some distance, violent crime was the issue of most concern to local residents, and
that non-violent crime, ranked fourth highest in the list, was ahead of issues such
as the quality of housing, the quality of the local environment and unemployment.
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The same sample was also asked about perceptions of safety in their residential
areas, both over the last three years and in terms of their expectations over the next
three years, and the results are summarised in Table 7.2. This shows that about half
of that sample felt that their area had become less safe during the previous three
years, and only just over one-quarter expected to see any improvement over the next
three years. This latter result could be seen as the triumph of hope over experience,
since twice as many people thought their area would become safer over the next
three years than thought it had become safer over the past three years.
Similar pictures have emerged from more local studies. For example, a docu-
ment which tells in promotional terms the story of the Nottingham City Challenge
programme over the period 1992–1997 describes the issues as follows, under the
banner headline of ‘Winning the Fight against Crime’:
In the past, St. Ann’s in particular has hit the national press headlines as one of
the most crime ridden areas in the country, with the perception that it is literally
crawling with drug dealers and those perpetrating motor crime. Yes, it is a tough
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Table 7.1 Public perceptions of factors affecting the quality of life in major urban areas
Variable Percentage of sample ranking Rank
variable as ‘very important’ order
Violent crime 79.3 1
Quality of healthcare 73.7 2
Cost of living 71.9 3
Non-violent crime 67.2 4
Quality of housing 64.2 5
Quality of welfare services 61.7 6
What the area looks like 61.3 7
Employment prospects 59.2 8
Pollution 58.2 9
Unemployment levels 58.0 10
Source: Robson et al. (1994) page 340
Table 7.2 Public perceptions of safety in major urban areas
Category Do you think your area has Do you expect your area to 
become safer over the last become safer over the next 
three years? three years?
Safer 14% 28%
The same 37% 37%
Less safe 49% 35%
Source: Robson et al. (1994) page 342
area and it was realised that the network of alleys and cul-de-sacs [sic] provided
havens for the small minority intent on car stealing, domestic theft and violent
crime.
Crime, and the fear of crime continued to be the number one priority of
local residents throughout the programme – and has indeed, continued to do so.
A reduction of 7.5% in crime overall has been achieved through partnership
with the police, city council, residents and business; this reduction is a
significant achievement and compares very favourably with the city and national
crime figures.
A survey of residents’ views of crime in the City Challenge area carried
out in 1995 back[s] up the statistics, revealing that people perceived that there
was less crime in the area than they did in 1993 when they were originally
asked.
Challenge implemented a radical programme of security improvements
to the St. Ann’s Estate; closing off unwanted footpaths, creating parking spaces
next to homes, providing safe walking routes for residents with good lighting
and eradicating hidden areas, installing thousands of new toughened doors,
fitting locks and bolts to windows and doors and spending over £3m on
improvements to these (Nottingham City Council, undated, page 5).
Similarly, the final review of the Dearne Valley City Challenge programme in South
Yorkshire over the 1992–1997 period (the same Government Programme over the
same period as the Nottingham example quoted above), written in rather less pro-
motional terms than was the Nottingham example, says the following:
Following the ‘Priority Search’ survey carried out at the beginning of City
Challenge and subsequently used as a working document, year 5 saw a MORI
poll return to the concerns of the local residents. ‘Better crime prevention and
Safety on the Streets’ was now seen as the highest priority. City Challenge
funding has continued to reinforce the security and safety message via the
security grant scheme. Open to application from community groups and small
businesses in the area, it has been able to directly target this issue.
Assistance to small retail outlets to provide CCTV, support to
Neighbourhood Watch Schemes which promote crime prevention and reduce
the fear of crime and securing the premises of local groups are some of the
initiatives supported by the community programme. The victims of crime have
not been forgotten. Our support of the Dearne Valley Victim Support scheme
has been instrumental in ensuring its long term future and it continues to be a
help and benefit to people in the area when they most need it (Dearne Valley
Partnership, 1996, Strategic Objective 4).
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The important point about both of these City Challenge examples, which were con-
centrated five-year programmes tackling some of the worst problems of urban
deprivation in the country, is that in both cases when asked the local residents indi-
cated that crime and safety were their number one concerns. This example, which
is wholly consistent with the results of the Robson study quoted above, could be
repeated several times over in terms of recent studies in British urban areas,2 and it
is clear (as was the case in the Nottingham and Dearne Valley instances) that find-
ings of this nature have influenced the contents of major public intervention pro-
grammes undertaken in those areas. It is also clear from the quoted descriptions of
what was done in these two cases that the actions taken included a considerable
amount of ‘target-hardening’,3 in large measure in response to public concerns. If
the planning process is to be seen to be successful in tackling the problems that
are extant in these sorts of urban areas, it is clear from this evidence that it will
need to address this type of agenda; it is part of our thesis that to date it has done
this too little and too ineffectively.
The 2000 British Crime Survey returned to the broad issue of public attitudes
towards crime and the fear of crime under the heading ‘Concern about crime’ (Home
Office, 2000b, pages 41–54). The headline findings from this work were as follows:
• 33% of respondents felt that crime had increased nationally ‘a lot more’ over
the previous two years and a further 34% felt that it had increased ‘a little
more’, although in fact on British Crime Survey counts crime levels had been
reducing over that period.
• Perceptions of crime rates in people’s own localities were a little more posit-
ive, with the figures for ‘a lot more’ being 20% and for ‘a little more’ being
30%.
• When asked about whether they thought they were likely to be on the receiv-
ing end of crimes over the next year, car-related crimes were well ahead of
other types of crime, with 33% of car owners saying they were ‘very’ or ‘fairly’
likely to experience theft from their car and with the equivalent figure for theft
of their car itself being 29%. Responses generally tended to be well-ahead of
‘actual’ rates, with (for example) 21% of households saying they were ‘very’
or ‘fairly’ likely to be on the receiving end of a burglary as compared with an
actual burglary rate of 4.3% of households in 1999.
• When asked the more general question about whether people were ‘worried’
about crime (as distinct from whether they expected as individuals to be on
its receiving end), the top six areas of concern when adding together ‘very
worried’ and ‘fairly worried’ responses were:
1 = burglary 57%
1 = theft of cars (owners) 57%
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3. theft from cars (owners) 53%
4. credit/bank card fraud 50%
5. mugging/robbery 44%
6. physical attack 43%
This provides very clear evidence from a recent national study that the major public
concerns about crime recorded in the more locally based surveys undertaken
earlier in the 1990s and reported above are continuing.
The Place of Environmental Design in Responses
to Crime
It is important, of course, to keep this matter in perspective: in no sense is it being
suggested here, nor could it be said to be a feature of the policies being promoted
by successive British Governments, that by itself environmental design can solve
the problem of crime in localities. Essentially, environmental initiatives need to be
seen as one of a suite of measures addressing this problem in a comprehensive
way. Walklate (in McLaughlin and Muncie, 1996, pages 293–331), in summarising
current British thinking in the early/mid 1990s, describes four inter-related themes
as being visible in crime prevention policy:
• offender-centred strategies, which tend to be about enforcement and punish-
ment and which would be regarded as the traditional major concerns of the
system;
• victim-centred strategies, which tend to be about how to avoid the major
problems in the field of crime, but are also about improving victim support
once crime has taken place;
• environment-centred strategies, also described by Clarke and Mayhew
(1980) as ‘situational crime prevention’. This component is, of course,
the primary focus of this present book. It spans a broad spectrum of activ-
ities, including both ‘target-hardening’ approaches, which both make indi-
vidual potential crime scenes more difficult for criminals to access and to
escape from and which increase surveillance of them (see for example
Bottoms, 1990), and the approaches of ‘New Urbanism’ which seek to
reduce crime by promoting environmental design approaches; these stimu-
late human activity on streets, in buildings and in and overlooking public
spaces and thereby increase natural surveillance (see, for example, Rudlin
and Falk, 1999).
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• community-centred strategies, which raise many definitional and social policy
issues but which are essentially about involving local communities directly or
indirectly in various ways in crime prevention activities. This sort of broad
‘community safety’ approach is argued for (see, for example, Osborn and
Bright, 1989) on the grounds that it focuses on the role of other public
authorities and organisations as well as the police; that it addresses the
particular needs of groups that are most vulnerable to crime; that it considers
the relationship between levels of crime and the facilities, services and
opportunities of particular neighbourhoods; and that it tries to divert young
people from offending in the first place and young offenders from further
offending. The approach found expression in the Home Office’s Safer Cities
Programme launched in 1988, with sixteen cities initially being chosen to
participate and with a wide range of strategies being visible (see Walklate in
McLaughlin and Muncie, 1996, pages 317–20 for a useful general
summary).
Tilley (1992, page 29) argues that the initiatives taken here can be seen not only in
physical and in social terms, but also in terms of three levels of intervention: the
conduct of new dedicated initiatives, incorporation into new and potentially rele-
vant initiatives, and the re-examination of existing patterns of practice. The wide-
ranging nature of the social interventions at this third level of intervention was seen
by Tilley as providing the greatest scope for the police to begin to threaten the
strategies of other agencies rather than to concentrate primarily on their own
responsibilities. While this can be seen to be widening the agenda without always
sharpening the focus, it can also be seen as a precursor to some of the more holis-
tic approaches embarked upon later in the 1990s which we discuss later in this
chapter. It should be noted, incidentally, that although this sort of approach has
been seen as having potential by many writers, it has also been criticised for its
lack of clarity and for the fact that its advocates are promoting its virtues before
much firm evidence from carefully researched cases has become available
(Hughes, in Jewson and MacGregor, 1997, pages 153–65). More recently, Gilling
(1999) has added to this a concern about whose values are actually driving
community safety debates, and has expressed doubts about whether much of what
is being done in Britain is helping to tackle the problems of social exclusion as dis-
tinct from, in effect, reinforcing them.
This apparent broadening of the range of types of crime-prevention initiatives
in response to the problem of rising crime levels does not mean that traditional atti-
tudes to the roles of the police and of the criminal justice system have necessarily
been supplanted. Locke (1990, pages 245 and 246) described this development
in thinking in the late 1980s as follows:
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Strategic thinking seems to have moved away from being satisfied only with
controlling crime, towards an albeit tentative confidence that crime can in fact
be reduced. The machinery of criminal justice policy is still dominated largely by
lawyers, with their traditionally myopic visions of how to respond to crime. This
domination has been increasingly challenged by magistrates, probation officers,
voluntary organisations, police officers and by those in local government. The
view that the criminal justice system alone cannot effectively respond to crime
has by no means been displaced. . . . What has been added to current thinking is
a clearer idea of what needs to complement the workings of the criminal justice
system – crime prevention, diversions and community based measures.
Critics of police operations have undoubtedly added to this debate by arguing that
in some localities police approaches can contribute more to the problem than they
do to the solution. Lea and Young (1993, but first published in 1984), for example,
argue that police practice in the large cities has often tacitly divided those cities
into ‘respectable’ and ‘non-respectable’ parts, resulting in two different styles of
policing: ‘one in the inner city based on force and coercion, the other in the
suburbs and the smart part of town based upon consensus’ (ibid., page 65). They
argue that it is little surprise that the former style, which they describe as ‘military
policing’, is reacted to in very negative ways by many of the residents of inner city
areas whereas the latter style, which they describe as ‘consensus policing’, gener-
ates a much more positive response.
This ferment of ideas appears to include an acceptance of the broad notion
that environmental initiatives have a part to play in crime prevention, but it is clearly
only a part (and a contested one at that, in terms of what works where) in a broad
field containing many contested elements. The broad position in Britain by the late
1990s, as it prepared itself for a new round of partnership initiatives required by
the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998 (see below), can be summarised by reference to
the contents of the manual prepared to support this initiative (Crime Concern,
undated). This argued that approaches needed to be tailored to the local situation,
but that in particular the problems of the approximately 2,000 residential neigh-
bourhoods in the United Kingdom exhibiting the following characteristics required
special attention:
• crime rates three to four times higher than surrounding areas;
• high levels of repeat victimisation;
• above-average rates of disorder and anti-social behaviour by young people;
• high incidence of neighbourhood disputes and anti-social behaviour by
adults;
• widespread drug dealing and prostitution. (ibid., page 3)
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In such areas, crime was seen as being likely to be one of many problems albeit, as
we have already seen, one that local residents are likely to put very high up their
lists of problems needing to be tackled. The other common features were seen as:
• high levels of poverty and deprivation, with up to 60 per cent of families
dependent on state benefits;
• high unemployment rates, often spanning generations and including up to 35
per cent of young men;
• a shifting population, with annual turnover at 20 per cent or more;
• above average proportions of lone-parent households (20 per cent or more)
and of children under 16 (30 per cent or more);
• run down, defective and unattractive housing stock, some of which goes
unfilled for long periods;
• physical dereliction such as graffiti, abandoned cars and boarded-up shops;
• a struggling local economy;
• few play and leisure facilities;
• physical isolation (ibid.).
Within an holistic approach to tackling this range of problems (because the
manual accepts that attempting to tackle crime in areas such as this as if it
were a free-standing issue would not be likely to succeed), the recom-
mended approach is that:
. . . successful crime reduction depends on:
• effective local partnerships involving the police, local authorities, the 
community and other key agencies;
• consulting, motivating and involving residents and young people as an 
integral part of their work;
• a problem-solving approach based on sound information, analysing the 
problems clinically and listening to the experience of local people;
• tailor-made packages of measures: single steps are rarely enough to reduce 
crime, criminality and fear of crime. At most they are ‘fire-fighting’ exercises
to contain the problem. What is needed is an across-the-board approach
which may include not only security, policing and surveillance initiatives but
also improved housing management, family support programmes and good
youth facilities (ibid., page 5).
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The Role of the Police Service in Environmental
Design
Part of the changing nature of the responses described above has been an accep-
tance on the part of the police service that since environmental design is one of the
elements that impacts upon crime and crime prevention, and has very practical
implications for police operations, it would be helpful from a police perspective to
try to influence decisions about the layout and organisation of physical space. This
has resulted in the establishment in virtually all of Britain’s police forces of Archi-
tectural Liaison Officers (or equivalent title). Some of these posts are civilian posts,
and sometimes they are serving police officer posts carrying a rank; no doubt
within the police service itself there are arguments about the strengths and weak-
nesses of each approach at a time when ‘civilianisation’ has been an important
issue in policy developments in police forces. Whichever way this is handled in
individual forces, their duties in practice tend to fall into three broad groups:
a ‘spreading the gospel’ to all interested or affected parties;
b liaising with development interests over the design of proposals, helped by the
conferment of a ‘Secured By Design’ award to projects which meet the prin-
ciples expressed. (The award, among other things, has been used as a market-
ing tool by private housing developers.) The ‘Secured By Design’ approach is
the subject of a more detailed case study in Chapter 8 of this book; it should
be noted that, as well as being a significant award in its own right, the guide-
lines laid down in order to secure it illustrate also the kind of advice that Police
Architectural Liaison Officers are likely to give on free-standing cases;
c responding to consultations from local planning authorities at the stage
when planning applications have been received.
Table 7.3 presents a more detailed description of this role in terms of the way in
which it is conceived by the Nottinghamshire Police.
The first of these roles, the task of ‘spreading the gospel’, is well illustrated
by the appearance at the 1996 Town and Country Planning Summer School for
Councillors (which is typically attended by about 300 elected members who are on
the Planning Committees of local planning authorities) of two serving police offi-
cers from two different forces to talk about their work and philosophies (Pearson,
1996; Stokes, 1996). The more senior of these officers summed up the value of
the approach as follows:
Police experience has demonstrated that where the local authorities, the
community and the police operate together, good housekeeping methods can
go a long way towards helping us achieve the desired effect of reducing not
only crime but also the fear of crime (Pearson, 1996, page 81).
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The third of these functions, responding to consultations by local planning authori-
ties on planning applications, is of particular relevance to the subject matter of this
book. It may be helpful, therefore, to try to put a scale against this sort of activity.
Before doing so, however, it is important to understand that such consultations are
not of themselves mandatory. Local planning authorities have been urged to do this
in paragraph 9 of DoE Circular 5/94 (Department of the Environment, 1994) by the
Secretary of State for the Environment as good practice, and since most local
planning authorities are likely to take the general view that such consultations lead
to better informed decision-making there would not usually be any inhibition in
doing this. Nonetheless, this is a matter for the exercise of local discretion; there is
no compulsion behind such consultations.
At the time of the 1993 White Paper on the then Government’s proposals for
the reform of the police service (Home Office, 1993), there were forty-three
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Table 7.3 The Architectural Liaison Officer role in the Nottinghamshire Police
The Crime Prevention Officer and Architectural Liaison Officer roles are combined
in this description of the ‘core duties’ of the three officers who fill these posts in the
‘C’ Division of the Nottinghamshire Police:
• identifying potential solutions for crime ‘hotspots’, highlighted by the monitoring
and analysis of local crime and incident statistics, produced by Local Intelligence
Officers and intelligence inputs;
• assisting in promoting all aspects of crime prevention to both the Police Service
and the public, while maintaining contact with other agencies and community
groups who promote these issues;
• liaison with local authority departments, architects and other agencies, with the
view to ‘Designing out Crime’ by evaluating and reporting upon new
developments and planning applications from a security aspect;
• providing information to members of the local community regarding relevant
prevention advice, in the way of talks, seminars and presentations;
• working with under-represented minority groups in order to encourage and instil
confidence, so that crime is reported and underlying causes of crime are
identified;
• surveying domestic and business premises, where there are special or difficult
security features which need to be considered;
• keeping up to date on crime prevention techniques as produced by the Home
Office Crime Prevention Agency and relevant external organisations, regarding
best practice;
• design, delivery and evaluation of training in the crime prevention arena both
internally and externally;
• carrying out all duties with full regard to the Police policies and procedures.
Source: Nottinghamshire Police website at http://www.nottspolice.org.uk (accessed July 2000)
separate police forces in England and Wales covering an area with a population of
approximately 50 million people. Thus a police force on average covered just over
1 million people. The White Paper, incidentally, claimed that this was too large a
number of police forces, although it was unable to advance any very rational criteria
for reducing the number! Within each of these forces, the Architectural Liaison Unit
typically might consist of a couple of officers plus some administrative support, and
in some forces it is even smaller than this. There is inevitably a limit in this situation
to what such a unit can do, and particularly to how many cases it can pursue
effectively at any one time.
In contrast, there are well over 400 local planning authorities in England and
Wales, or approximately ten times the number of police forces. This ratio, for
example, is repeated exactly in Greater Manchester, where there are ten Metropoli-
tan District Councils covering an area with a population of approximately 2.5 million
people policed by the Greater Manchester Police Force. In any one year, these ten
local planning authorities together will typically deal with around 20,000 planning
applications. Clearly, the Architectural Liaison Unit of the Greater Manchester
Police, given that it is of the typical size described above, would be swamped by
consultation on this scale. Practicalities dictate that consultation needs to be on a
selective basis. In any event, of course, many applications are small-scale and do
not raise significant or non-standard issues. Thus, the fact that individual planning
case officers exercise their discretion over when to consult the force Architectural
Liaison Unit is not of itself a problem, provided that the cases are sensibly chosen;
and informal liaison usually produces some agreed guidelines about this. Indeed,
this process can be seen as another example of the discretionary nature of the
British planning system (Booth, 1996). Perhaps the more important question is
what local planning authorities do with police comments of this kind once they
have received them. There is very little research on this, but Kitchen (1997a) sug-
gested two broad probabilities based upon his own professional practice
experience. The first is that, where local planning authorities adopt a consultative
style of development control decision-making, adverse police comments would be
likely to be referred back to the developer and/or the developer’s agent for further
consideration, and most such people would be likely to take police advice about
these matters seriously. The second is that, if this process resulted in no amend-
ments to the application having been made that would now make it acceptable,
both planning officers in making a recommendation and elected members in taking
a decision would be likely to attach weight to the views of the police. This would
not be the case universally, however, and Kitchen has recorded instances of high-
profile cases where police views seen as coming from the ‘target-hardening’ stable
were ignored in favour of a rather different philosophical stance (Kitchen, 1997b,
pages 156 and 157).
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Overall, it is probably correct to say that police consultation has by now
become an established part of development control practice in many local planning
authorities, and that while police views on major developments do not always carry
the day (because other considerations may be regarded as dominant) they are
often on the table when such decisions are taken. This represents a very radical
change from the situation of a decade ago, when the policy guidance, the police
staff capability and the planner awareness simply did not exist. That is not to say, of
course, that there may not be substantial scope for improvement to this process on
both sides, and scope also for more meeting of minds on substantive issues based
upon research findings about what appears to work on the ground and in what cir-
cumstances. An example of the kind of issue that this kind of research-driven
approach could help with is the development of policy towards roller-shutter blinds
and doors on commercial premises, which were often installed on police advice for
security reasons but are often criticised by planners because at night they can
make commercial areas look dark and intimidating (see the photographs at Figure
7.1). Manchester City Council’s development guide (Manchester City Council,
1997, page 7) puts the matter as follows:
There is ample evidence that the sensitive combination of good management,
good design and community involvement is an effective way of creating more
secure environments and of reducing vandalism and the threat of crime and
violence. We want to see high-quality crime prevention measures being adopted
across the whole City. Alongside this we believe that increased and properly-
controlled public use of buildings and commercial facilities will enhance
community ownership of the city’s buildings and spaces. Manchester can be
made a more secure city without resorting to the obtrusive and offensive
spectre of universal barbed wire, bollards, shutters and other crime prevention
devices. The creation of fortified territories is a confession of defeat. We see the
application of many such architectural approaches to public security as negative
and an inhibition to the City’s creativity.
It may well be that the partnership framework introduced by the Crime and Dis-
order Act, 1998 will help to bring together some of the views about issues of this
nature by providing a more effective framework within which this can take place.
The advice that Police Architectural Liaison Officers (ALOs) give, as reflected
in the Secured By Design scheme, is sometimes presented as coming out of the
‘target-hardening’ school, thereby reflecting a fortress mentality (see, for example,
Rudlin and Falk, 1995, page 56). Whilst there is undoubtedly some truth in this, it
is also an over-simplification of a complex reality. This is partly because such a per-
ception sees Secured By Design as essentially a static concept coming from a
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Figure 7.1 The impact of roller-shutter blinds and doors
These two photographs (taken of the same local shopping parade from more or less the same position at
two different times) are typical of the situation to be found in thousands of similar locations throughout
Britain. The negative effect on the street scene of shops being closed and roller-shutters being down is
obvious from comparing the two photographs. At night, the problem is even worse, because while
windows reflect street lights roller-shutters do not.
particular and limited perspective, whereas both in theory and in practice (because
there are mechanisms in place for updating the available guidance) this need not
be axiomatic. It also overlooks the fact that Architectural Liaison Officers, while
starting from a common base, have to deal with a wide range of situations and of
people. In giving advice, therefore, they are engaged in processes of social inter-
action as well as in debates about building and space layouts. Police ALOs are
also individual human beings in their own right; and how they deal with situations
and with people will thus vary from person to person. In spite of this, it is certainly
possible to summarise what is in essence the common basis for what police advice
is aiming to achieve. In relation to domestic burglaries, Pascoe (1993b) identifies
two immediate aims of police advice and a longer-term objective. The two imme-
diate aims are:
• to reduce the opportunities for crime; and
• to increase the chance of catching an offender.
The longer-term objective is ‘to design housing layouts that will encourage resid-
ents to bond as a community unit. The community should then take action to
defend its territory against criminals, resulting in less crime and an improvement in
the quality of life for the residents’ (ibid.). Thus, the approach seeks to combine
target-hardening at the level of the individual property with more generalised
approaches to estate design around the creation of defensible space, well lit and
well defined circulation routes, and the concept of natural surveillance. Pascoe
reports, however, that the majority of Police ALOs appear to emphasise the target-
hardening elements of this rather than the estate layout elements, and to favour
one particular form of estate layout (based around culs-de-sac linked by main
feeder roads) despite the flexibility offered by the Secured By Design model (ibid.).
This finding is perhaps not wholly surprising, since, as a typical police response, it
reflects the classic stance of ‘situational crime prevention’: if a crime target is made
as difficult as possible from the criminal’s perspective that individual will act ration-
ally and not commit the crime (Clarke, 1980; Barr and Pease, 1992). In itself, this
is a contentious approach, since it is very doubtful whether it offers a model which
can be assumed to apply either to all types of crime or to the complex range of
criminal motivation (Pascoe, 1993a; for a more general review of some of the liter-
ature in this field, see Pascoe and Topping, 1997). In any event, this approach
inevitably raises the issue of the extent to which measures of this nature stop crime
or merely deflect it to less secure locations, which is how one might expect the
rational criminal to behave (Barr and Pease, 1992). It is perhaps not too surprising,
therefore, that an approach as rigid as this will from time to time come into conflict
with other views about these matters. The Secured By Design scheme is one of
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the three case studies presented in Chapter 8, which looks at these debates in
more detail.
One particular type of initiative in Britain which has been particularly associ-
ated with police advice, and which has been widely introduced in the 1990s, is
closed circuit television (CCTV). The reliance on CCTV in towns and city centres
to provide security has grown considerably, with strong Government backing
including financial support, which continues at the time of writing; for example,
under the headline ‘Thousands of new cameras filming streets’, The Independent
of 18 January 2000 reports further government funding for CCTV of £170 million
over a three-year period. Fyfe (in Pacione, 1997, page 257) records the growth of
such schemes in town and city centres from two in 1987, to thirty-nine in 1993, to
approximately ninety in 1995. Growth has continued apace since then, and CCTV
schemes increasingly are now to be found not just in town and city centres, but in
many other types of areas as well. The available research seems to suggest that
these schemes are broadly successful in their own terms, in that they both deter
some crime and help achieve subsequent arrests once crimes have taken place
(Brown, 1995), and also that their reception from the general public has been
‘broadly positive’ (Honess and Charman, 1992). Superintendent Pearson of the
Strathclyde Police, when talking to the Town and Country Planning Summer
School for Councillors in 1996 about his experiences with the introduction of a
CCTV scheme in Airdrie town centre, described the matter thus:
Probably (most important) was the effect on community morale. The public felt
that at last something constructive was happening within their community. The
convergence of interests on behalf of the various authorities was seen as
constructive, and the creation of safeguards to ensure the proper management
of the system further enhanced the public view of the system. Even criminals
appeared to show their support for closed circuit television – at any rate they
were heard to observe that because of the presence of cameras, police officers
no longer stopped them to ascertain if they had been involved in crime – as the
cameras detected the real offenders, ensured they were properly identified, and
led to their arrest (Pearson, 1996, page 82).
One of the early decisions taken in relation to the redevelopment of that part of the
city centre of Manchester which had been devastated by the IRA bomb of June
1996 was that the response would include a significant extension in the use of
CCTV cameras (Kitchen, 2001). The photographs at Figure 7.2 give an impression
of the visual appearance of these cameras. This was based upon a view that CCTV
cameras were preferable to much ‘harder’ forms of security that would run the risk
of making the City Centre a less attractive place to visit, and also upon the belief
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Photograph 2
Figure 7.2 CCTV Cameras in Manchester city centre after the IRA bomb
Photographs 1 and 2 show externally-mounted CCTV cameras looking respectively down a street and at
the entrance to a major facility. One of the issues raised by wall-mounting of this nature is the relationship




Photograph 4, taken at the entrance to another retail arcade, shows that telling people that CCTV is in
operation is seen as having a deterrent value in itself.
Photograph 3
Figure 7.2 continued
Photograph 3 shows a CCTV camera in an internal pedestrian space (in this case, near the entrance to a
retail arcade), where there is much less architectural form to hide its intrusive appearance.
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that there would be a very high level of public acceptance of CCTV in this situ-
ation, particularly in the wake of the IRA bomb. To date, both of these propositions
would appear to be correct; or, to put it more accurately as a double-negative,
there is little available evidence to show that they are incorrect.
Schemes of this nature inevitably give rise to concerns both about the pos-
sible displacement of crime to adjacent areas not covered by the scheme
(Dawson, 1994) and more generally about the civil liberties implications of this kind
of surveillance (see, for example, Graham and Marvin, 1996, pages 225–7). Oc
and Tiesdell (1997, pages 130–42), in an overview of the role of CCTV in helping
to create safer city centres, agree that these matters need to be kept under con-
stant review, but conclude that overall the effect of CCTV has been a positive and
well-received one and that it is ‘here to stay’ as an element of public policy.4
DoE Circular 5/94 and other planning guidance
DoE Circular 5/94 (Department of the Environment, 1994) is rather optimistically
entitled ‘Planning Out Crime’, although in practice it is less a document that tells
planners and others how to do this and rather more a list of issues to think about,
sources of information, and processes that need to be gone through. This is not said
to belittle the value of this advice in its own right, but simply to record the point that
despite its title it is not a recipe for the elimination of crime via the planning process.
Indeed, paragraph 2 of the Circular puts the contribution of planning in realis-
tic terms, as follows:
Successful crime prevention often depends upon a wide range of measures.
Crime prevention initiatives on housing estates, for example, are known to
require a package of measures which address a range of issues – not just
crime itself – and involve several agencies. The planning system is one, but only
one, important factor in a successful crime prevention strategy. Good planning
alone cannot solve the problem of crime, but when co-ordinated with other
measures, its contribution can be significant.
The primary significance of the Circular, which represents advice from the Secret-
ary of State to local planning authorities rather than anything which has a more
formal legal status, can probably be summarised in five points:
• It represented a formal acknowledgement of the relationship between crime
prevention activities and the planning system which had not previously
existed in such explicit terms.
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• It provided a much more formal status for the work of Police Architectural
Liaison Officers in terms of the planning system.
• It urged local planning authorities to reflect crime prevention concerns in their
development plans through the incorporation of principles for the design,
layout and landscaping of new residential or commercial development, which
should aim ‘to reassure the public by making crime more difficult to commit,
increase the risk of detection and provide people with a safer, more secure
environment’. (ibid., paragraph 13)
• It argued for strategic and collaborative approaches to areas, seeing planning
and crime prevention as complementary and mutually reinforcing activities.
• It argued for some key concepts, such as mixed uses, that are about the
promotion of activity via planning policies and environmental design rather
than security measures in relation to buildings, and as such started to open
up some of the debates promoted by ‘New Urbanists’, particularly in relation
to town centres (ibid., paragraph 14), as well as covering more familiar
ground such as the promotion of CCTV.
This basic approach has continued to be developed in subsequent guidance,
alongside the development of the policy ideas which form the next section of this
chapter. Many towns and cities, for example, have picked up on ideas such as
mixed uses, promoting the night-time economy and ‘the 24-hour city’ as a means of
revitalising the economies of their city centres, implicitly or explicitly accepting in
this process the view that the promotion of activity is the best way to deter crime.
Some of these, it is now being suggested, are becoming the victims of the success
of these policies, in the sense that so much night-time activity has been promoted
that the police cannot cope with the sheer volume of lawlessness that is now hap-
pening in such areas, often fuelled by over-indulgence in alcohol. The Independent
of 17 July 2000, under the banner headline ‘Planners and police surrender city
centres to Britain’s mass volume vertical5 drinkers’, reports research showing this
as a common phenomenon in parts of Nottingham, Manchester, Liverpool, New-
castle, Leeds, Hull and Birmingham. Manchester City Centre, for example, is
reported as receiving an influx of 75,000 people every Friday and Saturday night
(as compared with 30,000 in the early 1990s), with the Gay Village being both a
major destination and also ‘the key hotspot for assaults’. The Greater Manchester
Police are reported as having forty officers on street duty in the city centre at such
periods plus another fifteen in vehicles, as compared with 3,200 registered door
staff in 1999 (although presumably not all of these will be on duty at the same
time); as a consequence, effective control of the problems of violence and disorder
that have accompanied this growth is said to have passed from the police to the
private security system.6 It might be argued that the headline blaming planners (as
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well as the police) for this problem is somewhat unreasonable, since planners,
while promoting the policy in these areas, were not responsible for decisions about
policing them or about the resources this would require; but this example perhaps
serves to underline the point which has already been made elsewhere in this book
about the often emotive nature of reporting in this field.
Mixed uses, as distinct from the segregation of land uses that often charac-
terised previous generations of planning activities (Coupland, 1997), has been
carried forward as an idea into advice about areas other than town centres. The
1999 public consultation draft of the revision of PPG3 (the Planning Policy Guid-
ance note about housing), for example, sees mixed-use development and mixed
communities as not only being desirable concepts in their own right but also as an
essential component of successful housing areas in the future (Department of the
Environment, Transport and the Regions, 1999a, paragraphs 9–12). Some of this
is about seeking to increase the density of housing areas, both because of consid-
erations of urban sustainability and in order to generate more activity in such areas
with, among other things, benefits in terms of crime prevention because of the
natural surveillance this would generate. The final version of PPG3 (Department of
the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 2000a) sets a target of achieving res-
idential densities of between thirty and fifty dwellings per hectare net, as compared
with the current average of twenty-five dwellings per hectare and an achievement
of under twenty dwellings per hectare by more than half of all new housing (ibid.,
paragraphs 57 and 58). The principles that should guide the design of these
housing areas are stated (ibid., paragraph 56) as being:
• create places and spaces with the needs of people in mind, which are
attractive, have their own distinct identity but respect and enhance local
character;
• promote designs and layouts which are safe and take account of public
health, crime prevention and community safety considerations;
• focus on the quality of places and living environments being created and
give priority to the needs of pedestrians rather than the movement and
parking of vehicles;
• avoid inflexible planning standards and reduce road widths, traffic speeds
and promote safer environments for pedestrians; and
• promote the energy efficiency of new housing where possible.
This advice reflects a concern about the continuing spread of urbanisation, which
is described in more detail below. But it must also to a degree represent a
challenge to the sorts of developments that to date have been taken through
the Secured By Design scheme (see above, and also Chapter 8), which have
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tended to be relatively low density, and also to extant guidance on highways
layouts in residential areas where that pre-existing advice has undoubtedly con-
tributed to the achievement of low densities by virtue of the land-take it involves
(see below). As PPG3 puts it (ibid., paragraph 57), ‘local planning authorities
should therefore examine critically the standards they apply to new development,
particularly with regard to roads, layout and car parking, to avoid the profligate use
of land.’
The argument about urban sustainability in recent years in Britain has been
intimately connected with debates about the need in a highly urbanised country for
new housing and related developments to meet the changing needs of the popu-
lation without further large-scale suburban expansion intruding on the countryside
on a massive scale. The numbers in the calculations that have been made have
changed as this debate has ebbed and flowed, but in essence the argument is
unchanged. This is that new housing units need to be made available on a large
scale to cope with major shifts in the nature of the family in Britain, producing far
more one- and two-person households than has been seen in the past and hence
for a given population size a larger number of housing units. Of the order of 4
million new housing units on this basis are said to be needed over a 20/25 year
period, and the Government’s policy is that at least 60 per cent of these should be
constructed on previously used urban land (Department of the Environment, Trans-
port and the Regions, 1998a). This is seen in some quarters as a major opportunity
to promote urban living based upon the application of ‘New Urbanist’ principles
because of the densities of development it will require (Rudlin and Falk, 1999,
pages 125–46); others, however, have been more cautious in arguing that the
extant problems of education, crime and social welfare to be found in Britain’s
cities will need to be tackled more effectively than they have been to date and that
the merits of urban living will need to be promoted to a largely sceptical public if
such a policy is to succeed (Breheny and Ross, 1998). Nevertheless, there is a
strongly urban push to British policy about meeting housing needs in sustainable
ways at present, and this inevitably raises issues about how urban crime is tackled.
Indeed, this linkage between urban crime and sustainability may become a key to
the need, for which we have been arguing, for planning and planners to take the
relationship between crime and the design and organisation of the built environ-
ment more seriously, since if planners see tackling the problem of urban crime as
an integral part of working towards sustainability (which is now a central theme of
British planning practice) they may find it much easier to conceive of work of this
nature as a mainstream activity.
This link is taken further in the reworking of the companion volume to PPG3
offering design guidance in relation to residential roads and footpaths (Department
of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, 1998b), as follows:
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The design of housing layouts can make a major contribution to both the
prevention of crime and alienating the fear of crime. Most crime is opportunistic,
and common sense measures can make an area secure for both people and
property. The main points to be borne in mind are:
• Crime depends upon concealment. Well used or overlooked streets and
spaces make the criminal feel uncomfortable and exposed.
• Anonymous and uncared for spaces can cause long-term problems. The
design of layouts should provide a clear definition of ownership and
responsibility for every part of a development.
• Clear and direct routes through an area for all forms of movement are
desirable, but should not undermine the ‘defensible space’ of particular
neighbourhoods.
. . . In terms of detailed design, the principal means of crime prevention are:
• Natural surveillance: neighbours should be able to see each other’s houses,
and where cars are parked outside (at front or back), owners should be able
to see them.
• Routes that are overlooked and busy. If separate footpaths or cycle tracks
form part of a layout they should be on routes which generate high levels of
movement and should be as short as possible. Long, indirect pedestrian and
cycle links may feel threatening for users and may provide escape routes for
criminals.
• Play areas or communal space located where they are well-related to
surrounding areas and are overlooked. They should not be regarded as just
a use for parcels of land left over after the rest of the layout has been drawn
up.
The development of a good community spirit is the most obvious way of
deterring crime, but that cannot be relied on as a solution on its own. Mutual
support works best when the design of an area has taken account of security
issues at the outset (ibid., page 46).
As noted above, however, some of this advice does represent quite a chal-
lenge to hitherto conventional traffic engineering views about such issues as road
widths and visibility splays at junctions, which have a major impact on many resi-
dential layouts, and indeed as questioning the relative significance of the cul-de-
sac which, as we have already seen, has been a favoured form of layout for many
Police Architectural Liaison Officers. As yet, however, the advice cannot be said to
British policy and practice 205
have fully resolved these issues, since it both begins to shape these challenges
and at the same time persists with highway layout advice of the type it is question-
ing, although it has begun the process of re-examining the extent to which highway
layout standards need to be amended if its other objectives are to be achieved
(ibid., pages 50–75).
The Urban Task Force chaired by Lord Rogers of Riverside (Urban Task
Force, 1999) urges the Government to take this further, by arguing that crime
reduction strategies under the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998 ought to include six
principles:
• policies and guidance for ‘designing out crime’. The key elements here are
seen as being ‘the creation of lively areas with public spaces that are well
overlooked, interconnected streets and a fine grained mix of uses with plenty
of windows and doors that face onto streets’;
• joint action on a multi-agency basis;
• engaging residents and businesses in the fight against crime;
• making ways of using statutory orders for tackling particular kinds of crimes
as easy as possible;
• bringing local services together to focus on crime and vandalism ‘hotspots’;
• improving public confidence in the police (ibid., page 127).
What is clear from all of this is that ideas about how urban areas, and particularly
residential areas, should be laid out – ideas that have had the status of ‘conven-
tional wisdom’ for some time – are now being challenged in contemporary Britain.
Considerations of crime prevention and public safety are an important component
of these debates, treating these matters not as free-standing issues but as
component elements in thinking about the planning of urban areas. The fact
that Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998 imposes a new duty on
local planning authorities to exercise their functions with due regard both to the
effect on and the need to do all they can to prevent crime and disorder will rein-
force this relationship, because it will focus attention on how these matters impact
upon design policies and the operation of the development control function. At the
time of writing, it is probably fair to say that the full import of this new duty has not
yet been fully understood by all local planning authorities; but it is to be hoped that
as this process unfolds it will pay particular attention to local circumstances and
will not be turned into a set of rigid rules that are applied irrespective of those cir-
cumstances and the views and wishes of local people. Much of this experience is
likely to be garnered in practice through local initiatives across the country which
have an experimental component to them. One such case, for much of the 1990s,
was the redevelopment of large parts of Hulme in Manchester, which has received
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a considerable amount of both critical and uncritical attention and which has
played a part in helping to shape some of the ideas discussed above. The story
of the 1990s redevelopment of Hulme is one of the detailed case studies in
Chapter 8.
Regeneration, Social Inclusion and the
Partnership Approach
As has already been indicated through the examples of the Nottingham and the
Dearne Valley City Challenge initiatives, the urban regeneration process in Britain
in recent years has started to tackle crime and related issues because typically the
residents of those areas when asked tend to put such matters at or near the top of
the agenda for action. There is some evidence to suggest that this has not always
been as effective as was hoped, however, as the final evaluation of the City Chal-
lenge Programme (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions,
1999b) concludes that crime projects were the least successful of the common
types of projects carried out through the programme in terms of delivering targeted
outcomes. Perhaps this is a useful cautionary reminder about the limitations of the
‘quick-fix’ approach all too likely to be adopted in short-term initiatives when
dealing with something as endemic as crime.
Another characteristic of the regeneration process in Britain throughout the
1990s has been its emphasis on multi-sectoral partnerships (Bailey, 1995). This
approach has been carried through into the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998, which
places an equal duty on local authorities and the police to join together and work
with others to:
• review crime and disorder problems in their area;
• publish and seek views on their findings; and
• put in place a strategy, taking account of comments, with targets for reducing
crime and disorder in the area.
The early experiences of this in Salford, Greater Manchester, constitute one of the
detailed case studies developed in Chapter 8. Although this process was the
component of the Act that attracted most attention, the fact that Section 17 of the
Act also imposed a new duty on local planning authorities to exercise their func-
tions with due regard both to the effect on and the need to do all they can to
prevent crime and disorder may also turn out to be of some importance. At the time
of writing, this new duty does not appear to have registered very significantly with
the British planning community, but since this approach is also followed up in the
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Urban Policy White Paper of 2000 (see below) it seems unlikely that it will be left
simply as a rhetorical stance by Government.
The most distinctive element that the Labour Government elected in 1997
has brought to all of this is probably the work of the Social Exclusion Unit. In its
first major report (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998), the Unit describes the problem of
social exclusion7 as follows:
Over the last generation, this has become a more divided country. While most
areas have benefited from rising living standards, the poorest neighbourhoods
have tended to become more rundown, more prone to crime, and more cut off
from the labour market. The national picture conceals pockets of intense
deprivation where the problems of unemployment and crime are acute and
hopelessly tangled up with poor health, housing and education. They have become
no go areas for some and no exit zones for others. In England as a whole the
evidence we have suggests there are several thousand neighbourhoods and
estates whose condition is critical, or soon could be (ibid., page 9).
Social inclusion is therefore the process of tackling the multiplicity of problems
exhibited by and in these areas so that they become less separated off from the
condition of the rest of the country. The key ideas about tackling crime, as part of a
comprehensive attack on this problem, are:
• making crime reduction in the very worst areas a high priority for the police,
local authorities and others by, amongst other things, setting targets;
• instituting locally run neighbourhood warden8 schemes, in cooperation with
the police, and empowering such wardens to get involved in a wide range of
tasks (such as making environmental improvements) which are relevant to the
aim of reducing crime and the fear of crime;
• focusing on anti-social behaviour as a major source of crime and fear of crime;
• tackling racist crimes as a particular subset of anti-social behaviour (Social
Exclusion Unit, 2000, paragraphs 6.8–6.18).
The ‘National Strategy Action Plan’ (Social Exclusion Unit, 2001) that has emerged
from this work takes this thinking further. The Foreword by Prime Minister Tony
Blair (ibid., page 5) sets out why the approach to the renewal of poor neighbour-
hoods is different to previous approaches:
First, the true scale of the problem is being addressed – not the tens but the
hundreds of severely deprived neighbourhoods. Second, the focus is not just on
housing and the physical fabric of neighbourhoods, but the fundamental
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problems of worklessness, crime and poor public services – poor schools, too
few GPs and policing. Third, the Strategy harnesses the hundreds of billions of
pounds spent by the key Government departments, rather than relying on one-
off regeneration spending. Fourth, the Strategy puts in place new ideas
including Neighbourhood Management and Local Strategic Partnerships for
empowering residents and getting public, private and voluntary organisations to
work in partnership.
This approach is translated into two long-term goals (ibid., page 8):
• In all the poorest neighbourhoods, to have common goals of lower
worklessness and crime, and better health, skills, housing and physical
environment.
• To narrow the gap on these measures between the most deprived
neighbourhoods and the rest of the country.
Throughout, the Strategy stresses the holistic nature of the approach that needs to
be adopted, emphasising both the need to think about problems and solutions in
inter-related ways rather than as the separate prerogatives of individual players,
and the need for the processes adopted to be as inclusive as possible in terms of
agencies and communities. The key crime reduction target set is that by 2005
domestic burglary will have been reduced by 25 per cent, with no local authority
district having a rate more than three times the national average (ibid., page 30),
which is also the target contained within the Urban Policy White Paper, 2000 (see
below). The specific ‘new policies, funding and targets’ listed under the heading of
‘tackling crime’ are as follows (ibid., page 35):
• Use the Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships and the Strategies they
produce to spearhead action towards ambitious national targets, which
include not only the domestic burglary target described above, but also redu-
cing vehicle crime by 30 per cent by 2004 and reducing robbery in the prin-
cipal cities by 24 per cent by 2005.
• Focus on racist crime and incidents by developing effective solutions to local
problems, with appropriate national policy and practice guidance and
support.
• Develop youth justice pilot projects, and target re-offending amongst young
people and ex-prisoners.
While in specific terms these initiatives do not talk explicitly abut the relationships
between crime and the design of the built environment, the emphasis they place
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upon enabling and supporting action within an appropriate local context involving
all the key players, together with the overall emphasis on neighbourhood manage-
ment and strategic partnership, surely represents a major opportunity for these
kinds of initiatives sitting alongside others to be developed as part of a coherent
strategy. This sense of opportunity is reinforced by Appendix F of the Strategy
(ibid., pages 94–116), which picks out examples of good practice in terms of the
common goals of less worklessness, less crime, better skills, less ill-health and
better housing and physical environment. Of the fourteen examples listed there
under the banner of crime-related initiatives (ibid., pages 98–100), several clearly
have a strong environmental component to them, and they demonstrate that it is
possible to make significant improvements relatively quickly by a combination of
partnership approaches and targeting particular problems. The value of this is not
merely that it illustrates the variety of what can be done within the framework that
has now been established, but also the commitment that it involves to publicising
good practice so that localities can benefit from each other’s experience.
The partnership approach, particularly in relation to deprived neighbourhoods
with high levels of crime in comparison with national averages, has also been a
significant component in recent years of the process of distributing national
funding available for local crime prevention work. Partnerships have been able
during this period to access both Home Office and Department of the Environ-
ment, Transport and the Regions funding for work of this type, and while there have
been some difficulties with this in terms of take-up rates it seems likely that this
kind of targeted approach will continue to be a feature of practice in this field.
This approach will therefore be a further layer in the accumulation of public
policy positions looking at these sorts of issues detailed in this chapter. This
ensures that crime and environmental design concerns will be looked at increas-
ingly as part of multi-agency and multi-functional initiatives, working with the local
community attempting to tackle the problems of Britain’s most deprived areas in
holistic ways. This is a challenging agenda; although some experience has been
accumulated in relation to some of this, it has to be said that for many ideas there
is much pioneering work to be done and hopefully much careful recording of what
appears to succeed and what does not, to avoid a process of endless reinvention
of the wheel.
The Urban Policy White Paper, 2000
The Urban Policy White Paper (Department of the Environment, Transport and the
Regions, 2000b) provided a major and long-awaited opportunity to pull all this
policy material together into an integrated statement showing among other things
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how crime-reduction initiatives are seen in an urban policy context. It saw the five
key issues facing Britain’s town and cities as being:
• to accommodate the new homes needed by 2021;
• to encourage people to remain in and move back into urban areas;
• to tackle the poor quality of life and lack of opportunity in certain urban areas;
• to strengthen the factors in all urban areas which will enhance their economic
success;
• to make sustainable urban living practical, affordable and attractive (ibid.,
page 29).
The vision that was presented in response was:
Our vision is of towns, cities and suburbs which offer a high quality of life and
opportunity for all, not just the few. We want to see:
• people shaping the future of their community, supported by strong and truly
representative local leaders;
• people living in attractive, well kept towns and cities which use space and
buildings well;
• good design and planning which makes it practical to live in a more
environmentally sustainable way, with less noise, pollution and traffic
congestion;
• towns and cities able to create and share prosperity, investing to help all
their citizens reach their full potential; and
• good quality services – health, education, housing, transport, finance,
shopping, leisure and protection from crime – that meet the needs of people
and businesses wherever they are.
This urban renaissance will benefit everyone, making towns and cities vibrant
and successful, and protecting the countryside from development pressure
(ibid., page 30).
The White Paper then in effect runs through the action it sees as being necessary
in order to deliver against this agenda. Although issues around crime and public
perceptions of safety in urban areas could be said to be related to most if not all of
these points, little is specifically said about these matters until the consideration of
crime under the heading of ‘quality services and opportunities for all’. This includes
setting the specific target of reducing domestic burglary by 25 per cent by 2005,
with no local authority area having more than three times the national average
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(ibid., page 111). It also includes the specific commitment to make crime preven-
tion a key objective for planning and to review the advice contained in DoE Circular
5/94 (ibid., page 120), although it actually says very little about how this will be
done and concentrates instead on summarising and extending existing initiatives.
For example, it describes the key elements of a £400 million crime reduction pro-
gramme which was already under way to support innovative work in local
communities, many of which are in high crime urban areas, as follows:
• a national scheme to fund projects in areas containing 2 million homes in
crime hot-spots, in order to reduce domestic burglary;
• the biggest-ever expansion of CCTV schemes (in both residential as well as
commercial areas);
• programmes to prevent children from becoming involved in crime, and to
reduce school truancy and exclusions;
• funding to support the establishment of neighbourhood warden schemes to
complement the work of police and local authorities;
• providing drug-arrest referral schemes in all police custody suites, to encour-
age drug-misusing offenders into treatment and out of crime (ibid.).
Nevertheless, the commitment to making crime prevention a key objective for plan-
ning may prove to be a watershed, in the sense that it moves the position from
advice given in a Circular (which planners can and do ignore, if they choose) to
one where a requirement exists. The changes introduced through the Crime and
Disorder Act, 1998 began this process of moving from advice to a degree of com-
pulsion, although as we have noted above in their own terms they do not at the
time of writing appear to have had much impact on planners. If this approach is
followed up by a re-write of Circular 5/94 which is less ‘all things to all men’ and
much more pointed both in its advice and in its recognition of some of the conflicts
that exist in some of the extant policy theorising and guidance in this area,
however, this situation could well change quite quickly.
It is clear that the Urban Policy White Paper is placing a considerable amount
of reliance on the local partnership mechanisms established under the Crime and
Disorder Act 1998, one case study example of which can be found in Chapter 8. It
records the position on this at the time of publication as being that 376 crime and
disorder reduction partnerships were up and running in England and Wales (ibid.),
which means that the vast majority of local authority areas were covered by such a
partnership at that time, albeit with variable amounts of progress having been
made. One of the key recommendations in the White Paper, however, is the cre-
ation of Local Strategic Partnerships to ‘bring together the local authority, all
service providers (such as schools, the police and health and social services), local
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businesses, the full range of community groups and the voluntary sector’ (ibid.,
page 34), to:
• develop a Community Strategy to cover the local authority area. This should
look at all aspects that contribute to quality of life together; identify
strengths and weaknesses; and set out a long-term vision that has been
agreed with all the key stakeholders;
• agree priorities for action and monitor local performance against agreed
local indicators taking into account national and regional targets; and
• co-ordinate the work of more local or more specific partnerships dealing
with particular neighbourhoods or issues (ibid.).
Clearly, therefore, this is another over-arching mechanism to which the work of
crime and disorder reduction partnerships will be expected to relate. It remains to
be seen whether all of this in the different localities where it will be operational pro-
vides an effective local framework, or risks degenerating into a multiplicity of con-
flicting partnership initiatives which inhibit action, create coordination problems and
generate a new bureaucracy of their own.
Conclusions
This chapter has presented a picture of a national policy framework which has
developed considerably over the past decade or so, and may well continue to do
so, and also one of a ferment of ideas through which these processes are attempt-
ing to steer. Figure 7.3 tries to present this in a simplified form, so that readers can
see at a glance the key national policy imperatives that have been impacting upon
thinking about crime and the design of the built environment.
Taken together, the range of influences summarised in Figure 7.3 (which is
not exhaustive) represents a very significant central government policy push in
recent years that marks the British approach out from that of the USA. Indeed, as
we have already said, a defining characteristic of the British situation, in compari-
son with the American situation presented in Chapter 5, is that it has this strong
component of central government policy together with a series of mechanisms that
to varying degrees of effectiveness ensure that it is followed through at the local
level.
At the time of writing, a great deal of work had been done at the national level
to put these elements of the approach in place, and at the local level some useful
individual initiatives had been taken and the general process of beginning to
put into practice the requirements of the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998 had
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commenced. Thus a framework existed, but a great deal remained to be done to
achieve the benefits at the local level that this framework has been assembled in
order to seek. Although the planning and environmental design contribution is only
a small part of this process, its status is now such that it is acknowledged to be an
important component. This suggests both that the opportunities to achieve benefi-
cial changes in these terms over the next few years might be quite considerable
and that the expectations that have been raised as a result of setting this up are
also on perhaps a greater scale than has been the case in the past. There is
undoubtedly still work to be done, however, to set out unambiguously what is actu-
ally going to be the ‘official’ advice about the relationship between environmental
design concerns and effective crime prevention. As we have noted, there are some
tensions in the range of advice that currently exists, for example between highway
layout standards, desires to raise urban densities, the precepts that flow from the
Secured By Design scheme and issues around the quality of the urban places we
are seeking to create if we are to encourage people to choose to live in cities. The
need here is to acknowledge that these tensions exist and then to resolve them,
rather than to endorse each of these stances as if they were all automatically com-
fortable bedfellows. The commitment to revisit the guidance currently provided in
DoE Circular 5/94 is clearly an opportunity to do precisely this, which needs to be
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Figure 7.3 Key influences on recent British debates about crime and the design of the built environment
grasped. That challenge will need to be worked through not just at the (inevitably
rather generalised) level of national policy guidance but also all over the country in
terms of what is actually done on the ground. If this is not done, and the planning
system is expected to deliver beneficial changes as a result of the duties that it
acquired under the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998 without this accompanying
clarity of strategic thinking, there is a risk that all of this will merely programme the
system to achieve less than it would otherwise have been capable of doing.
Chapter 8 has a more local emphasis, at any rate in two of the three case
studies that it presents, in order to illustrate contemporary British practice at the
local scale in more detail than has been possible in this chapter. The three case
studies are the Secured By Design award scheme run by the police, the process
of responding to the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998 in Salford through the estab-
lishment of a partnership and the preparation of a crime reduction strategy, and the
process throughout much of the 1990s of redeveloping Hulme in Manchester in
accordance with design guidelines in which concerns about the relationships
between crime and environmental design were a major and explicit component. All
three of these cases show something of the process of change in British policy
and practice in this field that has been taking place in recent years; but all three
also show how much still remains to be achieved.
Notes
1 We have referred in note 2 to Chapter 2 to the terminological and data problems
surrounding the use of the expression ‘Britain’ in some of the literature. Exactly the same
issues also arise when discussing policy and practice. For the avoidance of doubt,
therefore, when we are discussing British policy and practice in this chapter in terms
both of formal legislation and of the work of Government Departments, we mean policy
and practice in England and Wales. As far as the remainder of the United Kingdom is
concerned, policing in Northern Ireland has been regarded to date as being something
of a special case because of the long-standing nature of ‘the troubles’, with a conse-
quent emphasis in particular upon the fortification of what have been seen as key loca-
tions/targets, although hopefully the future will be more normalised in these terms than
the immediate past has been. Scotland has not thus far seen much distinctive policy and
practice development that would actually mark it out from the initiatives that we describe
in this chapter, although the process of devolution with its creation of a separate Scot-
tish Parliament provides an opportunity to do this in future if that is the wish in Scotland.
To a lesser extent the same could also be said of Wales, although the remit of the
Welsh Assembly is narrower than that of the Scottish Parliament. The title pages of the
National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (Social Exclusion Unit, 2001) give
expression to this relationship by saying: ‘This National Strategy applies to England only,
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but will be drawn upon by the administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland
in compiling their distinctive strategies.’
2 See also the Salford survey in the case study in Chapter 8 on how Salford responded to
the requirements of the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998.
3 One of the problems with which we have had to grapple in writing a book seeking to
introduce transatlantic perspectives is that terms can take on different meanings in the
USA and the UK without those differences being commonly understood. The term
‘target-hardening’ is a good example of this phenomenon. In the USA, it is usually used
to describe one component of a spectrum of action, which is to do with making a build-
ing more secure to try to make it more difficult for a criminal to penetrate and to make
criminal access and subsequent escape as difficult as possible. In the UK, particularly in
recent times, it has come to be used in some quarters as a more all-embracing term for
an approach which emphasises physical security at or near potential points of entry to a
building, to contrast it with the approach of the ‘new urbanists’ which emphasises
human activity, permeability, and all aspects of natural surveillance as key components
of the overall design approach. Thus, the former approach is presented as being nar-
rowly focused on the individual building irrespective of the implications of this for the
built environment of the area as a whole, whereas the latter approach is presented as
giving primacy to the type of built environment being created. In some such instances,
‘target-hardening’ appears to have become a term of abuse, seen to be associated with
a ‘fortress mentality’, rather than a recognition that there may be perfectly sensible
things that can be done to make a building a harder target for a criminal to penetrate
without necessarily sacrificing the quality of the living or the working environment (see
Crouch, Shaftoe and Fleming, 1999). Except where otherwise indicated, we use the
term ‘target-hardening’ in the US sense, and not as a term that is intended to have pejo-
rative implications. This particular terminological concern is an issue in some of the liter-
ature about the Secured By Design scheme, and so we return to it as part of that case
study in Chapter 8.
4 In the view of the authors, this is one of the most striking differences in practice between
the USA and the UK. The ‘civil liberties’ concerns have been much more forcefully and
extensively expressed in the USA, which as a consequence has seen nothing like the
British large-scale growth of CCTV in public areas and also no equivalent to the volume
of public-funding support that has been made available for this in Britain. It should
perhaps also be recorded that the concern about the displacement effect of new initi-
atives in the USA has also generally tended to be more widespread than has been the
case in Britain. More generally, there is no real equivalent in the USA to the role played
in Britain by police Architectural Liaison Officers, and no equivalent whatsoever to the
formal endorsement of this role in the planning system by the Government. We return to
this issue in Chapter 9.
5 The reference to ‘vertical’ here is because many of the outlets referred to operate on the
basis of providing standing-room rather than the more traditional sitting-down spaces.
This enables more people to be accommodated in a given amount of space but (it is
argued) contributes to the tendency for violence to erupt.
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6 The primary tasks of ‘registered door staff’ in Britain are to control access to the
premises (for example, to exclude obviously under-aged or already incapacitated
drinkers) and to try to deal with any trouble that might arise as swiftly as possible. Thus,
they work on behalf of the owners or operators of the establishment in question, and
their job is about the smooth operation of that business rather than about any respons-
ibility on behalf of the community as a whole for general issues of public safety in the
locality. This can be presented as a form of privatisation of hitherto public functions,
although the police arguably never performed these functions on a systematic basis for
individual establishments. The scale of this is nothing like the scale of privatisation of
security that has been taking place in the USA, however, through developments such as
the out-of-town shopping complex and the gated community (see, for example,
McLaughlin and Muncie, 1999).
7 While the ideas that sit behind the concept of ‘social exclusion’ will be relatively well
understood in the USA, and perhaps particularly in some of its more socially polarised
cities, the term itself is not in common currency. Similarly, while many of the components
of the action needed to achieve social inclusion can be found in American political
rhetoric and applied policies, it would be hard to argue that a comprehensive approach
to this issue driven by the Federal Government exists in a manner that is comparable to
that found in Britain. Indeed, it is unlikely that a Federal Government in the USA would
find this an easy task to accomplish, even if it were minded to attempt it, because this
would tread on jealously guarded territory at State and City levels.
8 Similarly, there is no precise parallel in the USA in terms of national policy prescription
to the idea of members of the community working with the police and acting as neigh-
bourhood wardens, although at the local level the USA exhibits a wide range of
community-involvement initiatives.





This chapter follows on from Chapter 7 by looking in more depth at three case
studies of aspects of British practice. Clearly, three case studies cannot possibly
do justice to the breadth and variety of British practice, so we make no claims
in this respect. Rather, they have been chosen primarily because they illustrate
elements of that practice that are of particular significance for the purposes of
this book, in that they illustrate the application in practice of some of the key
policy ideas introduced in Chapter 7. All three, to a significant extent, represent
‘work in progress’ which will no doubt continue to evolve. None of them can
be described as finished products on which all necessary monitoring information
has been assembled, so that informed judgements can be made about their
success or failure, although all three in their different ways have been the subjects
of (adverse or supportive) commentary from time to time. They also represent dif-
ferent spatial scales of activity, although a common feature of all three is that their
practical application is at a relatively localised level. The three case studies chosen
are:
(1) the Association of Chief Police Officers’ Secured By Design (SBD) scheme,
which is a national initiative applied at the local level (that is, it applies to an
individual development initiative);
(2) Salford City Council’s work with the Greater Manchester Police and others
to pull together a partnership and to generate a strategy which begins to
implement the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998;
(3) The redevelopment of Hulme in Manchester’s inner city via a set of design
principles heavily influenced by the ‘New Urbanist’ movement and containing
an explicit set of views about the relationships between crime and environ-
mental design.
These cases are directly linked, however. Although it is probably not ‘typical’ of
recent British urban regeneration initiatives because of the scale of demolition and
rebuilding it has entailed, the Hulme case study is interesting for present purposes
because it is about an approach that set out to reject the SBD approach from
the outset; and, because it helps to explain these differences, some aspects of
the Hulme Development Guide are introduced into the SBD case as a means of
counterpointing what its principles are seeking to achieve. There is also an import-
ant connection between the SBD case and the Salford case, in that work on the
latter to begin to implement the new requirements of the Crime and Disorder Act,
1998 incorporates the SBD scheme as one of the available tools. Indeed, this is an
important relationship, not just in the specific circumstances of Salford but also in a
more general sense: the police across the country are key players in Crime and
Disorder Partnerships and their starting point in relation to environmental design
issues as part of the strategies produced through these Partnerships will tend to
be the principles of the Secured By Design scheme. So, although these three
cases are different, the interplay between them reflects some of the contemporary
debates about crime and the design of the built environment that are taking place
in Britain.
The Secured By Design Scheme
Although the Secured By Design scheme had been around in previous forms for
approximately a decade since its inception in 1989 (Home Office Crime Prevention
Centre, 1994), at the time of writing much of the information about what the
scheme is seeking to achieve had recently been re-presented as part of a Secured
By Design website (at http://www.securedbydesign.com), which is the primary
source of the material in this section of the chapter. For readers interested in
following up the material presented in this case study in more detail, this website
provides a very good starting point. It should be noted, however, that this process
of re-presentation has not involved major rethinking of the thrust of the advice avail-
able via the SBD scheme since 1989; as Topping and Pascoe (2000, page 72)
put it, ‘the only changes to the specifications of the scheme have been the fine-
tuning of physical security criteria’.
The significance of looking at the SBD scheme as a case is not merely that it
is applied across the whole country, but also that it reflects the kinds of advice
given by Police Architectural Liaison Officers when dealing with cases whether or
not they are seeking SBD approval. The primary purpose of the initiative is defined
as follows:
Secured By Design (SBD) is a police initiative to encourage the building
industry to adopt crime prevention measures in development design to assist in
reducing the opportunity for crime and the fear of crime, creating a safer and
more secure environment (paragraph 1.2, ‘Secured By Design Principles’,
Secured By Design website).
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To achieve this objective, its approach is summarised as follows:
Secured By Design aims to achieve a good overall standard of security for the
building shell and, in order to deter criminal and anti-social behaviour within the
curtilage or grounds of an estate, to introduce appropriate design features that
enable natural surveillance and create a sense of ownership and responsibility
for every part of the development. These features include secure vehicle
parking, adequate lighting of common areas, instilling a sense of ownership of
the local environment, control of access to individual and common curtilages,
defensible space, and a landscaping scheme that enhances natural surveillance
and safety (ibid., paragraph 1.5).
In terms of the concepts that we have used elsewhere in this book (see Chapter
4), this basic approach can be seen as combining elements of ‘target-hardening’ at
the level of the individual building with a recognition that natural surveillance,
defensible space, senses of shared ownership and community involvement, and
the promotion of appropriate activity, all have a part to play in the design of the
wider environment. Presentationally, some of this fits well with the thrust of govern-
ment policy, as it developed throughout the 1990s, that we described in Chapter
7. However, there remains a concern in some critical quarters about the extent to
which in practice the SBD scheme is mainly about ‘target-hardening’, with this
phrase being used as a rather dismissive characterisation of the limited nature of
the approach as a whole (Rudlin and Falk, 1995, page 56) rather than as a factual
description of one component of the spectrum of issues it covers, as we have used
it in Chapter 4. Part of this problem was undoubtedly caused by the way in which
the scheme was being applied by police Architectural Liaison Officers: Pascoe
(1993b) reported that in practice the majority of ALOs concentrated on the target-
hardening element rather than the wider (and inevitably potentially more flexible)
elements to do with overall layout. How individual ALOs seek to apply the guide-
lines in their revised form will, of course, remain an issue, since the effectiveness of
schemes depends upon how they are implemented in practice. Indeed, it could be
argued that the risk of ALOs in practice falling back on the hard-edged target-
hardening components will grow as more balancing material is added about wider
factors affecting environmental design, simply because these are likely to be seen
as having a much softer edge and therefore as being more difficult to apply. This is
one issue that future research needs to monitor very carefully.
Before leaving this debate about ‘target-hardening’ in order to look more
generally at the Secured By Design scheme, it is important to consider the
available evidence as to whether in its own terms target-hardening actually works.
In looking at both British and international studies of whether target-hardening
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measures are successful in preventing or reducing domestic burglary, Knights and
Pascoe (2000) concluded that the available evidence suggests clearly that they
are. Their summary of this (ibid., page 1) reads as follows:
This report contends that simple measures are effective. There is little more
basic than a sophisticated application of a natural instinct present throughout
history, preventing unauthorised entry into a home. The utilisation of the right
hardware in the right location for the right purpose is the simplest way to
prevent a very simple crime.
In terms of the point we have made above about the use of language, it should be
noted that this conclusion reflects the concept of ‘target-hardening’ in its proper
and more limited sense as one of a range of measures, rather than in its broader
and more dismissive sense of an approach which is seen as being excessively
dependent upon defensive attitudes. Put like this, target-hardening as a means of
making domestic burglary harder to accomplish at the point of entry clearly has a
part to play in the panoply of responses to this type of crime, and the evidence that
it works in these terms is likely to reinforce the significance of this role. There is still
a debate to be had about the extent to which the Secured By Design scheme is
overly dependent upon these kinds of approaches, and whether as a consequence
it results in physical environments that can be criticised from other perspectives;
we return to these matters later in our presentation of this case study. But we
believe that it is inappropriate in the light of this evidence to dismiss the SBD
scheme on the grounds that it is merely target-hardening, partly because the SBD
scheme does have more to it than that and partly because target-hardening does
have a role to play in the range of responses to crime (and to burglary in particular).
The approach of the SBD scheme in its contemporary form incorporates two
sets of ideas about the components of the wider environment that need to be taken
into account (‘community interaction’ and ‘crime features’), together with an import-
ant general message about the need for site management on a continuing basis to
ensure that environments do not deteriorate into those that unwittingly abet crime.
Table 8.1 sets these elements out in more detail. While there are some ele-
ments of this that can be seen to be in common with the approach adopted in
Hulme (see below), there are two related elements in particular that appear to be
rather different. The first relates to the idea of movement around an area. The SBD
scheme takes the view that escape routes should be limited in number, to the point
where in the past the scheme has been seen as favouring the residential cul-de-
sac beloved of low-density suburban housing layouts to the exclusion of all other
forms (Pascoe, 1993b). A key feature of ‘New Urbanism’ thinking, however, is the
notion of ‘permeability’, which is about the ability of people to move around and
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through an area as a means of promoting activity. To illustrate how different this
approach can be to the approach outlined in Table 8.1, the Hulme Development
Guide (Hulme Regeneration Ltd, 1994, pages 22 and 23) puts the four basic
requirements of permeability as follows:
• all streets should terminate in other streets;
• streets should encourage through-movement;
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Table 8.1 Key elements within the built environment that influence crime and anti-social behaviour,
according to the Secured By Design scheme
1 Community interaction
• defensible space and territoriality
• the way that members of communities exercise control over their environment and
interact with one another
2 Crime features
• anonymity – organise the built environment so that anti-social behaviour is less
likely to be ignored, through creating a sense of ownership of place and space.
This includes manipulating the balance between public and private space so as to
avoid the former becoming excessive, and being particularly careful about the
design of interfaces between public and private spaces so as to create ‘buffer
zones’ between them
• alternative escape routes – the more escape routes exist, the easier it is for the
criminal to make an escape and the more confident that individual is likely to feel
that this will be the case
• lack of surveillance – residents need to be able to see what is taking place
outside their house and around them
• crime generators – examples are footpaths which link two places together
(because they promote anonymity), facilities such as supermarkets which are out-
of-scale with the locality because they are intended for a wider community,
‘honeypots’ (places like fast-food take-aways that encourage people to
congregate), ‘hotspots’ (places where criminal or anti-social behaviour has
become concentrated), and ‘fear generators’ (places which cause a perception of
fear and become abandoned to anti-social acts and behaviour)
3 Site management
• regular grass cutting and landscape maintenance
• litter and graffiti removal on a regular basis
• keep abreast with the social and service needs of residents, in terms of elements
such as shops, telephone kiosks, bus routes and meeting rooms, so that
community activity is encouraged
Source: Paragraphs 4.1–9.2, ‘Secured By Design Principles’, Secured By Design Website at
http://www.securedbydesign.com
• there should be a variety of routes that people can choose when travelling
through an area;
• the grain of the streets should become finer around nodes of activity;
And to emphasise the point that this is radically different from the kind of advice
summarised in Table 8.1, the Hulme Development Guide stated the following:
The concept of defensible space, when applied to large areas of the public
realm, reinforces isolation and imposes artificial communities, rather than
allowing natural networks to develop. Much development over recent years has
been based upon an assumption that communities can be fostered and crime
reduced by creating places which physically and psychologically deter outsiders
and which remove escape routes. The result is that law abiding outsiders are
excluded, whilst creating deserted and isolated spaces which are ideal for crime.
The predominant street environment should be based upon the principle of
permeability. . . . A street should lead somewhere and should serve the joint
function of an external space for its residents and a through route for outsiders.
The cul-de-sac is anti-urban in that it reduces permeability and legibility,
promoting isolation not integration and, on the whole, will not be permitted (ibid.,
page 22).
This extract from the Hulme Development Guide is in fact describing its perception
of the kind of environments it felt were being created in the early 1990s by the
application of Secured By Design principles, which it was explicitly setting out to
reject.
The second component of the approach summarised in Table 8.1 that is
significantly different from the ‘New Urbanist’ approach adopted in Hulme that will
be introduced later in this chapter is the attitude it adopts towards the promotion
of human activity. The SBD scheme seems to be comfortable with the notion of
promoting human activity insofar as it contributes to natural surveillance or to the
growth of a sense of responsibility for space in the community, but is much less
comfortable with activity generators that promote anonymity or that it sees as being
out-of-scale with community needs. Thus, it takes a very controlled view of activity.
The ‘New Urbanist’ stance, on the other hand, is that human activity is in principle
something to be strived for because of its inherently desirable consequences. The
introduction to the Hulme Development Guide puts the approach as follows:
The new Hulme will be physically and socially integrated with the rest of the city,
encouraging the exchanges of movement and resources that stimulate
economic activity. There will be a diverse range of economic and social
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activities, not ‘zoned’ but integrated, offering a wide variety of uses for people to
live, shop, work and relax locally, and bringing new income to the local economy.
We want to create a clear urban framework which produces streets, squares
and buildings of variety and quality, but within a coherent urban whole, thus
welcoming both visitors and residents into and through the area. New
developments need to create a density of people and activity sufficient to
sustain the local economy and avoid ‘dead’ and empty streets and public spaces.
Particular regard needs to be paid to designing secure and ‘self policing’
developments, where neighbourliness is encouraged and patterns of life are
established which can make the area self-sustaining for generations to come
(ibid., page 3).
The contrast between what the SBD scheme is saying and what ‘New Urbanist’
thinking, as expressed in the Hulme Development Guide, is arguing for should be
clear from comparing these two extracts from the latter (respectively, about perme-
ability and about activity) with Table 8.1. It is difficult to see how SBD guidance, for
example, would have been likely to have produced the kinds of densities of develop-
ment in Hulme illustrated in the photographs in Figure 8.3. This perhaps serves to
reinforce the point that the SBD scheme is regarded as being controversial in some
quarters, notwithstanding its formal commendation in Paragraph 10 of DoE Circular
5/94 (see Chapter 6), and its re-presentation in some aspects to link into the thrust
of Government policy in the second half of the 1990s. It is, of course, important to
make the point that although there is a clear clash of ideas here, that does not mean
that both cannot co-exist. It is simply that they are different, and will result in different
kinds of environments. Indeed, it is possible to argue that it is inappropriate to
regard one as being ‘right’ and therefore the other as being ‘wrong’ (as the protago-
nists for both sides have from time to time found it convenient to do), and instead to
see the approaches as producing a range of choices that people ought to have
available to them in or on the edges of our cities if urban/metropolitan living is to be
encouraged. In this latter context, there can be no denying the marketing value to
developers of the ability to use the SBD logo in their advertising and their promo-
tional literature once they have gained SBD approval for their development, not least
because (as Chapter 2 has already shown) there is an association between high
crime levels and some urban areas. The ‘principles’ paper on the SBD website, at
paragraph 2, is quick to present this ‘marketing opportunity’ as a further argument to
developers about the value to them of the SBD scheme.
In essence, the way in which the SBD scheme works is straightforward.
Guidelines are published which relate to particular types of development; pre-
application discussions take place between the Architectural Liaison Officer of the
local police force and the intending applicant or agent (at initial sketch plan stage,
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and before a planning application is submitted to the local planning authority); a
formal application is then made with a set of documents specified for this purpose
and the specified fee is paid; provisional approval is given once the ALO is satis-
fied that the necessary standards have been agreed and will be met ‘to enable the
developer to promote Secured By Design in any marketing strategy’ (see ‘Applica-
tions for SBD’ on the Secured by Design website). An SBD certificate will not be
issued, however, until a site inspection has taken place upon completion of the
building works and has shown them to be of a satisfactory standard.
A key element of this process is clearly the publication of guidelines about
particular types of development, and it is also these publications which give the
best current indication of what ALO advice is likely to be on development pro-
posals irrespective of whether or not they are being submitted for SBD approval.
At the time of preparing this case study, the Secured By Design website contained
guidelines in respect of four types of residential development (refurbishments, new
homes, multi-storey dwellings and sheltered accommodation), and it also con-
tained SBD application forms for residential development and for commercial
development. In addition, guidelines were available for the SBD scheme for
secured car parking in a separate publication costing £25, and so these were not
on the website. To illustrate the ground covered in guidance of this nature and its
level of detail, Tables 8.2 and 8.3 summarise from this material what is being said
about sheltered housing and about commercial development.
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Table 8.2 SBD guidance – sheltered housing
As well as meeting the general SBD New Homes standard developments must
include the following:
1 A good lighting scheme that covers adequately all potential areas of risk with
lighting that switches automatically
2 There should be discussions with the ALO to determine whether lockable gates
to parking areas/garages are needed
3 The main communal entrance door should be part of an access control system at
least linked to the warden’s office and ideally linked to each individual unit
4 Other commercial access doors (excluding fire doors) are to be agreed with the
ALO, particularly in terms of their locking systems
5 Final communal fire exit doors must meet all the appropriate standards, and must
allow residents (bearing in mind their particular characteristics) to escape while
being strong enough to keep out intruders
6 The unit front door must have an agreed locking system which provides entry by
key only
7 Consideration should be given to a 24-hour monitored help alarm system
Source: Authors’ summary of the Sheltered Accommodation SBD guidance on the SBD website,
at http://www.securedbydesign.com
It can be seen from Tables 8.2 and 8.3 that some elements of these speci-
fications are detailed and prescriptive, while others offer guidance about the sorts
of things that would be acceptable and allow for the exercise of discretion through
discussion between the ALO and the applicant. Some of this content would prob-
ably be regarded as non-controversial, and indeed as providing common-sense
guidance about sensible measures to make premises secure and to avoid intruder
access. But some of it may from time to time be more controversial, perhaps espe-
cially where it affects a particular design approach so as to change it significantly.
For example, the approach in the past has been criticised as reflecting a ‘fortress
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Table 8.3 SBD guidance – commercial developments
The ground covered by the application form for commercial developments is as
follows:
1 development design, covering issues such as the approach adopted to
defensible space, boundary treatments, open views to and from frontages,
access and parking arrangements, possible climbing and access points by
criminals, mains services and natural surveillance
2 has CCTV been considered and if so of what kind?
3 perimeter treatment is to be agreed with the ALO
4 an illumination scheme is needed for the entire site designed to deny criminals
the advantage of being able to operate unobserved during the hours of
darkness
5 where cash transfer points are needed, factors about their security are listed for
consideration
6 vehicle parking and access arrangements need to be subject to good natural
surveillance or inaccessible to intruders, to be controlled, and to have different
types separated (visitors, staff and goods, with the latter having a secured
compound)
7 outbuildings also need to be covered by the security arrangements
8 the design of the building should have attack-resistance materials, straight sight
lines without deep recesses, no features which provide easy access to a roof
or to windows, and recessed external pipework
9 a series of detailed specifications are provided about doors
10 a series of detailed specifications are provided about shutters for goods
storage areas
11 design principles for roof lights are dealt with
12 sets down a series of tests so as to minimise the likelihood of entry via a roof
13 covers window design, starting from the statement that glazing to industrial
units should be kept to a minimum
14 sets down detailed standards for intruder alarms
Source: Authors’ summary of the content of the SBD Commercial Development application form
on the SBD website, at http://www.securedbydesign.com
mentality’, which pays too much attention to defensive measures that derive from
the ‘target-hardening’ philosophy and not enough attention to the qualities of place
that derive from its application or indeed to whether people would actually choose
to live and work in such surroundings (Rudlin and Falk, 1995, page 56). Readers
might like to test for themselves how they think the guidance summarised in Tables
8.2 and 8.3 stands up against this latter criticism; and they may well conclude, as
we have already argued, that a great deal may depend upon how these guidelines
are actually interpreted in specific situations by police ALOs. Another example of
the more controversial aspects of the guidance might be the bald statement that
glazing to industrial units should be kept to a minimum; this might meet security
requirements, but might make some industrial buildings aesthetically challenging
(as indeed in the real world some of them are), and might also raise questions
about what such a building would be like to work in.
Pascoe and Topping (1997), in a review of the basis of the scheme as it
stood at that time (and the differences between SBD as it was then and its
contemporary form are not particularly significant), saw it as a combination of the
thinking derived from the ‘situational crime prevention’ approach and assumptions
about the behaviour of burglars as ‘rational opportunists’. Regarding the first of
these two elements, they conclude that there was a good degree of fit with the
available literature except that the emphasis on ‘target-hardening’ found in the
practical operation of the SBD scheme was greater than could be justified from the
published research evidence. This reinforces the conclusion reached by Pascoe
(1993b) to the effect that police Architectural Liaison Officers tended to empha-
sise the target-hardening elements of the SBD standards rather than the other ele-
ments when working on individual schemes. As far as the second element of the
scheme is concerned (the assumption that burglars are ‘rational opportunists’),
Pascoe and Topping argue that while there is a range of views about this and also
a range of observable criminal behaviour, the assumption fits broadly with the out-
comes of available behavioural research on offender decision-making. This rein-
forces the results of previous work by Pascoe (1993a), based upon interviews with
burglars, which shows them as typically looking for environmental ‘cues’ to enable
judgments to be made about risk, reward and ease of entry. This work also argues
that the decision to attempt a burglary is based upon ‘limited rationality’, in the
sense that the reading of cues is instinctive and the burglar’s own previous experi-
ences influence his judgement. Thus, Pascoe and Topping conclude that although
there is not a perfect fit between the precepts of the SBD model and the available
research evidence, the degree of fit was such as to suggest that in its own terms it
had a reasonable chance of success. Their plea was for more empirical research to
investigate not only what happened over time to SBD schemes but also to look in
more detail at the success or otherwise of some of its individual components.
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Topping and Pascoe (2000) have subsequently responded to their own chal-
lenge by producing an evaluation of the available evidence about the success of
the SBD scheme in countering household burglary. Their broad conclusion is that
the ideas behind SBD are seen as being congruent with the thrust of much policy
development in recent years, and that in various ways the scheme is being more
widely implemented. The (limited) amount of post hoc evaluative evidence that is
available also seems to support the view that in its own terms the scheme is
working: the two recent large-sample studies that have been done do seem to
show statistically significant reductions in the incidence of burglary and in the fear
of crime, and also improvements in residents’ perceptions of their quality of life.
Topping and Pascoe’s conclusion (ibid., page 77) remains a cautious one,
however, because what remains unclear is which parts of the scheme are having
the desired effects. Critical to this is likely to be an improved appreciation of the
processes of implementation, which unpicks not only the bundle of ideas pulled
together within the SBD template, in order to understand the predictive powers of
each, but also the ways in which the package is applied to the specific circum-
stances of individual sites, including via the exercise of discretion by the parties to
this process.
Another recent British study which can be seen as making a plea for more
empirical research (Cozens et al., 2000) looks at how different key players (in this
case, burglars, planning professionals and police officers) perceive different types
of housing design in terms of territoriality, surveillance and image. The research
was based upon responses to photographs of five different types of house design
(detached, semi-detached, terraced, low-rise, high-rise), with variations reflecting
maintenance standards (well maintained or poorly maintained). While there were
some differences in the responses obtained in terms of whether the image pre-
sented by the house type in question was positive, neutral or negative, there was
also a considerable measure of agreement. So, all three groups perceived
detached housing in positive terms whether well or poorly maintained, and the
same result was also obtained for well maintained semi-detached and terraced
housing. Similarly all three groups saw poorly maintained semi-detached housing,
well maintained high-rise housing and poorly maintained low-rise housing in negat-
ive terms. So, the responses to seven of the ten types were identical. The differ-
ences were in respect of poorly maintained terraced housing (seen in negative
terms by burglars and planners and as neutral by police respondents), well main-
tained low-rise housing (seen in positive terms by burglars and in neutral terms by
planners and the police) and poorly maintained high-rise housing (seen in negative
terms by burglars and in neutral terms by planners and the police). Clearly, these
expressed preferences will reflect the different perspectives of the three groups,
but as a generalisation they tend to be more positive towards ‘traditional’ housing
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types (detached, semi-detached and terraced) than they are towards more
‘modern’ housing types (low-rise and high-rise multiple-occupation blocks). This
appears to be confirmed by the results obtained when respondents were asked to
comment on these housing types in terms of their vulnerability to crime. While
again there were some differences between the responses of the three groups, the
most striking component of the results is that they show a very similar hierarchy in
terms of the perceived vulnerability of the various housing types. From most vulner-
able (rank order 1) to least vulnerable (rank order 10), the hierarchy this produces
is shown in Table 8.4.
As well as suggesting that in terms of their vulnerability to crime ‘traditional’
housing types are seen in more positive terms than are ‘modern’ housing types,
this hierarchy also reinforces the general importance of maintenance standards in
reducing perceptions of risk of being on the receiving end of crime. These results
can be seen as being broadly supportive of the kind of thinking that drives the
Secured By Design scheme, not just in terms of the views of police and planners
(which could perhaps be explained in terms of their pre-existing ‘buy-in’ to this type
of thinking), but also by virtue of the broad similarity of the results achieved from
these two groups and from burglars.
Finally, of course, if the developer wants the award (and as has already been
said, the marketing advantages of this to the developer are fairly obvious) then the
developer has to meet the standard. Since the developer will also need to have in
mind the interests of those end-users of the development who will either purchase
or rent it – because otherwise the developer’s own commercial considerations
could be at risk – there could be said to be at least an element of representation of
those interests in discussion between the developer and the ALO, with the devel-
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Table 8.4 Hierarchy of vulnerability to crime of house types
Combined House type Burglar Planner Police
ranking rankings rankings rankings
1 poorly maintained low-rise flats 1 1 3
2 well maintained high-rise flats 4 2 1
3 poorly maintained high-rise flats 2= 5 2
4 poorly maintained terraced houses 2= 4 4
5 poorly maintained semi-detached houses 5 3 5
6 well maintained low-rise flats 7 6 6
7 well maintained terraced houses 6 7 7
8 well maintained detached houses 10 8 8
9 poorly maintained detached houses 8= 9 9
10 well maintained semi-detached houses 8= 10 10
Source: developed from Cozens et al. (2000) Figure 4
oper as a proxy; although this argument must get tenuous in cases where, for
example, a tenant is several steps away in the chain from a developer. However,
other interests (such as, for example, the general public interest in the quality of
place that ensues) are not so obviously looked after in this process; while it might
be argued that this is properly the job of the planning process there are limitations
on the ability of local planning authority development controllers in these terms
once they are faced with a planning application that has already been shaped by
the SBD process. More generally, there must be a conceptual debate to be had
about whether the precepts of SBD will contribute fully to the promotion of higher
density urban development in British cities, which is one of the goals of current
policy (see Chapter 7), or whether the application of SBD will tend in practice to
produce more typically suburban lower density environments. Nevertheless, the
SBD scheme has been having an effect on the design of housing developments in
particular in Britain for over a decade; Schneider (1996), for example, reports that
the rate at which SBD awards were being made to housing estates of various sizes
had already exceeded 500 per annum in England and Wales by the middle of the
1990s. Pascoe and Topping (1997) record 35,000 houses on nearly 3,700
estates, involving in excess of 630 builders, as having been built to SBD standards
in Britain over the period 1989–1996, which is something like 2–3 per cent of the
total number of houses built in Britain over this period.
Salford’s Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy
The Crime and Disorder Act, 1998, placed a duty jointly on local authorities and on
the police working with appropriate partners to carry out an audit and to produce
and then implement a crime and disorder reduction strategy for each local authority
area. This case study looks at how this task was tackled in one such authority’s
area. Salford in Greater Manchester is a particularly appropriate authority to
choose for this purpose, because it responded quickly to the new duties, as might
perhaps have been expected from the local authority that performed lead authority
functions on behalf of all ten Greater Manchester District Councils in respect of
the Greater Manchester Police Authority.1 In addition, however, and very much in
line with the government policy thinking introduced earlier in Chapter 6, Salford
saw issues of crime and of urban regeneration in an holistic manner. Indeed, the
work that had already been done in the City in preceding years to pull together
partnerships for various purposes gave the City a flying start in terms of assem-
bling a partnership to meet the new requirements of the 1998 Act. The starting
point for understanding the approach adopted in Salford should therefore be the
City’s regeneration strategy.
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Salford lies immediately to the west of the City of Manchester, and has just
over half of that City’s population at just under 228,000 (1996). Like many of the
cities of northern England, Salford saw huge changes in its traditional employment
base in the latter part of the twentieth century, losing almost one-third of its tradi-
tional employment base during the last three decades (Salford Partnership,
undated, page 9). This has brought in its wake a series of social, economic and
environmental problems, which have made Salford the thirty-first most deprived
local authority district in England and fourth in the North West region (ibid.). But, of
course, this has also created opportunities; it is this balance of problems and
opportunities that the regeneration process in the City has set out to tackle, with
some considerable success, from the mid-1980s onwards. This was reinforced in
the spring of 1994 by the launch of the Salford Partnership, which was created in
order to agree a common and integrated approach to regeneration in the City, to
secure the commitment of all partners to this approach, and to ensure that the
approach is efficiently and effectively delivered (ibid., page 5). Table 8.5 shows the
membership of the Salford Partnership. What is clear from this is how broad-based
and multi-sectoral the Partnership is; regeneration here is clearly seen in terms of
the broad range of social and economic concerns encompassed by the ‘social
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Table 8.5 Membership of the Salford Partnership
Salford City Council
Manchester Training and Enterprise Council (which covers the Salford area)
Salford Chamber of Commerce
North West and Merseyside Housing Corporation
Salford and Trafford Health Authority
Greater Manchester Police – Salford Division
Government Office for the North West





Salford Quays Job Centre (Employment Service)
Cable and Wireless Communication
Speedy Products
Thurnall plc
Greater Manchester Fire Service
Salford Council for Voluntary Service
Salford and Trafford Groundwork Trust
Northern Counties Housing Association
Source: Salford Partnership (n.d.) pages 2 and 3
exclusion’ debate introduced in Chapter 7, as well as in terms of the more tradi-
tional and often more fully-developed physical development activities. As part of
the analysis of the current position set down in the Partnership’s regeneration strat-
egy, it says the following about crime:
• In 1997 Salford Police dealt with over 30,000 key crimes. The incidence of
these key crimes varied across the City with high rates in Broughton,
Pendleton, Langworthy3/Seedley and Little Hulton.
• They were called out to 9,500 incidents involving juvenile nuisance which
represents 28 per cent of all incidents. The proportion of juveniles sentenced
in 1996/97 was 10.9 per cent per 1,000 young people aged 10–17.
• 13 per cent of key incidents involved domestic disputes.
• Over 8,000 burglaries took place in 1997 – 27 per cent of all key crimes.
• Nearly 10,000 car crimes, i.e. theft of, or theft from, vehicles were reported in
1997, a third of all key crimes (ibid., page 10).
The approach adopted in the regeneration strategy is via three City-wide themes
(economic development, social inclusion, and living environment) applied both
across-the-board and through area-based programmes in areas of need or of
opportunity. Tackling crime is listed as one of five areas of activity falling within the
social inclusion theme, although all of the other areas of activity that make up this
theme (building community capacity, tackling poverty, maximising the potential of
young people and improving health) could be said to be relevant to the objective of
tackling crime, as are areas of activity that form parts of other themes (such as cre-
ating clean, safe and healthy local environments under the living environment
theme, for example). Thus the approach being adopted is clearly both multi-agency
via the partnership mechanism and holistic through the breadth of action envisaged
in the strategy. The stated objective for the ‘Tackling crime’ component, drafted
while what became the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998 was still a Bill, is as follows:
Tackling Crime – making Salford a safer place by supporting vulnerable
individuals and communities, creating a safer environment, working to improve
security and developing innovative, local multi-agency initiatives in response to
the Crime and Disorder Bill (ibid., page 16). 
Perhaps the most important point about this is that it clearly grounds action on
crime in Salford’s regeneration agenda, seeing tackling crime not as a free-
standing issue but as something integral to the job of regenerating the City in eco-
nomic, social and environmental terms. As can be seen from the above quotation,
the Crime and Disorder Bill (which became the 1998 Act) was seen as providing
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further opportunities to continue this work. The vehicle for this was the Salford
Crime Reduction Partnership, which initially came together in 1993 (so actually
just before the more broadly based Salford Partnership with its focus on regenera-
tion), but which was clearly given further impetus by the Crime and Disorder Act,
1998. Table 8.6 itemises the membership of the Crime Reduction Partnership, and
this can be compared with the information on the Salford Partnership in Table 8.5.
This comparison clearly shows a significant overlapping membership between the
two in terms of organisations, but it could perhaps be said that the actual member-
ship (in terms of who has formally signed the strategy documents) is at a more
operational level for the Crime Reduction Partnership, reflecting its focus on action.
The starting point for the process of producing a crime and disorder strategy
for Salford was an audit of the existing situation (Salford Crime Reduction Partner-
ship, 1998). This started from recent survey information that already existed, and
notably a recent ‘Quality-of-Life’ survey commissioned by the City Council which
showed amongst other things that ‘in answering the question what could be done
to improve the quality of the lives of people of Salford, the most common response
was for action to be taken to reduce crime in the City’4 (ibid., page 3). Indeed, the
outcome of that particular exercise is interesting in terms of what it says about the
views of the people of Salford about the most important actions to be taken to
improve the quality of life in the City. Table 8.7 reproduces the results of this
survey in priority order.
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Table 8.6 Membership of the Salford Crime Reduction Partnership
Salford City Council – 8 members, of which 2 are elected members
(respectively, the Chair and Deputy Chair of the City
Council’s Community Safety Sub-Committee) and 6
are officers who head various parts of the Council’s
services
Greater Manchester Police – 4 members, all senior officers in the Division of the
Greater Manchester Police force (‘F’ Division) that
covers Salford
Salford Victim Support Service
Safer Salford2
Salford and Trafford Health Authority
Salford Probation Service
Greater Manchester Fire Service
Salford Chamber of Commerce
Manchester Training and Enterprise Council (which covers Salford)
Crown Prosecution Service
Salford Council for Voluntary Services
Source: Salford Crime Reduction Partnership (1999) page 4
The audit then sought to define the key elements of the current situation from
existing data (acknowledging the limitations of recorded crime data) both for the
City as a whole and on a comparative basis for eleven subdivisions of it. These
eleven subareas are called ‘service delivery areas’, and are the common basis used
for the delivery of City Council services in Salford (see Table 8.8). The study of
crime and disorder in these eleven service delivery areas concentrated on four key
types of crime, which recorded crime statistics showed together to be responsible
for 83 per cent of crime in Salford, and also on the area of ‘juvenile nuisance’ to
pick up the ‘disorder’ part of the audit process because of evidence that sug-
gested that this was responsible for a substantial proportion of anti-social behavi-
our (ibid., page 6). The four chosen types of crime were:
• vehicle crime, which accounted for 31 per cent of recorded crime between
the beginning of April and the end of August 1998;
• criminal damage, which accounted for 22 per cent of crime on the same
basis;
• burglary other than in a dwelling, which was responsible for 15 per cent of
crime; and
• burglary in a dwelling, which was also responsible for 15 per cent of all
crimes (ibid.).
A more localised (i.e. at below the level of the service delivery areas) process of
mapping crime ‘hot spots’ was also undertaken, to provide an information base for
the Crime Reduction Partnership, but the audit report did not publish information at
this level ‘so as to safeguard the safety and integrity of local communities’5 (ibid.,
page 4); although it was intended to make more information of this kind available
as part of the consultation process on the results of the audit.
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Table 8.7 1998 Salford Quality-of-Life Survey – Top ten priorities of Salford residents
1 More police about
2 Safe and affordable places for young people to go
3 More discipline in Salford Schools
4 Traffic to be slowed down
5 Improved education standards
6 More training and support to help people into work
7 Somewhere for children to go after school
8 Better healthcare
9 An improved physical environment
10 Better roads and pavements
Source: Salford Crime Reduction Partnership (1999) page 11
The basic statistics against the five chosen indicators for the eleven service
delivery areas were expressed both in real terms and in terms of incident levels per
100 residents, in order to make them more readily comparable with each other.
This latter analysis was then compared with the City average. Table 8.8 presents a
summary of the complex matrix this would produce. It pulls together into a single
table for the convenience of readers information that is presented on several charts
in the audit, but shows clearly that this type of information, when taken together
with other relevant information available from partners, certainly enables the
process of building a picture of the distribution of crime in Salford to begin. While
there are very significant variations across the City in relation to several of the
indicators (and more localised concentrations still in ‘hotspots’), there are also
some apparently recurring patterns. Again for the convenience of readers, Table
8.9 presents this in very simplified form.
The analysis in Table 8.9 can be related in very simplistic terms to the socio-
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Table 8.8 Summary of crime level comparison, Salford service delivery areas
Service delivery area Vehicle Criminal Burglary: Burglary: Juvenile
crime damage non-dwellings dwellings nuisance
Blackfriars/ Broughton A A C B B
Charlestown A B B A C
Claremont/Weaste C C B C C
Eccles D C C B C
Irlam E E E E C
Kersal D D D C D
Little Hulton E C D B B
Ordsall A A A D C
Precinct B B C B B
Swinton C C B D C
Worsley/Walkden D D C D D
City average (rounded) 2.0 1.4 1.0 1.0 1.8
1 April–30 August 
1998 (incidents per 
100 residents)
Source: Developed by the authors from information presented in Salford Crime Reduction
Partnership (1998) pages 9–13
Notes: 
A – more than 50% above City average
B – 20–50% above City average
C – within + or – 20% of City average
D – 20–50% below City average
E – more than 50% below City average
economic geography of Salford by looking at Figure 8.1, which maps this clustering
on to the location of the eleven service delivery areas within the City of Salford. What
is clear from that comparison is that the four service delivery areas that make up
cluster 1 are collected together in the south-eastern part of Salford, which is the area
of the City most easily described as ‘inner city’. The cluster 2 areas are to be found to
the west of this concentration, with the cluster 3 areas to the west of the cluster 2
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Table 8.9 Analysis of crime level comparisons, Salford service delivery areas
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 
SDAs with predominantly SDAs with predominantly SDAs with predominantly
A and B scores C scores D and E scores
(i.e. at least 20% (i.e. no more than 20% (i.e. at least 20% 





Source: Developed by the authors from Table 8.8
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Cluster 1–above city average crime levels
Cluster 2–around city average crime levels
Cluster 3–below city average crime levels
Little Hulton falls into none of these clusters
N
Figure 8.1 Location of the eleven Salford service delivery areas
Source: Developed by the authors
t 
areas and north of the cluster 1 areas forming some of Salford’s most affluent subur-
ban areas. This is very simplistic, because a finer-grained breakdown would begin to
show a range within each of these eleven areas, but at this broad level of generalisa-
tion it is consistent with the pattern we have already seen in Chapter 2 which shows
the links between levels of crime and levels of relative poverty/deprivation.
Building on this base, the Crime and Disorder Reduction Strategy (Salford
Crime Reduction Partnership, 1999) sets out a statement of intent, a set of stra-
tegic objectives and an approach to the management of the process for the period
1999–2002. It is not suggested that crime in Salford can be solved, or anything as
grandiose as that, on this basis. The approach is described as follows:
Of course it would be unrealistic to believe that we can solve all of the problems
associated with crime and disorder through this document. A three-year
timescale will not be enough to radically change some of the deep rooted
problems which exist and have an impact on criminal behaviour. This strategy is
the start of what will become a long term programme of crime reduction to
which all of our key partners are committed (ibid., page 7).
The three principles that are advanced as the basis for tackling the problems
illustrated in the audit are:
• intervention, by focusing on young people, communities, and those who are
the victims and witnesses of crime;
• prevention, by making the environment more resistant to crime and prevent-
ing further offending behaviour; and
• detection, by targeting partnership action and resources at high volume crime
and at the persistent offenders that commit a high proportion of it.
The ways in which these will be developed are described in the following terms:
These three principles require us to think more creatively about how we tackle
crime, so that we can change and tackle the things which have prevented us
from having the most effective impact within our communities. They also lay the
foundations for the development and production of effective local action plans.
It is these local partnership plans which will transform the objectives of the
strategy into real and tangible action on the ground (ibid.).
The Strategy then proceeds to identify six interrelated themes as the running
agenda for action at both the City-wide and the local action planning scales. The
six are:
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• youth and family intervention;
• community mobilisation;
• environmental resistance;
• intimidation, victim and witness support;
• offender targeting and rehabilitation;
• targeting high volume crime and disorder (ibid., page 12).
Of these six, ‘environmental resistance’ is probably the theme that is most closely
related to the interests of this book, but in looking at this in more detail it is import-
ant to note that it is intended that action should be taken across the broad range of
all six themes rather than be isolated in any one. That having been said, the nine
detailed objectives established to guide action under the environmental resistance
theme are summarised in Table 8.10.
The connection with the first case study in this chapter (the Secured By
Design scheme) will immediately be obvious from Table 8.10: the influence of SBD
thinking on its contents is clear among other things from the formal commitment to
it in the second objective. It is also clear from Table 8.10, because this is a pro-
gramme for a limited period of time, that it does not propose the large-scale retro-
fitting of existing environments, but takes a very selective approach with an
emphasis on managing new development, on town centres and other business
areas, on vandalism and graffiti and on street lighting.
In taking forward this strategy, the Crime Reduction Partnership commits
itself to five particular sets of actions (on the next page):
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Table 8.10 Environmental resistance objectives, Salford crime reduction strategy
• to promote the work of Risk Management Groups across the City (these are
groups established to provide local, practical advice and expertise on physical
and environmental issues)
• to promote and encourage the adoption of the principles of ‘Secured By Design’
• to promote a pre-emptive and a preventative approach to business crime
• to promote safe and secure town centres
• to improve the physical environment by tackling widespread vandalism and graffiti,
and by providing opportunities for young people to undertake environmental
improvement work within the community
• to review and improve street lighting, particularly in areas of high crime
• to promote Codes of Practice for security services and for Closed Circuit
Television (CCTV)
• to explore the expansion and extension of mobile security patrols across the City
• to work with insurance companies to prepare a risk assessment of physical
assets within the business community
Source: Salford Crime Reduction Partnership (1999) pages 13, 18 and 19
• ensure that all plans and programmes which impact on this strategy are
integrated and closely linked;
• work with Government, and in particular the Home Office, to influence
legislation, and to explore whether national rules and regulations need to be
amended to enable the most effective and efficient delivery of our objectives;
• secure resources to implement the strategy;
• establish targets and monitor progress, building in evaluation as a key
principle of all activity pursued;
• secure real and tangible benefits for local communities, making a real
difference to the people living and working in the City (ibid., page 27).
In relation to the environmental resistance theme, the three specific targets
set in this first round of strategy making are:
• by 2002, ensure that all local authority contracts comply with the Code of
Practice for Security Services and CCTV;
• 30 per cent of all business to be covered by a ‘Business Watch’ scheme by
2002;
• identify eight nominations for the Secure Car Park Award Scheme by 2000
(ibid., page 31).
It is readily apparent from a comparison of the nine detailed objectives and this
short list of specific targets that the process of setting targets that can be used for
performance measurement purposes is still in need of further development. This is
not entirely surprising in what is, after all, the first cycle of a new process. Without
denigrating the three specific targets in themselves, what is probably more import-
ant is the commitment established by their definition to the idea that targets need
to be set in order to make an assessment of progress possible.
This case study shows the initial steps taken in one City to tackle the new
responsibilities established by the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998. This is a locality
where there is clear evidence that the local authority and the police were already
working closely together, and thus these new responsibilities introduced via the
Act were building on existing relationships rather than starting afresh. This will not
be the case in every partnership established under the Act, however, and in cases
where the pre-existing relationship was a fragile one the process will not be as
smooth as it appears to have been in Salford. There may, of course, be longer-term
benefits in the development of these relationships where this is needed through
the compulsion engendered by statutory partnerships. Over time, of course, the
real test will be the effectiveness of a strategy of this nature in the achievement of
its objectives, but because the case study was written in the early stages of this
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process it is still too soon to adopt such an evaluative stance. In any event, the
strategy-shaping process will undoubtedly develop further as Salford learns from
these experiences, but it is clear from what has been done to date that there are
four components of it in particular that are of vital importance:
• the process of ensuring that concerns about crime and disorder are
grounded in the broader strategies being developed for the rest of the City,
rather than treated in isolation;
• the commitment to a multi-agency and multi-sectoral partnership as the basis
for the approach;
• the systematic process adopted of working from an audit through the estab-
lishment of principles, objectives and actions, with a commitment to monitor-
ing and review so that this becomes a cyclical and learning process rather
than something which is essentially linear in character; and
• the attempt to balance an holistic approach to the problem with a realistic
appraisal of what can be achieved in a short period of time.
It should be apparent from the above how this relates to the material presented in
Chapter 7 about the approach that is being encouraged nationally to work under
the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998.
The Redevelopment of Hulme, Manchester
The story of the redevelopment of Hulme has been told in several places (see, for
example, Manchester City Planning Department, 1995, pages 37–40; Kitchen,
1997b, pages 153–9; Rudlin and Falk, 1999, pages 207–30), so readers who
wish to look at aspects of this particular initiative other than those covered in the
case study can readily do so. Essentially it is a story of a part of the inner city of
Manchester which had been redeveloped in the 1960s and 1970s as part of Man-
chester City Council’s slum clearance programme, but in a manner which quickly
earned the tag of ‘failed’. This was mainly because of major difficulties with some of
the new housing stock – the notorious ‘Hulme Crescents’, system-built, walk-up,
high-rise blocks which quickly proved unsatisfactory as family housing for a variety
of reasons – but also because the kind of place that had been created effectively
turned its back on the rest of the City and became isolated, despite its location just
south of the City Centre and adjacent to the City’s University precinct, and on
either side of the main road from the City Centre to Manchester Airport. It had
become a place nobody went through to get to anywhere else, and which had little
interaction with the main motors of the City’s economy (of which the city centre,
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the universities and the airport were major elements). In addition, although air
photographs, if taken from high enough up, made Hulme look like a very green
place, in practice much of that was informal public open space that served no
particular purpose and quickly became degraded.
On top of these physical difficulties, Hulme was also among the most
deprived wards in the inner city of Manchester in socio-economic terms. Figure
8.2, using data from the 1991 Census (i.e. the period just before the redevelop-
ment of Hulme through the City Challenge process commenced), shows where
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Figure 8.2 Spectrum of deprivation in the wards of inner-city Manchester, 1991
Source: This diagram first appeared as Figure 7.2 in Kitchen (1997b) page 133
Hulme sat at that time in the spectrum of deprivation amongst the inner city wards
of Manchester; it also illustrates the point made above about the relative centrality
of Hulme’s geographical location.
Taking all of these matters together, it was small wonder that Manchester
City Council had been grappling for years with the issue of whether it could afford
to redevelop Hulme but had regretfully concluded that it could not. The opportunity
in public funding terms to do so was presented, however, by the announcement of
the Government City Challenge scheme in 1991. Hulme was a first-round winner,
and this provided Government funding of £37.5 million for a five-year period as the
basis for establishing a public-private partnership to oversee the redevelopment of
the area. Hulme Regeneration Ltd became the vehicle for this process.
There was a huge amount of consultation and discussion around the questions
of the nature and the form of this redevelopment. Some of that was acrimonious, in
the sense that it reflected clashes not merely of ideas but also of personalities. One
of the areas of discussion that certainly did turn out to be contentious was the rela-
tionship between the design of the built environment and crime; the police (via the
Architectural Liaison Officer of the Greater Manchester force) argued for the kinds of
principles enshrined in the Secured By Design award scheme, while the group of
people who eventually took the lead in drafting the Hulme Development Guide
argued much more along ‘New Urbanist’ lines (Kitchen, 1997b, pages 156 and 157;
Rudlin and Falk, 1995, page 56), having already secured the support of leading politi-
cians for this stance. Rudlin and Falk, writing very much from a ‘New Urbanist’ stance
and also from David Rudlin’s involvement as one of the group of people working on
the Hulme Development Guide, put this clash in the following terms:
This new urban thinking suggests a different approach to security. There has
been a great deal of debate about security in housing promoted largely by the
work of Alice Coleman (1990). ‘Secure By Design’ principles have been used to
criticise the emerging approach to urban layouts. In Hulme one of the main
critics of the Urban Design Guide has been the police architectural liaison
officer. The exponents of secure by design favour an approach of ‘target
hardening’ with respect to individual homes and estate layouts. The aim is to put
up barriers to crime and to assist policing by reducing escape routes. The
alternative argument is that estates can never be made entirely secure and that
the best defence against crime is the activity and informal stewardship which
characterises traditional urban areas . . . . [T]he main deterrent to crime is activity
so that mixed use development which promotes activity throughout the day is
the best way to design out crime. The promise is of more congenial places (or
softer cities) rather than the creation of defended enclaves within increasingly
hard and hostile urban areas (Rudlin and Falk, 1995, page 56).
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In presenting the case study of the Secured By Design initiative earlier in this
chapter, we have already used elements of the Hulme Development Guide to point
out some of the areas of controversy that can arise from the SBD approach,
particularly around the concepts of permeability and of the promotion of activity
which are central to New Urbanist thinking. It should also be acknowledged,
however, as noted above, that many of the ideas being promoted in relation to the
redevelopment of Hulme were seen as controversial by the police in terms of their
advocacy of the SBD approach.
The key ideas that drive the Hulme Development Guide (Hulme Regeneration
Limited, 1994) are set out in Table 8.11. Of those concepts of the type of
place being sought, one that has had a particular impact upon the kinds of
new environment that have been emerging is that of ‘stewardship’. This concept
is important because it makes the claim that the ways in which buildings and
spaces are designed and relate to each other can make a real difference to
the willingness of people to incorporate responsibility for what goes on in
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Table 8.11 Hulme Development Guide – the kind of place it seeks to create
• an emphasis upon the public realm, defined as all the spaces between buildings
in which people interact. The intention here is to create outdoor spaces which
stimulate the senses but which are comfortable and human in scale, are clearly
defined and serve a useful purpose
• an emphasis upon streets and squares. Streets (as distinct from roads) are seen
as being not merely about conveying vehicles quickly but also as being ‘a self-
supervised area of public contact and interaction’
• a rich mix of uses and tenures, rather than the segregation of both that tended to
characterise much of the past
• a high enough density both of population and development so as to achieve a
sustainable community, including helping to make commercial activity servicing
the area viable and achieving the aspiration of security through natural
surveillance
• strong links to and through the area, to achieve a high level of permeability
• a strong sense of place, fostered not only by making good use of the public
buildings that remain but also by locating major buildings at nodes of activity such
as junctions and squares. Such buildings define corners, help to create vistas and
contribute to the overall sense of identity of the area
• all spaces should have clearly defined functions which encourage a sense of
stewardship on the part of those living and working in the developments
overlooking them
• the creation of sustainability through flexible and adaptable developments, high
densities, and resource-efficiency
Source: Hulme Regeneration Ltd (1994) pages 10–13 (authors’ summary)
those spaces into their daily routines. In essence, this asserts that enough people
will feel a sense of responsibility for their immediate environments that they will be
willing not merely to act as ‘eyes on the street’ but will also take appropriate action
in relation to criminal activity once they become aware of it, including reporting it to
the police.
It should be noted in this context that doubts have been expressed for some
time about whether this concomitant of the philosophy of natural surveillance
(that people will challenge others when they see behaviour that is apparently
wrong or suspicious) will actually be reflected in what people do. Merry (1981),
for example, has argued that this is inherently less likely in areas with a high per-
ceived risk to personal safety than it is in areas where risks are perceived to be
lower; and if this is true, it suggests that approaches based upon creating the
concept of ‘stewardship’ might be more likely to succeed in areas where the fear
of crime is less entrenched than in others. This argument can be pushed too far,
however. It is not necessary to adopt a wholly deterministic approach (i.e. to
conclude that this kind of approach to environmental design will automatically
trigger the kind of human behaviour that is desired) to be able to accept that the
philosophy of ‘eyes on the street’ increases the likelihood that anti-social behaviour
will be observed and that, as a consequence, the likelihood of an appropriate
response is improved, as compared with a situation which does not create these
kinds of opportunities in the first place. The Hulme Development Guide puts this as
follows:
Streets, squares and courtyards all have recognisable functions and help to
foster stewardship. Carefully designed, they can help to minimise the risk, and
fear, of crime, and a high priority will be placed on designing in high levels of
natural surveillance. Thus we want to see buildings fronting streets, with
pavements well overlooked by windows and doors within frontal elevations close
to the pavement edge. We are also keen to see cars parked on the street where
they can be easily seen, or in properly secured, private courtyards, rather than
within the front curtilage where they break the important relationship between
building and street, and also compromise the all-important surveillance of the
pavement and street (ibid., page 12).
The translation into practice of this particular component of the guidance can be
readily seen several times over in the photographic essay of Hulme included with
this case study (Figure 8.3).
These driving ideas are followed up in the ‘Design Guide’ section of the
Hulme Development Guide by a series of more detailed policies under the follow-
ing headings:





• routes and transport
• landmarks, vistas and focal points
• definition of space
• identity
• sustainability
• hierarchy (ibid., pages 18–36)
We have introduced what the guidance says about permeability earlier in this
chapter as a counterpoint to what can be found in the police’s Secured By Design
scheme. As a further example, Table 8.12 shows the guidance given under the
heading ‘the street’, and the level of prescriptiveness it contains should be clear to
the reader. This guidance has also had a direct effect on the kinds of development
that have materialised in Hulme, as the photographic essay at Figure 8.3 clearly
illustrates. In looking at these photographs to see how the guidance described
here has been translated into reality, readers should ask themselves (just as was
argued in relation to the Secured By Design scheme) what they think of the quality
of the built environment being produced and what they think it would be like to live
there.
The twelve photographs that make up the essay cannot hope to do full
justice to the new Hulme, but hopefully they will help the reader not familiar
with the area to understand the sort of environment being produced as a result of
the application of the guidance just described. It should be noted that they
were taken on a weekday (i.e. working) afternoon in July 2000: one thing
common to all of them is the virtual absence of people from the streets. That
does not, of course, mean that there were no ‘eyes on the street’, since the photo-
graphs all show a heavy emphasis on fenestration in the elevations facing the
streets. As well as perhaps being a consequence of the photographs being
taken during the working day, the apparent lack of street activity might also be a
function of the fact that the essay concentrates mainly on housing and therefore
under-represents the mixed use component of development in Hulme. It should be
remembered that the variety of activities that mixed uses can promote, at different
times of the day and night, is an important part of the argument for the mixed use
approach.
Readers can obviously make up their own minds about how they view the
kind of environment being created in Hulme. It can already be said, however, that
people are voting with their feet to live in Hulme, which represents a total reversal
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of the experience of the years preceding City Challenge. As a very simple illustra-
tion, the housing stock shown in the photographic essay was clearly occupied
rather than vacant, and new (private sector in particular) housing was under con-
struction at several locations near to the points from which the photographs were
taken, which clearly suggests a positive market response. As far as crime is con-
cerned, the redevelopment of Hulme has had to grapple with its long-term stigmati-
sation as an area with a high crime rate. There is some evidence (for an area wider
than Hulme, but encompassing it) that in recent years reported crime has been
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Table 8.12 Hulme Development Guide – urban design guidance – ‘The street’
Aspiration
• A variety of streets will define the urban structure of Hulme.
• These streets will serve equitably the needs of all pedestrians, cyclists,
public transport and the private car without being dominated by the motor 
vehicle.
• Streets will be defined and animated by buildings and their occupants.
Buildings of all types should front onto streets, squares or parks
‘They should show their public face to the street and spill their activity out onto it.
The primary means of access to all buildings should be from the street.’
Streets should be designed to encourage walking and cater for the needs of
people with mobility problems
‘The street should be a public space which promotes socialisation, and must be
attractive and safe for pedestrians. The car should be accommodated but should
not dominate the street, and vehicle speed should be severely restricted by design.
Devices such as speed tables and pedestrian crossings should be used to maximise
pedestrian safety.’
There should be eyes on the street
‘It is important that streets are overlooked to promote natural supervision. Blank
walls onto streets and excessive distances between the footpath and windows will
therefore not be permitted.’
Doors onto streets should be at no more than 15-metre intervals
‘This is necessary to ensure that sufficient activity and vitality is generated on the
street.’
Ground floors of residential properties can be elevated 450 millimetres above
pavement level
‘This enables better supervision of the street, as well as increasing the privacy of
ground floor rooms. Notwithstanding, convenient access should be provided for
people with mobility problems.’
Source: Hulme Regeneration Ltd (1994) page 19
Photograph 2
Figure 8.3 Hulme Photographic Essay
Photographs 1 and 2: Variety of building forms, heights and tenures in Hulme street scenes. The




Photographs 3 and 4: Off-street car parking arrangements in Hulme. The sculpted gate treatment of the
main access area can clearly be seen, as can the relationship between the car park and surrounding




Photographs 5 and 6: The relationships between open spaces of various sizes and built form in Hulme.




Photographs 7 and 8: Street layout arrangements designed to restrict speed and to promote on-street
parking. Note also in photograph 8 that the space between the front elevation of the housing and the




Photographs 9 and 10: Variety of detailed housing treatments in Hulme. The housing in photograph 9
appears to be a product of a relatively relaxed view of the guidance, given that it is set back from the
street far enough for a drive to be incorporated on which a car could park. Note the strengthened corner




Photograph 11: The modelling of a corner in this case has been taken to the point of producing a
balcony that provides ‘eyes on the street’ in different directions by overlooking the road junction.
Photograph 12
Figure 8.3 Continued
Photograph 12: As well as a front elevation containing nine windows (including the one on the front door)
for a three-storey property, the treatment here also includes a corner balcony to provide an opportunity to
look down the street. It can be argued that in this case the desire to create “eyes on the street” has
actually unbalanced the elevation.
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reducing (McLoughlin, 1999), as Table 8.13 shows; it should however be stressed
that the long-term monitoring information that would demonstrate more conclu-
sively that crime levels in Hulme are making an effective case for the design
approach adopted in its redevelopment does not yet exist.
As readers will be aware from the discussion of this matter in Chapter 2,
there are general reasons to be careful about statistics based upon reported
crimes, as well as specific ones (the area concerned is wider than Hulme, and the
figures only cover a very short period of time) in this particular case. The source
paper in question also contains a cautionary note about an apparent increase in
car crime in 1998 (ibid., paragraph 4.2), as well as commenting more generally on
Hulme’s growing population, its changing population structure, apparent improve-
ments in the relationships between the police and the community in the area, and
changes in crime reporting procedures, all of which could very well have an effect
on crime statistics. There is also a manifest difficulty with the relationship between
cause and effect here; even if we could dismiss all of these statistical concerns,
could we be sure that the improvement was attributable to the application of the
guidelines? All of that having been said, very often these are the only kinds of stat-
istics available at such a localised level for judging whether, in terms of their explicit
objectives in relation to crime, the guidelines could be said to be working; to the
extent to which these statistics have to be relied upon they are clearly promising.
Perhaps the other thing that can already be said about Hulme is that it is
being described as a success in some quarters well before it is complete and long
before any longitudinal studies of people’s reactions to living in it have been done.
The Government’s Urban Task Force (1999, page 135), for example, praises the
‘integrated approach which has been crucial to the prospects for long term sus-
tainable regeneration’. Rudlin and Falk, writing from an unequivocally committed
standpoint, go so far as to ask whether Hulme should be seen as a ‘model neigh-
bourhood’, and quickly jettison their question mark as their text unfolds (Rudlin and
Table 8.13 Reported crime, C2 Division (encompassing Hulme), 1996 and 1997
Type of crime 1996 1997 1996–1997
percentage change
Burglary (dwellings) 1600 1200 25
Theft from motor vehicle 1200 1100 9
Theft of motor vehicle 1100 750 32
Robbery 650 700 8
Theft from the person 300 200 33
Source: McLoughlin (1999) page 6. Figures have been rounded because they have been
calculated from a chart.
256 Planning for crime prevention
Falk, 1999, pages 207–30). While understanding why people would want to look
for successful models of urban development, our standpoint of wanting to see
claims backed up by authoritative research demands a note of caution. It is vital in
a case like this that the experience of living in the kind of environment being
created in Hulme should be carefully monitored over a period of time, so that we
know what ordinary people think about this and about the problems (if any) that
they find, and so that we do not have to rely solely on arguments from either sup-
porters or opponents of the driving ideas. It is also important to remember that
Hulme is not like many other parts not just of Manchester (Kitchen, 1997b, pages
158 and 159) but also of many other British cities, in that their immediate urban
futures will not be in terms of large-scale redevelopment. There are therefore some
clear difficulties with presenting Hulme as a generally applicable urban model, as is
being done in some quarters. We see Hulme as an interesting story with valuable
lessons to offer, and as a development which ought to be carefully monitored as
the process continues and as the experience of living in it accumulates; but it is far
too early as yet to describe it as a panacea.
Conclusions
It is impossible to draw general conclusions from these three case studies
because it is very difficult to say how representative they actually are of the extent
and variety of British practice. It is more helpful to see them as current slices of
what is taking place in contemporary Britain in the field of crime and the design of
the built environment, and as illustrating some of the issues, debates and
processes to be found there.
The Secured By Design scheme is part of current practice; although it has
been criticised in some quarters (and, as we have shown, is in some ways very dif-
ferent from the ‘New Urbanist’ approach being adopted in Hulme) it continues to
affect the quality of what gets submitted to local planning authorities and what gets
built all over the country. It also influences the police contribution to the Crime and
Disorder Partnerships that are everywhere grappling with the new responsibilities
imposed by the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998, and the approach described in
Salford illustrates one way of tackling this new set of responsibilities and struc-
tures. The redevelopment of Hulme has turned into a high-profile regeneration initi-
ative, within which ‘New Urbanism’ principles with their explicit views about the
relationship between crime and the design of the built environment are being
applied; and whatever view one takes about the theory, it is certainly a very inter-
esting case from the point of view of this book, with the potential to offer a variety
of lessons if properly researched.
The approach being adopted in Hulme is probably found much less fre-
quently in British practice than the introduction of SBD ideas and principles
through local Crime and Disorder Partnerships and Strategies. Depending upon
one’s perspective, one can either attribute that to how the battle of ideas is
panning out or to the practicality of the situation on the ground, where Hulme-type
experiences of large-scale demolition and redevelopment are likely to be infrequent
but where the police are always major players in the local Crime and Disorder
Partnership. Our preferred explanation tends towards this latter view, although we
have noted in Chapter 7 that many of the contemporary concepts that are to be
found in key policy documents are consistent with ‘New Urbanist’ ideology but are
not always wholly consistent with SBD thinking. Our hope in presenting these
cases is that they give at least a flavour of some of the contemporary initiatives that
are taking place in Britain in this field, and help readers to reflect on some of the
important practice questions raised by these initiatives.
Notes
1 In England, when the former Metropolitan County Councils were abolished in 1986 and
local government in these areas became single-tier rather than two-tier, one of the
issues that had to be resolved in each metropolitan area was which of the Metropolitan
District Councils would take lead responsibility on behalf of all of the others for adminis-
trative functions still operated on a County-wide basis. The police authority function was
one such activity, and Salford City Council performed this function in Greater Manches-
ter on behalf of all ten District Councils.
2 ‘Safer Salford’ is the Community Safety Unit for the City of Salford, and is responsible
for the coordination of crime and disorder issues for the City Council and its partners. It
is a continuation of an initiative that first began with the Home Office’s Safer Cities Pro-
gramme in 1989, and is now part of the Chief Executive’s Department in the City
Council. Strictly, therefore, for the purposes of Tables 8.5 and 8.6 it should be counted
as part of the Salford City Council membership, but it has been treated as a separate
entity because of this particular role and history.
3 The Langworthy area was one of the forty-seven crime ‘hot spots’ in England and Wales
identified by the Government in July 2000 as a location for an initiative under the Youth
Inclusion Programme, targeting the fifty youngsters aged 13–16 seen as representing
the greatest risk of criminal activity (The Independent, 26 July 2000). Langworthy is in
the Claremont and Weaste SDA as defined in Table 8.8.
4 This mirrors the findings of research from elsewhere, reported in Chapter 7, about
resident perceptions of quality of life issues. Both the large study of Greater Manches-
ter, Merseyside and Tyne and Wear, and the smaller studies in the Dearne Valley and
Nottingham as part of the City Challenge process, show essentially the same public
views.
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5 This reflects the tension which frequently exists between the desire to publish informa-
tion both to demonstrate the thoroughness of the work that has been done and to
encourage discussion, and the desire in so doing not to stigmatise an area and perhaps
as a result run the risk of making the problems worse. The compromise recorded here
(of saying that more localised information would be available for certain purposes only)
is quite a common response to this problem.
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PART 3





In this chapter, we revisit much of the ground that we have already covered in this
book, but this time with the explicit objective of making some more formal Anglo-
American comparisons. We want to do this not merely for its intrinsic interest, but
also because we are conscious that ideas and practices in the contemporary world
can flow very quickly between locations and cultures. Unless, however, these ideas
and practices are understood in the contexts in which they have been developed
and/or applied, there is a risk that they will be transplanted without consideration of
the contextual elements which may be of critical importance to their success or
failure. Further, it would be helpful if those considering adopting ideas and prac-
tices used in other locations would check whether any careful evaluation studies
have been undertaken, to try to understand in what ways and to what extent
particular initiatives actually succeeded in achieving their stated objectives. Sadly,
in far too few cases will such an evaluation exist, so people will be forced to rely on
the inherent attractiveness of an idea (which may well be a function of how effect-
ively it has been sold by its progenitors and supporters) rather than on reliable
evidence about what its application has achieved. Our ideal would be that moving
ideas around the world, which is becoming ever easier with modern information
technology, is done in full knowledge both of context and outcome, because we
believe that this is the most successful way to take policy ideas from one society
and culture to another. Since many of the major ideas in the field covered by this
book emanate from either the USA or Britain, an Anglo-American comparison is
clearly important in terms of understanding how portable this material might be
(Kitchen and Schneider, 2000).
To this end, we revisit the relationships between crime and the fear of crime,
crime trends in both societies, the history of place-based crime prevention, the
intellectual heritage that supports our current understandings of the relationships
between crime and the design of the built environment, and the policy and practice
frameworks in the two countries. Our broad overview of this is that the major differ-
ences are to be found in crime trajectories (although not, we think, in terms of
some of the issues of the geography and the demography of crime that sit behind
these trends) and in the policy and practice frameworks in each country. There
are also some significant differences in the ways in which individual ideas are
conceived and used and in the cultural reactions to certain kinds of initiatives,
particularly in the examination of the history of place-based crime prevention, and
we touch on these as we work through this analysis. As far as other areas are con-
cerned, the similarities seem to us to be more important than the differences and,
indeed, we believe that what we have described as the intellectual heritage that
supports work in this field, would be accurately described as common. We return
to this broad overview in the concluding section of this chapter.
Crime and the Fear of Crime
Both the USA and Britain clearly face major problems in terms of fear of crime; in
both countries, the available research evidence suggests that it is either at the top
of or very high up community lists of what concerns people the most in terms of
quality of life in the contemporary world. While it is almost counter-intuitive to say
this, we have come to the conclusion from looking at the ways in which these
issues emerge and are dealt with in both societies that treating crime and the fear
of crime as two separate but related concerns is more helpful than thinking of them
as two sides of the same coin. The large literature about the fear of crime (Pain,
2000) points to a complex range of social phenomena as factors which influence it
rather than a simple linear connection with extant or recent crime rates. It also
needs to be acknowledged that sometimes fear of crime may be an acceptable
expression of an underlying social attitude that may be less acceptable in
contemporary society, which is really fear of differences (which might be socio-
economic, cultural, ethnic, religious or indeed other elements as well (Sandercock,
2000)); this makes for obvious difficulties in the use of expressed fear of crime as a
precise indicator. This does not, in our judgment, suggest that fear of crime should
be regarded as anything other than a very real public concern in most urban areas;
it is simply a measure that should be used carefully. This is reinforced by the obser-
vation that we have made in Chapter 2 to the effect that crime rates in the USA
were falling throughout much of the 1990s, yet social surveys were not showing
Americans to be much less concerned about crime or less fearful of its potential
impact upon their lives, their family’s lives and their homes. In public policy terms,
this suggests that we cannot expect that initiatives designed to achieve crime
reduction in a particular locality will automatically bring down the fear of crime in
that locality. Even when crime incidents reduce, or people’s experiences of crime
recede into the past, there appears, as we have argued in Chapter 1, to be a resid-
ual fear of crime (perhaps analogous to the imprint that a strong light can leave on
the eye after it has been switched off) which must be counted as part of the
‘hidden’ costs of crime because of its impact upon the quality of life that we are
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only now beginning to assess. All of this suggests that what is likely to be neces-
sary is a separate (but, hopefully, linked) set of initiatives which seek to tackle each
problem, rather than the undifferentiated assumption that both will be addressed
by a single set of actions. We think that this confusion of objectives (is something
designed to tackle the incidence of crime? the fear of crime? or both?) has some-
times been visible in initiatives in both the USA and Britain, and may well have con-
tributed to the difficulties sometimes experienced by those initiatives.
It is almost certainly the case that we do not fully understand the sets of rela-
tionships that are involved here. It is also almost certainly the case that it is essen-
tial to talk about this in the plural form, in the sense that we are talking about sets
of relationships in particular circumstances rather than one particular view with uni-
versal explanatory value; it is very doubtful that a single model could have such
value other than at a very high level of generality. In this very general sense,
however, we can probably say that there are links between crime rates, public per-
ceptions of the fear of crime, the ways crime-related issues are reported in the
media, and political and managerial responses to crime concerns, but that we are
unsure about the causality elements of these relationships. What we can almost
certainly also say is that, in their different ways, each of these elements is acted
upon by a wide range of cultural, economic, social and physical/environmental
factors, rather than that the four elements described above constitute a closed
system. In turn, we think that these ‘crime-specific’ elements contribute to this cul-
tural, economic, social and physical/environmental milieu in both negative and
positive ways, which are very imperfectly understood. We try to give expression on
a very simplified basis to this probable set of relationships in Figure 9.1, but in
doing so we want to stress that we think that in the real world this is likely to
operate in very complex ways that will vary very greatly from locality to locality and
from culture to culture. In other words, we do not think that there are in principle
significant differences between the USA and Britain, but we do believe that in
these terms both countries are likely to exhibit a wide range of circumstances,
many of which will be very different from each other. The variety visible in the USA
may well actually be greater than the variety visible in Britain, however, because as
we will go on to show Britain has been experiencing in recent years the strong
imposition of policy frameworks and processes on the part of its central govern-
ment which may well have brought about a degree of uniformity in local responses.
The USA, on the other hand, has experienced no comparable equivalent, and is
indeed characterised by a diversity of approaches at the local level in the absence
of a strong and uni-directional central push.
Figure 9.1 is not meant to imply that all of these elements are in play or
indeed are necessarily filtered by all of the other components in each instance. A
very simple illustration of this would be a woman in fear of violence in the domestic
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arena from a partner who on previous occasions has been violent towards her. It is
entirely understandable in this situation that her fear derives from her previous
experience, rather than being related either to the ways in which domestic violence
is reported in the media or conceived of as a problem requiring their attention by
politicians or managers of agencies or facilities. But even here, the other factors
may influence what she does as a consequence of her experiences and her fears;
for example, women today may now be much more willing than was the case thirty
or forty years ago to talk about such matters with other people rather than simply
endure them, or even to report them to the police, or indeed to take direct action
themselves and seek both physical and legal refuge. Or, to take an environmental
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Figure 9.1 How might crime and the fear of crime be linked?
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example, someone needing to withdraw money from their bank account late at
night via an ATM may be afraid of doing this if the facility is badly lit or has dark
places immediately around it where others might hide, simply because this situ-
ation is inherently intimidating; that person’s instinctive fear is likely to be a more
important component of this judgement than what they can recall of what has been
said about this problem in the media, by politicians or by managers. Even here,
however, it is possible to argue that these other elements are absorbed by people
throughout their lives on an ongoing basis and thus contribute, albeit subliminally,
to people’s fears. The other relevant point to make about these two examples for
the purposes of this book, of course, is that they illustrate the point that not all
types of crime are equally amenable to amelioration through environmental action,
with the first case (the problem of domestic violence) being primarily non-
environmental in terms of societal action to deal with the problem, whereas the
second case (the location of an ATM) ought to be amenable to action in terms of
the visibility of its location, the quality of lighting in the immediately surrounding
area, and the avoidance of the creation of hiding places.
The reporting of crime in the media may have a particular effect on the fear of
crime if it emphasises as if they were commonplace crimes that are in fact relatively
scarce. As we have already shown, crimes of violence are not evenly distributed by
age and by gender throughout society, but the ways in which these types of crime
are reported may not reflect this distribution. For example, young men are the
social group most at risk from physical attack (usually by other young men), but
unless its consequences are very serious a fight between two groups of young
men is not usually deemed to be worthy of media attention or, if it is, that reporting
is usually very low key. On the other hand, elderly women are typically the social
group least at risk from attack, but if an elderly women is attacked and beaten
press photographers are likely to visit her hospital bed and photographs are likely
to accompany screaming headlines. In one sense, of course, this is affirming the
point that such an event is atypical; it is news because it is unusual. In another
sense, the event is in its own right a deeply shocking thing, and thus is absolutely
legitimate territory for media attention. But the cumulative effect of all of this can be
very distorting, particularly in terms of the messages it sends out to elderly people
about their safety. Both authors, during their preparation of this book, have had the
experience of talking to public officials about the adverse consequences which a
single story of this nature given prominence in the local media can have for careful
and long-term campaigns about public safety; but equally, these officials tend not
to believe that it would be legitimate to ask the local media to give such a story
less prominence when it occurs. Perhaps the main point to be taken from these
experiences is that campaigns dealing with public perceptions about safety need
to include a strong media dimension, but also need to anticipate, no matter how
Some Anglo-American comparisons 265
cooperative the general attitude of the local media, the likelihood of individual
stories with a negative impact on that campaign.
It is probably also the case that the media have a much more general effect
on crime and public perceptions of safety than in the fairly specific terms set out
above, and that is in terms of the host of media images with which we are con-
fronted every day in the western world. It is not the purpose of this book to go into
the arguments about the extent to which this directly influences human behaviour,
although we are aware that a wide range of views exists about this. But it seems
inherently implausible to argue that human beings in the contemporary world are
likely to go through their lives completely unaffected by this barrage of images,
since the whole point of media portrayal is that we should take some sort of notice
of what is being portrayed. Crimes of all kinds play a large role in some parts of the
popular media in Britain and the USA, such as the film industry, and thus it seems
likely that the experience of absorption in this particular culture will have some
sorts of effects (probably widely varying) upon people. In this sense, it is probably
helpful to see the impact of the contemporary media on public fears of crime as not
just being in the specific box assigned to it in Figure 9.1 by virtue of the ways in
which crime gets reported, but also to see the more general contribution of the
media of popular culture as part of the cultural, economic, social and
physical/environmental milieu shown in Figure 9.1 as the frame within which the
more specific variables interact.
Political and managerial reactions to problems of crime and of public percep-
tions of safety are significant both because of their mutually reinforcing nature and
because they create the opportunity for experiment and for participation. It could
be argued, for example, that media coverage creates the impression that ‘some-
thing needs to be done’; in turn, once politicians and managers have decided what
that ‘something’ is, they will certainly be interested in securing media coverage of
their actions; and so crime issues remain in the headlines throughout this process.
It is not necessary to adopt a cynical stance towards the motivation of politicians
and of managers to see that, if crime and safety are major issues of public concern,
then they would both want to do something about them and want to be seen to be
doing something about them. While one of the great virtues of place-based crime
prevention is that it has the potential to be adopted as ‘self-help’, many of the prac-
tical things that need to be done to kick-start initiatives of this kind (particularly
when public funding is involved) require authorisations in the first instance from
politicians and managers, and so their roles are vitally important in this sense as
well.
For managers of facilities and agencies, a further pressure to take action is
bound to come from the vested interest in running an efficient business within
budget. Public transport operators, for example, tend to be very interested in action
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to combat vandalism and graffiti because these things cost them money and
adversely affect the quality of the service they offer; and if the public impression is
that the service is unsafe for passengers (as, for example, has been said about
some late night bus services in British cities), then the response of those passen-
gers and of others whose actions are affected by this adverse publicity may be to
ignore the service altogether, resulting ultimately in its withdrawal. This can relate
both to problems of safety within vehicles (where ‘environmental’ responses may
be limited) and to safety at transit stops (where environmental responses may be
very significant; see Loukaitou-Sideris, 1999). Similarly, the success of car parking
facilities may well be a function of how safe from crime potential patrons feel their
car would be; environmental responses may have a large part to play here in taking
action that in reducing the perceived risks on the part of customers also makes the
operation a commercial success (Smith, 1996).
Our plea would be for more effective monitoring and evaluation of initiatives
that are taken to deal with these problems, and a greater willingness to report this
type of work in publicly available locations so that others can learn from the
experience. This really should include both successes and failures, because it is
possible to learn from both, although organisations are often more reticent about
publicising their failures than they are their successes. To repeat what we have
previously said in this book, we agree with the rather dispiriting judgement of a
recent review of crime prevention programmes in the USA for its Department of
Justice (Sherman et al., 1997):
Many crime prevention initiatives work. Others don’t. Most programs have not
yet been evaluated with enough scientific evidence to draw conclusions (ibid.,
page 1).
This is a situation that really does need to change in future, not only in Britain and
the USA, but also in many other parts of the world1 if we are to do better.
At the level of the individual property and the individual householder, we
suspect that while advice from bodies such as the police is occasionally sought,
most decisions about the emphasis to place on security are the result of individual
views about fear of crime rather than any real knowledge of crime opportunities.
The photographic essay that constitutes Figure 9.2 uses an Australian example to
demonstrate this point, by showing how four rather different treatments of essen-
tially the same situation in nearby properties on the same street in the same Perth
suburb have materialised over the years as a result of decisions by the individual
property owners.
The situation here is that single storey (and in this case middle-income)
houses have been built on common plot sizes on an area of land which was
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Photograph 2
Figure 9.2 Suburban residential units in Perth, Western Australia
Photographs 1 and 2 show the property largely hidden from view to and from the street by a combination




Photographs 3 and 4 show much more open fronts with a much higher level of visibility to and from the
street than is the case with photographs 1 and 2.
Photograph 3
cleared and subdivided for residential purposes. Over the years, residents have
made their own decisions about elements such as constructing walls or fences,
about the nature and scale of landscaping, about window treatments and about the
sitting-out area at the front of the house. Their individual reasons for manipulating
these various elements in the ways in which they have done this will be many and
varied, and will in all probability be about the amenity value they get or hope to get
from their property at least as much as about safety considerations. These
decisions result in very different outcomes from what is in each case essentially the
same situation, which of course is the right of the individual householder but which,
as far as these decisions are based upon perceptions of safety, may be misin-
formed. For example, does a large front wall mean that the occupant is safer, or
does it merely create the illusion of safety? If the ‘eyes on the street’ philosophy
has any meaning at all, it must be in a two-way sense; in other words, a property
owner contributes to community safety through their own eyes on the street, but in
turn their safety is contributed to by the ability of others to watch what is going on
at the front of their property. So a large wall, while giving an owner privacy and
perhaps a sense of safety, might mean that a burglar who has scaled it is actually
less at risk of being caught because they will not be able to be seen from the
street. Similar issues arise in respect of different types of fencing, of how luxuriant
landscaping is allowed to become, and of how individuals choose to make use
of the front parts of their houses. Readers are invited, having thought about
this discussion, to place the four photographs that make up Figure 9.2 in rank
order in terms of both apparent resident perceptions of safety and what they
think actual safety might be, and then to reflect on the differences (if any) between
these two analyses and their implications.2 It is also worth reflecting on the quite
limited extent to which the actions taken in these cases over the years by property
owners actually involved any formal planning controls on the part of the local
authority.
Our overall conclusion about the relationship between crime and the fear of
crime is that, as we said at the outset, both USA and British experience suggests
that it is more helpful to think of them as two separate but linked issues than it is to
think of them as being two sides of the same coin. The fear of crime is a hugely
complex phenomenon (probably more so than is crime itself, which in one sense
can actually be seen as a relatively straightforward matter), which does not appear
in either of the two societies to be closely related to what happens year on year to
crime rates. Indeed, this point is well expressed by recent US experience, where
the fact that crime has been falling in recent years (which we discuss in more detail
below) does not appear to have resulted in much diminution of the fear of crime. In
turn, this suggests to us that programmes designed to tackle crime problems
ought to be very clear about their objectives, rather than simply assume that in
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tackling crime they are also tackling fear of crime, and indeed should often adopt a
twin-track approach; a programme to tackle a crime problem, and a linked pro-
gramme to tackle associated issues of public perception.
Crime Trends in the USA and in Britain
As Chapter 2 has illustrated, the USA in recent times has seen generally falling
crime rates, whereas until recently Britain has seen a continuation of a long-term
rise to the point at which, for many individual types of crime, rates in Britain by the
mid-1990s were well ahead of those in the USA. The most recent British data do
suggest that a downturn occurred in the late 1990s, although it is too soon on the
basis of two data sets (the British Crime Surveys of 1998 and 2000) to declare
this to be the permanent reversal of the long-term upwards trend. This is almost
certainly not consistent with many of the images of popular culture, which typically
present the USA as a lawless society and Britain as being essentially law-abiding –
although there is evidence to suggest that this image is more accurate in terms of
violent crime as measured by comparative murder rates and the use of firearms in
crimes. Even here, however, the position in the USA appears to have been improv-
ing in recent years, although in terms of these particular types of crime the USA
remains well ahead of Britain. It is possible that these trajectories have in turn
affected the attitudes both within the two societies and in their governments
towards the need for new policy frameworks within which crime issues should be
understood and tackled: the policy framework within the USA in recent years has
been relatively stable (and largely local in its nature) whereas in Britain there
appears to have been an ever-broadening approach in search of a solution to what
appeared to be an intractable problem. The British approach may produce a great
deal of innovation, but what it cannot claim (at least yet) is that it has been suc-
cessful over any period of time. Indeed, it would be hard to argue convincingly that
the downturns recorded in the 1998 and 2000 British Crime Surveys were mainly
a function of the specific policy innovations taken by the Blair Government since its
election to office in 1997, simply because insufficient time had been available to
enable initiatives such as those introduced via the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998
to have much effect.3 The USA approach, on the other hand, allows scope for local
innovation within a broadly stable national framework, and it can be argued that this
balance has actually contributed to the successes in containing and reducing
crime.
We have not attempted to explain why we think these divergent trends have
occurred in the two societies, nor do we think that a single explanation would in all
probability be accurate. We suspect that in both societies the explanations are
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multiple and complex, within which national and local economic circumstances,
cultural norms and behaviour patterns, the ways in which issues concerned with
crime are dealt with in the media, approaches to punishment upon conviction, pat-
terns and styles of policing, and public attitudes to the police all play a part; and
there may be many other elements in there as well. In a sense, for the purposes of
this book the broad explanations do not matter all that much, except in the sense
that they influence decisions about policy and practice. What really matters is that
crime continues to exist on a large scale; it is clearly perceived as a major problem
both by society at large and by governments; it is clearly also a major problem to
those who are on the receiving end of it; and because much of it is place-specific it
raises issues about the kinds of place-related activities that might make a dif-
ference both to the opportunities to commit certain kinds of crimes and citizens’
fears that they will be the victims of such an attempt. While we have not attempted
to enter this debate about why crime trends in the two societies until very recently
have followed divergent paths, we have pointed out on several occasions through-
out this book that many others have made claims about this. We have also shown
in Chapter 2 that these matters are frequently the stuff of media and political
exchanges. Readers should be aware, therefore, that this is heavily contested
territory.
These large differences between the scale and the trajectory of crime trends
in the USA and Britain should not hide the point (as they can easily do) that the
patterns of crime in each country tend to be largely similar. Crime is a particularly
urban phenomenon in both countries; many types of crimes appear to impact
particularly upon the poorest people in those societies; these concerns seem to be
linked to issues of housing tenure and of race; and there are important differences
between geographical locations within the two countries which exhibit broadly the
same characteristics. The concept of ‘unequal risks’ used in recent British Crime
Surveys can just as easily be applied in the USA, and it can be applied in broadly
predictable ways. So, without wanting to suggest that the experience of the two
societies in these terms is identical, we believe that the broad similarities here are
at least as important as the relatively detailed differences that could readily be enu-
merated in a comparative study. The importance of this, of course, is that, as we
have already argued, one of the critical needs when seeking to adapt an innovation
that has been attempted in one location to another is the need to understand the
context within which that initiative has been applied. While there are important
societal and cultural differences between Britain and the USA at the local or neigh-
bourhood level (Bennett, 1997, pages 3–24), it is also possible to find broadly
comparable situations in these terms that might suggest that what has worked in
one location could work in another, and which at the very least would facilitate
comparative studies.
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The History of Place-based Crime Prevention
In terms of urban settlement, Britain is a much older country than the USA, and
thus has a longer history of settlement form being influenced by considerations
such as the ability to defend (in the military sense) key buildings or locations, in the
manner described in Chapter 3. Because British settlements are often influenced
by historic layout patterns even where no or few artefacts remain, this can have a
direct effect on contemporary urban form; an example would be the centre of a
town or city where the medieval street plan and associated building layout still
dominate, even though few if any original medieval buildings remain. Large areas of
British cities face major decisions about the re-use of land rather than decisions
about further outward expansion; and as we have seen from Chapter 7 this is now
reflected in British Government policy, with its requirement for at least 60 per cent
of development to meet the needs of anticipated new household formation over the
next few years to be on previously used urban land. Even some British suburbs are
by now becoming quite venerable, although this should not be taken as implying
that no new development is taking place on greenfield sites; a target of 60 per
cent of development on previously used urban land still implies that 40 per cent of
development will take place on land that does not fall into this category.
By contrast, the USA has a shorter urban history, and although many of its
cities are quite old a much larger proportion of development in the USA is through
further suburbanisation (and, indeed, the use of more remote locations) than is the
case in Britain. In an absolute sense, land is not generally perceived to be in short
supply in the USA, although its value varies hugely by location, and in comparison
to Britain there are simply not the same pressures to redevelop in urban areas to
prevent further rural encroachment. Very high car ownership levels, and in some
areas poor or non-existent public transport services, have exacerbated this trend.
The USA also saw major inter-regional shifts in the twentieth century, with large-
scale movements of population to sun-belt states such as California, Arizona,
Texas, Georgia and Florida as the economy of the USA reduced its dependence
on the manufacturing activities mainly located further north. That has left major
urban regeneration (in the USA, ‘urban revitalization’; Wagner, Joder and
Mumphrey, 1995) issues to be tackled in cities such as Pittsburgh and Detroit, but
it has also meant that cities such as Miami, Los Angeles and Atlanta experienced
growth in the twentieth century on a massive scale.
These pen-pictures immediately indicate that, in terms of the relationships
between crime and the design of the built environment, we would expect to see
some quite major differences not merely between the two countries but also inside
each of them as well. The USA is still a growing country, where in general terms
land is not treated as a commodity in short supply, and the likelihood is that the
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vast majority of development will continue to be on land being used for urban pur-
poses for the first time. Britain, on the other hand, is a country where the overall
population (as distinct from the number of households) is growing very little, and
where there is considerable policy pressure to see urban land re-used to prevent
the further spread of suburban and rural development. Despite the building of a
relatively small number of New Urbanist developments in the USA, one of the con-
sequences of this difference is that planners dealing with further suburban devel-
opment in America will usually be dealing with relatively low density layouts where
the car is the only means of transport; whereas in Britain densities will often be
higher, public transport considerations may apply to the development, and one of
the important issues will be fitting it as well as possible into the existing urban
fabric.
We believe that only a small proportion of the development we have been
talking about above over the last 25 years or so has given much explicit considera-
tion to place-based crime prevention issues, not in the military sense (which has
affected settlement structure on a long-term basis in many locations) but in the
sense for which Oscar Newman coined the term ‘defensible space’. We estimated
in Chapter 8 that some 2–3 per cent of British houses over the period 1989–1996
had been built in accordance with Secured By Design standards, and of course
another way of putting this same figure is that 97–98 per cent had not explicitly
met these standards. That figure probably underestimates the effect of defensible
space and related ideas on new house-building in Britain over this period, of
course, because Oscar Newman’s ideas will have influenced many architects, irre-
spective of whether the house-builders for whom they were working wished to
advertise their products as Secured By Design. Nonetheless, it is probably true to
say that in both countries explicit consideration of the desire to reduce the
opportunity for crime through environmental design, and within this the use of
defensible space ideas as a major design parameter, has not been a major feature
of most house-building in recent times. One of the consequences of this, certainly
experienced in both countries, is that where problems of particular types of crime
are subsequently encountered this is often tackled by ‘retro-fitting’ (adapting what
already exists); this is by definition a constrained process which probably tends to
emphasise target-hardening actions at the level of the individual property, simply
because these are much easier to carry out than a major revision of the layout of
the wider area which might entail a considerable amount of demolition.
Having suggested that probably only a small minority of the housing stock
built both in the USA and in Britain over the past twenty-five years has been
explicitly influenced by these sorts of ideas as a means of discouraging criminal
activity, we believe that there have been some significant differences between the
two societies in some of the derivatives of these ideas that have made an impact
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over this period. The three on which we wish to concentrate here are the privatisa-
tion of space and facilities and the approach to security that goes with it, the
notion of the gated community, and the spread of closed circuit television (CCTV).
We take each of these in turn below.
Although both the USA and Britain have seen the privatisation of security
operations on a large scale, our impression is that this has been taken much further
in the USA than it has in Britain. Out-of-town shopping malls, for example, which
have proliferated in the USA, will typically have their own security systems in place,
including both cameras and their own security staff, and the anathema towards
CCTV cameras in public places in the USA (which we discuss in more detail
below) has not stopped their widespread use in what are formally private places.
The approach that is adopted essentially seems to be that people are invited into
these private places (which is necessary if they are to succeed commercially) pro-
vided that they abide by the rules established by the operators, with these rules
being enforced not usually by the police but usually by the operators’ security staff.
The phenomenon of gated communities (which we discuss in more detail below)
can be seen as a further example of this process of private security operation, in
the sense that people use their purchasing power to opt into a security system that
is designed to keep others out, or at the very least to screen them carefully. Since
in these cases we are talking about enclosed spaces (the walls and gates of a
gated community, the internal environment of a shopping mall), the approach to the
relationship between the opportunity for crime and environmental design is also an
internalised approach; crime is contained within a space, and the hope is that the
security system can become aware of it and deal with it quickly while it remains
within that space.
The American notion of the gated community finds no real parallel in
contemporary Britain, although of course it can be argued that it is the modern
equivalent of the walled cities common in Europe up to the medieval period and in
some cases beyond, as discussed in Chapter 3. Where the similarity ends is that
the modern gated communities, which have been springing up particularly in Cali-
fornia, Texas and Florida, can be seen as being anti-urban. The thrust of this argu-
ment is that the phenomenon represents people voting with their feet and their
wallets against the things they dislike in the American city, including crime and the
fear of crime, and instead establishing themselves in a secure enclave outside it,
particularly in America’s ‘sunbelt’ states which have in any event been experiencing
in-migration in recent years (Blakely and Snyder in Ellin, 1996, pages 85–7). This
can be seen as people explicitly turning their backs on the notion of cities as
‘communities of difference’ which need to be managed as such (Sandercock,
2000), because they have sufficient purchasing power to be able to make a choice
of this nature. It is thus an exclusive concept, and is deliberately marketed as such;
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and it is clearly a powerful image, as is instanced by the growth in the metropolitan
area of Orlando in Florida during the 1990s from virtually no inhabitants to an
anticipated population of 100,000 in gated communities by the year 2000
(Haynes, 1997, page 52). These people are far from being a random cross-section
of the population of the city; they are overwhelmingly from its wealthiest sectors.
The clear sense of this as turning away from the city, and indeed of sending a
message about not wishing to associate with the remaining city dwellers, is import-
ant to the ‘parent’ city not just in a psychological sense but also in a community
sense, because many of these people would otherwise have been among the
natural leaders in the urban community and as such would have played an import-
ant part in trying to make the city a better place. As an approach, this would be
anathema to current British public policy, with its emphasis on regenerating cities
through housing the majority of development needs on previously developed urban
land; and by the year 2000 very little of this kind of development could be found in
Britain. But it is often said that Britain experiences USA urban trends some ten to
twenty years later; it will therefore be interesting to see whether the clear US
market interest in gated communities crosses the Atlantic and is able to overcome
British planning policy resistance during this period.
The experience with CCTV appears to be the complete reversal of the
experience with gated communities; British cities have taken CCTV as an import-
ant component of their strategies both for protecting public places and for encour-
aging people to believe that public places are safe. As a consequence the 1990s
in particular saw not only the mushrooming of CCTV schemes in British cities but
also the development of public funding regimes in order to encourage further
schemes to come forward. The available research seems to suggest that this initi-
ative is working; public acceptance of CCTV seems to be at quite a high level; and
it is now regarded as a vital component of British policy both towards commercial
areas and also increasingly towards other types of areas (Oc and Tiesdell, 1997).
Other societies seem to have followed a similar route, as became very evident for
example during a visit by one of the authors to Perth, Western Australia in August
and September, 2000. This has simply not happened on this scale in public places
in the USA, where civil liberties concerns and the fear of ‘big brother’ have consid-
erably restricted the use of CCTV. This has not been such a problem in relation to
private places, however, where as we have noted above acceptance of CCTV
seems in effect to be part of the ‘rules’ which govern admission. Thus, while CCTV
is part of the approach to security adopted in many shopping malls in the USA, it is
much less common in the public parts of the downtown areas of many American
cities, many of which of course have been losing retail floorspace to out-of-town or
suburban malls over a long period. There may well be a relationship between these
two phenomena, in the sense that retailers may have relocated not just because
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they sensed that that was the way the market was moving but also because they
felt that the security package on offer in the malls (of which CCTV was often a
component) was more attractive to their business than a perceived lack of security
in a downtown location.
A final comment under this broad heading may be of some significance: evid-
ence is starting to accumulate that in the USA, a society where litigiousness may
have been taken further than in most other parts of the world, landlords could con-
ceivably be at risk of successful civil actions by tenants if it can be argued that they
have failed to take advantage of current best practice in terms of Crime Prevention
Through Environmental Design (CPTED) and a crime has taken place as a result of
which the tenant has sustained losses (Gordon and Brill, 1996). So far at any rate
this line of argument has not really surfaced in Britain; in any event it seems to us
to be a difficult line of argument, since it carries with it the assumption, which we
would dispute, that thinking about CPTED has been developed to the point at
which for many situations there is clearly a right and a wrong answer which can be
backed up by research findings. However, if this line of argument were to become
fully established, it would clearly be a powerful force pushing landlords towards
taking their crime prevention responsibilities more seriously.
We think that it is possible to argue, when looking at this comparative survey
of the use of place-based crime prevention ideas in both societies, that the same
basic principles have been around in discussions (both professional and lay) about
the form of urban development in each, but that they have been applied in different
ways (where this has happened at all) primarily as a result of cultural factors. So, it
would certainly be possible both in the USA and in the UK, when analysing the
forms that development has taken over the past 20 years or so in the context of
crime prevention, to find examples in both cases of the situational crime prevention
principles of opportunity, reward, risk and effort and of the defensible space prin-
ciples of territoriality, surveillance, access control and activity generation that we
introduced in Chapter 4; but these are likely to have been differently applied in the
two societies for cultural reasons. To illustrate this by returning to the example of
gated communities that we discussed above (see also the discussion by McLaugh-
lin and Muncie in Pile et al., 1999, pages 117–22), they can be seen as perhaps
fairly extreme attempts to minimise the opportunity and maximise the risks and
efforts involved in crime through harnessing the principles of territoriality, surveil-
lance and access control. We think that the likeliest explanation as to why gated
communities have occurred on a large scale in recent years in parts of the USA
and in some other parts of the world, but not on any scale in the UK and some
other societies, is because of the cultural endorsement of the view in the former
group that if people can afford to pay to live in developments of this nature then
they should have the opportunity to do so. Perhaps what this particular example
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reflects is the cultural view that what really matters most in the USA is what
choices individuals make in respect of their private and semi-private spaces,
whereas in countries like Britain the public purpose and public policies seem to
count for more. If this is true, it suggests that we will make real progress in devel-
oping our ideas about crime prevention and environmental design through improv-
ing our understandings about how these broadly common principles or ideas
interact with the cultural values and norms of particular societies.
Our overall conclusion about the history of place-based crime prevention
measures when looked at comparatively, however, is that it seems unlikely that this
idea has dominated contemporary thinking either in the USA or in Britain in terms
of the deliberate manipulation of the physical environment in order to reduce crime
opportunities. Both societies have seen huge volumes of new residences con-
structed since Oscar Newman’s ideas were first published and, while the latter
have been part of the intellectual capital that the development professions have
drawn on in the intervening period, the available evidence suggests that only a
small minority of these houses have been constructed with this relationship upper-
most in the minds either of the house-builder or of the design team. This view is
shared by Richard Peiser (in Felson and Peiser, 1998, pages x–xi) in commenting
on the lack of impact that crime prevention measures through development and
management approaches had yet had in the USA on the real estate community:
NIJ’s (National Institute of Justice) CPTED program (Crime Prevention Through
Environmental Design) is virtually unknown to the real estate community. . . .
Real Estate owners and developers have considerable experience in dealing
with different types of crime, but the major organisations whose members are
property owners and developers had little formal contact with the principal
institutions involved in research on criminology – until the policy forum in
Washington D.C. in June 1995.
Clearly, even if designers and house-builders as communities had taken fully on-
board the messages of place-based crime prevention (and the evidence suggests
that at the time Peiser was writing this was not the case), they would have found
putting these messages into practice an uphill struggle given the absence of
understanding of these matters by the owners, developers and financial institutions
who tend to hold the purse-strings of the property development process.
Several of the other elements that we have examined under this heading have
taken different forms in each of the two societies, and we see this mainly as an
expression of cultural differences. So, for example, the gated community idea has
taken hold in the USA because it is seen as relating to individuals’ rights if they
have the financial resources to purchase their way into a secure and exclusive
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environment, whereas the more collective ethos of Britain would (at least for the
present) reject this approach because of its inconsistency with current public
policy. Similarly, CCTV has been both relatively popular and successful in many
British public places because it is seen as dealing with an overriding public good
(perceptions of safety in a major public place such as a city centre, which in turn
affects the continuing economic viability of such places), whereas in the USA this
has been seen to be less important than concerns over the civil liberties of indi-
viduals; although we have noted in passing that these concerns seem to be less
significant in private places in the USA, where a different ethos reigns. These dif-
ferences certainly remind us of the importance of cultural considerations when
looking at transatlantic comparisons of this nature.
The Intellectual Heritage in the Available
Literature
We can deal with this subheading briefly, because in our view the transatlantic
comparison is a straightforward matter in this instance. The intellectual heritage in
terms of what the available literature has to say about the relationship between
crime and the design of the built environment is a common one. There is not one
identifiable American strand and another identifiable British strand containing dif-
ferent sets of ideas. Rather, ideas have moved back and forth across the Atlantic
with contributions on an ongoing basis from both American and British authors,
with each building on the work already done irrespective of nationality. Interest-
ingly, formal comparisons to see whether cultural, social, economic or
physical/environmental contexts are sufficiently similar to warrant such a ready
transfer are quite rare in the literature, and it therefore seems clear that the majority
of the authors who borrow from work done on both sides of the Atlantic do not
regard these issues as being of particular significance. Similarly also, the available
literature, irrespective of its source, remains open to the charge that it is fairly thin
on careful post hoc evaluations of what has been done, and particularly so in terms
of the absence of many longitudinal studies; although an interesting exception is
the longitudinal study of Baltimore over the period 1981/82–1994 by Taylor
(1999) which does stress the importance of the wider social, political and eco-
nomic environment. Nonetheless, it is clear that the field has been developing and
will continue to develop in this multi-national manner, and the advantages of a
common intellectual tradition will in our view outweigh the disadvantages, as long
as these points about context and about outcomes identified via careful research
receive more attention than has been the case hitherto.
The most important points about this common intellectual heritage are that it
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should be used, and that its users should in turn accept a responsibility to con-
tribute to it via their own experiences. It is easy, as indeed we have done above, to
criticise the literature for what it does not contain, but this should not obscure the
fact that there is some solid evidence that some place-based crime initiatives do
appear to have worked. As we have said, most of this evidence appears to be relat-
ively short-term in its nature, and the absence of much evidence about what the
longer-term consequences of measures have been is one of the reasons why we
are sceptical about some of the claims made to the effect that it is possible to
‘design out crime’ or to ‘plan out crime’ (to paraphrase titles of key texts that can
be found in the contemporary literature). We would say, on the basis of the avail-
able evidence, that it is possible in some instances through place-based
approaches to crime problems to ‘make a difference’. We would also argue that
this more limited claim is nevertheless a worthwhile objective, which can be
achieved without necessarily endorsing some of the more controversial extensions
of defensible space thinking, such as gated communities or some of the aspects of
target-hardening.4 We also believe that it is possible in the future to do better than
we often have in the past and on a more consistent basis, through learning from
the successes and failures that are experienced as a result of taking initiatives. If
we are to achieve this, it will require a greater commitment from the relevant practi-
tioner and academic communities to monitoring, critical evaluation, and reporting
both in the immediate aftermath of an experiment and longitudinally. What we hope
as a result is that in the future the available literature will be more helpful to intend-
ing takers of initiatives than it is today, and that the cycle of overblown hype and
public relations followed by let-down which has accompanied too many initiatives
in the past will as a consequence be less common.
Policy and Practice Frameworks
There are clearly major differences in the policy and practice frameworks to be
found in the USA and in Britain. To take the organisational structure first, the USA
simply has no equivalent to the British system of Architectural Liaison Officers (or
equivalent title) throughout British police forces, nor is there any equivalent to the
formal link between this and the planning system of the kind forged by DoE Circu-
lar 5/94, with its commendation to local planning authorities of the value of working
in this manner. Some USA police forces have CPTED trained staff and in some
localities the working relationships between police and planners are good through
the personal contacts that have been forged; but there is no explicit route for the
police into the process of influencing development control decisions in these situ-
ations of a kind that compares with the formal status in this process granted to
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their British ALO opposite numbers by Circular 5/94. In the United States, prob-
ably the best known endorsement of place-based crime prevention measures (and
specifically defensible space), which is also the statement which by virtue of its
source is closest to being an equivalent of the British Circular 5/94, was the essay
by former HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros published in 1995, which lauded Oscar
Newman’s work at Clason Point Gardens in New York’s South Bronx (Cisneros,
1995). More recently in Britain, Section 17 of the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998
has gone still further in placing a statutory duty on local planning authorities to
have regard to crime and disorder issues in carrying out their statutory functions,
although it is as yet far from clear what this new duty will actually mean in terms of
everyday planning practice at the local level.5 This has reinforced the sense that the
British planning system at the local level is at least beginning to incorporate these
concerns into its activities, even if as yet this is often not very well thought through,
and there is no near equivalent to this in the USA.
At the time of writing, work on local crime reduction strategies is also getting
under way throughout England and Wales, via the partnership approach required
under the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998 (Crime Concern, undated). The critical
point about this is not merely its emphasis upon a partnership approach, and not
even its requirement that a crime audit should precede work on the strategy, but
the fact that it places equal responsibility on the local planning authority and the
police to take this approach forward. It is too soon to say how well this new
approach is working in England and Wales, and in any event it is almost certain
that, when looked at across the board, performance particularly in the early years
will be patchy. But the Salford case study described in Chapter 8 certainly showed
the approach to be promising. There is no formal equivalent in the USA in the
sense of legislation mandating this as a requirement in every locality, but the idea
of multi-agency partnerships to tackle crime is not a new one. Thus, several roughly
analogous initiatives will be found in the USA, albeit without the explicit statutory
backing of the British case; a recent study (Rohe et al., 2001) has calculated, for
example, that about half of local American police departments had adopted by
1994 various forms of community policing strategies involving multi-agency
community planning, law enforcement and development partnerships. This sug-
gests that cross-national comparisons may have a role to play in looking at the con-
tributions such approaches can make: a study restricted to Britain looking at
several partnerships all operating within the same legislation might struggle to see
difficulties arising from the framework itself, as distinct from the ways in which it is
being applied in various localities, whereas a comparative element looking at
aspects of the approach without this legislative support might provide some useful
insights. It will also be interesting to see over the next few years what impact these
new arrangements have in Britain upon mainstream planning activities, and in turn
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what effects planning systems and processes have on work under the 1998 Act,
especially in the context of its Section 17.
At the national level, as Chapter 7 has indicated, British policy in the past
decade has gone through a series of ever-widening discourses in the apparent
search for answers, and now locates the relationship between crime and the
design of the built environment in amongst a large number of policy drivers in a
manner that we have tried to encapsulate in Figure 7.3. There is undoubtedly an
intellectual rationale for this in the sense that it is possible to argue for all these
policy connections without too much difficulty. The problem is that so far this
framework has delivered very little; it has been characterised in recent years by
further policy initiatives being added on a regular basis to the ‘ferris wheel’
represented by Figure 7.3, rather than by very much in the way of effective imple-
mentation that is starting to change things on the ground. This is not to be dismis-
sive of all of this, so it is not claiming that the framework is inappropriate or is
incapable of delivering. Simply, it is not yet possible to demonstrate the effective-
ness of this approach, whatever its intellectual attractions might be, through solid
achievements on the ground, and this must be its real test. Throughout this period
until very recently, the phenomenon of apparently ever-rising crime rates in Britain
has been a more or less continuous presence, and indeed it is possible to argue
that there is a relationship between this continuing central problem and the appar-
ent process of thrashing around ever more broadly looking for solutions.
The position in the USA, by contrast, has been considerably more calm,
although this does not necessarily mean that it will stay that way, especially if the
American economy experiences a period of prolonged turbulence. Without sug-
gesting that the crime problem can be regarded as ‘solved’ in the face of a set of
falling crime statistics, there has certainly not been the ferment of policy searches
that has characterised the British situation. Indeed, it is possible to argue that it
would in any event be very difficult for both constitutional and political reasons for a
US Federal Government to adopt a stance similar to that of the British Govern-
ment, even if it felt that this was an appropriate thing to do, because so much of
the policy responsibility taken by the British Government falls in the USA to state
or more local levels, and indeed is jealously guarded as such. So, while the Federal
Government can (and does) support local initiatives through competitive bidding
processes for grant-aid, it would find it very difficult to adopt the more holistic
stances seen in Britain because of the limitations of Federal responsibility. At the
same time, it could be argued that this creates more scope for the exercise of local
initiative in the USA, simply because it does not impose the kind of local uniformity
that can be a characteristic of strong central initiatives. It should be pointed out, of
course, that there have been no particular signs in recent times of the political will
in the USA to follow the British pattern; this could be argued to be a rational
282 Planning for crime prevention
stance in the sense that the trajectory of crime statistics in the USA does not seem
to be indicating the need for more radical policy actions. All of this might suggest
that the existence of a strong central policy push is not a necessary precondition of
successful action in this field, but is a function of the political constitution and char-
acter of the society in question. So, we would expect to see such a phenomenon in
Britain but we would not expect to see its equivalent in the USA. We suspect that
both approaches are capable in their different ways of achieving successful crime
reduction strategies, with neither necessarily being better than the other; they are
simply different.
We conclude from the foregoing that in the next few years Britain is likely to
exhibit more uniformity of practice than the USA. In the former case this will be
driven by a strongly top-down (i.e. central government-led) approach, whereas the
USA will see more diversity arising from a range of initiatives at the local scale
characterised by a much more bottom-up approach. This range is likely to be very
broad, from virtually nothing in some cases to a very considerable set of actions in
others; but what happens in individual instances will be determined predominately
by local people (citizens, professionals and politicians) and local situations rather
than by any particularly strong Federal push. Indeed (writing at the start of the
administration headed by George W. Bush), given what is known about its likely
philosophical orientation as compared with that of the preceding Clinton adminis-
tration, we would expect to see more of an emphasis in Federal policy on punitive
crime policies in the immediate future and relatively less emphasis on prevention,
whether through treatment of offenders or of environments.
To repeat our regular pleas, our hope is that this range of actions on both
sides of the Atlantic, whatever it turns out to be, is accompanied by careful moni-
toring work which is made widely available so that we learn what appears to be
succeeding in what circumstances and why, as well as what appears to be failing.
The mix of approaches that we have described may also lend itself to careful cross-
national comparisons, in particular to try to understand the importance of some of
the contextual issues that are always part of any initiative but which are very diffi-
cult to separate out from the specific variables being studied. We return to this
matter in our final chapter which looks at some of the further research that we think
is necessary in this field.
Conclusions
As we said at the outset, our main conclusion is that the most visible differences
between the USA and Britain are their opposite experiences in recent years of
crime levels and trajectories and the very different policy and practice frameworks
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that have arisen in each country. We also believe that there are some important
cultural and societal differences in the ways in which individual concepts or policy
ideas are handled, and we have discussed most of these under the broad heading
of ‘the history of place-based crime prevention’. In spite of this, there are also
several similarities. Notable amongst these are the common intellectual tradition,
with ideas and literature essentially being shared (as is also the habit of often not
bothering to evaluate properly the initiatives that are taken), which is simply not a
respecter of national boundaries and clearly is not about to become so. Another
major similarity is the broad pattern of the incidence of crime problems and the
phenomenon of ‘unequal risk’, despite the overall differences in the scale and the
trajectory of the crime figures themselves. So, for example, crime in the inner cities
of Britain is likely in practice to have many features in common with crime in the
inner cities of America, and in many ways the geography and the sociology of both
criminal activity and the propensity to become a victim of crime tend to be fairly
similar. This suggests that there is scope for the USA and Britain to learn from
each others’ experiences, to try initiatives in one that appear to have worked in the
other provided that there is a sophisticated understanding of the contextual differ-
ences that are bound to be encountered, and to participate in joint studies which
use these similarities and differences as learning devices. But this analysis also
suggests that seizing on something from the one culture in the hope that it will
provide a ‘quick fix’ in the other without understanding the contextual differences
and in advance of any careful analysis of whether or not it actually works in situ is a
recipe with a high potential for failure.
A particular similarity which we have been struck by in carrying out the work
for this book has been the experience of the fear of crime in both societies.
Although the scales and the trajectories of crime in the USA and in Britain are very
different, the evidence we have cited (although it is very difficult to compare it
directly) suggests that fear of crime is embedded in both societies as a major
issue. At the simplest of levels, we have tried to model both this and its relationship
with actual crime levels in Figure 9.1, although we stress again that this is a very
complex set of relationships which we would expect to see vary very considerably
according to local circumstances. But this very general conclusion has led us to
suggest that we think that the most helpful way of looking at this phenomenon in
terms of public policy initiatives is to see actual crime types and rates and public
perceptions of the fear of crime as two separate but related areas requiring separ-
ate but related policy attention. We think it very likely that initiatives which fail to
make this distinction, or which implicitly assume that by dealing with the one issue
they are automatically dealing with the other, are increasing very considerably the
probability that they will not succeed. Similarly, initiatives which fail to set clear
objectives which recognise this distinction, or which confuse the two sets of
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objectives, are also likely to struggle. We believe that parallel and mutually reinforc-
ing initiatives, with clear and distinctive sets of objectives, are most likely to
succeed in these terms, especially where major efforts have been made both to
win community support for and then to enrol community partnership in those initi-
atives. We believe that this is such a significant conclusion that we return to it
again in Chapter 10.
Notes
1 For example, one of Ted Kitchen’s conclusions from a review of practice in this field in
the metropolitan area of Perth in Western Australia undertaken as part of a Visiting Fel-
lowship at Curtin University in the late summer of 2000 was that this judgement by
Sherman et al. could certainly be applied to the Australian situation as well.
2 For what it is worth (because there is no right or wrong answer here), our view about
this is that each of these adaptations is probably regarded as being safe by the property
owner because that is what they have deliberately chosen to do, but we suspect that in
terms of actual safety the rank order may actually be the reverse of the order in which
the photographs are presented, i.e. the property in photograph 1 may be the least safe
because that high fence once penetrated provides perfect screening for an intruder, and
the property in photograph 4 may be the safest because it offers a good example of
‘eyes on the street’.
3 We are conscious of stepping out into deep water here, because we are aware of the
extent to which this is contested political territory, with parties quick to blame others and
claim credit for themselves. For the avoidance of doubt, therefore, we are not criticising
the specific policies of the Blair Government when commenting that we think it unlikely
that they are the main reasons for the improving crime figures recorded in the 1998 and
2000 British Crime Surveys; we are merely saying that there is probably not much of a
relationship between these two because there has been insufficient time for such rela-
tionships to develop with any strength. The 2000 British Crime Survey does begin to
offer some explanations for falling property crime in recent years, mainly around
improved security on the part of property owners, local crime reduction initiatives, and a
general improvement in economic circumstances (Home Office, 2000b, pages 56 and
57), and it also makes the point that this trend is visible in many other countries such as
the USA (ibid, page 57).
4 Our discussion in Chapter 4 raises some of the issues that surround the notion of
defensible space and some of the questions that have arisen over the years about the
extent to which and the consistency with which the idea is capable of being successfully
applied. A further useful discussion of some of the issues and concerns here can be
found in McLaughlin and Muncie (in Pile et al., 1999, pages 119–22); and we would
want to associate ourselves with the view expressed there to the effect that some of the
products of this thinking can be socially repressive, whether this is intended or not (our
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paraphrase). We would also agree with the view expressed in the same book by its
editors (ibid, page 354) to the effect that while this certainly makes it possible to criti-
cise the argument that social problems (if that is ultimately what crime is seen as being)
can be solved through physical means, it would be unwise to dismiss both this line of
argument and the impact that it has had and will continue to have in decisions about the
future of our cities. We see this as being consistent with our formulation that the avail-
able evidence does not (at least, not yet) support the idea that it is possible to ‘design
out crime’, but that place-based responses to crime problems are capable of ‘making a
difference’.
5 At the time of writing, the British Government has still to spell out what changes in plan-
ning practice it thinks need to flow from this new duty placed on local planning authori-
ties to have regard to crime and disorder issues, although as we have shown in Chapter
7 the Urban Policy White Paper (Department of the Environment, Transport and the
Regions, 2000b, page 120) does contain a commitment to review the extant guidance.
Key examples where attention may need to be focused in this context are:-
(a) the policies contained in development plans, which inter alia may need to contain
more explicit statements in support of appropriate urban design policies;
(b) a greater emphasis upon crime prevention measures in the development control
process, both through the reasons that local planning authorities might use to
refuse planning applications or the conditions they might impose upon consents
and through the guidance material that they might prepare and disseminate; and
(c) the contents of environmental improvement programmes, which could be seen
through the partnerships promoted via the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998 as con-
tributory public sector components to a range of crime prevention measures.




This chapter tries to pull together some of the most important threads that have
been emerging throughout this book. To do this, we have divided it into three
broad sections. The first deals with general stances, and discusses some of the
most significant perspectives which in our view should determine the way forward
for the broad field of planning for crime prevention. The second looks at some key
propositions which we feel able to advance with a degree of confidence as useful
elements to help with this journey. And the third section deals with what we con-
sider the way forward for research in this field to be, given that we have placed
emphasis throughout on the importance of knowledge accumulation rather than
polemic if the field is going to develop and if practice decisions are to benefit from
effective guidance from the record to date. Our conclusions reiterate the key mes-
sages that we hope readers will take from this book.
We should say straight away that we do not feel able to advance an
approach to ‘the way forward’ which people can simply take away and apply to
whatever cases they are dealing with in the full expectation that the outcome will
be successful. Nothing would give us greater pleasure than to be able to do this:
to produce the equivalent of a Mrs Beeton’s cookery book (or, for American
readers, a ‘Joy of Cooking’) for the field of planning for crime prevention which
could stand the test of time would be an achievement indeed. But, as we have said
on many occasions throughout this book, the level of what we can claim to know in
this field which is backed up by reliable research or by post-hoc evaluation is
simply insufficient to support a cook-book approach of this kind. This may well be
an appropriate long-term objective, but were we to attempt this for the present this
would simply put another piece of polemic alongside the considerable volume
of material of this kind which already exists. This is so despite the fact that there
is indeed a growing body of evidence collected on both sides of the Atlantic to
the effect that some place-based crime prevention strategies do work or are at
least promising. Nevertheless, the tripartite approach that we have outlined
(general stances, key propositions and further research) is as far as we think we
can reasonably go at this stage; and we hope it contributes not merely to current
understandings but also to the process of shaping future work agendas. To
readers who have come thus far with us and who were expecting a conclusion
replete with more fireworks than this, we can only ask that they reflect on what we
have said.
General Stances
A recent review for the US Department of Justice of place-based crime prevention
in the USA (Feins et al., 1997) summarises its findings in terms that we would
strongly support:
The most effective place-specific crime prevention strategies are those that
take into account the geographic, cultural, economic, and social characteristics
of the target community. Thus, the selection of place-specific crime prevention
strategies and tactics should be made in close collaboration with the
community, after sustained observation of its current patterns of use. The
experiences of the study sites reveal two major lessons:
• Physical design modifications, management changes, and changes in use
should be tailored to specific locations and co-ordinated in their planning
and implementation.
• The most effective security and crime prevention efforts are those that
involve a coalition of different players working together to define the
problem and then seek solutions.
By emphasising that crime prevention is not a ‘one-size fits all’ effort, and that
some communities may require more attention and ingenuity than others in
crafting effective strategies, this report stresses the importance of a thorough
analysis of the problems and needs of a given community, as well as ongoing
monitoring and evaluation of the place-specific strategies selected (ibid., pages
xi and xii).
We believe that this encapsulates many of the ideas in the field that really do
matter quite considerably. Key amongst these are:
• Different strategies are likely to be successful in different places because of
differences in localities, in the people who live, work in or use them in other
ways, and in the relationship between these two.1
• There cannot as a consequence be a strong argument for proceeding to
determine what is likely to work in a given locality without a careful study of
that locality and the characteristics of how it is used by people.
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• Ideas gleaned from elsewhere may be very useful as a source of starting
points for thinking about solutions, but they should not be imported irrespec-
tive of the results of careful and detailed local study.
• All of this should be done in partnership with local communities and with the
key agencies operating in the area, because it is likely to be the case that
their knowledge will help shape appropriate solutions in the first instance and
it is almost certain that over the long term their behaviour will make a consid-
erable difference to whether or not success is achieved. This latter point
simply acknowledges the unavoidable observation that there are very often
intervening variables in the relationships between crime and environmental
design, and many of these are about people, about cultural and social norms
and forces, and about the operational behaviour of agencies.
• There are no reliable sets of standard solutions here, because there often are
no standard problems and there are certainly no standard communities. In
reviewing the various theories, ideas and practices that are to be found in the
literature, we have been careful not to pick on a small number and argue that
they are to be preferred, because at this stage of our knowledge we simply
do not believe that it is possible to do this with confidence; and we consider
it inherently implausible in any event in such a varied world that standardised
approaches could possibly be appropriate as anything other than starting
points for careful and detailed local consideration.
• Careful monitoring of what is happening with any initiative, including a willing-
ness to make changes if that is what the monitoring information is pointing to,
plus a vigorous post hoc evaluation of what has worked and why (and what
has not worked and why not), offer the best prospects of building up the pool
of knowledge we need in order to take major strides forward. They are also of
vital importance in helping those initiatives and the people committed to them
to adapt to the changing circumstances that they must expect to have to face
during the life of a project.
This is a strongly empirical approach, which perhaps of itself represents some-
thing of a departure from the history of work in the field which has tended to be
dominated by ideas and propositions which are largely untested but which happen
for various reasons to have become fashionable. Perhaps a good example at the
time of writing is the strong support that exists in certain quarters for the ideas of
‘New Urbanism’, which have not only been influential in some projects in the USA
but have travelled across the world and have also influenced projects as diverse as
the redevelopment of Hulme in Britain (which is one of the case studies in Chapter
8) and the regeneration of East Perth in Western Australia. The photographs in
Figure 10.1 show some aspects of this latter project, and readers might like to
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Photograph 2
Figure 10.1 ‘New Urbanism’ in the up-market regeneration of East Perth, Western Australia
Note the importance of water as a key element in the design approach.
Photograph 1
Photograph 4
Note also the application of the ‘eyes on the street’ philosophy both to significant vehicular access
streets (photograph 3) and to off-street pedestrian walkways (photograph 4).
Photograph 3
compare and contrast the more ‘up market’ application of these ideas in East Perth
with the illustrations of Hulme in Chapter 8, where design and layout principles were
also heavily influenced by ‘New Urbanist’ thinking. Our views about this are that
‘New Urbanism’ represents an interesting and potentially fruitful contribution to the
spectrum of ideas, albeit one that needs to be applied across a broader spectrum of
house-price ranges and tenures than the relatively expensive owner-occupied
housing that has dominated to date; that its emphasis upon human activity, natural
surveillance and permeability rather than physical barriers as the basis of crime pre-
vention is intellectually attractive; but that it is not the universal panacea that some
of its advocates come close to presenting it as being (see, for example, Rudlin and
Falk, 1999) and could not be at least until a considerable amount of post hoc and
long-term evaluative research looking at New Urbanist projects has accumulated.
We want to emphasise in particular the importance of long-term perspectives here,
because most of the post hoc evaluation studies that have been done to date have
been relatively short-term in their focus; they have, in effect, looked at the immediate
aftermath of an initiative, rather than at what has happened to an area and to the
quality of life it affords its users over subsequent years. As we have said, the field to
date has been dominated to too great an extent by the trumpeting of ideas both
before and beyond their demonstrated worth, which has not only done few favours
for the field itself but may also result in individual ideas riding the roller-coaster of
fashion and then being dismissed rather than finding a worthwhile place among the
pantheon of possibilities. A more empirical and a less adversarial approach is
exactly what the field now needs, in our judgement, together with a greater sense of
those things that can achieve lasting and positive impacts.
This does not prevent us from advancing some key propositions which we
think may well be reliable as a set of starting points for the endeavour over the next
few years that we have described above. We do this in the next section of this
chapter, together with some comments on their policy and practice implications
which we hope readers will find helpful. These also include some cautionary words
about the possibility that the process of accumulating knowledge which we are
arguing for here might in future cause us (or others) to want to modify some or all
of these propositions.
Key Propositions
Acknowledging the present stage of work in the field, and based upon the things
that we have said throughout this book, there are nine broad propositions that we
wish to advance as concepts that we believe are likely to prove to be reliable con-
tributory elements to future work.2 These are as follows:
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• Issues related to crime and the fear of crime matter very much to local people
in their communities, and if planning is to address the ‘quality-of-life’ issues
that local people identify then it must address this concern more effectively
than it has done to date. Place-based crime prevention is far too important to
be left to the police alone or to any other agency that does not have a grasp
of comprehensive design, planning and development issues. Thus, while as
societies we may be content to have police playing their traditional role of
keeping places safe, we need far broader participation in the processes of
making them safer.
• The design of the built environment does impact both upon opportunities for
crime and the fear of crime, but it does this in complex ways often involving a
range of intervening variables rather than in ways that generate universal
rules about what works. It is not the only factor that needs to be taken into
account when seeking to understand these issues in localities, and for some
(perhaps many) types of crime it may not be the most important explanatory
element; but environmental design needs to take its place as one of the
significant factors to think about when considering opportunities for crime
and the fear of crime in localities.
• While crime and the fear of crime intuitively ought to be related to each other,
in practice this relationship appears to be very complex. As a consequence,
rather than assume that action in the one area will automatically bring bene-
fits in the other area as well (as many contemporary initiatives do) it is better
to see these as two separate but related problems which each need to be
tackled via tailored programmes with clear objectives which are coordinated
with each other.
• There needs to be a much more rigorous approach to the careful evaluation
of initiatives in this field so that we learn what works well where and why,
rather than the over-reliance that we have seen to date on sets of ideas often
advanced by true believers in the absence of such a research base.
• Approaches need to be tailored to specific local circumstances and to the
people whose daily lives are framed by those circumstances, because the
likelihood that there are standard formulae that can be universally applied
with a guarantee of success is remote. This is so despite the fact that there
are now some increasingly accepted principles that link crime prevention with
human behaviour and the physical environment. The role of theoretical ideas
and of experiences from elsewhere is to provide some starting points for this
process, rather than to predetermine it.
• Issues around crime and the design of the built environment do not exist in
isolation, but are intimately bound up with all the other cultural, social, eco-
nomic and physical forces that impinge upon people’s lives. Whether or not
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the formal approach to this is the very structured one to be found in Britain or
the rather less structured one to be found in the USA, the intellectual
approach to the task ought to be an holistic one rather than one that sees
crime prevention measures as free standing.
• In turn, this inevitably means that planners have to work closely not just with
the police but also with many other professionals in developing possible solu-
tions to these sorts of problems. This process must also be one of working
with local communities to this end, rather than believing that solutions can be
imposed on local communities. This represents a real challenge to planning
professionals not just to improve their inter-professional working skills but
also to improve the ways in which they work with local communities over the
long term, to shape, implement, monitor and if necessary modify initiatives.
• Statistically at least, some of the greatest potential gains to be had from initi-
atives to reduce crime and the fear of crime by environmental measures
sitting alongside other types of initiatives are in some of the poorest and most
deprived communities in our urban areas, simply because these are the areas
where crime rates and victimisation are likely to be the highest. They may
also, of course, be the hardest initiatives to mount and to sustain, as com-
pared for example with initiatives in suburban areas with very active local
communities.
• When looking at ideas from other places that may appear to be attractive, it
is important to understand the context in which they have been applied and
also whether or not robust evaluation has taken place. The failure to study
both context and outcome can all-too-easily lead to ideas being imported
which are imperfectly understood from the outset, and as a consequence can
increase significantly the likelihood of failure when they are attempted else-
where. In a world where knowledge in all its forms is not only constantly
growing but is able to be moved around ever more rapidly, the risk of this is
probably growing, especially where a ‘quick fix’ or ‘something different’ is
being sought.
We take each of these in turn below, using in each case a shorthand title to sum-
marise the essence of the concept.
CRIME AND THE FEAR OF CRIME MATTER GREATLY TO THE
INTENDED BENEFICIARIES OF PLANNING
As we have seen, issues to do with crime and the fear of crime are very high both
on political horizons and on the results of surveys which ask citizens about the
things that matter to them about their lives; and, indeed, we think these two things
are intimately related. This seems to be true irrespective of the trajectory of crime
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statistics in recent years; the evidence that public concerns about crime in the
USA are fading along with continually declining crime levels is still somewhat
limited, and in Britain the roller-coaster of recent crime statistics seems to make
very little difference to public attitudes. Further, concerns about crime are clearly
not just about global statistics; what matters to people is what is happening in their
locality and what they perceive to be their risk of being on the receiving end of
crime. Planning (in the sense of urban planning, to use a phrase that would be
recognised throughout the world), with its concerns to improve the quality of
people’s lives through the ways in which they engage with and relate to their locali-
ties and to involve citizens in decisions about these processes, ought, therefore, to
be deeply involved with this agenda as well. It would be an odd kind of planning
given this central thrust that only concerned itself with the issues that planners felt
were important, and did not address (and, indeed, give a measure of priority to) the
views of the intended beneficiaries of its activities.
And yet, without wishing to deny the value of some local initiatives in which
planners have been deeply involved, it would be broadly true to say that planning
has not to date made anything like the impact upon the relationship between crime
and the design of the built environment that it could potentially have done. We
believe that planning needs to embrace this concern much more fully and much
more effectively than it has done to date; and we are encouraged to note (as we
have done in Chapter 7) that the British Government, among its welter of policy
initiatives in recent years, has acknowledged the need for crime prevention to
become one of the central concerns of planning. In so doing, planners will need to
see their contributions as being complementary to those of other professions,
notably those of the police; place-based crime prevention initiatives should be seen
as arenas of multi-professional activity rather than largely being left to the police
who, with the best will in the world (and without denying the potential value of their
contribution), are not well equipped to shoulder this responsibility largely alone
because they do not have a comprehensive grasp of design, planning and develop-
ment issues. Planners will need to learn to respect the knowledge and experience
of the police in these matters, recognising that just because these come from a dif-
ferent epistemology they are not inferior. This is about planners and the police (and
indeed other environmental professionals as well) working together in partnership
to add value, and not merely the one substituting for the other.
THERE ARE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CRIME, THE FEAR
OF CRIME AND ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN
Of course, if planners are to engage more effectively in the kinds of initiatives
we have outlined above, a prerequisite is for them to understand and to accept
the nature of the relationships that exist between crime, the fear of crime and
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environmental design. Perhaps in the past this understanding and acceptance has
not been helped by the swings of fashion (for example, promoting initiatives as
panaceas and then having them dismissed as environmental determinism), and also
by the overly simplistic nature of some of the prescriptions that have been offered.
The starting point in rectifying this might be two very simple assertions. The
first is that it is self-evidently the case that certain kinds of crimes and certain kinds
of fears have an environmental component to them. For example, whether or not a
property is seen as a potential target by a burglar is likely to be a function among
other things of whether that individual sees in the immediate environment of that
property opportunities to break into it and to escape from it without being seen; or
whether a woman feels comfortable walking along a footpath late at night is likely
among other things to be related to how well lit the footpath is and how overgrown
(and therefore possibly providing hiding places for aggressors) the surrounding
landscaping appears to be. Environmental issues will not be the only concerns at
work here and in many other kinds of examples that could have been cited, but in
these cases and in others they are highly likely to be an important part of the mix. It
is therefore inappropriate (and flying in the face of experience) to dismiss this as
‘environmental determinism’.
The second assertion is simply that these relationships are likely to be both
very complex and very variable, and as yet we know far too little about them. One
of the reasons why we have argued throughout this book for a much more system-
atic approach to the monitoring and evaluation of local initiatives is because this is
one of the most important ways in which we will begin to build up our knowledge
about these relationships. Another very promising way in which we can expand our
knowledge about these matters appears to be through the use of GIS technology,
which can look in increasingly sophisticated ways and at a wide range of spatial
scales at geographical patterns of crime to contribute not only to our understand-
ing of what has been happening in localities but also to our knowledge of risk and
of what sorts of responses might be effective (Craglia et al., 2000). But while this
accumulation of knowledge is an essential endeavour, it is not a substitute for plan-
ners getting involved in local initiatives, taking as few preconceptions into them as
they possibly can, and immersing themselves in the local situation, working along-
side the other people and organisations involved, and tailoring what they and their
colleagues do to this growing local understanding.
CRIME AND THE FEAR OF CRIME ARE DIFFERENT BUT LINKED
PHENOMENA WHICH BOTH NEED TO BE TACKLED
We have talked on several occasions throughout this book about the extent to
which ‘objective’ knowledge about crime and ‘subjective’ perceptions about fear of
crime, although clearly linked in the broadest of senses, cannot be relied upon to
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operate as mutually supportive concepts. So, for example, clear evidence from pub-
lished crime statistics does not appear to result in a reduction in people’s fear of
crime, and statistical assessments of risk experienced by various kinds of groups in
the population are often not closely related to the perceptions of risk recorded by
members of those groups when asked. What is equally clear is that it is not practic-
ally possible to focus on one of these phenomena to the exclusion of the other. In
many ways, fear of crime is as potent a problem as crime itself, because, as the
evidence from both Britain and the USA demonstrates, fear changes people’s
behaviour and can condition their expectations of political and organisational
responses to problems of crime. Initiatives are thus almost inevitably forced both
into tackling problems of crime as it has been experienced and managing people’s
expectations or fears, and there is clearly a risk that those that only tackle the first of
these concerns (as many have in the past) will fail in respect of the second, espe-
cially if they make the explicit or implicit assumption that tackling crime successfully
will automatically change people’s fears in positive ways. We believe that initiatives
are much more likely to be successful if they acknowledge explicitly right from the
outset that they have to be addressing both of these phenomena, but that because
they are different they require different objectives and strategies. These need to be
linked; for example, successes in terms of the incidence of crime can be used as
‘good news’ stories to try to relate to local fears of crime, especially if as part of the
process local communities have been heavily involved from the outset and the local
media have played a role as a supportive partner.
Good communication with local people as intended beneficiaries before,
during and after a specific initiative has been embarked upon is likely to be
absolutely fundamental to the process of trying to tackle fear of crime, but so is an
understanding of what local fears actually are and a deliberate attempt as part of
the process of crafting an initiative to address these issues. The ‘we know best’
attitude, or the purchase of a standard solution from an external consultant likely to
depart the local scene shortly after he/she arrives, will in all probability not work
well in these terms; and there have been a large number of both of these in the
past. It is likely also that during the life of an initiative there will be setbacks, which
are likely to be reported in the local media (because that is their job, irrespective of
whether they are playing the role of supportive partner in the initiative); and it is
probably best at the planning stage to assume that this is likely to happen and
to prepare contingency plans accordingly. Moreover, the media tend to report
short-term improvements as if they were permanent. We know, however, that
modern crime-deterrence measures can decay, much as the defensive designs of
medieval and renaissance cities noted in Chapter 3 did under the onslaught of new
technologies; and quite probably over much shorter time-scales in the contempor-
ary world. Criminals and predators adapt to changed environments and criteria as
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bacteria do to antibiotics. So, this must be foreseen and planned for as well
(Ekblom, 1997).
This twin-tracking approach, which treats both the initiative itself and local
fears about crime to which the initiative relates as being equally important, has not
always been a prominent feature of local actions in this field in the past, but we
believe that it has a great deal to offer.
THE CAREFUL EVALUATION OF INITIATIVES
We have said so much about this in the book already that further repetition here at
any length is probably unnecessary. We will content ourselves by repeating the
points that far too few of the initiatives in this field that have been embarked upon
in the past have been properly evaluated, and that it is difficult to see how we can
build up any collective knowledge about what works well where and why without a
much more systematic approach to this issue in the future, combined with a
greater willingness to make such results available. Modern information technology
should make this latter point much more straightforward than has ever been the
case in the past. One particularly important proviso that we would add is that it is
often possible to learn at least as much from what does not appear to work as from
what does. Publicising negative results of this nature can be particularly problem-
atic for organisations, however, because they can often see their own credibility as
being at risk in these circumstances. This can be particularly true in respect of initi-
atives launched amidst a fanfare of publicity where individual politicians are seen
as being closely associated with them, since (generally speaking) politicians want
to be associated with success rather than with failure, especially when there are
likely to be many subsequent reminders to the voting public of that association. On
the other hand, we would argue that this is a field where there can be no certainty
about the outcome of an initiative, and that this simple recognition might warrant a
degree of caution at the outset rather than the creation of a situation where an initi-
ative cannot in practice be seen or allowed to fail. A recognition that there must
inevitably be an experimental element to a local initiative, even where something is
being attempted which has worked well elsewhere, would help considerably in this
kind of situation.
This makes the role of the planner (and associated professionals) all the more
important, since evaluations should be made at short-, mid- and long-term intervals
if we are to be able to understand as fully as possible the outcomes of crime pre-
vention initiatives and particularly those acknowledged to be ‘experiments’. Both
politicians and managers tend to be orientated, for understandable reasons, to
short- or at best mid-term horizons in this respect, whereas planners are taught
and need to fly the flag for thinking in the longer-term, with horizons extending
beyond the next election or term of office of an individual politician or manager.
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Indeed, planners often clash with politicians and managers over these differences
in perspectives, but long-term vision is an essential part of the planning armoury
and should be used for the public’s benefit in relation to place-based crime preven-
tion initiatives just as much as in other fields of planning activity.
APPROACHES SHOULD BE TAILORED TO LOCAL CIRCUMSTANCES
AND PEOPLE
In the end, most initiatives are by definition applied within a particular local situ-
ation. That situation is not just about the characteristics of physical space, but is
also about the people and organisations that own, use or relate to that space. This
introduces a potentially infinite variety of local circumstances into what might
apparently be a commonly occurring problem, and these local circumstances are
likely to make a considerable difference to whether or not something works in that
particular instance irrespective of the record achieved by similar approaches else-
where. That record may well be the reason why a particular approach is being sug-
gested in a particular locality, and that is a perfectly proper use of knowledge or
experience gained from elsewhere. But that knowledge or experience is not a sub-
stitute for careful consideration of how to relate to local circumstances; and the
people who know most about those local circumstances in all their manifold variety
are the local people and organisations who regard the locality as ‘theirs’. So, we
believe that the application of standard formulae or prescriptions without very
careful consideration of local circumstances and the full involvement of local
people in this process is much more likely to result in failure or at any rate under-
achievement than is an approach in which these are strong characteristics. There
is simply no substitute for a careful study of the local situation drawing on detailed
local knowledge, and then for an approach tailored to the specifics of the situation.
ISSUES AROUND CRIME AND THE DESIGN OF THE BUILT
ENVIRONMENT DO NOT EXIST IN ISOLATION
Perhaps one of the reasons why some views about the relationship between crime
and the design of the built environment have been criticised in the past as ‘environ-
mental determinism’ is because they suggested a simple, linear, causal relationship
between the two. In other words, the impression they gave was that attending to a
particular environmental deficiency or adopting a particular view about what
needed to be done based upon an environmental stance would of itself solve the
crime problem being encountered. We think that this will turn out to be the case in
the real world relatively rarely. In most cases, there will be a complex set of cultural,
social, economic and physical forces at work, and while environmental concerns
will in some cases be of considerable significance, in many others they will simply
be one amongst several factors that need to be understood. This suggests that
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usually environmental initiatives should be seen as part of a multi-headed attack on
the problem of crime rather than something attempted in isolation. The approach
needs to be both holistic and sustained if it is to maximise the chances of success,
rather than to be based upon the starting proposition that a quick piece of environ-
mental adjustment is all that is needed; although it is of course possible that, after
the careful examination of a range of solutions studied as part of this holistic
approach, all that is deemed to be necessary in a particular situation is a particular
programme of environmental change. The critical point here is that the approach
should be holistic, and if the outcome is a relatively simple programme of action
that should be as a result of such a process and not something that was pre-deter-
mined. There is no evidence from our comparison of the USA and Britain, inciden-
tally, which suggests that the formal framework within which decisions of this kind
are taken should preferably be either the very highly structured one now to be
found in Britain or the very loose one providing considerable room for local initi-
atives to be found in the USA. These things appear to be more a product of the
particular characteristics of governance in the two societies than they are require-
ments of success.
LOCAL CRIME-PREVENTION INITIATIVES REQUIRE PARTNERSHIP
WORKING, BOTH BETWEEN PROFESSIONALS AND WITH LOCAL
COMMUNITIES
It follows from all we have said about the nature of the process of setting up local
crime prevention initiatives with the maximum prospects of success that the
approach needs to be not only a multi-professional partnership but also a partner-
ship which fully embraces local people. This will require planners to work alongside
professionals of several types, some of whom will be very familiar as professional
partners (for example, architects or highway engineers) but others of whom may
often be less familiar (for example, police officers). Professionals often tend to
place considerable emphasis on solutions that fall within their own jurisdictions
because these are the things they know best and often want to do; but the need
here is not to build programmes that necessarily give something to each profes-
sional group but rather to assemble programmes which address the problems that
have been identified in ways that command the support of local people. A particu-
lar issue with this kind of approach can be the extent to which the nature of a pro-
gramme is determined by the types of funding that are available rather than by local
needs, so that some things can be done readily because funding is available for
them but others cannot be done, no matter how desirable they might appear to be,
because funding is not specified as being available for them. Professionals can
often do a great deal in terms of the presence or absence of flexibility between
funding areas either to make sure that programmes are tailored to local needs or
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follow pre-determined formulae, both through their control over and influence upon
programme criteria or because they are well placed to lobby for flexibility. This
requires genuine multi-professional partnership-working towards common ends,
and this can be a challenge in terms of inter-professional working, not least
because communication across professional boundaries with other professionals is
not always as good as it might be. This has been particularly evident in relations
between planners and the police in both Britain and the USA, where there is mani-
fest scope for improvement.
This approach also requires a willingness to work with local people as equals,
acknowledging that the detailed local knowledge they bring to the table is at least
as valuable in its own way as are the different kinds of professional knowledge that
the non-local members of the team bring with them.3 The processes of shaping,
implementing, monitoring and (if necessary in the light of evidence provided by the
monitoring process) modifying programmes are time-consuming and complex, but
working with local communities throughout these processes and communicating
effectively with local people so that they understand the issues involved and have
the opportunity to play a major role in decision-making about the programme are of
critical importance to success. Planners, with their traditions of public participation
and their beliefs in ‘planning for people’, can make a very significant contribution to
processes of this nature.
SOME OF THE MOST EXTREME PROBLEM AREAS ALSO OFFER THE
GREATEST POTENTIAL FOR POSITIVE ACHIEVEMENT
We have shown in this book that in both Britain and the USA crime tends to be a
particularly urban phenomenon, and that within major urban areas there are often
sizeable differences between localities in these terms. Some of the heaviest con-
centrations of urban crime are in some of the urban areas which experience a
range of symptoms of multiple deprivation, with crime being part of that process of
deprivation. It follows logically from this that these are among the areas where
crime prevention initiatives may be most needed (at any rate in a statistical sense)
and may also have the greatest potential to bring about improvements (again in a
statistical sense). They may also be among the areas where community-based initi-
atives can be particularly difficult to start and to maintain, not least because there
can be considerable suspicion both of professionals such as planners and of the
police on the part of local people. For example, the study by Sherman et al. (1997,
page 8) lists under the heading ‘What doesn’t work?’:
Community mobilization of residents’ efforts against crime in high-crime, inner
city areas of concentrated poverty fails to reduce crime in those areas.
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It can often be easier to start and to maintain anti-crime programmes in more
middle-income suburban areas, not only because the problems of suspicion of
(similarly middle-income) professionals and of the police may be less, but also
because the cultural pattern of members of the community participating in initi-
atives designed to benefit that community at large may well be more established.
While areas of this latter type may appear to be more promising as a location for
initiatives for these reasons, and while their citizens will of course have the right in
a democratic society to benefit from initiatives of this kind, it is important that the
more apparently intractable areas are not dismissed as being ‘too hard’. They may
offer some of the most complex challenges because of the mix of elements that
determines their deprived status, but they also offer scope for real achievement in
terms of improving the quality of the lives of the very many honest and hard-
working citizens who live there, and who can all too easily become stigmatised by
virtue of the circumstances that have created their surroundings. As we have
shown, surveys frequently find that citizens of a wide range of types of urban area
cite crime as one of their major problems. Thus, if urban crime is to be tackled suc-
cessfully initiatives need to be taken in the most difficult areas (even if they prove to
be long and hard and to experience many setbacks along the way) as well as in
other areas where fear of crime might be more vocally expressed. If this is going to
be done successfully, however, the things that we have said above about winning
the support and trust of local people, about multi-professional team working, and
about the full involvement of local people in the process making full use of their
local knowledge are likely to be of particular significance. We do not wish to under-
estimate the challenge here, and we know that the record to date in these kinds of
areas is not particularly encouraging, but we believe that this real opportunity to do
better in future needs to be grasped.
THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT AND OUTCOME WHEN
TRANSPLANTING IDEAS FROM ONE PLACE TO OTHERS
Modern information technology makes the process of moving ideas around the
world easier than it has ever been. There is, of course, a great deal of advantage to
be gained from this situation, but we think that a word of caution is also appropri-
ate in terms of the field that is the subject of this book. We believe that whether or
not something actually works is not just a function of the inherent characteristics of
the idea, but is also very dependent upon the context (cultural, economic, social
and physical) in which it is applied. A failure to understand this can easily lead to a
belief that something which appears to have worked in one location is likely to
work in another, notwithstanding the very different context in which it will inevitably
be applied, and we believe that this failure of understanding will increase the
probability of project failure quite significantly. Similarly, it is important to test the
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extent to which claims about success can be justified on the basis of objective
assessment, rather than to rely on what can be self-serving claims to this effect
often well before any such evaluation has been competed (and even, in some
cases, in the complete absence of any measurement of this kind). It is wholly
understandable that people will want to import apparently successful ideas and
apply them to situations where previous initiatives have not solved problems,4 but
there is a real risk that if this is done without understanding the context and the
outcome of the initial application of the ideas people are simply programming
themselves to fail. This would be particularly unfortunate if, for example, it was to
result in the opportunity being missed through an awareness of context and
outcome to suggest how an idea could be adapted to improve its likelihood of
success when applied in different circumstances. We say this particularly because
we think it very likely that in this field there is very considerable scope for learning
from initiatives elsewhere and for adapting them to differing circumstances, but we
believe that this has to be a conscious process of adaptation based upon know-
ledge rather than blind copying in the hope of achieving a ‘quick fix’. Thus the last
of our nine key propositions is an emphasis upon context and outcome as vital ele-
ments of the knowledge needed to borrow ideas successfully from elsewhere and
apply them in particular situations, because all situations are particular.
Our emphasis upon the importance of the accumulation of knowledge in the
field through understanding the context in which initiatives are taken and through
careful post-hoc evaluation of outcomes inevitably leads us to conclude this
section by observing that these processes may over time cause us (and others) to
modify what we have said above about these nine key propositions, although we
believe that there is a good chance that this material will stand the test of time. Our
hope would also be that this process of accumulation of knowledge would lead us
(and others) to want to add to these propositions over time. We would prefer to
see the field develop in this manner than to see a continuation of past patterns
where fashion and exhortation have played a fuller part in the development of ideas
than they should have done.
Further Research
We have already discussed at some length two of the areas where further
research is necessary, namely in the development of the careful post-hoc evalu-
ation of initiatives and in the improvement of the understanding of the cultural,
social, economic and physical contexts in which they are applied. Related to these,
a third area in which further research is vitally necessary is in relation to the most
effective processes of making information about these matters available in ways
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that are readily understandable to a wide range of potential end-users, both profes-
sional groups and interested citizens. Within this general framework, we agree very
much with the conclusions reached by Taylor and Harrell (1996, pages 22 and 23)
after a careful review of the extant literature for the US Department of Justice
National Institute of Justice of the major areas of research that were still needed:
• the sequence of relationships between physical change, crime events, fear
of crime and perceptions of place vulnerability. We know that these areas
are inter-related, but we know very little about the causal or the sequential
elements in these relationships. More understanding of these complex rela-
tionships ought to improve our ability to identify points at which it is possible
to intervene to maximum effect.
• the contribution of social, cultural and organisational features to the success
of crime reduction through physical environment modifications. As we have
said, physical environmental changes in relation to crime can rarely be seen
to be truly stand-alone, but usually are affected or filtered by a whole series of
other aspects which together constitute the context within which initiatives
are applied. We need to know much more about these relationships, not
least because this will help us to develop a much more sophisticated under-
standing of the contribution that environmental initiatives can make alongside
other kinds of initiatives and of the sorts of factors that need to be taken into
account if initiatives of a predominantly environmental character are to be
successful (see also Fleissner and Heinzelmann, 1996).
• the effects of the larger social, political and economic environment on the
risk of crime, and the relationships between these broader issues and the
process of modifying the physical environment. If the previous point was
mainly about the immediate context affecting the implementation of environ-
mental initiatives, this one is about the very broad societal context. Much of
this work may well involve studying changes in places over the long term and
relating these local changes to much broader societal changes; as yet there
has been relatively little longitudinal work of this nature in this field (but see
Taylor, 1999 for an interesting longitudinal study of Baltimore between
1981/82 and 1994 which raises some of these issues).
• the relative importance of key variables such as housing disrepair and
vacancy, land use patterns, vandalism, physical layout, and patterns of traffic
and pedestrian circulation. At a very general level we can say that these ele-
ments are likely to have some sorts of effects on local crime patterns and to
be amongst the kinds of variables which local initiatives are likely to attempt
to manipulate. But we actually know relatively little about how these elements
relate to each other in understanding crime patterns, different types of crime,
304 Planning for crime prevention
or people’s perceptions of risk. Trying to improve our understanding of these
elements, while continuing to accept the huge variety in these terms likely to
be found in the real world, would produce some very useful and strongly
policy-oriented research.
We think in turn that all of this implies a fifth major area of research:
• the need for more cross-national studies. Given that, as we have said, ideas
and approaches will increasingly flow around the world irrespective of
national boundaries, we need to know much more about how they are
capable of being successfully transplanted from one culture to another. This
will involve in particular an attempt to understand the significance of cultural
factors in the successful application of initiatives, and of the processes of
adaptation that are likely to be necessary to enable similar levels of success
to be achieved with broadly the same ideas in very different cultures. What
hopefully would come out of this would be a better understanding of those
elements of the relationships between criminal behaviour, the physical
environment and planning to prevent crime that may prove to have the status
of general principles rather than being essentially determined by particular
local circumstances.
Finally, we think it is very important that there is a continuing willingness to explore
ideas, to try them out in different situations, and to report on them not just in terms
of whether they were successful in their own terms but also in the sense of what
potential for development and wider application they may have. An important piece
of work in this context was a 1998 study for the US Department of Justice National
Institute of Justice which looked at more than 500 (mainly American) crime preven-
tion practices which had been the subject of systematic review to try to determine
‘. . . what works, what doesn’t, (and) what is promising’ (Sherman et al., 1997).
Although most of the initiatives examined there could not be described as environ-
mental initiatives per se, many certainly have environmental components. This kind
of research stock-taking from time to time is extremely valuable, not least because
it helps to shape public policy (it is better to concentrate public money on things
that appear to work or may have a chance of working rather than things that do
not) as well as to focus future research effort, particularly in terms of developing
those initiatives described as ‘promising’. If we are to see the field develop in the
kind of knowledge-driven manner that we have argued for throughout this book,
this kind of systematic appraisal from time to time of the knowledge that is con-
stantly accumulating via individual pieces of research is going to be needed as a
critical piece of support.
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Conclusions
The basic messages that we hope that our readers have taken from this book are
as follows:
• Improving crime prevention in localities really matters to local people, and
can make a big difference to the quality of life in those areas. So it is
worthy of much more planner attention than it has achieved to date
because it is capable of ‘making a difference’ to the quality of life available in
our urban areas.
• The organisation and management of the physical environment is one of the
components that is capable of being manipulated in order to improve crime
prevention in localities. It is not a universal panacea for crime prevention; it is
much more significant in relation to some kinds of crimes than others; and
rarely will environmental solutions be able to prevent crime in complete isola-
tion from other types of considerations. But place-based crime prevention
when seen in these lights can contribute to successful local crime prevention
efforts, and needs to take its place alongside other measures as an important
and in some cases powerful weapon in the armoury.
• There are no ‘cook book’ approaches to this task that can be recommended
with certainty, although there are advocates for many such approaches
who will speak with zeal about them. Rather, there are some broad
concepts that appear to have some validity and that can be applied with very
considerable care to particular local circumstances, taking into account not
merely the physical situations to be found in those areas but also the human
behaviour patterns to be observed and the views of the users of those
localities.
• To do this, planners need to work in partnership with the police, other
environmental professionals and people and organisations in the communit-
ies where crime prevention initiatives are to be taken. This is a team task,
where the contribution of each of these elements that will constitute the team
needs to be respected alongside the views and knowledge of local people. It
is also a task that needs to be seen in terms of a long-term commitment to
improving the quality of life in the locality rather than a ‘quick fix’.
• To this end, we need to improve our knowledge and understanding of what
works and what does not, where and why, in its short-, mid- and long-term
senses. And we need the willingness both to record our successes and fail-
ures and to communicate this kind of information in accessible ways to
increase considerably, if the future in these terms is to be much more know-
ledge-driven than has often been the case in the past.
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Our hope is that readers will share these aspirations, and will see their own work
not just as helping to tackle pressing local problems but also as contributing to the
development of this broader knowledge base for which we are arguing. If we have
helped readers through this book to understand the need for and to adopt these
perspectives, we will be well pleased.
Notes
1 This is not merely a result of the cultural differences between the USA and the UK that
we have emphasised in Chapter 9, important though these are. The cases that we have
presented in Part 2 of this book show that, although general principles such as
opportunity blocking, surveillance, access control, boundary definition and regular main-
tenance are to be found throughout that range and remain relatively constant, the effec-
tiveness of their application in different places is likely to be different because of
differences in micro-environments and in the people who live, work or use these places
as well as in the cultural context that surrounds such applications. So, for instance, the
cases of Pruitt-Igoe in the USA (see Chapter 5) and of the Hulme Crescents in the UK
(see Chapter 8) provide evidence that high-rise apartment living can be far more of a
crime problem for low-income residents because of the particular combinations of cir-
cumstances to be found in each of these situations than for middle or upper income
residents; but the responses to these two situations (apart from the fact that they both
involved demolition) were somewhat different.
2 This list first appeared in summary form in Kitchen and Schneider, 2000.
3 Local people can often be the source of ideas which are completely different from those
being pursued in political and official quarters. An interesting example of a community
originating initiative of this kind that is beginning to attract media attention in Australia is
a scheme called ‘Camwatch’, begun by a local group in Perth, Western Australia, led by
Roger Broinowski. This takes as its starting basic principle that residents are encour-
aged to have cheap but reliable portable small cameras available at all times in their
homes and in their cars to take photographs of apparent criminal activity that they see
around them, in order to provide evidence. Camwatch stickers are produced to put on
places such as letterboxes and front windows, to show to intending criminals as well as
to the local community that Camwatch activities of this kind are taking place in the
neighbourhood. Community groups sharing this basic approach then get together to
exchange information and to discuss what other actions they can take to encourage
crime prevention, such as photographing valuable possessions, planting thorny plants
such as roses, making fences and gates as secure as possible, and taking action as
community groups to identify and report anti-social behaviour in public places. Some of
this, of course, has clear commercial potential, and this is one of the issues now being
explored to develop from this basic idea. Further details of Camwatch can be found from
its website http://www/camwatch.org.
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4 As an example, some of the claims that the authors have heard advocates of ‘new urban-
ism’ make about what it is capable of achieving could be said to be of this type. Apart
from the fact that such claims may not succeed in their own right, they scarcely do ‘new
urbanism’ itself many favours, because instead of it settling down amongst the range of
available ideas about urban design, exaggerated claims carry the risks of tarnishing its
reputation and then of generating a subsequent negative backlash.
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